BabaKhalbali
Senior Member
- Joined
- Jun 8, 2020
- Messages
- 1,838
- Likes
- 10,285
KPS Gill: The Man who made the Khalistani Terrorists pay the Bill
India Pakistan conflict along IB and LoC (July 2021 onwards)
- Thread starter hit&run
- Start date
KPS Gill: The Man who made the Khalistani Terrorists pay the Bill
pankaj nema
Senior Member
- Joined
- Oct 1, 2009
- Messages
- 10,158
- Likes
- 38,009
China unable to supply spare parts for missiles it sold to Pakistan
- Joined
- Oct 14, 2020
- Messages
- 27,502
- Likes
- 189,940
I genuinely want to know from where do these Indian media outlets source their “exclusive” news regarding Pakistan from, because the biggest source of news for Indian media literally is Twitter.
Definitely. And the then political leadership also, which had spine......
- Joined
- Nov 10, 2020
- Messages
- 12,207
- Likes
- 73,688
Chutiya gulam failed pakis.
MonaLazy
Senior Member
- Joined
- Aug 12, 2019
- Messages
- 1,320
- Likes
- 7,895
Le carenze progettuali e logistiche cinesi mettono in crisi la difesa aerea pakistana
La difesa aerea pakistana è seriamente danneggiata dall’incapacità di Pechino di manutenere i sistemi missilistici superficie-aria forniti 5 anni fa. In pratica la Cina non ha provveduto a fornire un numero adeguato di pezzi di ricambio, ritardando così la piena operatività dei sistemi d’arma...
CHINESE DESIGN AND LOGISTICAL SHORTCOMINGS UNDERMINE PAKISTANI AIR DEFENSE
(of Tiziano Ciocchetti)
26/07/22
Pakistani air defense is seriously damaged by Beijing's inability to maintain surface-to-air missile systems provided 5 years ago.
In practice, China has not provided an adequate number of spare parts, thus delaying the full operation of the weapon systems.
We are talking about the medium-range surface-to-air missiles HQ-16 (LY-80), acquired by Pakistan in 2017 as a key system for the protection of national skies.
The HQ-16 is equipped with a vertical launch system, which gives it 360 ° coverage and the ability to operate in a complicated geographic environment. The missile system is mounted on a 6x6 high mobility chassis designed in China rather than on crawler platforms, offering ease of maintenance and better road mobility.
The missile system would be able to intercept air targets at altitudes between 15 km and 18 km. The maximum interception range for planes is 40 km, while for cruise missiles it would be between 3.5 km and 12 km.
The producer, China Aerospace Science and Technology, would argue that the probability of killing is 85% against aircraft and 60% against cruise missiles. The missile is credited with a speed greater than mach 4.
The HQ-16 system includes a passive solid state 3D search radar IBIS-150, a passive S-band PESA (Electronically Scanned Array) radar with a range of up to 150 km, PESA tracking and guidance in multiple L-bands and vertical missile launchers. six cells. Each L-band tracking radar has a range of 85 km and can detect up to six targets, including four. An HQ-16 battery includes a location radar and four missile launchers.
Pakistan has placed at least two separate orders of HQ-16. According to the disclosure of the Pakistani Ministry of Defense Production (MoDP), Pakistan ordered three HQ-16 systems and eight IBIS-150 radars in 2013-2014 for $ 225.77 million and $ 40 million, respectively. This was followed in 2014-2015 with an order of $ 373.23 million for six additional HQ-16 systems.
The HQ-16 was hailed as "the beginning of a new era in the air defense of the nation".
Over the past five years, systems have developed beyond 477 defects, paralyzing Pakistan's air defense. Islamabad tried to run for cover, but with little success.
The Chinese company sent a special team of engineers in May-June 2021, but the issues proved too extensive to solve them completely. There was not enough spare parts left. Even a second team of Chinese technicians, sent in the following October, was unable to complete the job.
Yet Pakistan, given its little rosy economic situation, has no choice but to continue acquiring Chinese weapons the purchase of 6 other HQ-16 systems has already been planned.
iNorthernerOn9
Senior Member
- Joined
- Jun 17, 2021
- Messages
- 1,407
- Likes
- 16,393
Haji Pir is one of the few areas where Paki posts are actually located higher than Indian positions bcoz of terrain advantage on their side.
Reasons why India should definitely take Haji pir at an opportune time:
1. It will straighten the LOC between Poonch & URI... hence reduce the number of bunkers & personnel required to man them by more than 50%. (Reduction in operational cost)
2. It will reduce the road distance between Poonch & Uri from 270 km to 56 km... hence saving 100s of crores in annual logistics(fuel etc) cost.
BabaKhalbali
Senior Member
- Joined
- Jun 8, 2020
- Messages
- 1,838
- Likes
- 10,285
Chad Jaishankar sitting next to kiddo Bhutto
BabaKhalbali
Senior Member
- Joined
- Jun 8, 2020
- Messages
- 1,838
- Likes
- 10,285
lol
- Joined
- Jul 12, 2014
- Messages
- 31,933
- Likes
- 148,154
- Joined
- Mar 24, 2009
- Messages
- 4,988
- Likes
- 9,931
- Joined
- Mar 24, 2009
- Messages
- 4,988
- Likes
- 9,931
Ex-envoy to Pakistan reveals chilling details of 2008 Mumbai attacks aftermath
Less than two years after the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, India’s then envoy to Islamabad, Sharat Sabharwal, was told by the Pakistan Army that no action would be taken against Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) founder Hafiz Saeed as there was “no evidence” against him.
In his new book ‘India’s Pakistan Conundrum’, Sabharwal has written that he told a Pakistan Army interlocutor about the evidence provided by New Delhi on Saeed’s role, but the interlocutor remained non-committal.
By then, India and other countries had shared considerable evidence with Pakistan on LeT’s role in the three days of carnage in India’s financial hub that killed 166 people. The attacks were carried out by a 10-member team that sailed from Karachi and sneaked into Mumbai. Ajmal Kasab, the only member of the LeT team to be captured alive, and other sources subsequently detailed Saeed’s role in the attacks.
Sabharwal also mentioned in his book about a meeting in August 2010 with a senior Pakistan Army interlocutor, who gave him a four-point message: “(i) The Mumbai terror attack was not authorised either by the army or the ISI leadership. (ii) India was progressing fast and they realised that such acts of terror would neither halt India’s progress nor aid the cause of providing better economic opportunities, health and education facilities to the Pakistani people. (iii) The army had helped with the investigation that resulted in nabbing the Mumbai culprits. However, if India was waiting for action against Hafiz Saeed before resuming dialogue that would not happen because there was no evidence of his involvement in the attack. (iv) Pakistan had its own concerns regarding Indian interference in its internal affairs and would like them to be addressed.”
“I referred to the evidence provided by India regarding Hafiz Saeed’s role but my interlocutor remained non-committal. The above was clearly a mixed message, with some reasonable sounding words, but also the usual harping on the so-called Indian interference and no intent to act against Hafiz Saeed,” he wrote.
Sabharwal, who was the envoy to Pakistan from 2009-13, said in the book that there was “much scepticism” in New Delhi even about the “reasonable words” of the Pakistani interlocutor. “It did not escape my attention that while ruling out authorisation of the Mumbai operation by the army or the ISI leadership, my interlocutor had not ruled out the involvement of army officers at other levels and yet no such officer was brought to book,” he added.
Pakistani authorities have so far not taken any action against Saeed for his role in planning the Mumbai terror strike despite mounting evidence of his personal involvement with the attackers. Kasab, who was tried and hanged in November 2012, had confessed that Saeed spoke to the attackers several times during their training, gave them new names and personally decided the timing of the attacks.
“The evidence given by India regarding his [Saeed’s] lead role in the Mumbai attack, including the reference to him in the confessional statement of Ajmal Kasab, has never been presented in any court of law in Pakistan,” Sabharwal wrote.
Saeed is currently serving several prison sentences in terror financing cases. His conviction in these cases is seen as an outcome of the pressure on Pakistan from the Financial Action Task Force, which placed the country in its ‘grey list’ in 2018.
Sabharwal and his predecessor in Islamabad, late Satyabrata Pal, both played a crucial role in interfacing with Pakistani authorities engaged in investigating the Mumbai attacks. Though seven men, including LeT’s operations commander Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, were arrested and put on trial, the case has languished for years in a Pakistani anti-terror court even after testimony by dozens of witnesses.
Sabharwal wrote that it took the government in Islamabad six weeks to even acknowledge Kasab as a Pakistani national, while Pakistan’s foreign ministry under Shah Mahmood Qureshi “seemed obsessed with resumption of structured dialogue, spoke of Pakistan as the biggest victim of terror, urged India to provide credible evidence concerning the Mumbai attack...”
The former envoy said he often heard the argument that it would have been illogical for the army and ISI leadership to authorise such a large-scale attack at a time when their hands were full in dealing with terrorism within Pakistan. Others argued the Pakistani generals, who were not pleased with the then president Asif Ali Zardari’s declared intent to improve relations with India, seemed to have authorised the attack to sabotage the president’s agenda
“Yet another possibility is that the attack was among the LeT operations against India, conceived and fleshed out by the ISI at some stage and was carried out by the LeT with the help of some army officers without getting an express go ahead from the army/ISI leadership. Whatever be the reality, it is clear that an attack of this magnitude could not have been prepared without the involvement of state structures at some point and the army/ISI leadership was at the very least guilty of hiding the involvement of army officers and not charging them in the Mumbai attack trial,” Sabharwal said in the book.
Less than two years after the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, India’s then envoy to Islamabad, Sharat Sabharwal, was told by the Pakistan Army that no action would be taken against Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) founder Hafiz Saeed as there was “no evidence” against him.
In his new book ‘India’s Pakistan Conundrum’, Sabharwal has written that he told a Pakistan Army interlocutor about the evidence provided by New Delhi on Saeed’s role, but the interlocutor remained non-committal.
By then, India and other countries had shared considerable evidence with Pakistan on LeT’s role in the three days of carnage in India’s financial hub that killed 166 people. The attacks were carried out by a 10-member team that sailed from Karachi and sneaked into Mumbai. Ajmal Kasab, the only member of the LeT team to be captured alive, and other sources subsequently detailed Saeed’s role in the attacks.
Sabharwal also mentioned in his book about a meeting in August 2010 with a senior Pakistan Army interlocutor, who gave him a four-point message: “(i) The Mumbai terror attack was not authorised either by the army or the ISI leadership. (ii) India was progressing fast and they realised that such acts of terror would neither halt India’s progress nor aid the cause of providing better economic opportunities, health and education facilities to the Pakistani people. (iii) The army had helped with the investigation that resulted in nabbing the Mumbai culprits. However, if India was waiting for action against Hafiz Saeed before resuming dialogue that would not happen because there was no evidence of his involvement in the attack. (iv) Pakistan had its own concerns regarding Indian interference in its internal affairs and would like them to be addressed.”
“I referred to the evidence provided by India regarding Hafiz Saeed’s role but my interlocutor remained non-committal. The above was clearly a mixed message, with some reasonable sounding words, but also the usual harping on the so-called Indian interference and no intent to act against Hafiz Saeed,” he wrote.
Sabharwal, who was the envoy to Pakistan from 2009-13, said in the book that there was “much scepticism” in New Delhi even about the “reasonable words” of the Pakistani interlocutor. “It did not escape my attention that while ruling out authorisation of the Mumbai operation by the army or the ISI leadership, my interlocutor had not ruled out the involvement of army officers at other levels and yet no such officer was brought to book,” he added.
Pakistani authorities have so far not taken any action against Saeed for his role in planning the Mumbai terror strike despite mounting evidence of his personal involvement with the attackers. Kasab, who was tried and hanged in November 2012, had confessed that Saeed spoke to the attackers several times during their training, gave them new names and personally decided the timing of the attacks.
“The evidence given by India regarding his [Saeed’s] lead role in the Mumbai attack, including the reference to him in the confessional statement of Ajmal Kasab, has never been presented in any court of law in Pakistan,” Sabharwal wrote.
Saeed is currently serving several prison sentences in terror financing cases. His conviction in these cases is seen as an outcome of the pressure on Pakistan from the Financial Action Task Force, which placed the country in its ‘grey list’ in 2018.
Sabharwal and his predecessor in Islamabad, late Satyabrata Pal, both played a crucial role in interfacing with Pakistani authorities engaged in investigating the Mumbai attacks. Though seven men, including LeT’s operations commander Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, were arrested and put on trial, the case has languished for years in a Pakistani anti-terror court even after testimony by dozens of witnesses.
Sabharwal wrote that it took the government in Islamabad six weeks to even acknowledge Kasab as a Pakistani national, while Pakistan’s foreign ministry under Shah Mahmood Qureshi “seemed obsessed with resumption of structured dialogue, spoke of Pakistan as the biggest victim of terror, urged India to provide credible evidence concerning the Mumbai attack...”
The former envoy said he often heard the argument that it would have been illogical for the army and ISI leadership to authorise such a large-scale attack at a time when their hands were full in dealing with terrorism within Pakistan. Others argued the Pakistani generals, who were not pleased with the then president Asif Ali Zardari’s declared intent to improve relations with India, seemed to have authorised the attack to sabotage the president’s agenda
“Yet another possibility is that the attack was among the LeT operations against India, conceived and fleshed out by the ISI at some stage and was carried out by the LeT with the help of some army officers without getting an express go ahead from the army/ISI leadership. Whatever be the reality, it is clear that an attack of this magnitude could not have been prepared without the involvement of state structures at some point and the army/ISI leadership was at the very least guilty of hiding the involvement of army officers and not charging them in the Mumbai attack trial,” Sabharwal said in the book.
BabaKhalbali
Senior Member
- Joined
- Jun 8, 2020
- Messages
- 1,838
- Likes
- 10,285
top view bhi chaiye
armortec
Regular Member
- Joined
- Dec 8, 2021
- Messages
- 184
- Likes
- 876
Makes logical sense to take it. How feasible is it to salami slice (or pork chop) it back and hold it? What would be the financial, human, diplomatic cost?
Return of Haji Pir Pass in 1965 – Myth and the Reality - Indian Defence Review
In 1965 war, Indian Army had captured the strategic Haji Pir Pass. During the Tashkent talks between Indian and Pakistan, held through the good offices ofwww.indiandefencereview.com
THESIS THORON
Senior Member
- Joined
- Apr 23, 2021
- Messages
- 6,594
- Likes
- 32,200
om shanti
- Joined
- Oct 14, 2020
- Messages
- 27,502
- Likes
- 189,940
- Joined
- May 29, 2009
- Messages
- 14,104
- Likes
- 63,371
