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India developing anti-satellite capability
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US has officially stated that any destruction of US satellites will be considered an act of war that may be met with nuclear retaliation. That is why the Chinese anti-satellite test was considered so belligerent, Knowing this fact the Chinese demonstrated their capability to "send a message" to US of their arrival. After the Chinese demonstration US rushed to test more advanced anti-satellite capability developing SM-3 and testing it successfully. Similarly India(Australia and Japan) have also reacted to China's anti-satellite tests and kick started their own programs,Japan working more closely with US; Australia working on scramjets with US and India more or less charting it's own course.
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The more the Chinese send satellites for redundancy the more ASATs are trained at those satellites from other countries... It's still a losing proposition for China.
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Anti-Satellite Shot Described - Defense News
Anti-Satellite Shot Described
Only a small group of sailors and a small team of government and industry experts knew the nature of the U.S. Navy cruiser Lake Erie's mission when the ship left port in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on Feb. 14.
A modified SM-3 will be used during the attempt. (U.S. Navy) As the ship began steaming northwest, the news that a Navy ship would attempt to shoot down an errant spy satellite was breaking at the Pentagon. Capt. Randy Hendrickson, the skipper of Lake Erie, told Navy Times via telephone that he waited until the ship was at sea to call an all-hands meeting and inform his crew of 360 sailors what they were about to attempt. Until then, all the crew knew was that it was training for an unspecified mission, the captain said.
The ship spent four days conducting rehearsals, Hendrickson said, prior to steaming to its launch site in the ocean. The ship arrived on station northwest of Hawaii a "few hours prior to launch" Feb. 20, the skipper said.
"[We] were granted weapons release authority, and the crew performed superbly," he said. "They were very calm."
The SM-3 was launched, and there were cheers in the control room as the missile hit "dead center to the basket," Hendrickson said. "We could see the radar as filled with debris."
After the shot, the crew and a team of about 30 government and industry experts began conducting the lethality analysis, Hendrickson said. As the civilian team did the analysis and advised the crew, the sailors manned all the equipment, Hendrickson explained.
"The crew was very astute to what they were doing," he said.
The missile launch was the fifth SM-3 the ship had launched since April 2007. The other four missiles were launched as part of the Missile Defense Agency's sea-based ballistic missile defense tests.
Pacific Fleet commander Adm. Robert Willard called Hendrickson on the radio to congratulate the Lake Erie on what appeared to be a successful shot, the skipper said. Hendrickson also received e-mails from Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead and Strategic Command chief Air Force Gen. Kevin Chilton.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates gave the final go-ahead for the launch after receiving information from Chilton about eight hours prior to the launch, Marine Gen. James Cartwright, vice Joint Chiefs chairman, told reporters at the Pentagon the morning after the shot.
The satellite carried hydrazine, a toxic fuel, which Pentagon officials said would make its re-entry dangerous. The satellite, known as USA 193, experienced problems upon launch in 2006 and was roughly the size of school bus.
As the Lake Erie steamed back toward Pearl Harbor, Hendrickson said the crew plans a "little celebration" of the first-of-its-kind shot. The party will be conducted "moderately and modestly," he added.
It took the Navy about six weeks to make the necessary modifications to the missiles and radars to "take it to sea with some degree of confidence," a Navy official said Feb. 19 at a press briefing.
The Navy had no prior capability to shoot down satellites and had previously "not explored that," the source added.
Cartwright called the shot a "one-time thing" the morning after the missile hit. He said he does not anticipate satellite shoots becoming a regular mission for the military. Because of the hazardous nature of the fuel carried aboard USA 193, Cartwright said "it would have been irresponsible" not to reduce some of the risk of harmful materials hitting land.
In response to suggestions that the satellite shot would be a boon to the Pentagon's nascent missile-defense capabilities, Cartwright said the only "elements of missile defense" involved in the shot were in the sensors, instrumentation and software used in the test.
"This was a one-time modification," he said.
Hendrickson said his crew returned from a Pacific deployment last summer and is "well-versed" in many forms of operations. Nonetheless, he admitted the satellite shot "pushed its limits."
Anti-Satellite Shot Described
Only a small group of sailors and a small team of government and industry experts knew the nature of the U.S. Navy cruiser Lake Erie's mission when the ship left port in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on Feb. 14.
A modified SM-3 will be used during the attempt. (U.S. Navy) As the ship began steaming northwest, the news that a Navy ship would attempt to shoot down an errant spy satellite was breaking at the Pentagon. Capt. Randy Hendrickson, the skipper of Lake Erie, told Navy Times via telephone that he waited until the ship was at sea to call an all-hands meeting and inform his crew of 360 sailors what they were about to attempt. Until then, all the crew knew was that it was training for an unspecified mission, the captain said.
The ship spent four days conducting rehearsals, Hendrickson said, prior to steaming to its launch site in the ocean. The ship arrived on station northwest of Hawaii a "few hours prior to launch" Feb. 20, the skipper said.
"[We] were granted weapons release authority, and the crew performed superbly," he said. "They were very calm."
The SM-3 was launched, and there were cheers in the control room as the missile hit "dead center to the basket," Hendrickson said. "We could see the radar as filled with debris."
After the shot, the crew and a team of about 30 government and industry experts began conducting the lethality analysis, Hendrickson said. As the civilian team did the analysis and advised the crew, the sailors manned all the equipment, Hendrickson explained.
"The crew was very astute to what they were doing," he said.
The missile launch was the fifth SM-3 the ship had launched since April 2007. The other four missiles were launched as part of the Missile Defense Agency's sea-based ballistic missile defense tests.
Pacific Fleet commander Adm. Robert Willard called Hendrickson on the radio to congratulate the Lake Erie on what appeared to be a successful shot, the skipper said. Hendrickson also received e-mails from Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead and Strategic Command chief Air Force Gen. Kevin Chilton.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates gave the final go-ahead for the launch after receiving information from Chilton about eight hours prior to the launch, Marine Gen. James Cartwright, vice Joint Chiefs chairman, told reporters at the Pentagon the morning after the shot.
The satellite carried hydrazine, a toxic fuel, which Pentagon officials said would make its re-entry dangerous. The satellite, known as USA 193, experienced problems upon launch in 2006 and was roughly the size of school bus.
As the Lake Erie steamed back toward Pearl Harbor, Hendrickson said the crew plans a "little celebration" of the first-of-its-kind shot. The party will be conducted "moderately and modestly," he added.
It took the Navy about six weeks to make the necessary modifications to the missiles and radars to "take it to sea with some degree of confidence," a Navy official said Feb. 19 at a press briefing.
The Navy had no prior capability to shoot down satellites and had previously "not explored that," the source added.
Cartwright called the shot a "one-time thing" the morning after the missile hit. He said he does not anticipate satellite shoots becoming a regular mission for the military. Because of the hazardous nature of the fuel carried aboard USA 193, Cartwright said "it would have been irresponsible" not to reduce some of the risk of harmful materials hitting land.
In response to suggestions that the satellite shot would be a boon to the Pentagon's nascent missile-defense capabilities, Cartwright said the only "elements of missile defense" involved in the shot were in the sensors, instrumentation and software used in the test.
"This was a one-time modification," he said.
Hendrickson said his crew returned from a Pacific deployment last summer and is "well-versed" in many forms of operations. Nonetheless, he admitted the satellite shot "pushed its limits."
LETHALFORCE
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Chinese have reached a point where they may have passed the Russians in their space rivalry with USA?? If they can knockout satellites they can pursue their hegemony in outer space denying others access??
http://defenceforumindia.com/china-...celerates-space-program-plots-out-course.html
http://defenceforumindia.com/china-...celerates-space-program-plots-out-course.html
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Outer Space Treaty (1967) | Nuclear Arms Control Treaties | atomicarchive.com
Outer Space Treaty (1967)
Outer Space Treaty (1967)
Summary
Multilateral agreement signed and ratified between the U.S., U.S.S.R., and U.K. banning:
1....placement of nuclear weapons or "weapons of mass destruction" in orbit around the Earth.
2....installation of nuclear weapons or "weapons of mass destruction" on the moon, on any other celestial body, or in outer space
3....use of the moon or any celestial body for military purposes, including weapons testing of any kind.
Ninty five nations have ratified the treaty. The treaty entered into force on October 10, 1963.
Narrative
The Outer Space Treaty, as it is known, was the second of the so-called "nonarmament" treaties; its concepts and some of its provisions were modeled on its predecessor, the Antarctic Treaty. Like that Treaty it sought to prevent "a new form of colonial competition" and the possible damage that self-seeking exploitation might cause.
In early 1957, even before the launching of Sputnik in October, developments in rocketry led the United States to propose international verification of the testing of space objects. The development of an inspection system for outer space was part of a Western proposal for partial disarmament put forward in August 1957. The Soviet Union, however, which was in the midst of testing its first ICBM and was about to orbit its first Earth satellite, did not accept these proposals.
Between 1959 and 1962 the Western powers made a series of proposals to bar the use of outer space for military purposes. Their successive plans for general and complete disarmament included provisions to ban the orbiting and stationing in outer space of weapons of mass destruction. Addressing the General Assembly on September 22, 1960, President Eisenhower proposed that the principles of the Antarctic Treaty be applied to outer space and celestial bodies.
Soviet plans for general and complete disarmament between 1960 and 1962 included provisions for ensuring the peaceful use of outer space. The Soviet Union, however, would not separate outer space from other disarmament issues, nor would it agree to restrict outer space to peaceful uses unless U.S. foreign bases at which short-range and medium-range missiles were stationed were eliminated also.
The Western powers declined to accept the Soviet approach; the linkage, they held, would upset the military balance and weaken the security of the West.
After the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Soviet Unions position changed. It ceased to link an agreement on outer space with the question of foreign bases. On September 19, 1963, Foreign Minister Gromyko told the General Assembly that the Soviet Union wished to conclude an agreement banning the orbiting of objects carrying nuclear weapons. Ambassador Stevenson stated that the United States had no intention of orbiting weapons of mass destruction, installing them on celestial bodies or stationing them in outer space. The General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on October 17, 1963, welcoming the Soviet and U.S. statements and calling upon all states to refrain from introducing weapons of mass destruction into outer space.
The United States supported the resolution, despite the absence of any provisions for verification; the capabilities of its space-tracking systems, it was estimated, were adequate for detecting launchings and devices in orbit.
Seeking to sustain the momentum for arms control agreements, the United States in 1965 and 1966 pressed for a Treaty that would give further substance to the U.N. resolution.
On June 16, 1966, both the United States and the Soviet Union submitted draft treaties. The U.S. draft dealt only with celestial bodies; the Soviet draft covered the whole outer space environment. The United States accepted the Soviet position on the scope of the Treaty, and by September agreement had been reached in discussions at Geneva on most Treaty provisions. Differences on the few remaining issues -- chiefly involving access to facilities on celestial bodies, reporting on space activities, and the use of military equipment and personnel in space exploration -- were satisfactorily resolved in private consultations during the General Assembly session by December.
On the 19th of that month the General Assembly approved by acclamation a resolution commending the Treaty. It was opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, 1967. On April 25 the Senate gave unanimous consent to its ratification, and the Treaty entered into force on October 10, 1967.
The substance of the arms control provisions is in Article IV. This article restricts activities in two ways:
First , it contains an undertaking not to place in orbit around the Earth, install on the moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise station in outer space, nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction.
Second , it limits the use of the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for establishing military bases, installation, or fortifications; testing weapons of any kind; or conducting military maneuvers.
After the Treaty entered into force, the United States and the Soviet Union collaborated in jointly planned and manned space enterprises.
Outer Space Treaty (1967)
Outer Space Treaty (1967)
Summary
Multilateral agreement signed and ratified between the U.S., U.S.S.R., and U.K. banning:
1....placement of nuclear weapons or "weapons of mass destruction" in orbit around the Earth.
2....installation of nuclear weapons or "weapons of mass destruction" on the moon, on any other celestial body, or in outer space
3....use of the moon or any celestial body for military purposes, including weapons testing of any kind.
Ninty five nations have ratified the treaty. The treaty entered into force on October 10, 1963.
Narrative
The Outer Space Treaty, as it is known, was the second of the so-called "nonarmament" treaties; its concepts and some of its provisions were modeled on its predecessor, the Antarctic Treaty. Like that Treaty it sought to prevent "a new form of colonial competition" and the possible damage that self-seeking exploitation might cause.
In early 1957, even before the launching of Sputnik in October, developments in rocketry led the United States to propose international verification of the testing of space objects. The development of an inspection system for outer space was part of a Western proposal for partial disarmament put forward in August 1957. The Soviet Union, however, which was in the midst of testing its first ICBM and was about to orbit its first Earth satellite, did not accept these proposals.
Between 1959 and 1962 the Western powers made a series of proposals to bar the use of outer space for military purposes. Their successive plans for general and complete disarmament included provisions to ban the orbiting and stationing in outer space of weapons of mass destruction. Addressing the General Assembly on September 22, 1960, President Eisenhower proposed that the principles of the Antarctic Treaty be applied to outer space and celestial bodies.
Soviet plans for general and complete disarmament between 1960 and 1962 included provisions for ensuring the peaceful use of outer space. The Soviet Union, however, would not separate outer space from other disarmament issues, nor would it agree to restrict outer space to peaceful uses unless U.S. foreign bases at which short-range and medium-range missiles were stationed were eliminated also.
The Western powers declined to accept the Soviet approach; the linkage, they held, would upset the military balance and weaken the security of the West.
After the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Soviet Unions position changed. It ceased to link an agreement on outer space with the question of foreign bases. On September 19, 1963, Foreign Minister Gromyko told the General Assembly that the Soviet Union wished to conclude an agreement banning the orbiting of objects carrying nuclear weapons. Ambassador Stevenson stated that the United States had no intention of orbiting weapons of mass destruction, installing them on celestial bodies or stationing them in outer space. The General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on October 17, 1963, welcoming the Soviet and U.S. statements and calling upon all states to refrain from introducing weapons of mass destruction into outer space.
The United States supported the resolution, despite the absence of any provisions for verification; the capabilities of its space-tracking systems, it was estimated, were adequate for detecting launchings and devices in orbit.
Seeking to sustain the momentum for arms control agreements, the United States in 1965 and 1966 pressed for a Treaty that would give further substance to the U.N. resolution.
On June 16, 1966, both the United States and the Soviet Union submitted draft treaties. The U.S. draft dealt only with celestial bodies; the Soviet draft covered the whole outer space environment. The United States accepted the Soviet position on the scope of the Treaty, and by September agreement had been reached in discussions at Geneva on most Treaty provisions. Differences on the few remaining issues -- chiefly involving access to facilities on celestial bodies, reporting on space activities, and the use of military equipment and personnel in space exploration -- were satisfactorily resolved in private consultations during the General Assembly session by December.
On the 19th of that month the General Assembly approved by acclamation a resolution commending the Treaty. It was opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, 1967. On April 25 the Senate gave unanimous consent to its ratification, and the Treaty entered into force on October 10, 1967.
The substance of the arms control provisions is in Article IV. This article restricts activities in two ways:
First , it contains an undertaking not to place in orbit around the Earth, install on the moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise station in outer space, nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction.
Second , it limits the use of the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for establishing military bases, installation, or fortifications; testing weapons of any kind; or conducting military maneuvers.
After the Treaty entered into force, the United States and the Soviet Union collaborated in jointly planned and manned space enterprises.
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India Urges Strengthening Outer Space Treaty | Global Security Newswire | NTI
India Urges Strengthening Outer Space Treaty
The former head of India's air force yesterday called on the international community to amend the international Outer Space Treaty to further prohibit the militarization of space, Asian News International reported (see GSN, July 14, 2010).
"India would like to appeal to [the] international community to see what holes must be plugged" in the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, retired Air Marshal S. Krishnaswamy said in a speech at a New Delhi symposium on outer space.
"We also need a strong policing force in the U.N. If somebody crosses the line, we need to bring [them] down quickly," he told the audience.
Member nations to the treaty "undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner."
"The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all states parties to the treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes," according to Article 4 of the agreement. "The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited."
However, the treaty by implication permits some military operations such as the movement through space of intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, Krishnaswamy said.
"The authors of the treaty have left some gaps in the treaty. And probably with a sense of purpose. After all, law is very clever," he said.
Additionally, the pact fails to adequately the deployment of conventional weapons in space, according to the former air chief said.
"The treaty also allows testing of all weapons in space and floating military bases," Krishnaswamy said. "There is no ban on antisatellite, antimissile weapons as the treaty says outer space is free for all nation states."
"We all should get together and work for peaceful use of space," he argued.
"If something bad (from space) happens, it will be devastating. Indeed, the Earth will burn off" (Asian News International/OneIndia.com, Jan. 19).
India Urges Strengthening Outer Space Treaty
The former head of India's air force yesterday called on the international community to amend the international Outer Space Treaty to further prohibit the militarization of space, Asian News International reported (see GSN, July 14, 2010).
"India would like to appeal to [the] international community to see what holes must be plugged" in the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, retired Air Marshal S. Krishnaswamy said in a speech at a New Delhi symposium on outer space.
"We also need a strong policing force in the U.N. If somebody crosses the line, we need to bring [them] down quickly," he told the audience.
Member nations to the treaty "undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner."
"The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all states parties to the treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes," according to Article 4 of the agreement. "The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited."
However, the treaty by implication permits some military operations such as the movement through space of intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, Krishnaswamy said.
"The authors of the treaty have left some gaps in the treaty. And probably with a sense of purpose. After all, law is very clever," he said.
Additionally, the pact fails to adequately the deployment of conventional weapons in space, according to the former air chief said.
"The treaty also allows testing of all weapons in space and floating military bases," Krishnaswamy said. "There is no ban on antisatellite, antimissile weapons as the treaty says outer space is free for all nation states."
"We all should get together and work for peaceful use of space," he argued.
"If something bad (from space) happens, it will be devastating. Indeed, the Earth will burn off" (Asian News International/OneIndia.com, Jan. 19).
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LETHALFORCE
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http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/04/19/piggybacking-anti-satellite-technologies-on-ballistic-missile-defense-india-s-hedge-and-demonstrate-approach/3l6
[h=2]Piggybacking Anti-Satellite Technologies on Ballistic Missile Defense: India's Hedge and Demonstrate Approach[/h]
[h=2]Piggybacking Anti-Satellite Technologies on Ballistic Missile Defense: India's Hedge and Demonstrate Approach[/h]
In January 2007 China successfully tested an anti-satellite missile system. That test, although primarily meant as a warning shot across America's bow, also helped concentrate New Delhi's mind to begin fashioning policy responses to the militarization of space. The former head of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), Dr. Kasturirangan, typified India's response when he noted: "obviously we start worrying"¦India has spent a huge sum to develop its capabilities and place assets in space"¦there is a need to look at means to securing these."[URL="http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/04/19/piggybacking-anti-satellite-technologies-on-ballistic-missile-defense-india-s-hedge-and-demonstrate-approach/3l6#1"][SUP]1[/SUP]
The scientific advisor to the Indian defense minister also warned that China's test could possibly lead ISRO and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) to collaborate in developing satellite kill technologies.[SUP]2[/SUP]The debate was subsequently joined in by the chief of India's air force Air Chief Marshal Naik who made a forceful case for building anti-satellite weapons on the grounds that, "Our satellites are vulnerable to anti-satellite weapon systems because our neighborhood possesses one."[SUP]3[/SUP] These and other statements do not imply that India has an instituted anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) program. But they strongly suggest that Indian government agencies have begun exploratory efforts aimed at possibly instituting one.During the past three decades, the stakeholders in India's space program have been primarily civilian. Remote sensing, weather forecasting, telecommunications, and broadcasting consumed the bulk of ISRO's attention.[SUP]4[/SUP] But starting in the last decade, the Indian military's space footprint has begun to expand. Among India's 23 active satellites, 10 fly in geostationary earth orbits (GEO) and 13 in low earth orbits (LEO).[SUP]5[/SUP] Among the latter, at least three satellites, the Cartosat 2A, the RISAT 2, and a technology experimental satellite, are speculated to have military applications.[SUP]6[/SUP]Both the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy have plans to acquire dedicated satellites for communications and net-centric operations. Plans are also afoot to build a constellation of satellites for navigation purposes.[SUP]7[/SUP] The Indian military's embrace of the information-hungry revolution in military affairs will thus heighten dependence and also its vulnerability to potential disruption of space-based assets. It is therefore no surprise that Air Chief Marshal Naik refers to ASAT weapons as "one of our challenges of future war capability."[SUP]8[/SUP]There are two ways in which one could defend against threats to space assets: non-destructive and destructive. In non-destructive methods, "jamming" and "spoofing" are used to interfere with a satellite's systems. Electro-optical countermeasures such as "dazzling" optical sensors are also available.[SUP]9[/SUP] However, for such countermeasures to work, detailed knowledge of the targeted satellite is usually necessary. Among destructive methods are the Kinetic Energy-Anti-Satellite Weapon (KE-ASAT) and the co-orbital ASAT. Kinetic energy kill vehicles are lifted into space by rockets and destroy satellites by physically ramming into them.[SUP]10 [/SUP]Co-orbital ASAT systems on the other hand are orbited into space like any other satellite, but are put through a series of maneuvers to collide with and destroy a designated satellite.[SUP]11[/SUP] Thus far, there are few indications that India is invested in non-destructive countermeasures. The evidence so far suggests that India is keeping its option on the KE-ASAT open. India has also indicated some interest in building a ground-based laser program although not much is known about the program in the public domain.[SUP]12[/SUP] Just recently, in March of 2011, DRDO tested a short-range ballistic missile interceptor, a radio frequency seeker, and a fiber-optic gyroscope, as parts of its ongoing anti-ballistic intercept program.[SUP]13[/SUP] These systems could also in theory serve as components of an operational KE-ASAT capability in the future.The Indian approach to developing ASAT weapon technologies is measured and exploratory. It follows the now institutionalized methodology of developing dual-use technologies that have civilian and military spin-offs; or tacking military programs onto already instituted ones. The Indian approach also emphasizes the significance of 'technology demonstration' over the proving of operational military systems. Technology demonstration is less provocative externally, allows long lead times for technologies to mature, and is sensitive to the difficulties of building consensus within the Indian political system. This was the path for example that India took in developing nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and ballistic missile systems. To be sure, India has now elected in favor of operational nuclear and missile capabilities. However, for at least a decade, nuclear weapons were part of a hedge strategy. Similarly, chemical weapons were developed but never incorporated into the military's operational planning. Based on statements from ISRO and DRDO representatives, it appears that any program to validate technologies for a KE-ASAT program would also fit into the genre of a hedge and demonstrate strategy.[SUP]14[/SUP]The merits of a hedge and demonstrate strategy apart, there are pressures to test and validate key technologies for political reasons. Many Indian strategic analysts analogize from India's harsh experience under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to urge the testing and validation of operational systems. They fear the possibility of an NPT-analogous space regime that might once again draw an artificial dividing line between 'haves' and 'have nots'.[SUP]15[/SUP] Indian military leaders, perhaps wary of the DRDO's past failures in making good on its promises to develop working systems as well as the operational demands of having capabilities on the ground, also favor operational validation over technology demonstration.[SUP]16[/SUP] The technologists and scientists from DRDO and ISRO however are less keen on a program of operational testing for two reasons. First, they believe that since many KE-ASAT technologies overlap with the ballistic missile defense system currently under development, especially in the areas of radar tracking and target acquisition, a separate test program would be of little practical value. But more significant, they are concerned that a full operational test would add to the problem of space debris, which now poses a serious threat to all space assets in the LEO. China's ASAT test for example increased space debris (debris of diameter greater than 1 cm) in LEO by 15-20 percent, an experience that DRDO and ISRO are keen to avoid.[SUP]17[/SUP]The ASAT debate once again attests to the status quo bias in Indian national security decision-making. It shows that Indian institutions respond to threats. But they do not necessarily anticipate them. Indian political leaders for example have still not publicly endorsed statements from ISRO, DRDO and the military. The Indian military's wish list for an operational ASAT capability is also unlikely to be met for three reasons. First, it is not apparent that China poses an immediate operational threat to Indian space assets. Second, civilian agencies such as ISRO and DRDO have historically enjoyed far greater influence than the military in shaping strategic research and development choices. And finally, Indian political leaders are likely to find a hedge and demonstrate strategy less controversial and more economically viable. Thus an Indian ASAT program will more likely constitute a shadow capability in the short-term.
[/URL]
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Ex-ISRO chief calls China`s A-SAT a cause for worry
Ex-ISRO chief calls China's A-SAT a cause for worry
New Delhi: Former ISRO chief Dr K Kasturirangan on Monday said China's military capabilities in space, as demonstrated in 2007 by destroying a satellite, was a cause for worry for India.
"Obviously we start worrying. We cannot overlook this aspect," Kasturirangan said, referring to China's Anti-Satellite (A-SAT) capabilities, after releasing an Institute of Defence and Strategic Analyses (IDSA) report on 'Space Security' here.
"China's A-SAT capabilities displayed a few years ago was to show to the world that they too can do it. That China can do what it wants to do and demonstrate that it can do even more...to supersede the best of the world, that is the US," he said.
He said such a threat to India's satellites from the neighbourhood certainly called for an immediate enhancement of our capabilities to ensure safety and security of the space assets, as also putting them for military use.
"India has spent a huge sum to develop its capabilities and place assets in space. Hence, it becomes necessary to protect them from adversaries. There is a need to look at means of securing these," he said.
Noting that India had done well in civilian aspects of space technology, Kasturirangan said the country needed to put the assets to good use, as it strengthened war fighting capabilities of the armed forces.
Kasturirangan said the space assets provided "a multiplier effect" when integrated with the war fighting system of the armed forces.
"The situation has come when we cannot ignore the demands (of space in military applications). We need to have necessary security apparatus to deal with the threats to our space assets," he said.
Referring to United Nations' Conventions relating to space, the former ISRO chief said it did not prevent "militarisation" of space, as opposed to "weaponisation".
He called for the government to formulate a policy to deal with the whole gamut of space security issues, set up an institutional framework to handle them, put all technology required for the purpose in place, and create operational capabilities to integrate both civilian and military structures for leveraging space capabilities.
"Space security is a very critical issue to be addressed at the policy-makers level," he added.
Describing the US as the "indisputable leader" in space as of today, the former ISRO chief said Russia, China and Europe came in at the second rung of the space super league.
He placed India in the third rung along side Japan and Israel and said these three nations had the potential to get into the second tier of the space powers.
Ex-ISRO chief calls China's A-SAT a cause for worry
New Delhi: Former ISRO chief Dr K Kasturirangan on Monday said China's military capabilities in space, as demonstrated in 2007 by destroying a satellite, was a cause for worry for India.
"China's A-SAT capabilities displayed a few years ago was to show to the world that they too can do it. That China can do what it wants to do and demonstrate that it can do even more...to supersede the best of the world, that is the US," he said.
He said such a threat to India's satellites from the neighbourhood certainly called for an immediate enhancement of our capabilities to ensure safety and security of the space assets, as also putting them for military use.
"India has spent a huge sum to develop its capabilities and place assets in space. Hence, it becomes necessary to protect them from adversaries. There is a need to look at means of securing these," he said.
Noting that India had done well in civilian aspects of space technology, Kasturirangan said the country needed to put the assets to good use, as it strengthened war fighting capabilities of the armed forces.
Kasturirangan said the space assets provided "a multiplier effect" when integrated with the war fighting system of the armed forces.
"The situation has come when we cannot ignore the demands (of space in military applications). We need to have necessary security apparatus to deal with the threats to our space assets," he said.
Referring to United Nations' Conventions relating to space, the former ISRO chief said it did not prevent "militarisation" of space, as opposed to "weaponisation".
He called for the government to formulate a policy to deal with the whole gamut of space security issues, set up an institutional framework to handle them, put all technology required for the purpose in place, and create operational capabilities to integrate both civilian and military structures for leveraging space capabilities.
"Space security is a very critical issue to be addressed at the policy-makers level," he added.
Describing the US as the "indisputable leader" in space as of today, the former ISRO chief said Russia, China and Europe came in at the second rung of the space super league.
He placed India in the third rung along side Japan and Israel and said these three nations had the potential to get into the second tier of the space powers.
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http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1235/1
[h=1]China's BX-1 microsatellite: a litmus test for space weaponization[/h]In the wake of China's recent successful spacewalk and safe return of their three taikonauts, there have been [URL="http://www.livescience.com/blogs/2008/10/16/chinas-shenzhou-7-debate-over-mission-messages/"]concerns floating around the Internet over the microsatellite that was released at the end of this mission. Called the BX-1 in the official satellite catalog, and also referred to asCompanionSat, it was a very small cube approximately 40 centimeters on a side (16 inches) and weighing around 40 kilograms (90 pounds).
According to official reports by the Chinese media and interviews with Chinese officials, the purpose of the BX-1 was to provide images of the Shenzhou-7 (SH-7) capsule and demonstrate the ability to inspect the orbital module and conduct some limited proximity operations. It also carried out a data relay experiment. However, some observers have concluded that the BX-1 was actually a test of some of the capabilities required for a co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) attack.
The direct ascent ASATs which were used to destroy the Fengyun 1C weather satellite in January 2007 and the USA 193 spy satellitein February 2008 were fired from the surface of the Earth, travelled on a ballistic arc toward their target, and intercepted it at high speed. Total flight time from launch to impact for these types of weapons is usually less than 15 minutes when attacking low orbits. By contrast a co-orbital ASAT is actually put into orbit like any other satellite. After a certain period of time, the ASAT conducts a series of maneuvers to put it on a collision course with its target. A version of this developed and tested by the Soviet Union fired a cloud of small pellets at its target like a shotgun blast.
The facts behind the BX-1 mission are still coming to light, but here is a summary of what is known at this point. About two and half hours after the spacewalk, the BX-1 microsatellite was released from it resting position on top of the Shenzhou 7 module. This release was done via a spring, which is a very common method of deploying microsatellites due to its reliability and simplicity. At this point the BX-1 was not under active control and drifted away from the SH-7 to a maximum distance of around 100 to 200 kilometers after a few days.
Approximately four hours after its release, the BX-1 made its closest approach to the International Space Station (ISS) of around 25 kilometers. The SH-7 itself made its own close approach shortly thereafter coming within 36 kilometers of the ISS. In both of these cases, it is important to understand the difference in orbits between the vehicles. The lowest point (perigee) of the ISS was 347 kilometers and the highest point (apogee) of the SH-7 orbit was 336 kilometers. The SH-7/BX-1 and ISS were also in different inclinations: 42.4 degrees and 51.6 degrees, respectively. This means that not only were they at different altitudes but also their orbits intersected at about a 10-degree angle. There was no danger of collision.
The BX-1 was released a few minutes after the ISS passed in front of the SH-7. Two and a half orbits later, when the BX-1 was at its closest point to the ISS, it was still fairly close to the SH-7 and within view of China's limited space surveillance network. It makes sense that the Chinese, just like NASA and the Russians, plan important events to occur over tracking stations. But some analysts have observed that if it was indeed a simulated co-orbital ASAT test, having the target in observation by the mother ship before launch is beneficial for last-minute targeting. It will be almost impossible to determine whether or not the positioning of the SH-7 and ISS at the launch of the BX-1 and close approach were coincidence or pre-planned, but there may be other explanations. Chinese TV indicated that it was timed to obtain the best lighting conditions for the optical camera on the BX-1 to be able to observe the SH-7 as it drifted away.
After the taikonauts had returned to Earth, the BX-1 was placed under active control and commanded to maneuver back towards the orbital module, which had been left in orbit. This period of drift followed by active control was part of the mission plan all along, as indicated by an interview with Shen Xuemin, the head of the institute that designed the BX-1, on CCTV during the 29th orbit. The misquoting and slight changes during translation of this prompted some to conclude that there had been a problem with the mission and the BX-1 was somehow out of control or malfunctioning. Not only was this not true, but unguided spring release is a standard method of deployment for microsatellites used by many countries.
Following a series of maneuvers, the BX-1 was in an orbit where it could observe the SH-7 orbital module and take images from a fairly short distance. Some reports have indicated that it was in a 4 kilometer by 8 kilometer "orbit" around the module. This is simply not possible within the laws of physics. In reality, both the BX-1 and SH-7 module were in almost exactly the same orbit around the Earth, with a slight difference in eccentricity. From the point of view of the SH-7 module, this resulted in the BX-1 appearing to orbit around the module with between four and eight kilometers of separation.
The similar altitudes of both the ISS and SH-7 arise from some of the peculiars of orbital missions. As you go higher in orbital altitude, the atmosphere exerts less drag on your spacecraft. This means you need to do fewer fuel-expensive maneuvers to re-boost. At 400 kilometers, orbital lifetimes are usually measured in a few months without re-boost. At 200 kilometers this drops to a few weeks. But while higher is better from a fuel conservation perspective, there is an upper limit on how high it is safe to orbit humans for long periods. No manned missions are designed to orbit above 400 to 500 kilometers for long periods of time due to the health risk posed by the Van Allen radiation belts, and in particular the South Atlantic Anomaly.
The inclinations of the two objects have similar constraints. The latitude of the launch site plays the biggest factor in determining this. The most efficient launch trajectory is due east from a launch site, which places the satellite into an orbital inclination equal to the latitude of the launch site. It is fairly easy to launch objects into inclinations higher than the launch site latitude, but it is very difficult to launch directly into lower inclinations.
The 51.6-degree inclination of the ISS was determined by the latitude ofBaikonur Cosmodrome (also called Tyuratam), of 46 degrees. This is where the first module, Zarya, was launched from in 1998. Because Cape Canaveral is at a lower latitude than Baikonur at 28.8 degrees, it is possible for both the Americans and Russians to easily reach the ISS. Similarly, the 42.4 degree inclination of the Shenzhou-7 was largely determined by its launch site, Jiuquan Space Launch Center, at 40.6 degrees latitude in northern China. And yes, if necessary, the Chinese could easily launch into the same inclination as the ISS.
There are a few elements of the BX-1 launch and operations that do not correlate to what would be expected from a co-orbital ASAT test. As seen from the live footage and photographs, the cameras on board the BX-1 were focused on the SH-7 for much of its separation time. If it was indeed supposedly tracking the ISS for a simulated attack run, why were they not pointed at the ISS? Also, it is unclear what sort of data links were between the BX-1 and SH-7. The BX-1 was sending its imagery and communicating with the Shanghai Microsat Center, a different ground station than what the SH-7 was communicating with.
In addition to concerns over being a possible co-orbital ASAT, other observers noted that the BX-1 was a precursor to a satellite inspection craft. The best example of this type of satellite is the XSS-11, a small satellite the size of a dishwasher developed by the US Air Force Research Laboratory and launched in 2005. The XSS-11 was designed to be able to autonomously rendezvous with another satellite and observe it at close range with a variety of sensors, including high resolution LIDAR mapping.
The Air Force insisted the mission was a "technology demonstration" and noted that it had applications for determining satellite malfunctions and performing on-orbit servicing. But the similarities between XSS-11 andProject SAINT are palpable. SAINT (short for SAtellite INTerceptor) was a highly classified program in the 1950's designed to rendezvous with enemy satellites, inspect them with video cameras, and possibly disable or destroy them.
Another US satellite that was designed to perform autonomous rendezvous was the Demonstration for Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART). DART was also launched in 2005 and was intended to maneuver close to and conduct proximity operations around the defunct US Navy MUBLCOM satellite. A navigation error when DART and MUBLCOM were about 200 meters apart resulted in the two objects bumping into each other at a speed of around 1.5 meters per second, slow enough that neither object generated debris nor was destroyed, but fast enough to change the orbit of MUBLCOM significantly.
Was the BX-1 a technology demonstrator for satellite inspection? Was it a test run for a future Chinese rendezvous and docking mission with the ISS? Was it a test run of a co-orbital ASAT? Is XSS-11 the reincarnation of a Cold War-era ASAT program? Was DART a failed proximity operations mission or a successful co-orbital intercept?
All of these questions ultimately are both true and false, depending on the respondent's point of view. And this gets to the heart of the matter for space weapons: the basic technologies that can be used for peaceful and beneficial purposes can also be used for harm. The same technology that allows the Russian Progress or European ATV to automatically rendezvous and dock with the ISS could also be used in a co-orbital ASAT. The same technology that is used for ground or sea-based ballistic missile defense can also be used as a direct ascent ASAT. These events are a litmus test that reveals what the observer wants to see.
This is the argument that many make against the feasibility of space arms control: because of the dual-use nature of so many space technologies, any arms control regime or space weapons ban is inherently unverifiable. But the flip side of that assertion is that any advanced space technology development is also a potential weapons program. And that has potential to lead to a space arms race as each state attempts to develop the capabilities to counter perceived capabilities in its potential adversaries.
The official position of the US State Department is "that there is no—I repeat, no—on-going arms race in space," according to Paula DeSutter, the Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation. In the strictest sense of the definition, this is correct. No state currently has placed objects in space that are solely intended as weapons for attacking either other satellites or targets on the ground. But this official position deliberately ignores the research and development that is ongoing into the technologies crucial for such attacks. This is done because it is currently the policy of the United States to not deploy space weapons while "hedging" against an adversary deploying space weapons by continuing the research and development of space weapons. This policy is a compromise between those on the political right who see space weapons as necessary to continued American dominance and those on the left who wish to use space for only peaceful purposes.
Part of the justification for this policy is that the US sees other nations, specifically China, developing capabilities that could be used to attack US space assets. But China also sees the United States developing capabilities to counter its national interests along with military doctrine for space dominance with clear guidelines for offensive counterspace and national policy indicating that the US can and will deny adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests. And so China seeks to develop technologies and doctrine to counter the perceived capabilities of the United States.
These capabilities-based assessments of potential adversaries and development of counter-tactics are an essential element of sound military planning for any state, and completely within the legitimate rights of any state to conduct. But when left unchecked by policy and oversight, they will, and historically have, resulted in arms races and increased the potential for armed conflict.
Both the United States and China recognize the immense socioeconomic value and benefit that peaceful uses of space can provide. Both recognize the benefits to military power and international influence space can provide. Both are developing the technologies to counter each other's military power and international influence. Both accuse each other of hiding space weaponization behind a veneer of peaceful uses. Both deny there is an arms race.
Unless there is a change of policy on this issue towards transparency and cooperation, both states will remain on this untenable collision course in space. And the end result could negatively affect space security and sustainability for not only both nations but all of humanity's as well.
[/URL]
[h=1]China's BX-1 microsatellite: a litmus test for space weaponization[/h]In the wake of China's recent successful spacewalk and safe return of their three taikonauts, there have been [URL="http://www.livescience.com/blogs/2008/10/16/chinas-shenzhou-7-debate-over-mission-messages/"]concerns floating around the Internet over the microsatellite that was released at the end of this mission. Called the BX-1 in the official satellite catalog, and also referred to asCompanionSat, it was a very small cube approximately 40 centimeters on a side (16 inches) and weighing around 40 kilograms (90 pounds).
According to official reports by the Chinese media and interviews with Chinese officials, the purpose of the BX-1 was to provide images of the Shenzhou-7 (SH-7) capsule and demonstrate the ability to inspect the orbital module and conduct some limited proximity operations. It also carried out a data relay experiment. However, some observers have concluded that the BX-1 was actually a test of some of the capabilities required for a co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) attack.
| Some observers have concluded that the BX-1 was actually a test of some of the capabilities required for a co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) attack. |
The facts behind the BX-1 mission are still coming to light, but here is a summary of what is known at this point. About two and half hours after the spacewalk, the BX-1 microsatellite was released from it resting position on top of the Shenzhou 7 module. This release was done via a spring, which is a very common method of deploying microsatellites due to its reliability and simplicity. At this point the BX-1 was not under active control and drifted away from the SH-7 to a maximum distance of around 100 to 200 kilometers after a few days.
Approximately four hours after its release, the BX-1 made its closest approach to the International Space Station (ISS) of around 25 kilometers. The SH-7 itself made its own close approach shortly thereafter coming within 36 kilometers of the ISS. In both of these cases, it is important to understand the difference in orbits between the vehicles. The lowest point (perigee) of the ISS was 347 kilometers and the highest point (apogee) of the SH-7 orbit was 336 kilometers. The SH-7/BX-1 and ISS were also in different inclinations: 42.4 degrees and 51.6 degrees, respectively. This means that not only were they at different altitudes but also their orbits intersected at about a 10-degree angle. There was no danger of collision.
The BX-1 was released a few minutes after the ISS passed in front of the SH-7. Two and a half orbits later, when the BX-1 was at its closest point to the ISS, it was still fairly close to the SH-7 and within view of China's limited space surveillance network. It makes sense that the Chinese, just like NASA and the Russians, plan important events to occur over tracking stations. But some analysts have observed that if it was indeed a simulated co-orbital ASAT test, having the target in observation by the mother ship before launch is beneficial for last-minute targeting. It will be almost impossible to determine whether or not the positioning of the SH-7 and ISS at the launch of the BX-1 and close approach were coincidence or pre-planned, but there may be other explanations. Chinese TV indicated that it was timed to obtain the best lighting conditions for the optical camera on the BX-1 to be able to observe the SH-7 as it drifted away.
After the taikonauts had returned to Earth, the BX-1 was placed under active control and commanded to maneuver back towards the orbital module, which had been left in orbit. This period of drift followed by active control was part of the mission plan all along, as indicated by an interview with Shen Xuemin, the head of the institute that designed the BX-1, on CCTV during the 29th orbit. The misquoting and slight changes during translation of this prompted some to conclude that there had been a problem with the mission and the BX-1 was somehow out of control or malfunctioning. Not only was this not true, but unguided spring release is a standard method of deployment for microsatellites used by many countries.
| The similar altitudes of both the ISS and SH-7 arise from some of the peculiars of orbital missions. |
The similar altitudes of both the ISS and SH-7 arise from some of the peculiars of orbital missions. As you go higher in orbital altitude, the atmosphere exerts less drag on your spacecraft. This means you need to do fewer fuel-expensive maneuvers to re-boost. At 400 kilometers, orbital lifetimes are usually measured in a few months without re-boost. At 200 kilometers this drops to a few weeks. But while higher is better from a fuel conservation perspective, there is an upper limit on how high it is safe to orbit humans for long periods. No manned missions are designed to orbit above 400 to 500 kilometers for long periods of time due to the health risk posed by the Van Allen radiation belts, and in particular the South Atlantic Anomaly.
The inclinations of the two objects have similar constraints. The latitude of the launch site plays the biggest factor in determining this. The most efficient launch trajectory is due east from a launch site, which places the satellite into an orbital inclination equal to the latitude of the launch site. It is fairly easy to launch objects into inclinations higher than the launch site latitude, but it is very difficult to launch directly into lower inclinations.
The 51.6-degree inclination of the ISS was determined by the latitude ofBaikonur Cosmodrome (also called Tyuratam), of 46 degrees. This is where the first module, Zarya, was launched from in 1998. Because Cape Canaveral is at a lower latitude than Baikonur at 28.8 degrees, it is possible for both the Americans and Russians to easily reach the ISS. Similarly, the 42.4 degree inclination of the Shenzhou-7 was largely determined by its launch site, Jiuquan Space Launch Center, at 40.6 degrees latitude in northern China. And yes, if necessary, the Chinese could easily launch into the same inclination as the ISS.
There are a few elements of the BX-1 launch and operations that do not correlate to what would be expected from a co-orbital ASAT test. As seen from the live footage and photographs, the cameras on board the BX-1 were focused on the SH-7 for much of its separation time. If it was indeed supposedly tracking the ISS for a simulated attack run, why were they not pointed at the ISS? Also, it is unclear what sort of data links were between the BX-1 and SH-7. The BX-1 was sending its imagery and communicating with the Shanghai Microsat Center, a different ground station than what the SH-7 was communicating with.
In addition to concerns over being a possible co-orbital ASAT, other observers noted that the BX-1 was a precursor to a satellite inspection craft. The best example of this type of satellite is the XSS-11, a small satellite the size of a dishwasher developed by the US Air Force Research Laboratory and launched in 2005. The XSS-11 was designed to be able to autonomously rendezvous with another satellite and observe it at close range with a variety of sensors, including high resolution LIDAR mapping.
The Air Force insisted the mission was a "technology demonstration" and noted that it had applications for determining satellite malfunctions and performing on-orbit servicing. But the similarities between XSS-11 andProject SAINT are palpable. SAINT (short for SAtellite INTerceptor) was a highly classified program in the 1950's designed to rendezvous with enemy satellites, inspect them with video cameras, and possibly disable or destroy them.
| This gets to the heart of the matter for space weapons: the basic technologies that can be used for peaceful and beneficial purposes can also be used for harm. |
Was the BX-1 a technology demonstrator for satellite inspection? Was it a test run for a future Chinese rendezvous and docking mission with the ISS? Was it a test run of a co-orbital ASAT? Is XSS-11 the reincarnation of a Cold War-era ASAT program? Was DART a failed proximity operations mission or a successful co-orbital intercept?
All of these questions ultimately are both true and false, depending on the respondent's point of view. And this gets to the heart of the matter for space weapons: the basic technologies that can be used for peaceful and beneficial purposes can also be used for harm. The same technology that allows the Russian Progress or European ATV to automatically rendezvous and dock with the ISS could also be used in a co-orbital ASAT. The same technology that is used for ground or sea-based ballistic missile defense can also be used as a direct ascent ASAT. These events are a litmus test that reveals what the observer wants to see.
This is the argument that many make against the feasibility of space arms control: because of the dual-use nature of so many space technologies, any arms control regime or space weapons ban is inherently unverifiable. But the flip side of that assertion is that any advanced space technology development is also a potential weapons program. And that has potential to lead to a space arms race as each state attempts to develop the capabilities to counter perceived capabilities in its potential adversaries.
The official position of the US State Department is "that there is no—I repeat, no—on-going arms race in space," according to Paula DeSutter, the Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation. In the strictest sense of the definition, this is correct. No state currently has placed objects in space that are solely intended as weapons for attacking either other satellites or targets on the ground. But this official position deliberately ignores the research and development that is ongoing into the technologies crucial for such attacks. This is done because it is currently the policy of the United States to not deploy space weapons while "hedging" against an adversary deploying space weapons by continuing the research and development of space weapons. This policy is a compromise between those on the political right who see space weapons as necessary to continued American dominance and those on the left who wish to use space for only peaceful purposes.
Part of the justification for this policy is that the US sees other nations, specifically China, developing capabilities that could be used to attack US space assets. But China also sees the United States developing capabilities to counter its national interests along with military doctrine for space dominance with clear guidelines for offensive counterspace and national policy indicating that the US can and will deny adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests. And so China seeks to develop technologies and doctrine to counter the perceived capabilities of the United States.
These capabilities-based assessments of potential adversaries and development of counter-tactics are an essential element of sound military planning for any state, and completely within the legitimate rights of any state to conduct. But when left unchecked by policy and oversight, they will, and historically have, resulted in arms races and increased the potential for armed conflict.
| These events are a litmus test that reveals what the observer wants to see. |
Unless there is a change of policy on this issue towards transparency and cooperation, both states will remain on this untenable collision course in space. And the end result could negatively affect space security and sustainability for not only both nations but all of humanity's as well.
[/URL]
LETHALFORCE
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http://www.dnaindia.com/bangalore/report_ir-chief-marshal-pv-naik-wants-missiles-to-destroy-enemy-satellites_1338174http://www.dnaindia.com/bangalore/report_ir-chief-marshal-pv-naik-wants-missiles-to-destroy-enemy-satellites_1338174http://www.dnaindia.com/bangalore/r...-missiles-to-destroy-enemy-satellites_1338174
Air Chief Marshal PV Naik wants missiles to destroy enemy satellites
Taking serious note of China's growing defence capabilities, particularly its anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon system, Air Chief Marshal PV Naik on Friday sought the development of India's own missile system that can destroy enemy satellites.
"Our satellites are vulnerable to ASAT weapon systems because our neighbourhood possesses one," Naik said, while delivering the Air Chief Marshal LM Katre memorial lecture at the HAL Convention Centre here.
"We need to develop ASAT technology. It is one of our challenges of future war capability," he said.
He was referring to the vulnerability of a series of communication, weather and remote-sensing satellites of the Indian Space Research Organisation (Isro), which are in orbit.
If the satellites are targeted, there could be widespread chaos in the country. Indian TV channels would go off the air, satellite communication links would snap, and there would be no updates on weather and climatic data, which is crucial for aviation, shipping and meteorology.
Isro also has the Technology Experiment Satellite, launched on October 22, 2001, in orbit.
The satellite is equipped with a one-metre resolution camera and
is capable of sending images of troop movements and installations.
The first images of this satellite were requisitioned by the United Statesfor its Afghan operations.
"Defending our space-based assets is important and the IAFhas to protect them," said the air chief.
China demonstrated its ASAT capability in January 2007; the US followed suit the next year. These are the only countries with ASAT capability as of now.
S Chandrashekhar, National Institute of Advanced Studies, who is studying India's space weaponisation, toldDNA that scientists only need to fine-tune the existing missile and rocket-launching technologies to develop an ASAT system that will act as an effective counter to China's.
Air Chief Marshal PV Naik wants missiles to destroy enemy satellites
Taking serious note of China's growing defence capabilities, particularly its anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon system, Air Chief Marshal PV Naik on Friday sought the development of India's own missile system that can destroy enemy satellites.
"Our satellites are vulnerable to ASAT weapon systems because our neighbourhood possesses one," Naik said, while delivering the Air Chief Marshal LM Katre memorial lecture at the HAL Convention Centre here.
"We need to develop ASAT technology. It is one of our challenges of future war capability," he said.
He was referring to the vulnerability of a series of communication, weather and remote-sensing satellites of the Indian Space Research Organisation (Isro), which are in orbit.
If the satellites are targeted, there could be widespread chaos in the country. Indian TV channels would go off the air, satellite communication links would snap, and there would be no updates on weather and climatic data, which is crucial for aviation, shipping and meteorology.
Isro also has the Technology Experiment Satellite, launched on October 22, 2001, in orbit.
The satellite is equipped with a one-metre resolution camera and
is capable of sending images of troop movements and installations.
The first images of this satellite were requisitioned by the United Statesfor its Afghan operations.
"Defending our space-based assets is important and the IAFhas to protect them," said the air chief.
China demonstrated its ASAT capability in January 2007; the US followed suit the next year. These are the only countries with ASAT capability as of now.
S Chandrashekhar, National Institute of Advanced Studies, who is studying India's space weaponisation, toldDNA that scientists only need to fine-tune the existing missile and rocket-launching technologies to develop an ASAT system that will act as an effective counter to China's.
LETHALFORCE
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[url]http://www.spacenews.com/military/india-developing-anti-satellite-technology.html
India Developing Means To Destroy Satellites
PARIS — India has begun development of lasers and anexoatmospheric kill vehicle that could be combined to produce a weapon to destroy enemy satellites in orbit, the director-general of India's defense research organization said Jan. 3.
"The kill vehicle, which is needed for intercepting the satellite, needs to be developed, and that work is going on as part of the ballistic missile defense program," said V.K. Saraswat, director-general of the DefenceResearch and Development Organisation (DRDO), which is part of India's Ministry of Defence.
In a televised press briefing during the 97th Indian Science Congress inThiruvananthapuram, Saraswat said the program includes the development of lasers "which will be able to give you a concrete picture of the satellite, and use that picture to guide your kill vehicle towards that. That work has yet to be done."
The DRDO expects to have all the building blocks ready between 2012 and 2014, he said. An interceptor missile with a range of 120 to 140 kilometers will be test fired in September 2010, he said.
Saraswat said that while work on individual components of the system is going on, the anti-satellite (A-Sat) weapon will be built and tested only "if and when the country needs it." Saraswat, who is also the scientific adviser to the defense minister, said space security is going to be a major issue in the future and that India should not be left behind.
[/URL]
India Developing Means To Destroy Satellites
PARIS — India has begun development of lasers and anexoatmospheric kill vehicle that could be combined to produce a weapon to destroy enemy satellites in orbit, the director-general of India's defense research organization said Jan. 3.
"The kill vehicle, which is needed for intercepting the satellite, needs to be developed, and that work is going on as part of the ballistic missile defense program," said V.K. Saraswat, director-general of the DefenceResearch and Development Organisation (DRDO), which is part of India's Ministry of Defence.
In a televised press briefing during the 97th Indian Science Congress inThiruvananthapuram, Saraswat said the program includes the development of lasers "which will be able to give you a concrete picture of the satellite, and use that picture to guide your kill vehicle towards that. That work has yet to be done."
The DRDO expects to have all the building blocks ready between 2012 and 2014, he said. An interceptor missile with a range of 120 to 140 kilometers will be test fired in September 2010, he said.
Saraswat said that while work on individual components of the system is going on, the anti-satellite (A-Sat) weapon will be built and tested only "if and when the country needs it." Saraswat, who is also the scientific adviser to the defense minister, said space security is going to be a major issue in the future and that India should not be left behind.
[/URL]
LETHALFORCE
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CHINESE ANTI SATELLITE MISSILE TEST STILL REMAINS A TREAT
The test of anti-satellite technology is believed to be the first of its kind in two decades by any nation and raised concerns about the vulnerability of U.S. satellites and a possible arms race in space.
China's action drew sharp protests from other nations with satellite programs -- a predictable response that experts said dramatically illustrates Chinese willingness to face broad international criticism when it comes to space, which Beijing considers a key part of the push to modernize its military and increase its ability to compete in high-tech warfare.
"The U.S. believes China's development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil space area," National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe said yesterday. "We and other countries have expressed our concern regarding this action to the Chinese."
A spokesman at the Chinese Embassy said that he had no information about the anti-satellite test. The Chinese military did not mention the test either. But a Chinese newspaper that concentrates on foreign affairs, Global Times, relayed the reports from Washington in today's editions. The newspaper quoted Maj. Gen. Peng Guangquin as saying that the U.S. government was making too much of the test.
In addition to introducing a renewed military dimension to space, the destruction of the Chinese satellite created a large "debris cloud" that can seriously damage other satellites in nearby orbit, and possibly even spacecraft on their way to the moon or beyond. Analysts said that based on computer models, as many as 300,000 pieces of debris may have been created. While many would be very small, they said, hundreds would be large enough to create potentially serious problems.
The United States and the Soviet Union tested anti-satellite technology in the 1980s, and the United States shot down one of its orbiting satellites in 1985. Partially as a result of the debris problem, both sides stopped the programs.
The Chinese test, first reported online by the magazine Aviation Week and Space Technology, comes at a time of heightened tensions between the United States and China over space. China is leading an effort in the United Nations to set up an international conference to address what many consider to be an imminent space arms race. The United States has opposed the idea, arguing that it is not needed because there is no arms race in space. The Bush administration nevertheless released an updated national space policy last fall that strongly asserted an American right to defend itself in space against any actions it considers hostile.
The U.S. military is especially dependent on satellites for navigation, communications and missile guidance, while the American economy could also be broadly damaged by disruptions of communications, weather and other satellites. Some in the administration believe that this has left the nation especially vulnerable to attack and have proposed efforts to develop ways to defend its assets in space.
The day the test was conducted, the chiefs of major U.S. intelligence agencies presented their annual threat assessments to Congress. Neither China's anti-satellite program nor its general push toward space weapons was mentioned during the public hearing or anywhere in the written testimonies of the director of national intelligence, the director of the Pentagon's intelligence agency or the CIA director.
The United States retains the ability to destroy low-orbit satellites and has been conducting research on more advanced systems for years.
Officials who have been briefed on the test said that the Chinese ballistic missile reached as high as some U.S. spy satellites are positioned. Other satellites positioned at the same altitude are part of the missile defense network that the U.S. military is assembling. Sources said a hit-to-destroy ballistic missile could knock out any satellites at that low orbit. Many sensitive communications satellites are much higher, at about 22,000 miles above Earth, and officials said yesterday that the recent test does not prove that China has the capability to disrupt those systems. Still, U.S. intelligence officers and administration officials fretted.
For the second time in three years, China has shot down one of its dysfunctional satellites with a missile, US-based Foreign Policy magazine reported in its latest issue.
The destruction of the satellite, which reportedly happened in January, shows China's defensive missile ability, the magazine said.
China's Ministry of National Defense has yet to comment on the report.
The reported firing took place at almost the same time as a successful missile interception test that China conducted on Jan 11.
The website of Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV said the anti-satellite missile test, if confirmed, is likely related to the missile interception test, which occurred at the peak of a dispute between Beijing and Washington on a massive US arms sales deal to Taiwan.
During the interception test, US agencies spotted two missiles launched from two locations from the Chinese mainland, colliding outside the atmosphere, a Pentagon spokesperson said.
China's Foreign Ministry then said the interception test was defensive in nature and was not targeting any country.
Many military scholars believe it was targeting the Patriot missile defense system that Taiwan was trying to buy from the US at that time.
China's first anti-satellite missile test was conducted successfully on Jan 11, 2007, destroying an abandoned Chinese satellite.
The Foreign Policy article did not reveal any other details of the move or any response from the US government.
Chinese military experts even warned that Washington appeared determined to surround China with US-build anti-missile systems.
However, Peng Guangqian, a Beijing-based military expert, said the newly reported anti-satellite missile test was not necessarily related to the US arms deal with Taiwan.
"It was a large test which needs time to prepare for," he said.
"If confirmed, I think it was a further step for China to improve its defensive ability in space."
Peng also said that China has long advocated the principle of a nonmilitary outer space, on which the US has long kept silent.
Lobbed into space atop a ballistic missile, the ASAT destroyed the weather-watching satellite that had been orbiting Earth since May 10, 1999 [image]. The result was littering Earth orbit with hundreds upon hundreds of various sizes of shrapnel.
Debris cloud
NASA's Orbital Debris Program Office at the Johnson Space Center is now at liberty to discuss the characteristics and consequences of the debris cloud created by the fragmentation of the Fengyun-1C spacecraft.
As of today, the U.S. military's Space Surveillance Network has cataloged nearly 600 debris fragments, according to NASA's Nicholas Johnson, Chief Scientist for Orbital Debrisat the space agency's Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas.
However, more than 300 additional fragments are also being tracked, bringing it to a total of more than 900 bits of clutter. "These will be cataloged in due course," Johnson added.
"The total count of tracked objects could go even higher. Based upon the mass of Fengyun-1C and the conditions of the breakup, the standard NASA model for estimating the number of objects greater than 4 inches (10 centimeters) in size predicts a total about 950 such debris," Johnson advised SPACE.com.
Most prolific and serious fragmentation
Johnson said that the debris cloud extends from less than 125 miles (200 kilometers) to more than 2,292 miles (3,850 kilometers), encompassing all of low Earth orbit. The majority of the debris have mean altitudes of 528 miles (850 kilometers) or greater, "which means most will be very long-lived," he said.
The number of smaller orbital debris from this breakup is much higher than the 900-plus being tracked. NASA estimates that the number of debris larger than 1 centimeter is greater than 35,000 bits of riff-raff.
"Any of these debris has the potential for seriously disrupting or terminating the mission of operational spacecraft in low Earth orbit," Johnson pointed out. "This satellite breakup represents the most prolific and serious fragmentation in the course of 50 years of space operations," he said.
Also put in harm's way by the rain of junk from the Chinese ASAT test is the International Space Station (ISS).
"The collision risk between the Fengyun-1C debris cloud and the International Space Station peaked shortly after the breakup and has been declining since. The risk of collisions between ISS and hazardous objects in Earth orbit is now once again dominated by the background debris population existing prior to the breakup of Fengyun-1C," Johnson said.
Collision of coincidences
Last year's signing by U.S. President George W. Bush of a new U.S. National Space Policy addressed the topic of orbital debris. The document flagged the progress made both nationally and internationally regarding proliferation of orbital debris over the past decade - but also underscored the worrisome nature of space junk.
"Orbital debris poses a risk to continued reliable use of space-based services and operations and to the safety of persons and property in space and on Earth," the White House document stated. "The United States shall seek to minimize the creation of orbital debris by government and non-government operations in space in order to preserve the space environment for future generations."
In a collision of coincidences, the 25th meeting of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) is slated for April 23-26 and is hosted by the China National Space Administration. The meeting is to be held at the China Academy of Space Technology in Beijing.
IADC is an international governmental forum for the worldwide coordination of activities related to the issues of human-made and natural debris in space.
Also, reactions spurred by China's ASAT actions are sure to surface later this month at a meeting of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in Vienna.
On the UN agenda is the potential approval of draft Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines that were hammered out last year.
The test of anti-satellite technology is believed to be the first of its kind in two decades by any nation and raised concerns about the vulnerability of U.S. satellites and a possible arms race in space.
China's action drew sharp protests from other nations with satellite programs -- a predictable response that experts said dramatically illustrates Chinese willingness to face broad international criticism when it comes to space, which Beijing considers a key part of the push to modernize its military and increase its ability to compete in high-tech warfare.
"The U.S. believes China's development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil space area," National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe said yesterday. "We and other countries have expressed our concern regarding this action to the Chinese."
A spokesman at the Chinese Embassy said that he had no information about the anti-satellite test. The Chinese military did not mention the test either. But a Chinese newspaper that concentrates on foreign affairs, Global Times, relayed the reports from Washington in today's editions. The newspaper quoted Maj. Gen. Peng Guangquin as saying that the U.S. government was making too much of the test.
In addition to introducing a renewed military dimension to space, the destruction of the Chinese satellite created a large "debris cloud" that can seriously damage other satellites in nearby orbit, and possibly even spacecraft on their way to the moon or beyond. Analysts said that based on computer models, as many as 300,000 pieces of debris may have been created. While many would be very small, they said, hundreds would be large enough to create potentially serious problems.
The United States and the Soviet Union tested anti-satellite technology in the 1980s, and the United States shot down one of its orbiting satellites in 1985. Partially as a result of the debris problem, both sides stopped the programs.
The Chinese test, first reported online by the magazine Aviation Week and Space Technology, comes at a time of heightened tensions between the United States and China over space. China is leading an effort in the United Nations to set up an international conference to address what many consider to be an imminent space arms race. The United States has opposed the idea, arguing that it is not needed because there is no arms race in space. The Bush administration nevertheless released an updated national space policy last fall that strongly asserted an American right to defend itself in space against any actions it considers hostile.
The U.S. military is especially dependent on satellites for navigation, communications and missile guidance, while the American economy could also be broadly damaged by disruptions of communications, weather and other satellites. Some in the administration believe that this has left the nation especially vulnerable to attack and have proposed efforts to develop ways to defend its assets in space.
The day the test was conducted, the chiefs of major U.S. intelligence agencies presented their annual threat assessments to Congress. Neither China's anti-satellite program nor its general push toward space weapons was mentioned during the public hearing or anywhere in the written testimonies of the director of national intelligence, the director of the Pentagon's intelligence agency or the CIA director.
The United States retains the ability to destroy low-orbit satellites and has been conducting research on more advanced systems for years.
Officials who have been briefed on the test said that the Chinese ballistic missile reached as high as some U.S. spy satellites are positioned. Other satellites positioned at the same altitude are part of the missile defense network that the U.S. military is assembling. Sources said a hit-to-destroy ballistic missile could knock out any satellites at that low orbit. Many sensitive communications satellites are much higher, at about 22,000 miles above Earth, and officials said yesterday that the recent test does not prove that China has the capability to disrupt those systems. Still, U.S. intelligence officers and administration officials fretted.
For the second time in three years, China has shot down one of its dysfunctional satellites with a missile, US-based Foreign Policy magazine reported in its latest issue.
The destruction of the satellite, which reportedly happened in January, shows China's defensive missile ability, the magazine said.
China's Ministry of National Defense has yet to comment on the report.
The reported firing took place at almost the same time as a successful missile interception test that China conducted on Jan 11.
The website of Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV said the anti-satellite missile test, if confirmed, is likely related to the missile interception test, which occurred at the peak of a dispute between Beijing and Washington on a massive US arms sales deal to Taiwan.
During the interception test, US agencies spotted two missiles launched from two locations from the Chinese mainland, colliding outside the atmosphere, a Pentagon spokesperson said.
China's Foreign Ministry then said the interception test was defensive in nature and was not targeting any country.
Many military scholars believe it was targeting the Patriot missile defense system that Taiwan was trying to buy from the US at that time.
China's first anti-satellite missile test was conducted successfully on Jan 11, 2007, destroying an abandoned Chinese satellite.
The Foreign Policy article did not reveal any other details of the move or any response from the US government.
Chinese military experts even warned that Washington appeared determined to surround China with US-build anti-missile systems.
However, Peng Guangqian, a Beijing-based military expert, said the newly reported anti-satellite missile test was not necessarily related to the US arms deal with Taiwan.
"It was a large test which needs time to prepare for," he said.
"If confirmed, I think it was a further step for China to improve its defensive ability in space."
Peng also said that China has long advocated the principle of a nonmilitary outer space, on which the US has long kept silent.
Lobbed into space atop a ballistic missile, the ASAT destroyed the weather-watching satellite that had been orbiting Earth since May 10, 1999 [image]. The result was littering Earth orbit with hundreds upon hundreds of various sizes of shrapnel.
Debris cloud
NASA's Orbital Debris Program Office at the Johnson Space Center is now at liberty to discuss the characteristics and consequences of the debris cloud created by the fragmentation of the Fengyun-1C spacecraft.
As of today, the U.S. military's Space Surveillance Network has cataloged nearly 600 debris fragments, according to NASA's Nicholas Johnson, Chief Scientist for Orbital Debrisat the space agency's Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas.
However, more than 300 additional fragments are also being tracked, bringing it to a total of more than 900 bits of clutter. "These will be cataloged in due course," Johnson added.
"The total count of tracked objects could go even higher. Based upon the mass of Fengyun-1C and the conditions of the breakup, the standard NASA model for estimating the number of objects greater than 4 inches (10 centimeters) in size predicts a total about 950 such debris," Johnson advised SPACE.com.
Most prolific and serious fragmentation
Johnson said that the debris cloud extends from less than 125 miles (200 kilometers) to more than 2,292 miles (3,850 kilometers), encompassing all of low Earth orbit. The majority of the debris have mean altitudes of 528 miles (850 kilometers) or greater, "which means most will be very long-lived," he said.
The number of smaller orbital debris from this breakup is much higher than the 900-plus being tracked. NASA estimates that the number of debris larger than 1 centimeter is greater than 35,000 bits of riff-raff.
"Any of these debris has the potential for seriously disrupting or terminating the mission of operational spacecraft in low Earth orbit," Johnson pointed out. "This satellite breakup represents the most prolific and serious fragmentation in the course of 50 years of space operations," he said.
Also put in harm's way by the rain of junk from the Chinese ASAT test is the International Space Station (ISS).
"The collision risk between the Fengyun-1C debris cloud and the International Space Station peaked shortly after the breakup and has been declining since. The risk of collisions between ISS and hazardous objects in Earth orbit is now once again dominated by the background debris population existing prior to the breakup of Fengyun-1C," Johnson said.
Collision of coincidences
Last year's signing by U.S. President George W. Bush of a new U.S. National Space Policy addressed the topic of orbital debris. The document flagged the progress made both nationally and internationally regarding proliferation of orbital debris over the past decade - but also underscored the worrisome nature of space junk.
"Orbital debris poses a risk to continued reliable use of space-based services and operations and to the safety of persons and property in space and on Earth," the White House document stated. "The United States shall seek to minimize the creation of orbital debris by government and non-government operations in space in order to preserve the space environment for future generations."
In a collision of coincidences, the 25th meeting of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) is slated for April 23-26 and is hosted by the China National Space Administration. The meeting is to be held at the China Academy of Space Technology in Beijing.
IADC is an international governmental forum for the worldwide coordination of activities related to the issues of human-made and natural debris in space.
Also, reactions spurred by China's ASAT actions are sure to surface later this month at a meeting of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in Vienna.
On the UN agenda is the potential approval of draft Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines that were hammered out last year.
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US to Launch Space Arms-Control Initiative
US to Launch Space Arms-Control Initiative
The United States is launching a new space arms-control initiative, as a Russian official accuses a U.S. radar of being behind the failure of Russia's Mars probe.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is expected to announce the initiative later on Tuesday, the Washington Times reported.
The plan will draw on a 2008 European Union draft code of conduct for space, an unnamed administration official told the paper.
"The United States has decided to enter into formal consultations and negotiations with the European Union and other spacefaring nations to develop an International Code of Conduct," the official said.
"We believe the European Union's draft Code of Conduct is a solid foundation for future negotiations on reaching a consensus international code," the official said, adding negotiations to sign the code may stretch well into next year.
In 2008, Washington rejected an international treaty proposed by Russia and China to ban the use of weapons in outer space.
Last week, Ellen Tauscher, the State Department's top official on arms control, said the United States rejected the EU draft because it was "too restrictive."
John R. Bolton, a former US. ambassador to the United Nations, dismissed the initiative as "mindless."
"The last thing the United States needs is a space code of conduct," he told the Washington Times in e-mailed comments. "The ideology of arms control has already failed in the Russian 'reset' policy, and it is sure to fail here as well."
Russia's space agency Roscosmos declined to comment.
Earlier on Tuesday, Kommersant daily quoted an unnamed Russian space official as saying that the country's failed Mars probe, Phobos-Grunt, which crashed into the Pacific Ocean on Sunday, may have been disabled by "emissions" from a U.S. radar.
The official added, however, that this would have happened inadvertently.
In a newspaper interview on January 10, Roscosmos chief Vladimir Popovkin suggested "outside interference" may be to blame for a recent run of space failures.
"I don't want to accuse anyone, but today there are powerful means to affect the trajectory of spacecraft, and we cannot rule out that they have been deployed," he told Izvestia daily.
US to Launch Space Arms-Control Initiative
The United States is launching a new space arms-control initiative, as a Russian official accuses a U.S. radar of being behind the failure of Russia's Mars probe.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is expected to announce the initiative later on Tuesday, the Washington Times reported.
The plan will draw on a 2008 European Union draft code of conduct for space, an unnamed administration official told the paper.
"The United States has decided to enter into formal consultations and negotiations with the European Union and other spacefaring nations to develop an International Code of Conduct," the official said.
"We believe the European Union's draft Code of Conduct is a solid foundation for future negotiations on reaching a consensus international code," the official said, adding negotiations to sign the code may stretch well into next year.
In 2008, Washington rejected an international treaty proposed by Russia and China to ban the use of weapons in outer space.
Last week, Ellen Tauscher, the State Department's top official on arms control, said the United States rejected the EU draft because it was "too restrictive."
John R. Bolton, a former US. ambassador to the United Nations, dismissed the initiative as "mindless."
"The last thing the United States needs is a space code of conduct," he told the Washington Times in e-mailed comments. "The ideology of arms control has already failed in the Russian 'reset' policy, and it is sure to fail here as well."
Russia's space agency Roscosmos declined to comment.
Earlier on Tuesday, Kommersant daily quoted an unnamed Russian space official as saying that the country's failed Mars probe, Phobos-Grunt, which crashed into the Pacific Ocean on Sunday, may have been disabled by "emissions" from a U.S. radar.
The official added, however, that this would have happened inadvertently.
In a newspaper interview on January 10, Roscosmos chief Vladimir Popovkin suggested "outside interference" may be to blame for a recent run of space failures.
"I don't want to accuse anyone, but today there are powerful means to affect the trajectory of spacecraft, and we cannot rule out that they have been deployed," he told Izvestia daily.
