India developing anti-satellite capability

[utubekhiladi]

US to Launch Space Arms-Control Initiative

US to Launch Space Arms-Control Initiative

The United States is launching a new space arms-control initiative,

india and china won't give a damn to american initiatives.. do americans think that they are GOD of this world? we will develop outer space weapons if required..no matter what. Period.

I think americans are specifically targeting india and china here.

 

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india and china won't give a damn to american initiatives.. do americans think that they are GOD of this world? we will develop outer space weapons if required..no matter what. Period.

I think americans are specifically targeting india and china here.

Outer space should remain weapons free. How can one nation expect others to keep it weapon free
if they are developing space weapons??Russians have also told Clinton don't bother they are not
interested in any treaty either and may soon drop out of the SALT treaty. Obama has done a great job.

 

[utubekhiladi]

Outer space should remain weapons free. How can one nation expect others to keep it weapon free
if they are developing space weapons??Russians have also told Clinton don't bother they are not
interested in any treaty either and may soon drop out of the SALT treaty. Obama has done a great job.

americans have already developed it; chinese have already developed it; so i don't think india and japan will sit quite(specifically when chinese have one). as they say, India have all the necessary tech blocks to build ASAT weapons.. all we needs to do is, fine tune some of our long range missiles.

americans are the ones to blame here; they developed it first and now they don't want others to develop such thing. this biased american ego and attitude is one of the main reason why i support irans nuclear program.

if you have important things in your space then it is well worth to protect it.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

americans have already developed it; chinese have already developed it; so i don't think india and japan will sit quite(specifically when chinese have one). as they say, India have all the necessary tech blocks to build ASAT weapons.. all we needs is fine tune some of our long range missiles.

americans are the ones to blame here; they developed it first and now they don't want others to develop such thing. this biased american ego and attitude is one of the main reason why i support irans nuclear program.

if you have important things in your space then it is well worth to protect it.

India will keep everyone guessing on a lot of things Nukes,ICBM,Fissile material now add this anti-satellite
weapon to the list. Better to have everyone guessing on information of strategic importance.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

More Limits on U.S. Space Systems Unacceptable

More Limits on U.S. Space Systems Unacceptable

The Obama Administration launched a push for an international Code of Conduct pertaining to activities of space-faring nations, but its activities have been cloaked in secrecy. This lack of transparency caused 37 Republican Senators to request more information about the Administration's negotiations on this issue in February 2011.

According to Ellen Tauscher, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control, "We will never do a legally binding agreement because I can't do one. I can't get anything ratified." It appears that the Administration is trying to circumvent the Senate's constitutional role in consenting to the ratification of international agreements that should be concluded as treaties.

Negative Implications for the U.S. Military
Arms control treaties, such as the Washington and London naval limitation treaties, are designed to limit the quantity and quality of arms in the possession of the participating states during times of peace. They cease to pertain during times of war.

Laws of war treaties, such as the Geneva or Hague Conventions, on the other hand, are designed to dictate how the armed forces of participating states operate in times of war. If these restrictions are not honored, service members may be subject to courts martial as war criminals by their military justice systems.

The Code of Conduct for space will be as much about restricting how space forces are used by the U.S. military as about limiting their types and numbers. For example, participating states will have to operate their space forces in ways that prevent the generation of space debris.

In this context, a U.S. military service member who makes a split-second decision in the operation of space forces during a crisis, when an enemy has taken dangerous action but the U.S. is not yet certain of the situation, may be prosecuted by his service as a war criminal if his decision and the resulting action generate space debris. The Code of Conduct effectively means that, when seconds count, decisions will take minutes.

Even if applied only during peacetime, the Code of Conduct would jeopardize U.S. ability to engage in testing of both space weapons and space combat doctrines. These activities could be interpreted as failing to "minimize the possibility of harmful interference" and engaging in "actions that damage or destroy space objects unless reducing debris."

Both of these points are likely to appear in the Administration's version of the Code of Conduct. Even cyber activities might be seen as violating the code's demand to commit to International Telecommunications Union regulations and recommendations, another attribute of the Code of Conduct as currently drafted. If the U.S. military is going to fight the way it trains, then denial of peacetime training opportunities of weapons and doctrine is a sure path to failure.

Circumventing the Senate's Role
Section 2573 of Title 22 of the U.S. Code prohibits the Administration from taking any action, including entering into non-treaty agreements, that limit the armed forces of the U.S. in a militarily significant manner other than through treaty agreements or a specific congressional authorization.

Since there is no specific authorization by Congress to limit U.S. military options in ways that will necessarily be a part of the Code of Conduct, the Obama Administration is legally required to negotiate the Code as a treaty document and make it subject to the advice and consent process.

Despite this clear legal requirement, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's statement commits the Administration to negotiate the Code of Conduct as a document that is not legally binding and not subject to any level of congressional review or approval.

Congress, and the Senate in particular, should make it clear to the Administration that it is unacceptable for the Administration to pursue the kinds of limitations imposed by the Code of Conduct unless it takes the form of a treaty.

Preparing to Do More Damage?
Previously, the focus on using arms control to restrict space capabilities and activities was rooted in a treaty proposed by the governments of China and Russia for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), which would severely restrict U.S. military options and capabilities in space.

This item was put on the agenda of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD). On June 4, 2011, Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller told the CD that the U.S. had accepted this agenda.

Implicit in this announcement was that the U.S. would accept the PAROS Treaty proposed by China and Russia if the conference would conclude the negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), which is also on the CD's agenda.

The FMCT purports to ban the future production of fissile material used in the production of nuclear weapons, but it is not verifiable. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration considers the conclusion of the FMCT to be an essential step on the path toward its goal of nuclear disarmament.

Since May 2009, the CD's agenda has not advanced. The Secretary of State's announcement regarding the Code of Conduct says nothing about whether the U.S., as a result, has also withdrawn its support for CD's agenda and, by extension, the PAROS Treaty.

In the absence of a clear statement by the Administration regarding the CD's agenda, it impossible to avoid the conclusion that the negotiations on the Code of Conduct are designed to serve as a stalking horse for U.S. acceptance of the Chinese and Russian PAROS Treaty.

In essence, the Administration's acceptance of the CD's agenda was to trade U.S. military superiority in space, giving states like China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia an advantage over the U.S. and its allies in the nuclear arena. Congress should make it clear to the Administration that dressing up this ill-considered trade in the guise of a negotiation on a space Code of Conduct does not make it acceptable.

Protect U.S. Capabilities in Space
By accepting the code, the Administration would threaten the dominant U.S position in military and intelligence space capabilities, which provides the U.S. with enormous advantages over the enemy in the conduct, training, and support of military operations. In addition, the Administration is trying to circumvent the Senate's advice and consent role.

Congress should make it clear to the Administration that it will not tolerate an agreement that blurs the distinction between an arms control treaty and a law of war treaty.

By extension, if the U.S. enters into international negotiations on a space Code of Conduct, it should mean that the U.S. is withdrawing its support for the agenda at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament. Congress should vigorously defend its advice and consent role and demand the submission of the Code of Conduct as a treaty, rather than accepting the Administration's fiction that it is anything else.

 

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"India has all the building blocks for an anti-satellite capability" : India News - India Today

"India has all the building blocks for an anti-satellite capability""Ž

 

[LETHALFORCE]

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)

India's Anti-Satellite Weapon (ASAT) Capability


By P Bhalla

Following the successful test launch of Agni V missile, the DRDO chief, Dr. VK Saraswat said that the launch has ushered in fantastic opportunities in building ASAT weapons. He was however quick to point out that India does not believe in weaponisation of space and that his reference was only to capability development. These comments, while being seen as a reaction to the ASAT tests carried out by the Chinese on their own satellite in 2007, have also been criticised in some quarters for their potential of adversely affecting regional stability.

The exploration of space, which till a few years back was restricted mainly to the two superpowers, has added many new players since. These include not only the space faring nations but also those who piggy back on them for their own usage of space based assets. Starting from the first Gulf War, the military uses of space expanded from the strategic to the tactical sphere and this usage continues to grow. While space has not been used to store or launch weapons, the medium is being used to control and coordinate the ground war. The Outer Space Treaty which came into force in October 1967 bans placing nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction in orbit of earth, installing them on the moon or any other celestial body, or to otherwise station them in outer space. The Treaty however does not prohibit the placement of conventional weapons in orbit. As per the Treaty, a state that launches a space object retains jurisdiction and control over that object but is liable for damages caused by their space object and must avoid contaminating space and celestial bodies. Consequently, if space based assets are to be used to gain an edge in conventional military operations (or even in nuclear ones) the use of weapons by another contender to destroy them is possible and may even be justified.

Today, the varied civilian and commercial applications through space based assets have a huge bearing on all activities of these states and such applications will see ever increasing growth in the future. The security and survival of these systems has thus become vital for these nations. While this can be achieved through a variety of methods, one of the means being projected by the major powers is through space control or space dominance. ASATs were born out of this policy. Both US and the former Soviet Union tested ASATs, which eventually became a part of their strategy of deterrence, very similar to nuclear deterrence. The Chinese ASAT test in 2007 is widely seen to be challenging the dominance of the US in space. However, for India, these have a regional bearing as they threaten Indian satellites in orbit. While India presently does not have any designated military satellites which can be potential targets, any future war scenario, heavily dependent on space assets for information and communication, will heighten dependence as also vulnerability to potential disruption of space-based assets. Even suspected dual use satellites may be targeted. Collateral damage to civilian satellites thus cannot be ruled out. India has to take steps to ensure an assured use of its assets in space under all conditions. The options available are both active and defensive measures. Active measures that take the logic of developing a credible deterrent entail development of ASATs, either for hard kill or soft kill. The ASAT technology being talked of after the Agni V tests is the hard kill Direct Ascent KE weapon. Defensive measures can involve passive measures like manoeuvring the satellites away from the test orbit and shielding against debris, radiation etc. All such measures will be fruitful only after heightened space situational awareness. Information on Indian technological progress and application in these fields is very restricted.

Dr Saraswat's comments underpin the fact that India is wary of Chinese ASAT capability. Even earlier, he has spoken of India's interest in building capability that could then be used for developing ASATs, stating that these would be demonstrative technologies to be tested through simulation rather than actual tests. It needs to be emphasised that a major shortcoming of a hard kill ASAT test is the creation of space debris which then could potentially damage any other satellite in that orbit. ASAT tests therefore have a lot of political and diplomatic ramifications, besides threatening the very use of the affected orbit space.

It is clear that India has the technology to make an ASAT but will not take it to the next level of actual testing. This perhaps fits in with India's non proliferation record while at the same time giving India the option to develop whatever capability is required for its own security and interests when required. The government has rightly stayed away from making any statements, so as not to give any legitimacy to the Chinese tests or spark any discussion on escalation of a 'regional arms race'. The Indian stand is also in line with the advanced nations' policy on testing. Michael Krepon in his essay, "A Code of Conduct for Responsible Space Faring Nations", has highlighted this aspect by stating:

'Advanced space-faring nations are also pursuing hedging strategies ... Hedging strategies take the form of research and development programmes; the flight testing of multi-purpose technologies that could be used for peaceful or for war fighting purposes in space; ... Tests of dedicated ASAT weapons have been relatively infrequent phenomena during the space age'

Presently, there is an apparent contentment with the existing space laws and treaties, the justification being that they are sufficient to cater to contemporary security concerns. There is a perception that any new laws or definitions will restrict the larger nations from using space as freely as they are used to. Sooner or later, with proliferation of technology, this situation is bound to change, forcing all nations to the negotiating table. The threat of an asymmetric attack on existing assets by smaller nations with very little interests in space is also a grave possibility. There are heightening prospects in future wars, of smaller states using every potential asymmetric tool possible. These probabilities may force nations with existing capabilities to lay down stringent conditions for the newer entrants. With this in mind, whenever such multilateral treaties or formal agreements are debated, India would prefer to be a part of it as a 'have' rather than a 'have-not'. The sanctions that it had to endure as a result of its nuclear tests (by the haves) are a lesson not easily forgotten.

Clear declaration of India's ASAT capability will act as a credible deterrence to any misadventures. To give credence to the hedging strategy, India now needs to develop passive measures that would include better space situational awareness, strengthening its satellites, greater resilience to jamming, satellite redundancy and at a later stage, backup satellite capability. India also needs to develop its soft kill options like laser blinding, communication jamming etc. Only these will ensure safeguarding of India's interests in the realm of space.

Views expressed are personal

 

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cross posted

LiveLeak.com - India's beam weapon 'Kali-5000'

India's beam weapon 'Kali-5000'

India's beam weapon 'Kali-5000'
MUMBAI - The Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (Barc) here is in the final
stages of assembling a powerful electron accelerating machine named
''Kali-5000`` which, its scientists say, can potentially be used as a beam
weapon.

Bursts of microwaves packed with gigawatts of power (one gigawatt is 1000
million watts) produced by this machine, when aimed at enemy missiles and
aircraft, will cripple their electronics systems and computer chips and
bring them down.

According to scientists, ''soft killing`` by high power microwaves has
advantages over the so called laser weapon which destroys by drilling
holes through metal.

Kali-5000 will be ready for testing by the end of this year, according to
Mr P H Ron, head of the accelerator and pulse power division at Barc and
chief designer of India`s first star wars weapon.

However, in the present form India`s beam weapon is too bulky - it weighs
26 tons - including tanks containing 12000 litres of oil. Mr Ron said some
''compacting`` was possible.

He said Kali (kilo-ampere linear injector) machine was developed for
industrial applications and that the defence use was a recent spinoff. He,
however, declined to elaborate.

Describing it as a machine ''bordering basic research,`` Atomic Energy
Commission Chairman Rajagopalan Chidambaram admitted in an interview that
it has military potential. ''There are some technologies we have to be in
touch with because they may become useful (later),`` he said.

Development of the Kali machine was mooted in 1985 by Dr Chidambaram, then
director of Barc, but work earnestly began in 1989.

Mr Ron said the machine essentially generated pulses of highly energetic
electrons. Other components in the machine down the line converted the
electrons into flash x-rays (for ultra high-speed photography) or
microwaves. The electron beam itself can be used for welding.

The Defence Balistics Research Institute in Chandigarh is already using an
x-ray version of Kali to study speed of projectiles.

Another defense institute in Bangalore is using a microwave-producing
version of Kali which the scientists use for testing the vulnerability of
the electronic systems going into the light combat aircraft under
development and designing electrostatic shields to protect them from
microwave attack by the enemy.

According to Barc scientists, the Kali machine has for the first time
provided India a way to ''harden`` the electronic systems used in
satellites and missiles against the deadly electromagnetic impulses (Emi)
generated by nuclear weapons.

The Emi wrecks havoc by creating intense electric field of several
thousand volts per centimeter. The electronic components currently used in
missiles can withstand fields of Just 300 volts per centimeter.

While the Kali systems built so far are single shot pulse power systems
(they produce one burst of microwaves and the next burst comes much
later), Kali-5000 is a rapid fire device, and hence its potential as a
beam weapon.

According to Barc-published reports, the machine will shoot several
thousand bursts of microwaves, each burst lasting for just 60 billionths
of a second and packed with a power of about four gigawatts.

The high power microwave pulses travel in a straight line and do not
dissipate their energy if the frequency falls between three and ten
gigahertz.

According to Barc scientists, a microwave power of 150 megawatts has
already been demonstrated in earlier versions of Kali.

Source: DECCAN HERALD
--------

Newsgroup commentary on the above:

Auroral Arms Race: India plays "catch-up" against Beijing-US EMP/HAARP


Fearful of Sino-American advances in military uses of electromagnetic energy weapons that fry circuits, clouds and brains by bouncing gigawatts of energy off the ionosphere from thousands of miles away,the world's largest democracy is taking the precaution of developing electrostatic shield technologies to "rebounce" directed HAARP energies "somewhere else."

The electrostatic shield is a defensive technology against electromagnetic projection weapons now in the hands of China and the US (HAARP and the tactical pulse weapon that can "shoot down" satellites (actually burn out their circuits.)

India is also adapting its microwave technology for deterrence. Their 'Kali - 5000" (kilo-ampere linear injector) is being adapted for use against an aggressor's planes and missiles. Research on an array of shield and "Ray Wars" projects are underway at research centers at Chandigarh, Bangalore, and Bhabha. (Why can't the U.S. be this open and honest about its projects -- everyone in the world knows about HAARP except the American people.)

There is no indication that India is following the U.S. and China in developing clandstine weather modification technologies for military use. India's weather modification projects well publicized and benign. It appears that truly open governments do not resort to such horrors.


American missiles, as China (and everyone else)now knows thanks to Clinton and Loral's Bernard Schwartz, can be knocked out by a pulse of just 300 volts per centimeter -- and a hardened replacement chip is still years away --hence the new heavy-handed emphasis on the Alaskan weapon and GWB's willingness to dump our current nuclear warhead and ICBM arsenal for something better. (This is not a Clintonesque treason/sellout; the our best nuclear weapon delivery systems are garbage now against China's EMP and exotic info-warfare (infiltration and sabotage) capabilities.

India -- which is a highly advanced country the with a population enjoying a standard of living and education levels higher than Germany's although mixed within a population of one billion souls on the sub-continent is faced with dangerous neighbors: the totalitarian, deadly and neurotically Machiiavellian communist-globalist regime in Beijing and Beijing's on-again-off-again puppet Pakistan (whenever Pakistan is manipulated back into the hands of Beijing-directed Bhutto faction -- which includes Hillary Clinton's cut-from-the-same-cloth girlfriend, Banizar Bhutto -- when you are dealing with Beijing you never know what duplicitious official has "gone Clinton" conducting self-sabotaging policies (like aggression in Kashmir--where CHina secretly encourages fanatics on both sides)-- although Musharraf appears to be a genuine populist and humanitarian along the lines of Pinochet, Fujimori, Pat Buchanan and Putin when it comes to oppsoing globalist skulduggery.

At any rate, Delhi feels it prudent to develop defenses against the Beijing-Globalist axis. And it doesn't take a conspiracy theorist to see that the United States, whether under Clinton or Bush, cannot be relied on to thward Bejing's increasingly clear aggressive designs, should the PLA feel confident enough to drop its current Sun-Tzu-Leninist-Zhouist subversion and begin overt military aggression or intimidation.

I hope India, Japan, South Korea, and the Taiwan (with China's nationalist government in exile), Russia, Ukraine, Iraq and Argentina can break free of Sino-American globalism and start their own
truly liberal and populist world block, a bastion of sanity to which the other financially ravaged nations with humane leadership and a clear view of where the IMF, the World Bank and globalist "free trade" (free leveraged plunder, actually) can find refuge and counterforce. Why not hope that?
Obviously the current geopolitical monstrosity errected in behalf of the financial aristocracies for their "global plantation" has no future on this planet. And certainly no leadership the Establishmentazzi bankrolls, no globalist-puppet international organizations and NGO's, all instruments of rich-men's deceit and larceny, can never act intelligently to reform international governance on behalf of common humanity.

A world led by open-societies cooperating from clearly understood nationally framed popular interests is just what mankind needs -- and an India that can protect itself from the secret terror weapons of Princelings and Western plutocrats is a mighty good start in that direction.

(I am not privy to any secrets. I make deductions. If I think they are important and sound I pass them on for you to evaluate.)

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Can show anti-satellite capability if govt gives nod: DRDO chief - Indian Express

Can show anti-satellite capability if govt gives nod: DRDO chief

 

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Piggybacking Anti-Satellite Technologies on Ballistic Missile Defense: India's Hedge and Demonstrate Approach - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Piggybacking Anti-Satellite Technologies on Ballistic Missile Defense: India's Hedge and Demonstrate Approach

In January 2007 China successfully tested an anti-satellite missile system. That test, although primarily meant as a warning shot across America's bow, also helped concentrate New Delhi's mind to begin fashioning policy responses to the militarization of space. The former head of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), Dr. Kasturirangan, typified India's response when he noted: "obviously we start worrying"¦India has spent a huge sum to develop its capabilities and place assets in space"¦there is a need to look at means to securing these."1 The scientific advisor to the Indian defense minister also warned that China's test could possibly lead ISRO and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) to collaborate in developing satellite kill technologies.2 The debate was subsequently joined in by the chief of India's air force Air Chief Marshal Naik who made a forceful case for building anti-satellite weapons on the grounds that, "Our satellites are vulnerable to anti-satellite weapon systems because our neighborhood possesses one."3 These and other statements do not imply that India has an instituted anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) program. But they strongly suggest that Indian government agencies have begun exploratory efforts aimed at possibly instituting one.

During the past three decades, the stakeholders in India's space program have been primarily civilian. Remote sensing, weather forecasting, telecommunications, and broadcasting consumed the bulk of ISRO's attention.4 But starting in the last decade, the Indian military's space footprint has begun to expand. Among India's 23 active satellites, 10 fly in geostationary earth orbits (GEO) and 13 in low earth orbits (LEO).5 Among the latter, at least three satellites, the Cartosat 2A, the RISAT 2, and a technology experimental satellite, are speculated to have military applications.6 Both the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy have plans to acquire dedicated satellites for communications and net-centric operations. Plans are also afoot to build a constellation of satellites for navigation purposes.7 The Indian military's embrace of the information-hungry revolution in military affairs will thus heighten dependence and also its vulnerability to potential disruption of space-based assets. It is therefore no surprise that Air Chief Marshal Naik refers to ASAT weapons as "one of our challenges of future war capability."8

There are two ways in which one could defend against threats to space assets: non-destructive and destructive. In non-destructive methods, "jamming" and "spoofing" are used to interfere with a satellite's systems. Electro-optical countermeasures such as "dazzling" optical sensors are also available.9 However, for such countermeasures to work, detailed knowledge of the targeted satellite is usually necessary. Among destructive methods are the Kinetic Energy-Anti-Satellite Weapon (KE-ASAT) and the co-orbital ASAT. Kinetic energy kill vehicles are lifted into space by rockets and destroy satellites by physically ramming into them.10 Co-orbital ASAT systems on the other hand are orbited into space like any other satellite, but are put through a series of maneuvers to collide with and destroy a designated satellite.11 Thus far, there are few indications that India is invested in non-destructive countermeasures. The evidence so far suggests that India is keeping its option on the KE-ASAT open. India has also indicated some interest in building a ground-based laser program although not much is known about the program in the public domain.12 Just recently, in March of 2011, DRDO tested a short-range ballistic missile interceptor, a radio frequency seeker, and a fiber-optic gyroscope, as parts of its ongoing anti-ballistic intercept program.13 These systems could also in theory serve as components of an operational KE-ASAT capability in the future.

The Indian approach to developing ASAT weapon technologies is measured and exploratory. It follows the now institutionalized methodology of developing dual-use technologies that have civilian and military spin-offs; or tacking military programs onto already instituted ones. The Indian approach also emphasizes the significance of 'technology demonstration' over the proving of operational military systems. Technology demonstration is less provocative externally, allows long lead times for technologies to mature, and is sensitive to the difficulties of building consensus within the Indian political system. This was the path for example that India took in developing nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and ballistic missile systems. To be sure, India has now elected in favor of operational nuclear and missile capabilities. However, for at least a decade, nuclear weapons were part of a hedge strategy. Similarly, chemical weapons were developed but never incorporated into the military's operational planning. Based on statements from ISRO and DRDO representatives, it appears that any program to validate technologies for a KE-ASAT program would also fit into the genre of a hedge and demonstrate strategy.14

The merits of a hedge and demonstrate strategy apart, there are pressures to test and validate key technologies for political reasons. Many Indian strategic analysts analogize from India's harsh experience under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to urge the testing and validation of operational systems. They fear the possibility of an NPT-analogous space regime that might once again draw an artificial dividing line between 'haves' and 'have nots'.15 Indian military leaders, perhaps wary of the DRDO's past failures in making good on its promises to develop working systems as well as the operational demands of having capabilities on the ground, also favor operational validation over technology demonstration.16 The technologists and scientists from DRDO and ISRO however are less keen on a program of operational testing for two reasons. First, they believe that since many KE-ASAT technologies overlap with the ballistic missile defense system currently under development, especially in the areas of radar tracking and target acquisition, a separate test program would be of little practical value. But more significant, they are concerned that a full operational test would add to the problem of space debris, which now poses a serious threat to all space assets in the LEO. China's ASAT test for example increased space debris (debris of diameter greater than 1 cm) in LEO by 15-20 percent, an experience that DRDO and ISRO are keen to avoid.17

The ASAT debate once again attests to the status quo bias in Indian national security decision-making. It shows that Indian institutions respond to threats. But they do not necessarily anticipate them. Indian political leaders for example have still not publicly endorsed statements from ISRO, DRDO and the military. The Indian military's wish list for an operational ASAT capability is also unlikely to be met for three reasons. First, it is not apparent that China poses an immediate operational threat to Indian space assets. Second, civilian agencies such as ISRO and DRDO have historically enjoyed far greater influence than the military in shaping strategic research and development choices. And finally, Indian political leaders are likely to find a hedge and demonstrate strategy less controversial and more economically viable. Thus an Indian ASAT program will more likely constitute a shadow capability in the short-term.

Dr. Bharath Gopalaswamy is a Senior Research Scholar at Cornell University's Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. Gaurav Kampani is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation.

 

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India: Militarizing Space with U.S. Help

India: Militarizing Space with U.S. Help

U.S. President Barack Obama and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have a meeting scheduled in Delhi on November 8. Certain to be on the agenda is the removal of the last remaining export controls on U.S. dual-use technology and military hardware to India, including technology appropriate for development of space weapons. Since President Obama pledged in 2009 to seek a ban on space weapons, the United States should not be helping other countries develop these weapons, especially in dangerous regions that have nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. But with the final hurdles of export control removed, Washington could be doing just that for India, with so far little or no objection.

The relationship between the United States and India has been extraordinarily close since 2001. The United States views India as a rising democracy and ally in the fight against radical Islamic fundamentalism. Ten days after 9/11, Washington began to lift sanctions in place against India since its 1998 nuclear tests. Subsequently in 2001 the number of Indian companies on the Commerce Department's Entity List was reduced to just two from 159.

Additionally, the U.S. licensing policy with India for nuclear- and missile- related technology changed from "policy of denial" to case-by-case review. Since 2006, delegations from the U.S. defense industry, including large numbers of retired high-ranking military officers, have flocked to India to prospect the $32 billion that has been allocated for defense procurement in 2010-11, with $13 billion of that figure set aside for the acquisition of new weapons systems. These defense industry representatives and retired military officials have served as an informal lobbying firm that continues to actively encourage the U.S. government to drop remaining export restrictions on India organizations like the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO). In July 2010, the investment firm Deloitte estimated that India will "spend nearly US$80 billion over the next five years on defense related capital expenditure."

India is using space development as a way to advance a stronger geostrategic position in the region and globally. The U.S. defense industry is facilitating this military expansion with its aggressive move in to South Asian markets to supplement reductions in their Pentagon contracts. The potential long-term ramifications of both moves have been neglected in favor of short-term, understandable, gains. Nevertheless, the U.S. arms control community, by failing to address this dangerous situation, is asleep at the wheel.

India's "Peaceful" Space Program

India, not surprisingly, says that its space program is for "peaceful" purposes only. The parallels between India's nuclear program development and its current space program development, however, suggest otherwise. Former Indian President Abdul Kalam was a key developer and explicator of India's nuclear and missile programs, as well as its current space vision. His definition of "peaceful" provides India considerable latitude. Kalam once stated that, "In the 3,000-year history of India, barring 600 years, the country has been ruled by others. If you need development, the country should witness peace, and peace is ensured by strength. Missiles were developed to strengthen the country." This philosophy of peace through strength also provides the rationale for developing a wide range of new and emerging space technologies with far-reaching military applications. India considered its nuclear program peaceful right up to and including its 1974 test. Now, India considers its expanding space program peaceful as well. Despite contrary indications, Washington is apparently also willing to do so.

India's space program dates back to the launching of its first sounding rocket in 1963. Recently, however, the character of the Indian program has changed dramatically from utilitarian to more far-reaching. India is developing capabilities, including human exploration of space and expanded utilization of many dual-use technologies, to enhance its geostrategic position. This dual-use space technology can be used not just for military force enhancement but potentially for space weapons as well. Though most Indian politicians profess that India is not pursuing space weapons, some blur the lines. In February 2007, for example, Indian Defense Minister A.K Antony stated that, "It may be difficult to demarcate distinctly between peaceful and military uses. However, we have always advocated peaceful use of technology. Thus, we are of the view that weaponization of space must be discouraged."

The Indian military is not so circumspect and in fact at times directly contradicts the politicians. An alarming 2000 report titled "Military Dimensions in the Future of the Indian Presence in Space" caused waves within official circles but drew little international attention, probably due to its lack of availability outside of India. Perhaps most controversial was its suggestion that India could deploy a directed-energy weapon, such as a particle beam weapon, in space by 2010. At the time of publication, the paper's author, V. Siddhartha, was an officer on special duty in the secretariat of the scientific advisor to the defense minister. The paper is testament to, at the very least, a longstanding interest within the Indian military of deploying not only a space-based laser, but also a kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) system. Although India clearly has not deployed an ASAT system that utilizes directed energy technology to date, Siddhartha's forecast of India having the potential to develop an ASAT system still appears officially supported. In January of 2010 Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) Director General V K Saraswat stated at the 97th Indian Science Congress that, "India is putting together building blocks of technology that could be used to neutralize enemy satellites." All the while Indian officials continue to heavily lobby the United States to remove export restrictions on DRDO and ISRO, with a continuingly favorable reaction from the United States.

Perhaps most clearly and most recently, the Indian ministry of defense published a document that serves as a technological roadmap for the Indian military's future to the year 2015. This Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap confirms the pursuit of a formal anti-satellite program, stating "development of ASAT for electronic or physical destruction of satellites in both LEO and GEO-synchronous orbits" as a goal for 2015. Not only is the United States not speaking out against such Indian efforts, it has become more accommodating in providing the technology to accomplish them.

Meanwhile, international attention continues to focus on China's military space activities and, given China's overt ASAT test in 2007, rightfully so. But shortly after China's satellite shoot-down, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and then-Russian President Vladimir Putin convened a joint press conference where Singh declared; "Our position is similar in that we are not in favor of the weaponization of outer space." This was just one day after then-Indian Air Force (IAF) chief Shashi Tyagi had stated, "As the reach of our air force is expanding, it has become extremely important that we exploit space, and for it you need space assets." India's contradictory intentions concerning its space program are hard to miss, yet Washington seems intent on doing so.

U.S. Aerospace Posturing

Much to the U.S. aerospace industry's dismay, the Obama administration cancelled the rocket and spacecraft construction connected to NASA's Constellation program and cut back on the perpetually close-to-operationally-functional missile defense program. Aerospace firms stepped up their scouting efforts for new business, with a major focus on India.

In January 2006 the U.S.-India Business Council arranged for the most influential and largest defense-oriented delegation to travel to India to continue brokering the strategic partnership between the two nations. Headed by General (Rtd) Paul H. Kern, who was at the time a senior counselor with former U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen's Cohen Group, the delegation also included four-star Admiral (Rtd) Walter Doran, the vice president of Navy Accounts for Business Development at Raytheon, and former NASA astronaut Andrew Allen, then vice-president of International Fixed Wing Aircraft at Honeywell Defense and Space. The 31-member delegation represented 22 of the leading defense manufacturers in the United States, including Raytheon, Honeywell, Boeing, Lockheed, General Electric, Northrop Grumman. In 2010 the president and chief executive of Boeing Defense, Space and Security (BDS) Dennis Muilenburg was referring to India as Boeing's "Jewel in the Crown."

U.S. manufacturers, worried about their Pentagon contracts, are pushing hard to open the Indian market wider. Boeing is, for instance, offering the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) help with its manned space trip planned for 2016. Export restrictions on ISRO, however, remain in place – though perhaps not so after the November meeting in Delhi. Although ISRO considers itself a NASA counterpart and not part of the military establishment, there too the lines between the two are increasingly blurred. Retired Vice-Admiral Raman Puri, who supervised the Integrated Defense Force and led the coordination of India's long-range military plans and joint doctrines, has recommended that all "future [space] payloads including civilian space payloads should try to be dual-use" – meaning including military missions. As such, the Indian military could increasingly use ISRO-developed-and-operated satellites. India's Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) satellite launchers are not drawn from prior missile programs, as were early Russian, U.S., and Chinese launchers. But the Agni missile, first test-fired in 1989, is a two-stage missile with the first stage using the first-stage solid-fuel booster motor of the civilian-developed SLV-3 launch vehicle. The overlap between civilian and military communities is undeniable.

Let's Make a (Bad) Deal

India's geostrategic position – as a U.S. ally against Islamic radicalism and a potential market for the U.S. defense industry – has allowed it leeway not afforded to many other countries. Even now, India has enjoyed access to dual-use technology largely denied to countries with similar positions on proliferation, since India has not signed either the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and has not subscribed to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Since 2002, India has continued to push the United States for concessions in way few other countries would dare. According to the Times of India,remove top Indian agencies like the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) from the banned list." In terms of U.S. foreign policy and exceptionalism, India is to South Asia as Israel is to the Middle East. "India has 'very firmly' asked the U.S. to ease export controls and

The United States in the past has wanted India to sign onto the MTCR as quid pro quo for the U.S. dropping restrictions on ISRO. India, however, will likely offer some lesser concession for the removal of the last remaining hurdles to export control. The economic and political forces behind the prospective commerce law changes seem too strong to stop this fast moving train unless attitudes change very quickly.

India and International Law

If the upcoming meetings between Manmohan Singh and President Barak Obama are designed to assist India in its effort to enter into a new era of technological and military prosperity, the United States should require beforehand that India abide by the will of the international community. The international community for the most part has embraced a number of treaties that serve as the backbone of global disarmament and nonproliferation efforts. The United Nations has frequently called on India to embrace the Non-Proliferation Treaty; in fact this has become a perennial practice. India's status as a non-signatory undermines the treaty as long as New Delhi places itself – on paper - in the company of Tehran and Pyongyang.

That said, India's reasons for not conforming to the NPT are difficult to discern. While Indian officials say they support full disarmament, they seem unwilling to take even the initially required steps on route to that goal. Calls for India to subscribe to the Missile Technology Control Regime, which has 34 members, have been frequent. Although India claims voluntary "partial adherence" to MTCR guidelines, it is not a member. Even in areas of arms control relating to terrorism – arguably the greatest security threat facing India – India has declined to participate in globally supported initiatives. As of 2010, India even has yet to sign onto the Proliferation Security Initiative to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Given its nuclear history and its exceptional position on arms control – and its desire for dual-use technology usually reserved for countries demonstrating adherence to global arms control norms – India must now accept the responsibilities that come with a more pronounced position in global politics.

The actions of all the players in this drama may well be rational in the short term. But in the long term, the U.S. position of helping India boost its space program is counterproductive. India's record with dual-use nuclear technology suggests that it is comfortable blurring the line between civilian and military applications. Moreover, U.S. technology given or sold to other countries has sometimes been subsequently used against the United States. Consequently, at least slowing down technology transfer to India would be prudent. Before the November 8 meeting between Obama and Singh, the Obama administration should reevaluate its role of playing matchmaker between U.S. aerospace industries and the Indian military.

Matthew Hoey is the director of the Military Space Transparency Project. Joan Johnson-Freese is a professor at the Naval War College. They are both contributors to Foreign Policy In Focus.

 

[Dovah]

Although India claims voluntary "partial adherence" to MTCR guidelines, it is not a member.

We are stupid. Similar to "Peaceful Nuclear Tests".

 

[maomao]

^^^^^^The low intellect of corrupt wannabe liberal politicians always makes us a laughing stock.......peaceful nuclear tests my ass.....these dumbasses wont hesitate a bit to sell the country for a dime or kill their own countrymen for votes and power; however, they cower before media pressure to look peacenik and liberal.....sala kitna lootega yeh hara**** secular politician!

 

[trackwhack]

Please sense the desperation in his narrative. Every stupid regime starting from NPT to mtcr was India specific. Now that all have failed to achieve their intended purpose, the tone has changed to - we donated them the technology. And then he goes on to plead his case for why India should sign now. How pathetic.

 

[Bheeshma]

The article is pathetic. The MTRC andfNPT have failed miserably. Dissolve them and move on.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

 

[LETHALFORCE]

India developing anti-satellite weapons

India developing anti-satellite weapons

India intends to develop anti-satellite weapons following its successful Agni-V ICBM test.

Indian Defense Research and Development Organization Director General and scientific adviser to the Defense Minister V. K. Saraswat said the launch of Agni-V last week opens a "new era" for India

"Apart from adding a new dimension to our strategic defense, it has ushered in fantastic opportunities in building ASAT weapons and launching mini/micro satellites on demand," he said.

ASAT weapons require reaching about 500 miles above the Earth. Saraswat said Agni-V delivers the boosting capability and the kill vehicle, "with advanced seekers, will be able to home into the target satellite."

Saraswat noted that Agni-V's range of more than 3,100 miles was sufficient to take care of India's current threat perceptions.

"We have no problem in augmenting the range if in the future, threat perceptions change," he said. "We are not in a missile race with anyone. We are building missiles to mitigate our threats."

Saraswat added that the government had yet to give formal approval to the ASAT program.

"India does not believe in weaponization of space," he said. "We are only talking about having the capability. There are no plans for offensive space capabilities."

Underpinning India's interest in an ASAT program was China's 2007 use of an ASAT weapon to destroy an old satellite.

In late 1962 India and China fought a brief war over contested Himalayan territory, during which India lost 1,383 killed, 1,047 wounded, 1,696 missing and 3,968 captured. Chinese losses during the conflict were 722 killed and 1,697 wounded.

In January 2010, Saraswat said: "India is putting together building blocks of technology that could be used to neutralize enemy satellites. We are working to ensure space security and protect our satellites. At the same time we are also working on how to deny the enemy access to its space assets."

The ABM elements in India's space program were operational tested last year. India performed a test in March 2010, the sixth of the series, of the interceptor missile portion of its ballistic missile defense system. The test was reported to be a success and a validation of the technology to be integrated into India's missile defense capabilities.

A modified Prithvi target missile, modified to mimic the trajectory of a ballistic missile with a 324-mile range, was launched from Chandipur, Orissa Integrated Test Range Launch Complex III.

Indian military radar tracked the launch, determined its trajectory and relayed the data in real time to Mission Control Center, which launched the interceptor. The interceptor's directional warhead was maneuvered into close proximity to the modified Prithvi before detonating, the government said.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

A History of Anti-Satellite Programs (2012) | Union of Concerned Scientists

A History of Anti-Satellite Programs
Major Motivations and Milestones in the Development of Anti-Satellite Weapons

 

[W.G.Ewald]

We are stupid. Similar to "Peaceful Nuclear Tests".

A peaceful nuclear test is one without a mushroom cloud.