India and geostrategy

ajtr

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The New Great Game in Afghanistan


Background

Afghanistan has been an unfortunate and poor country for quite sometime. It has consistently witnessed intervention of the foreign powers into its internal affairs. After the two superpowers fighting their turf battles in Afghanistan, it is now the turn of two regional powers India and Pakistan to do the same.
It must be understood that for Pakistan, Afghanistan holds the similar importance like Nepal does for us. We do not wish to control Nepal and would like a peaceful stable Nepal. At the same time, we are alarmed by growing Chinese presence in Nepal. Similarly, Pakistan is alarmed by growing Indian presence in Afghanistan. Thousands of Nepalese are allowed to live and work in India. Likewise, Pakistan hosts about 3 million Afghans.

However, the similarity ends there. Pakistan has used Afghans to promote cross border terrorism into India. Thousands of Afghans families have been settled in POK which is in direct violation of the UN resolutions. This is something that India has always respected. Article 370 of Indian Constitution does not permit outsiders to buy land in Kashmir. Kashmiri women who marry outsiders cease to have any property rights. Thus, the demographics of Indian Controlled Kashmir hasn't been altered at all in the last 60 years.

On the other hand, India has always assisted the Nepalese Govt in developing its economy. It helped its Army in its struggle against the Maoists. It has invested in various infrastructure projects in Nepal. But ofcourse, India has also tried to interfere in the internal affairs of Nepal, but that has been essentially to keep the country stable. Nepal hosts a large number of Tibetan migrants from China. India has never tried to use them to promote insurgency and terrorism into China or even give any such impression. This is precisely the difference between the approaches of the two countries.
Indian presence in Afghanistan

It is a well known fact that it was Pakistan's ISI along with the CIA that created the Taliban. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Americans pulled, but the Pakistanis continued to support them. After the Taliban captured power in 1996, it was the Indians who continued to support the Northern Alliance. They continued to pump in money through the Tajiks. Eversince the Taliban were overthrown, India has actively invested in Afghanistan but has restricted itself to development project only. Some of the major projects are given below: (Source)

Committed $1.3 billion on various projects.
Built the 218-km Zelarang-Delaram highway to enable south-western Afghanistan to access the Iranian port of Chabahar.
Constructed the 220KV DC transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul and a 220/110/20KV sub-station at Chimtala.
Built the Salma Dam power project (42 MW) in Herat province (to finish by 2011).
Constructing the Afghan parliament building (to be completed by 2011).
Helped expand the Afghan national TV network, provided uplink and downlink facilities over all of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.
84 small projects in areas of agriculture, rural development, education, health, vocational training and solar energy.
Gifted three Airbus aircraft along with essential spares to Ariana Afghan Airlines. Also, 400 buses, 200 mini-buses and 105 utility vehicles.
Impact of Indian presence
There is absolutely no doubt that Indian presence has made a significant impact as well as a significant dent in Pakistani influence in the country. For e.g., the Indira Gandhi Hospital in Kabul is the only major Hospital in the country and has brought in tremendous Afghan goodwill. Other projects in the field of edcation, power and rural development have also made significant impact. However, nothing has made a bigger impact than the Indian made highways to Iran and Tajikistan.

Thanks to an Indian-constructed bridge in 2007 linking Afghanistan and Tajikistan, trade through that route increased sevenfold within a year and Afghan land values along that route shot up dramatically. Not to be outdone, Russia too has offered to facilitate a rail transit corridor linking Europe to Afghanistan via Uzbekistan. Increasing Afghan involvement in Central Asia can spin off and spill over, positioning it to capitalise on its natural endowments and become the regional hub of water resources, energy distribution and hydroelectric power. Indian completion in 2008 of the 135-mile road from Nimroz province to Iran's Chahbahar port provides an efficient transport corridor for goods between Central Asia and the Persian Gulf.

With the Khyber Pass under constant attack, this insurgent-free route could provide an alternative for supplying western troops with non-lethal goods and aid to the Afghan government. This would cost Pakistan economically as well as geopolitically since currently 75 per cent of non-lethal supplies are transported through the port of Karachi. If the US is able to reopen its base in Uzbekistan as planned, Pakistan's influence will erode even further. (Source)

Till date, Pakistan has refused to allow Indian Goods to reach Afghanistan through its territory. These are now being pushed through the Iranian ports. The biggest consequence for Pakistan is that these economic trends are creating conditions for a de facto partitioned Afghan state. The more stable north and west - with international linkages, economic growth and acceptance of the Afghan central government and western troop presence - can emerge self-sufficient and defensible while pockets of insurgency engulf the south and east.

Pakistan's counter strategy
Pakistan has realised that it needs to counter the growing Indian influence in the region. Firstly, it began attacking Indian missions in Afghanistan. The result of this has been disastrous. For the moment, India has decided not start any new projects in the country and is content with completing the existing projects. Secondly, Pakistan has started accusing India of promoting insurgency in Balochistan. This is again a well thought out strategy. Afghanistan is under US command and it is impossible for India to do anything their knowledge. Moreover, Pakistan media barely talks about Baloch terrorists. They dont have capabilities to conduct Lahore type attacks. This is just a diversionary tactic by Pakistan and quite similar to accusing India of stealing Indus river water. (Refer my earlier article)

Thirdly, it seems to have convinced the US to have talks with moderate factions of the Taliban where it could play a major role as a facilitator. They have found an able ally in the form of the current Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Karzai too supports talks with the Taliban. In the elections last year, the US supported his rival Abdullah Abdullah, which was seconded by India. Now, Karzai is hitting back and has made overtures to Pakistan. He called Pakistan and Afghanistan as conjoined twins - even though one is over 5000 years old while other is barely 63 years old and it is not certain whether it will remain forever.
Pakistan successfully kept India out of the London Conference on Afghanistan where it was essentially decided to open a dialogue with the Taliban. Several Taliban leaders were removed by US from its list of most wanted terrorists. Pakistan has increasing become more assertive with its demands. They presented a 56 page document containing their demands - something like the old trade unionists, in the hope that atleast some of them will be addressed. As of now, Pakistan will be given more F-16's and drone technology will also be transferred.

However, what the US fails to understand that despite all the money that it has pumped into Pakistan, the people of Pakistan remain deeply suspicious and anti-American. This is essentially because till date it has restricted itself to pumping money into millitary hardware, something that has not touched Pakistani lives. This is precisely what Kerry Lugar bill hoped to achieve. However, there was massive opposition particularly from the Army as there were provisions to monitor the usage of money every six months and the aid was conditional (only released if Pakistan remain under Civilian rule). This directly threatened the Army's hegemony. However, by directly dealing with the Army, the US has essentially weakened the Civilian Govt. instead of of strengthening it.
Possible Indian Strategy
India must realise that its laid back strategy and depending solely on US cannot work anymore. Under the 8 years of Republican rule of George Bush, India enjoyed a strong relations with the US. However, the Democrats do not seem to be bothered about Indian interests too much. India has to do everything to convince the Americans of reducing their reliance on Pakistan. One possible ally in this great game is Iran.

Iran, a neighbouring Islamic country, has tremendous stake in a stable Afghanistan. Afghanistan produces nearly 90% of the World's poppy, which is also a major source of revenue for the Taliban. Being a neighbour, the Iranians have a major drug menace in their country. They would also like the radical elements to be kept away from their territory.
Iran is among the more modern Islamic countries. It is a democractic country. Its HDI index was 0.782 which is extremely good. It has a literacy rate of 83% and women comprise of more than half of the students in universities, something unthinkable in the most of the Islamic world. Therefore, rather than the military ruled and radicalised Pakistan, it should be Iran with whom the US should be dealing with.

However, this may not be as easy as it sounds. Firstly, the US had overthrown an elected Iranian Govt. in 1953 and installed a pro-US regime. This was done primarily to keep US energy interests. However, the 1979 Iranian revolution overthrew the pro-US regime. Iran has remained under US sanctions since then. In last few years, Iran has increasing felt threatened by the US, particularly after the US invasion of Iraq, which also driven by Oil interests. Iran has therefore decided to take the North Korea's path and is developing Nuclear Weapons to deter the US from attacking. Secondly, Iran being an Islamic country is opposed to Israel's occupation of Gaza and other territories. Israel has historically enjoyed good relations with the US. With US openly criticizing any fresh Israeli settlements in Gaza, this could be the time to reach out to Iran.

Another possible ally is Russia. Russia again another neighbour that has stake in the stability of Afghanistan. Russia too has faced terrorism from Chechen rebels who have close links with the Al Quaeda operatives. The Russians who withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 are still believed have their intelligence presence in that country. But Russia again has been a long time US enemy strethching back to the Cold War era. However, recent agreements between Russia and US to reduced their nuclear warheads is a sign that the things are changing.
India which enjoys close relations with Russia and has had close relations with Iran in the past. If India could help strengthen the relations of the US with Russia and Iran, something similar to what the Pakistanis did to US-China relations, it could completely change the game in Afghanistan.
Final thoughts
As Pakistani Foreign Minister Mr Qureshi puts it, "Indian and Pakistani interests in Afghanistan cannot be the same". Ofcourse, one is development oriented while the other is not.
 

ajtr

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Afghanistan's Plight in the 'New Great Game'


By Rahab S Hawa


While the international community was quick to condemn the Islamic Taliban regime in Afghanistan for the senseless and vengeful destruction of the ancient Buddhist statues in Bamiyan, it has yet to act decisively on the impending disaster that is unraveling in the war torn, drought stricken nation.

In fact, the fatwa (edict) issued by the Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar to destroy Afghanistan's ancient heritage is an act of desperation to draw the world's attention to the situation of its people in the country.

In late April, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that 'the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan has reached alarming proportions and is likely to worsen'.

An agriculture survey in 24 Afghan provinces by the UN World Food Programme (WFP) released in late April said that one third of the impoverished farmers it surveyed will plant less than half of the land they normally sow because of drought and a lack of seed, according to a Reuters report on 26 April.

Aid workers say the lack of employment and economic ruin caused by 21 years of war and a 12-year long drought, the worst in 30 years, has forced half a million Afghans to become displaced.

According to Reuters, some half of the country's 21 million people have been affected by the drought and nearly three million were dependent on food aid for survival, says Gerard van Dijk, WFP Afghanistan country director.

Latest UN figures showed that the numbers who have fled Afghanistan because of war or drought have exceeded 700,000 since mid-2000 alone. More than 200,000 have come to Pakistan. The latter hosts more than two million Afghan refugees and can no longer accept more, whilst Iran has started deporting refugees.

Afghanistan's neighbours, Iran and Pakistan, are now home to nearly four million refugees who fled the Soviet Afghan war of 1979-89. Over the last 20 years, Afghanis have become the world's largest refugee population.

Hundreds of thousands of Afghans urgently need every basic human requirement - food, water, latrines, shelter, medicine and clothing. The UN predicts a major crisis if there is no immediate international help. In fact, it has received little from donors or to its request for assistance.

The international community, which does not recognize the Taliban regime, is increasingly reluctant to aid Afghanistan.

On top of this, the UN decision to cutback funding on demining operations will cost more lives and set back efforts to rebuild the shattered country. The decision in September 2000 to scale down by 50 percent its efforts through its Mine Action Programme will add to the ranks of amputees, beggars and widows in the world's most mined country.

'The decision is an injustice against our people,' said Mohammad Ismael Yosufzai, Mine Dog Centre operations manager, one of the half dozen demining agencies funded by the UN, according to an AFP news report dated 7 September 2000.

He said this meant that agricultural land, irrigation canals, roads, schools and other facilities would remain off limits as Afghanistan struggles to cope with severe drought and ongoing ravages of civil war.

'Meanwhile, new mines are being laid everyday as the ruling Taliban militia continue to battle opposition forces in various parts of the country,' said AFP.

The news release added that: 'Everyday, 10 to 12 Afghans fall victim to landmines laid during the 1978-1988 Soviet occupation and the ensuing internecine fighting between Afghan factions'.

In his report to the UN Security Council highlighting the humanitarian crisis, Kofi Annan has urged member states to contribute generously to the UN's $250 million appeal for Afghanistan, saying they were partly to blame for the country's plight.

'The international community having failed to remain engaged in Afghanistan following the departure of the forces of the former USSR, bears a large share of responsibility for Afghanistan's current plight,' he said in an AFP press release on 25 April 2001.

The tragedy unfolding in Afghanistan is the result of the role played by the US and its Muslim allies in the internal affairs of the country.

Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 24 December 1979, the US gave full support to the Islamic resistance against the Soviet-backed regime. Between 1979-89, the CIA poured some $5-6 billion in aid to the Islamic Afghan guerillas.

Washington's aid of guns and money was to foster the appearance of warlords, warring factions, poppy production and trafficking in opium, chaos and anarchy and criminal elements indulging in plunder, kidnappings, killings and rape.

Whatever social order that existed in Afghanistan was destroyed such that five years after the Soviet army left, the Afghan freedom fighters had turned the country into 'a breeding ground for drugs and terrorism'.

Out of this chaos, the Taliban emerged in the mid-1990s and by September 1996, they had seized Kabul, the capital, and today control more than 90 per cent of the country. When they came to power, they proved to be as ruthless as the Islamic factions they overthrew.

Although they brought some semblance of order into Afghan society, the Taliban have not endeared themselves to the international community with their brand of orthodox Islam, in their regressive policies towards women, their systematic and gross human rights violations, which were widely reported and their role in the narcotics trade. Until recently, Afghanistan was the world's largest producer of opium, the source of much of the heroin sold in Europe.

Once the Soviet army left, the US not only washed its hands off Afghanistan, but imposed punitive sanctions on the Taliban regime as the anti-US Osama bin Laden, whom the US regards as 'Public Enemy Number One', is sheltered there.

Russia supports the sanctions because it claims that the Taliban are training Chechen separatists to fight the Russians. They are convinced that the Taliban are out to destabilise the former Soviet republics in Central Asia.

The second round of UN sanctions imposed in December was sponsored by the US and Russia. The most immediate effect of the sanctions will be to worsen the living conditions for the people of Afghanistan resulting in a humanitarian catastrophe. The ten years of Soviet occupation was followed by 12 years of civil war.

Observers say that the war and devastation coupled with the drought could cause the death of between 500,000 to one million people this winter.

The shortage of food and medicines will lead to more deaths and drive thousands into neighbouring countries, destabilising the region. But the international community has done almost nothing to halt the human tragedy.

Despite the deepening crisis, heavy fighting has erupted between the two sides marking the start of a new spring offensive.

Just as Afghanistan had been the pawn in the imperial struggle between the British Empire and Russia in the 19th century, it continues to be fought over by economic and political interests using their Islamic proxies.

The 'new great game' in present day Afghanistan is the struggle for oil and gas pipeline deals involving the intrigues of its neighbours and the US, out to secure their economic and strategic objectives.

Afghanistan's problems will endure so long as the economic and geopolitical stakes remain high in the Central Asian region.

Almost totally isolated internationally, the new round of UN sanctions can only drive the Taliban further into desperate and dangerous brinkmanship, while the long suffering Afghanis pay the price.
 

ajtr

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Russia and the New Great Game


By Sacha Tessier-Stall

February 20, 2008

Red Square, by Paolo Crosetto (CC).

Energy security, it could be said, is in the eye of the beholder. Much to the chagrin of American and European observers, Russia last month moved to consolidate its strategic position in the areas of oil and natural gas by acquiring control of Serbia's oil monopoly (NIS) and signing a $15 billion pipeline deal with Bulgaria. This will cement Moscow's strategic position as gatekeeper of Europe-bound energy resources from the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The Europeans, who already depend on Russia for more than one-third of their oil and gas, are nervous. The Americans, keen on maintaining Europe's energy and economic independence, are worried. The Russians, who have just secured greater control over their most lucrative export and increased their diplomatic leverage, are relieved. As it happens, all three are right.

These two deals are but the most recent moves in what one might call the Great Energy Game, with the world's main powers jockeying for access to resources and markets. The aim: to win their own energy security, however it may be defined. In the run-up to the July 2006 G8 summit meeting devoted to the issue, the United States defined its energy security as "reduced dependence on Middle East oil [and] greater variety of oil resources," reported the International Herald Tribune. In other words, American energy security means increased and varied access to energy resources, particularly hydrocarbons.

For Russia, the world's number one exporter of natural gas and number two of oil, energy security is defined as "access of Russian energy to Europe," implying "[o]wnership of European and American pipelines," thereby constricting energy channels. In this winner-take-all competition, one player's energy security is antithetical to the other's, and control of upstream and downstream assets is the ace in the hole.

The stakes are huge for Russia. The country's economic recovery from the 1990s freefall has hinged to a large degree on exports of expensive oil and natural gas, namely to Western Europe. The political fates of President Vladimir Putin and his expected successor, Dimitri Medvedev, are related to Russia's standing in the energy game. Indeed, Putin's impressive popularity (consistently above 60 percent) is due in large part to rising living standards and a perception that under his leadership Russia has regained its great-power status, lost in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse.

Consistent defiance of U.S. interests, and attempts at establishing close, quasi-hierarchical relationships with Russia's "near abroad" have given the Russians something to be proud of. Thanks to energy revenues, Moscow has recently proceeded to significantly upgrade its military for the first time since the end of the Cold War; in late 2006, it deployed a new generation of missiles capable of evading American missile defenses.

Russian leverage in the energy sector has translated into more assertive policy toward its neighbors, both immediate (the Baltics, Ukraine) and distant (Europe). If war is politics by other means, the same can be said for commerce. Russia's policy toward Ukraine is emblematic of the geopolitical slant of its commercial energy policy.

For a few days in January 2006, Russia's Kremlin-influenced gas quasi-monopoly Gazprom (with Medvedev as Deputy Chairman of the Management Committee) completely cut supplies to Ukraine, ostensibly over that country's refusal to pay the 450 percent increase in power prices demanded by the company. Until then, Ukraine, as a member of the ex-Soviet bloc, had been allowed to buy natural gas for much cheaper than the world price; Gazprom's "favorable terms" for Ukraine were the abrupt introduction of "European" prices.

The Gazprom move had far-reaching implications, as more than three-quarters of Russian gas exports to Europe flow through Ukrainian pipelines. The crisis, one year after the Orange Revolution that brought the Western-friendly Viktor Yushchenko to power in Kiev was, according to observers, an attempt to remind the Ukrainians and Europeans of their strategic links to—and dependence on—their gigantic neighbor, which considers Ukraine a part of ancient "Kievan" Russia. Influencing the upcoming Ukrainian parliamentary elections may also have been a motive.

It is no coincidence that Gazprom's aggressive stance was adopted only months after Yushchenko initiated pipeline talks with Georgia and evoked Ukraine's "integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures," presumably euphemisms for the European Union and NATO. For many Ukrainians, the message from the crisis was clear: Don't cross Moscow. The pro-Russia Regions Party, led by the down-but-not-out Viktor Yanukovych, duly won the highest percentage of the vote three months later, putting a halt to Ukrainian NATO and EU ambitions. Not surprisingly, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov responded strongly to Ukraine's recent request to be accepted into NATO's Membership Action Plan, hinting that "future cooperation" between the two countries could be compromised.

Such a forceful posture does not represent a significant shift in Russia's approach: Since the collapse of the USSR, Moscow has frequently cut energy supplies to its ex-satellites for political motives, with Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine as the main victims. More Russia-friendly states, like Belarus, have also felt Russian pressure.

While seen primarily as assertive, Russian foreign policy may in fact be reflexive, echoing its fear of renewed containment by American allies. Over the last few years, Moscow has watched as three previously compliant regimes in the "near-abroad" fell one-by-one to Western-backed opposition, often through democratic elections overseen by OSCE-affiliated monitors. Moscow points to American involvement in the "color" revolutions of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan—all three are players in the European and Central Asian energy games—as evidence of an American strategy to encircle Russia and reduce its control over its most valuable asset.

This fear was further reinforced by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who concisely expressed American unease with Russia's dominant position, explaining in 2006 that "one of [our] concerns is that there could be a monopoly of [energy] supply from one source only, from Russia."

The players of the Great Energy Game see it as zero-sum, with one competitor's gains resulting in another's loss. This view seems unlikely to change soon, as instability in the Middle East fosters strategic cooperation between Russia and Iran, which together hold more than 40 percent of the world's natural gas reserves. On the other thorny energy issue of nuclear power, Moscow and Tehran have already consummated their allegiance, with Russia recently delivering the last shipment of nuclear fuel needed to power Iran's nuclear reactor at Bushehr.

With Moscow holding the best hand, and Washington's sleeve apparently empty of aces, now is the time to engage in constructive dialogue with Russia. For openers, each side needs to furnish the other with energy security assurances. Without assurances and without a more transparent mechanism for military engagement, this game could get out of hand—and without a referee there's no telling where that might lead.
 

ajtr

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NEW GREAT GAME REVISITED, Part 1
Iran and Russia, scorpions in a bottle

By Pepe Escobar

HONG KONG - Things get curiouser and curiouser in the Iranian wonderland. Imagine what happened last week during Friday prayers in Tehran, personally conducted by former president Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, aka "The Shark", Iran's wealthiest man, who made his fortune partly because of Irangate - the 1980s' secret weapons contracts with Israel and the US.

As is well known, Rafsanjani is behind the Mir-Hossein Mousavi-Mohammad Khatami pragmatic conservative faction that lost the most recent battle at the top - rather than a presidential election - to the ultra-hardline faction of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei-Mahmud Ahmadinejad-Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps. During prayers, partisans of the hegemonic faction yelled the usual

"Death to America!" - while the pragmatic conservatives came up, for the first time, with "Death to Russia!" and "Death to China!"

Oops. Unlike the United States and Western Europe, both Russia and China almost instantly accepted the contested presidential re-election of Ahmadinejad. Could they then be portrayed as enemies of Iran? Or have pragmatic conservatives not been informed that obsessed-by-Eurasia Zbig Brzezinksi - who has US President Barack Obama's undivided attention - has been preaching since the 1990s that it is essential to break up the Tehran-Moscow-Beijing axis and torpedo the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)?

On top of it, don't they know that both Russia and China - as well as Iran - are firm proponents of the end of the dollar as global reserve currency to the benefit of a (multipolar) basket of currencies, a common currency of which Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had the gall this month to present a prototype at the Group of Eight (G-8) meeting in Aquila, Italy? By the way, it's a rather neat coin. Minted in Belgium, it sports the faces of the G-8 leaders and also a motto - "Unity in diversity".

"Unity in diversity" is not exactly what the Obama administration has in mind as far as Iran and Russia are concerned - no matter the zillion bytes of lofty rhetoric. Let's start with the energy picture.

Iran is world number two both in terms of proven oil reserves (11.2%) and gas reserves (15.7%), according to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008.

If Iran ever opted towards a more unclenched-fist relationship with Washington, US Big Oil would feast on Iran's Caspian energy wealth. This means that whatever the rhetoric, no US administration will ever want to deal with a hyper-nationalist Iranian regime, such as the current military dictatorship of the mullahtariat.

What really scares Washington - from George W Bush to Obama - is the perspective of a Russia-Iran-Venezuela axis. Together, Iran and Russia hold 17.6% of the world's proven oil reserves. The Persian Gulf petro-monarchies - de facto controlled by Washington - hold 45%. The Moscow-Tehran-Caracas axis controls 25%. If we add Kazakhstan's 3% and Africa's 9.5%, this new axis is more than an effective counter-power to American hegemony over the Arab Middle East. The same thing applies to gas. Adding the "axis" to the Central Asian "stans", we reach 30% of world gas production. As a comparison, the whole Middle East - including Iran - currently produces only 12.1% of the world's needs.

All about Pipelineistan
A nuclear Iran would inevitably turbo-charge the new, emerging multipolar world. Iran and Russia are de facto showing to both China and India that it is not wise to rely on US might subjugating the bulk of oil in the Arab Middle East. All these players are very much aware that Iraq remains occupied, and that Washington's obsession remains the privatization of Iraq's enormous oil wealth.

As Chinese intellectuals are fond of emphasizing, four emerging or re-emerging powers - Russia, China, Iran and India - are strategic and civilizational poles, three of them sanctuaries because they are nuclear powers. A more confident and assertive Iran - mastering the full cycle of nuclear technology - may translate into Iran and Russia increasing their relative weight in Europe and Asia to the distress of Washington, not only in the energy sphere but also as proponents of a multipolar monetary system.

The entente is already on. Since 2008, Iranian officials have stressed that sooner or later Iran and Russia will start trading in rubles. Gazprom is willing to be paid for oil and gas in roubles - and not dollars. And the secretariat of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has already seen the writing on the wall - admitting for over a year now that OPEC will be trading in euros before 2020.

Not only the "axis" Moscow-Tehran-Caracas, but also Qatar and Norway, for instance, and sooner or later the Gulf Emirates, are ready to break up with the petrodollar. It goes without saying that the end of the petrodollar - which won't happen tomorrow, of course - means the end of the dollar as the world's reserve currency; the end of the world paying for America's massive budget deficits; and the end of an Anglo-American finance stranglehold over the world that has lasted since the second part of the 19th century.

The energy equation between Iran and Russia is much more complex: it configures them as two scorpions in a bottle. Tehran, isolated from the West, lacks foreign investment to upgrade its 1970s-era energy installations. That's why Iran cannot fully profit from exploiting its Caspian energy wealth.

Here it's a matter of Pipelineistan at its peak - since the US, still during the 1990s, decided to hit the Caspian in full force by supporting the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Baku-Tblisi-Supsa (BTS) gas pipeline.

For Gazprom, Iran is literally a goldmine. In September 2008, the Russian energy giant announced it would explore the huge Azadegan-North oilfield, as well as three others. Russia's Lukoil has increased its prospecting and Tatneft said it would be involved in the north. The George W Bush administration thought it was weakening Russia and isolating Iran in Central Asia. Wrong: it only accelerated their strategic energy cooperation.

Putin power play
In February 1995, Moscow committed to finishing construction of a nuclear reactor at Bushehr. This was a project started by that erstwhile, self-proclaimed "gendarme of the Gulf" for the US - the shah of Iran. The shah engaged KWU from Germany in 1974, but the project was halted by the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and hit hard between 1984 and 1988 by Saddam Hussein's bombs. The Russians finally entered the picture proposing to finish the project for $800 million. By December 2001, Moscow also started to sell missiles to Tehran - a surefire way of making extra money offering protection for strategic assets such as Bushehr.

Bushehr is a source of immense controversy in Iran. It should have been finished by 2000. As Iranian officials see it, the Russians seem never to be interested in wrapping it up. There are technical reasons - such as the Russian reactor being too big to fit inside what KWU had already built - as well as a technology deficit on the part of Iranian nuclear engineers.

But most of all there are geopolitical reasons. Former president Vladimir Putin used Bushehr as a key diplomatic peon in his double chessboard match with the West and the Iranians. It was Putin who launched the idea of enriching uranium for Iran in Russia; talk about a strategic asset in terms of managing a global nuclear crisis. Ahmadinejad - and most of all the Supreme Leader - gave him a flat refusal. The Russian response was even more foot-dragging, and even mild support for more US-sponsored sanctions against Tehran.

Tehran got the message - that Putin was not an unconditional ally. Thus, in August 2006, the Russians landed a new deal for the construction and supervision of two new nuclear plants. This all means that the Iranian nuclear dossier simply cannot be solved without Russia. Simultaneously, by Putin's own framework, it's very clear in Moscow that a possible Israeli strike would make it lose a profitable nuclear client on top of a diplomatic debacle. Medvedev for his part is pursuing the same two-pronged strategy; stressing to Americans and Europeans that Russia does not want nuclear proliferation in the Middle East while stressing to Tehran that it needs Russia more than ever.

Another feature of Moscow's chessboard strategy - never spelled out in public - is to keep the cooperation with Tehran to prevent China from taking over the whole project, but without driving the Americans ballistic at the same time. As long as the Iranian nuclear program is not finished, Russia can always play the wise moderating role between Iran and the West.

Building up a civilian nuclear program in Iran is good business for both Iran and Russia for a number of reasons.

First of all, both are military encircled. Iran is strategically encircled by the US in Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and by US naval power in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Russia has seen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) gobbling up the Baltic countries and threatening to "annex" Georgia and Ukraine; NATO is at war in Afghanistan; and the US is still present, one way or another, across Central Asia.

Iran and Russia share the same strategy as far as the Caspian Sea is concerned. They are in fact opposed to the new Caspian states - Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.

Iran and Russia also face the threat of hardcore Sunni Islam. They have a tacit agreement; for instance, Tehran has never done anything to help the Chechens. Then there's the Armenian issue. A de facto Moscow-Tehran-Erevan axis profoundly irks the Americans.

Finally, in this decade, Iran has become the third-largest importer of Russian weapons, after China and India. This includes the anti-missile system Tor M-1, which defends Iran's nuclear installations.

What's your axis?
So thanks to Putin, the Iran-Russia alliance is carefully deployed in three fronts - nuclear, energy and weapons.

Are there cracks in this armor? Certainly.

First, Moscow by all means does not want a weaponized Iranian nuclear program. This spells out "regional destabilization". Then, Central Asia is considered by Moscow as its backyard, so for Iran to be ascendant in the region is quite problematic. As far as the Caspian goes, Iran needs Russia for a satisfactory juridical solution (Is it a sea or a lake? How much of it belongs to each border country?)

On other hand, Iran's new military dictatorship of the mullahtariat will react savagely if it ever had Russia fully against it in the UN Security Council. That would spell a rupture in economic relations - very bad for both sides - but also the possibility of Tehran supporting radical Islam everywhere from the southern Caucasus to Central Asia.

Under these complex circumstances, it's not so far-fetched to imagine a sort of polite Cold War going on between Tehran and Moscow.

From Russia's point of view, it all comes back to the "axis" - which would be in fact Moscow-Tehran-Erevan-New Delhi, a counter-power to the US-supported Ankara-Tblisi-Telaviv-Baku axis. But there's ample debate about it even inside the Russian elite. The old guard, like former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov, thinks that Russia is back as a great power by cultivating its former Arab clients as well as Iran; but then the so-called "Westernizers" are convinced that Iran is more of a liability.

They may have a point. The key of this Moscow-Tehran axis is opportunism - opposition to US hegemonic designs. Is Obama - via his "unclenched fist" policy - wily enough to try to turn this all upside down; or will he be forced by the Israel lobby and the industrial-military complex to finally strike a regime now universally despised all over the West?

Russia - and Iran - are fully committed to a multipolar world. The new military dictatorship of the mullahtariat in Tehran knows it cannot afford to be isolated; its road to the limelight may have to go through Moscow. That explains why Iran is making all sorts of diplomatic efforts to join the SCO.

As much as progressives in the West may support Iranian pragmatic conservatives - who are far from reformists - the crucial fact remains that Iran is a key peon for Russia to manage its relationship with the US and Europe. No matter how nasty the overtones, all evidence points to "stability" at this vital artery in the heart of the New Great Game.

Next: Iran, China and the New Silk Road

Pepe Escobar is the author of Globalistan: How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War (Nimble Books, 2007) and Red Zone Blues: a snapshot of Baghdad during the surge. His new book, just out, is Obama does Globalistan (Nimble Books, 2009).
 

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NEW GREAT GAME REVISITED, Part 2
Iran, China and the New Silk Road

By Pepe Escobar

Part 1: Iran and Russia, scorpions in a bottle

HONG KONG - Does it make sense to talk about a Beijing-Tehran axis? Apparently no, when one learns that Iran's application to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was flatly denied at the 2008 summit in Tajikistan.

Apparently yes, when one sees how the military dictatorship of the mullahtariat in Tehran and the collective leadership in Beijing have dealt with their recent turmoil - the "green revolution" in Tehran and the Uighur riots in Urumqi - reawakening in the West the ghostly mythology of "Asian despotism".

The Iran-China relationship is like a game of Chinese boxes. Amid



the turbulence, glorious or terrifying, of their equally millenarian histories, when one sees an Islamic Republic that now reveals itself as a militarized theocracy and a Popular Republic that is in fact a capitalist oligarchy, things are not what they seem to be.

No matter what recently happened in Iran, consolidating the power the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad-IRGC axis, the relationship will continue to develop within the framework of a clash between US hyperpower - declining as it may be - and the aspiring Chinese big power, allied with the re-emergent Russian big power.

On the road
Iran and China are all about the New Silk Road - or routes - in Eurasia. Both are among the most venerable and ancient of (on the road) partners. The first encounter between the Parthian empire and the Han dynasty was in 140 BC, when Zhang Qian was sent to Bactria (in today's Afghanistan) to strike deals with nomad populations. This eventually led to Chinese expansion in Central Asia and interchange with India.

Trading exploded via the fabled Silk Road - silk, porcelain, horses, amber, ivory, incense. As a serial traveler across the Silk Road over the years, I ended up learning on the spot how the Persians controlled the Silk Road by mastering the art of making oases, thus becoming in the process the middlemen between China, India and the West.

Parallel to the land route there was also a naval route - from the Persian Gulf to Canton (today's Guangzhou). And there was of course a religious route - with Persians translating Buddhist texts and with Persian villages in the desert serving as springboards to Chinese pilgrims visiting India. Zoroastrianism - the official religion of the Sassanid empire - was imported to China by Persians at the end of the 6th century, and Manichaeism during the 7th. Diplomacy followed: the son of the last Sassanid emperor - fleeing the Arabs in 670 AD - found refuge in the Tang court. During the Mongol period, Islam spread into China.

Iran has never been colonized. But it was a privileged theater of the original Great Game between the British Empire and Russia in the 19th century and then during the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union in the 20th. The Islamic Revolution may at first imply Khomeini's official policy of "neither East nor West". In fact, Iran dreams of bridging both.

That brings us to Iran's key, inescapable geopolitical role at the epicenter of Eurasia. The New Silk Road translates into an energy corridor - the Asian Energy Security Grid - in which the Caspian Sea is an essential node, linked to the Persian Gulf, from where oil is to be transported to Asia. And as far as gas is concerned, the name of the game is Pipelineistan - as in the recently agreed Iran-Pakistan (IP) pipeline and the interconnection between Iran and Turkmenistan, whose end result is a direct link between Iran and China.

Then there's the hyper-ambitious, so-called "North-South corridor" - a projected road and rail link between Europe and India, through Russia, Central Asia, Iran and the Persian Gulf. And the ultimate New Silk Road dream - an actual land route between China and the Persian Gulf via Central Asia (Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan).

The width of the circle
As the bastion of Shi'ite faith, encircled by Sunnis, Iran under what is now a de facto theocratic dictatorship still desperately needs to break out from its isolation. Talk about a turbulent environment: Iraq still under US occupation to the west, the ultra-unstable Caucasus in the northwest, fragile Central Asian "stans" in the northeast, basket cases Afghanistan and Pakistan to the east, not to mention the nuclear neighborhood -Israel, Russia, China, Pakistan and India.

Technological advancement for Iran means fully mastering a civilian nuclear program - which contains the added benefit of turning it into a sanctuary via the possibility of building a nuclear device. Officially, Tehran has declared ad infinitum it has no intention of possessing an "un-Islamic" bomb. Beijing understands Tehran's delicate position and supports its right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Beijing would have loved to see Tehran adopt the plan proposed by Russia, the US, Western Europe and, of course, China. Carefully evaluating its vital energy and national security interests, the last thing Beijing wants is for Washington to clench its fist again.

What happened to the George W Bush-declared, post-9/11 "global war on terror" (GWOT), now remixed by Obama as "overseas contingency operations" (OCO)? GWOT's key, shadowy aim was for Washington to firmly plant the flag in Central Asia. For those sorry neo-cons, China was the ultimate geopolitical enemy, so nothing was more enticing than to try to sway a batch of Asian countries against China. Easier dreamed of than done.

China's counter-power was to turn the whole game around in Central Asia, with Iran as its key peon. Beijing was quick to grasp that Iran is a matter of national security, in terms of assuring its vast energy needs.

Of course China also needs Russia - for energy and technology. This is arguably more of an alliance of circumstance - for all the ambitious targets embodied by the SCO - than a long-term strategic partnership. Russia, invoking a series of geopolitical reasons, considers its relationship with Iran as exclusive. China says slow down, we're also in the picture. And as Iran remains under pressure at different levels from both the US and Russia, what better "savior" than China?

Enter Pipelineistan. At first sight, Iranian energy and Chinese technology is a match made in heaven. But it's more complicated than that.

Still the victim of US sanctions, Iran has turned to China to modernize itself. Once again, the Bush/**** Cheney years and the invasion of Iraq sent an unmistakable message to the collective leadership in Beijing. A push to control Iraq oil plus troops in Afghanistan, a stone's throw from the Caspian, added to the Pentagon's self-defined "arc of instability" from the Middle East to Central Asia - this was more than enough to imprint the message: the less dependent China is on US-subjugated Arab Middle East energy, the better.

The Arab Middle East used to account for 50% of China's oil imports. Soon China became the second-largest oil importer from Iran, after Japan. And since fateful 2003, China also has mastered the full cycle of prospection/exploitation/refining - thus Chinese companies are investing heavily in Iran's oil sector, whose refining capacity, for instance, is risible. Without urgent investment, some projections point to Iran possibly cutting off oil exports by 2020. Iran also needs everything else China can provide in areas like transportation systems, telecom, electricity and naval construction.

Iran needs China to develop its gas production in the gigantic north Pars and south Pars fields - which it shares with Qatar - in the Persian Gulf. So no wonder a "stable" Iran had to become a matter of Chinese national security.

Multipolar we go
So why the stalemate at the SCO? As China is always meticulously seeking to improve its global credibility, it had to be considering the pros and cons of admitting Iran, for which the SCO and its slogan of mutual cooperation for the stability of Central Asia, as well as economic and security benefits, are priceless. The SCO fights against Islamic terrorism and "separatism" in general - but now has also developed as an economic body, with a development fund and a multilateral economic council. The whole idea of it is to curb American influence in Central Asia.

Iran has been an observer since 2005. Next year may be crucial. The race is on to beat the clock, before a desperate Israeli strike, and have Iran accepted by the SCO while negotiating some sort of stability pact with the Barack Obama administration. For all this to happen relatively smoothly, Iran needs China - that is, to sell as much oil and gas as China needs below market prices, while accepting Chinese - and Russian - investment in the exploration and production of Caspian oil.

All this while Iran also courts India. Both Iran and India are focused on Central Asia. In Afghanistan, India is financing the construction of a US$250 million road between Zaranj, at the Iranian border, and Delaram - which is in the Afghan ring road linking Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif. New Delhi sees in Iran a very important market. India is actively involved in the construction of a deep water port in Chabahar - that would be a twin for the Gwadar port built in southern Balochistan by China, and would be very helpful to landlocked Afghanistan (freeing it from Pakistani interference).

Iran also needs its doors to the north - the Caucasus and Turkey - to channel its energy production towards Europe. It's an uphill struggle. Iran has to fight fierce regional competition in the Caucasus; the US-Turkey alliance framed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the perpetual US-Russian Cold War in the region; and last but not least Russia's own energy policy, which simply does not contemplate sharing the European energy market with Iran.

But energy agreements with Turkey are now part of the picture - after the moderate Islamists of the AKP took power in Ankara in 2002. Now it's not that far-fetched to imagine the possibility of Iran in the near future supplying much-needed gas for the ultra-expensive, US-supported Turkey-to-Austria Nabucco pipeline.

But the fact remains that for both Tehran and Beijing, the American thrust in the "arc of instability" from the Middle East to Central Asia is anathema. They're both anti-US hegemony and US unilateralism, Bush/Cheney style. As emerging powers, they're both pro multipolar. And as they're not Western-style liberal democracies, the empathy is even stronger. Few failed to notice the stark similarities in the degree of repression of the "green revolution" in Tehran and the Uighurs in Xinjiang. For China, a strategic alliance with Iran is above all about Pipelineistan, the Asian Energy Security Grid and the New Silk Road. For China, a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear dossier is imperative. This would lead to Iran being fully opened to (eager) European investment. Washington may be reluctant to admit it, but in the New Great Game in Eurasia, the Tehran-Beijing axis spells out the future: multipolarity.

Pepe Escobar is the author of Globalistan: How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War (Nimble Books, 2007) and Red Zone Blues: a snapshot of Baghdad during the surge. His new book, just out, is Obama does Globalistan (Nimble Books, 2009).
 

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Oil Pipelines Are The 'New Great Game': Pepe Escobar


What happens on the immense battlefield for the control of Eurasia will provide the ultimate plot line in the tumultuous rush towards a new, polycentric world order, also known as the New Great Game.

Our good ol' friend the nonsensical "Global War on Terror," which the Pentagon has slyly rebranded "the Long War," sports a far more important, if half-hidden, twin -- a global energy war. I like to think of it as the Liquid War, because its bloodstream is the pipelines that crisscross the potential imperial battlefields of the planet. Put another way, if its crucial embattled frontier these days is the Caspian Basin, the whole of Eurasia is its chessboard. Think of it, geographically, as Pipelineistan.

All geopolitical junkies need a fix. Since the second half of the 1990s, I've been hooked on pipelines. I've crossed the Caspian in an Azeri cargo ship just to follow the $4 billion Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline, better known in this chess game by its acronym, BTC, through the Caucasus. (Oh, by the way, the map of Pipelineistan is chicken-scratched with acronyms, so get used to them!)

I've also trekked various of the overlapping modern Silk Roads, or perhaps Silk Pipelines, of possible future energy flows from Shanghai to Istanbul, annotating my own DIY routes for LNG (liquefied natural gas). I used to avidly follow the adventures of that once-but-not-future Sun-King of Central Asia, the now deceased Turkmenbashi or "leader of the Turkmen," Saparmurat Niyazov, head of the immensely gas-rich Republic of Turkmenistan, as if he were a Conradian hero.

In Almaty, the former capital of Kazakhstan (before it was moved to Astana, in the middle of the middle of nowhere) the locals were puzzled when I expressed an overwhelming urge to drive to that country's oil boomtown Aktau. ("Why? There's nothing there.") Entering the Space Odyssey-style map room at the Russian energy giant Gazprom's headquarters in Moscow -- which digitally details every single pipeline in Eurasia -- or the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)'s corporate HQ in Tehran, with its neat rows of female experts in full chador, was my equivalent of entering Aladdin's cave. And never reading the words "Afghanistan" and "oil" in the same sentence is still a source of endless amusement for me.

Last year, oil cost a king's ransom. This year, it's relatively cheap. But don't be fooled. Price isn't the point here. Like it or not, energy is still what everyone who's anyone wants to get their hands on. So consider this dispatch just the first installment in a long, long tale of some of the moves that have been, or will be, made in the maddeningly complex New Great Game, which goes on unceasingly, no matter what else muscles into the headlines this week.

Forget the mainstream media's obsession with al-Qaeda, Osama "dead or alive" bin Laden, the Taliban -- neo, light or classic -- or that "war on terror," whatever name it goes by. These are diversions compared to the high-stakes, hardcore geopolitical game that follows what flows along the pipelines of the planet.

Who said Pipelineistan couldn't be fun?
Calling Dr. Zbig

In his 1997 magnum opus The Grand Chessboard, Zbigniew Brzezinski -- realpolitik practitioner extraordinaire and former national security advisor to Jimmy Carter, the president who launched the U.S. on its modern energy wars -- laid out in some detail just how to hang on to American "global primacy." Later, his master plan would be duly copied by that lethal bunch of Dr. No's congregated at Bill Kristol's Project for a New American Century (PNAC, in case you'd forgotten the acronym since its website and its followers went down).

For Dr. Zbig, who, like me, gets his fix from Eurasia -- from, that is, thinking big -- it all boils down to fostering the emergence of just the right set of "strategically compatible partners" for Washington in places where energy flows are strongest. This, as he so politely put it back then, should be done to shape "a more cooperative trans-Eurasian security system."

By now, Dr. Zbig -- among whose fans is evidently President Barack Obama -- must have noticed that the Eurasian train which was to deliver the energy goods has been slightly derailed. The Asian part of Eurasia, it seems, begs to differ.

Global financial crisis or not, oil and natural gas are the long-term keys to an inexorable transfer of economic power from the West to Asia. Those who control Pipelineistan -- and despite all the dreaming and planning that's gone on there, it's unlikely to be Washington -- will have the upper hand in whatever's to come, and there's not a terrorist in the world, or even a long war, that can change that.

Energy expert Michael Klare has been instrumental in identifying the key vectors in the wild, ongoing global scramble for power over Pipelineistan. These range from the increasing scarcity (and difficulty of reaching) primary energy supplies to "the painfully slow development of energy alternatives." Though you may not have noticed, the first skirmishes in Pipelineistan's Liquid War are already on, and even in the worst of economic times, the risk mounts constantly, given the relentless competition between the West and Asia, be it in the Middle East, in the Caspian theater, or in African oil-rich states like Angola, Nigeria and Sudan.

In these early skirmishes of the twenty-first century, China reacted swiftly indeed. Even before the attacks of 9/11, its leaders were formulating a response to what they saw as the reptilian encroachment of the West on the oil and gas lands of Central Asia, especially in the Caspian Sea region. To be specific, in June 2001, its leaders joined with Russia's to form the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It's known as the SCO and that's an acronym you should memorize. It's going to be around for a while.

Back then, the SCO's junior members were, tellingly enough, the Stans, the energy-rich former SSRs of the Soviet Union -- Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan -- which the Clinton administration and then the new Bush administration, run by those former energy men, had been eyeing covetously. The organization was to be a multi-layered economic and military regional cooperation society that, as both the Chinese and the Russians saw it, would function as a kind of security blanket around the upper rim of Afghanistan.

Iran is, of course, a crucial energy node of West Asia and that country's leaders, too, would prove no slouches when it came to the New Great Game. It needs at least $200 billion in foreign investment to truly modernize its fabulous oil and gas reserves -- and thus sell much more to the West than U.S.-imposed sanctions now allow. No wonder Iran soon became a target in Washington. No wonder an air assault on that country remains the ultimate wet dream of assorted Likudniks as well as **** ("Angler") Cheney and his neocon chamberlains and comrades-in-arms. As seen by the elite from Tehran and Delhi to Beijing and Moscow, such a U.S. attack, now likely off the radar screen until at least 2012, would be a war not only against Russia and China, but against the whole project of Asian integration that the SCO is coming to represent.

Global BRIC-a-brac

Meanwhile, as the Obama administration tries to sort out its Iranian, Afghan, and Central Asian policies, Beijing continues to dream of a secure, fast-flowing, energy version of the old Silk Road, extending from the Caspian Basin (the energy-rich Stans plus Iran and Russia) to Xinjiang Province, its Far West.

The SCO has expanded its aims and scope since 2001. Today, Iran, India, and Pakistan enjoy "observer status" in an organization that increasingly aims to control and protect not just regional energy supplies, but Pipelineistan in every direction. This is, of course, the role the Washington ruling elite would like NATO to play across Eurasia. Given that Russia and China expect the SCO to play a similar role across Asia, clashes of various sorts are inevitable.

Ask any relevant expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing and he will tell you that the SCO should be understood as a historically unique alliance of five non-Western civilizations -- Russian, Chinese, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist -- and, because of that, capable of evolving into the basis for a collective security system in Eurasia. That's a thought sure to discomfort classic inside-the-Beltway global strategists like Dr. Zbig and President George H. W. Bush's national security advisor Brent Scowcroft.

According to the view from Beijing, the rising world order of the twenty-first century will be significantly determined by a quadrangle of BRIC countries -- for those of you by now collecting Great Game acronyms, that stands for Brazil, Russia, India, and China -- plus the future Islamic triangle of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Add in a unified South America, no longer in thrall to Washington, and you have a global SCO-plus. On the drawing boards, at least, it's a high octane dream.

The key to any of this is a continuing Sino-Russian entente cordiale.

Already in 1999, watching NATO and the United States aggressively expand into the distant Balkans, Beijing identified this new game for what it was: a developing energy war. And at stake were the oil and natural gas reserves of what Americans would soon be calling the "arc of instability," a vast span of lands extending from North Africa to the Chinese border. No less important would be the routes pipelines would take in bringing the energy buried in those lands to the West. Where they would be built, the countries they would cross, would determine much in the world to come. And this was where the empire of U.S. military bases (think, for instance, Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo) met Pipelineistan (represented, way back in 1999, by the AMBO pipeline).

AMBO, short for Albanian Macedonian Bulgarian Oil Corporation, an entity registered in the U.S., is building a $1.1 billion pipeline, aka "the Trans-Balkan," slated to be finished by 2011. It will bring Caspian oil to the West without taking it through either Russia or Iran. As a pipeline, AMBO fit well into a geopolitical strategy of creating a U.S.-controlled energy-security grid that was first developed by President Bill Clinton's Energy Secretary Bill Richardson and later by Vice President **** Cheney.

Behind the idea of that "grid" lay a go-for-broke militarization of an energy corridor that would stretch from the Caspian Sea in Central Asia through a series of now independent former SSRs of the Soviet Union to Turkey, and from there into the Balkans (thence on to Europe). It was meant to sabotage the larger energy plans of both Russia and Iran. AMBO itself would bring oil from the Caspian basin to a terminal in the former SSR of Georgia in the Caucasus, and then transport it by tanker through the Black Sea to the Bulgarian port of Burgas, where another pipeline would connect to Macedonia and then to the Albanian port of Vlora.

As for Camp Bondsteel, it was the "enduring" military base that Washington gained from the wars for the remains of Yugoslavia. It would be the largest overseas base the U.S. had built since the Vietnam War. Halliburton's subsidiary Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) would, with the Army Corps of Engineers, put it up on 400 hectares of farmland near the Macedonian border in southern Kosovo. Think of it as a user-friendly, five-star version of Guantanamo with perks for those stationed there that included Thai massage and loads of junk food. Bondsteel is the Balkan equivalent of a giant immobile aircraft carrier, capable of exercising surveillance not only over the Balkans but also over Turkey and the Black Sea region (considered in the neocon-speak of the Bush years "the new interface" between the "Euro-Atlantic community" and the "Greater Middle East").

How could Russia, China, and Iran not interpret the war in Kosovo, then the invasion of Afghanistan (where Washington had previously tried to pair with the Taliban and encourage the building of another of those avoid-Iran, avoid-Russia pipelines), followed by the invasion of Iraq (that country of vast oil reserves), and finally the recent clash in Georgia (that crucial energy transportation junction) as straightforward wars for Pipelineistan? Though seldom imagined this way in our mainstream media, the Russian and Chinese leaderships saw a stark "continuity" of policy stretching from Bill Clinton's humanitarian imperialism to Bush's Global War on Terror. Blowback, as then Russian President Vladimir Putin himself warned publicly, was inevitable -- but that's another magic-carpet story, another cave to enter another time.

Rainy Night in Georgia

If you want to understand Washington's version of Pipelineistan, you have to start with Mafia-ridden Georgia. Though its army was crushed in its recent war with Russia, Georgia remains crucial to Washington's energy policy in what, by now, has become a genuine arc of instability -- in part because of a continuing obsession with cutting Iran out of the energy flow.

It was around the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, as I pointed out in my book Globalistan in 2007, that American policy congealed. Zbig Brzezinski himself flew into Baku in 1995 as an "energy consultant," less than four years after Azerbaijan became independent, and sold the idea to the Azerbaijani elite. The BTC was to run from the Sangachal Terminal, half-an-hour south of Baku, across neighboring Georgia to the Marine Terminal in the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean. Now operational, that 1,767-kilometer-long, 44-meter-wide steel serpent straddles no less than six war zones, ongoing or potential: Nagorno-Karabakh (an Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan), Chechnya and Dagestan (both embattled regions of Russia), South Ossetia and Abkhazia (on which the 2008 Russia-Georgia war pivoted), and Turkish Kurdistan.

From a purely economic point of view, the BTC made no sense. A "BTK" pipeline, running from Baku through Tehran to Iran's Kharg Island, could have been built for, relatively speaking, next to nothing -- and it would have had the added advantage of bypassing both mafia-corroded Georgia and wobbly Kurdish-populated Eastern Anatolia. That would have been the really cheap way to bring Caspian oil and gas to Europe.

The New Great Game ensured that that was not to be, and much followed from that decision. Even though Moscow never planned to occupy Georgia long-term in its 2008 war, or take over the BTC pipeline that now runs through its territory, Alfa Bank oil and gas analyst Konstantin Batunin pointed out the obvious: by briefly cutting off the BTC oil flow, Russian troops made it all too clear to global investors that Georgia wasn't a reliable energy transit country. In other words, the Russians made a mockery of Zbig's world.

For its part, Azerbaijan was, until recently, the real success story in the U.S. version of Pipelineistan. Advised by Zbig, Bill Clinton literally "stole" Baku from Russia's "near abroad" by promoting the BTC and the wealth that would flow from it. Now, however, with the message of the Russia-Georgia War sinking in, Baku is again allowing itself to be seduced by Russia. To top it off, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev can't stand Georgia's brash President Mikhail Saakashvili. That's hardly surprising. After all, Saakashvili's rash military moves caused Azerbaijan to lose at least $500 million when the BTC was shut down during the war.

Russia's energy seduction blitzkrieg is focused like a laser on Central Asia as well. (We'll talk about it more in the next Pipelineistan installment.) It revolves around offering to buy Kazakh, Uzbek, and Turkmen gas at European prices instead of previous, much lower Russian prices. The Russians, in fact, have offered the same deal to the Azeris: so now, Baku is negotiating a deal involving more capacity for the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, which makes its way to the Russian borders of the Black Sea, while considering pumping less oil for the BTC.

President Obama needs to understand the dire implications of this. Less Azeri oil on the BTC -- its full capacity is 1 million barrels a day, mostly shipped to Europe -- means the pipeline may go broke, which is exactly what Russia wants.

In Central Asia, some of the biggest stakes revolve around the monster Kashagan oil field in "snow leopard" Kazakhstan, the absolute jewel in the Caspian crown with reserves of as many as 9 billion barrels. As usual in Pipelineistan, it all comes down to which routes will deliver Kashagan's oil to the world after production starts in 2013. This spells, of course, Liquid War. Wily Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev would like to use the Russian-controlled Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) to pump Kashagan crude to the Black Sea.

In this case, the Kazakhs hold all the cards. How oil will flow from Kashagan will decide whether the BTC -- once hyped by Washington as the ultimate Western escape route from dependence on Persian Gulf oil -- lives or dies.

Welcome, then, to Pipelineistan! Whether we like it or not, in good times and bad, it's a reasonable bet that we're all going to be Pipeline tourists. So, go with the flow. Learn the crucial acronyms, keep an eye out for what happens to all those U.S. bases across the oil heartlands of the planet, watch where the pipelines are being built, and do your best to keep tabs on the next set of monster Chinese energy deals and fabulous coups by Russia's Gazprom.

And, while you're at it, consider this just the first postcard sent off from our tour of Pipelineistan. We'll be back (to slightly adapt a quote from the Terminator). Think of this as a door opening onto a future in which what flows where and to whom may turn out to be the most important question on the planet.
 

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The New "Great Game": Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia

Published on January 25, 1996 by Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. and Dr. Ariel Cohen
Introduction
The vast expanses of the former Soviet Union harbor oil and gas riches which will be crucial in fueling the global economy in the next century. The huge oil reserves, estimated at over 25 billion barrels, under the Caspian Sea and in the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are similar to those in Kuwait and larger than those in Alaska's Northern Slope and the North Sea combined.
Control over these energy resources and export routes out of the Eurasian hinterland is quickly becoming one of the central issues in post-Cold War politics. Like the "Great Game" of the early 20th century, in which the geopolitical interests of the British Empire and Russia clashed over the Caucasus region and Central Asia, today's struggle between Russia and the West may turn on who controls the oil reserves in Eurasia.
The world now faces a choice between the cooperative exploitation by the East and West of natural resources or a wasteful struggle that could cost a fortune in blood and treasure. Regional conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia threaten to deny Western access to the vital oil and gas reserves the world will need in the 21st century. The wars in Chechnya, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and in Georgia were started or exacerbated by the Russian military, and the outcome of these wars may determine who controls future pipeline routes. Moscow hopes that Russia will. Powerful interests in Moscow are attempting to ensure that the only route for exporting the energy resources of Eurasia will pass through Russia.
The U.S. needs to ensure free and fair access for all interested parties to the oil fields of the Caucasus and Central Asia. These resources are crucial to ensuring prosperity in the first half of the 21st century and beyond. Access to Eurasian energy reserves could reduce the West's dependence on Middle East oil and ensure lower oil and gas prices for decades to come. Moreover, oil revenues can boost the independence and prosperity of such Newly Independent States (NIS) as Azerbaijan and Georgia. For example, through production royalties, Azerbaijan could generate over $2 billion a year in revenue from its oil fields, while Georgia could get over $500 million annually from transit fees. With these new-found oil riches, non-Russian republics in the region would depend less on Russia, both economically and militarily. Independent and self-sufficient former Soviet states, bolstered by their oil revenues, would deny Russia the option of establishing a de facto sphere of influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Two pipeline routes in Central Asia are under consideration. The first would allow oil to flow from the Azerbaijani Caspian Sea shelf to the Black Sea coast. The second would transport oil from the giant Tengiz oil field, developed by the U.S.-based Chevron corporation in Kazakhstan, in a westerly direction toward Europe and the Mediterranean. Western governments and oil companies participating in the Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani pipeline projects1 face a choice: Will a neo-imperialist Russia (aided and abetted by Iran) dominate the development of Eurasian oil and its exports, or will Russia be an equal and fair player in the region with Turkey, the three Caucasian states (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan), and possibly Iran? The U.S. should respect the right of Russian companies to bid for the exploration and transport of oil and gas in the region. However, the West has a paramount interest in assuring that the Caucasian and Central Asian states maintain their independence and remain open to the West. Otherwise, Moscow will capture almost monopolistic control over this vital energy resource, thus increasing Western dependence upon Russian-dominated oil reserves and export routes.
In order to ensure free and fair access to the oil reserves in Central Asia, the U.S. should:

Strive to preserve the independence and economic viability of the Newly Independent States in Central Asia. The U.S. should try to prevent the reconstitution of Moscow's sphere of influence in the southern parts of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). To achieve that end, it should endeavor to ensure that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and other Newly Independent States receive a fair portion of the oil revenues from the region. Moreover, the U.S. should strengthen bilateral and multilateral political and military cooperation with these states.
Ensure that Russia is not a dominant, but rather an equal partner in developing the oil resources of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russian oil and gas companies should be allowed to participate in the development of Eurasian energy resources on an equitable basis with other countries in the region. That is their right. Forming partnerships with Western oil companies could turn the Russian business sector into an ally of the West. However, domination by military means should be rejected.

Work through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and through bilateral channels, to defuse ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus. Thus far, the West has focused mainly on settling the crisis in Bosnia, relegating the Caucasus region to the back burner. Now that a Bosnian settlement has been reached, the U.S. should endeavor to settle the conflicts in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The OSCE would be a useful vehicle for pursuing these goals.

Strengthen secular Muslim societies, notably Turkey and Azerbaijan, against Islamic militant groups. Both Russian geostrategic ambitions and Iranian-style religious militancy pose long-term threats to the Muslim societies of the region. These threats can be countered by helping to create free market economies, respect for the rule of law, and a civil society that respects democracy and political pluralism.

Support the Western oil route through Turkey to reduce oil transportation hazards in the Bosphorus Straits. Absent a new oil pipeline, more potentially hazardous oil shipments will pass through the already clogged Bosphorus Straits. Oil tanker fires like the one in 1994 can block international shipping through the Boshporus for days, causing tens of millions of dollars in damage and threatening the lives and health of local citizens. The U.S. should support a pipeline route through the territory of Georgia and Turkey that will bring oil from Eurasia to a Mediterranean port such as Ceyhan in Turkey.
Wars Endangering Oil Transit Routes in the Caucasus
The War in Chechnya
One of the main goals of the Russian attack on Chechnya in December of 1994 was to ensure control of the oil pipeline which runs from Baku, via Grozny, the Chechen capital, to the Russian city of Tikhoretsk. The pipeline ends at the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, designed by Russia to be the terminal for the proposed Kazakh and Azerbaijani pipelines.2 In addition, Grozny boasts a large refinery with a processing capacity of 12 million tons per year.
During its brief self-proclaimed independence under President Jokhar Dudayev from 1991 to 1994, Chechnya illegally exported crude oil and refined products worth hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars. The rebel government worked closely with corrupt politicians in Moscow to obtain export licenses. Partly to cut off this activity, Russia launched a massive but covert military action in the fall of 1994 to support opponents of Dudayev. In 1994, Dudayev turned to radical Islamic elements in the Middle East and Central Asia for support. This exacerbated the religious aspect of the conflict between the Muslim Chechens and Christian Orthodox Russians.
The overt military action began on December 12, 1994, when the Russian army marched on Grozny, destroying Chechnya's capital city by brutal aerial, tank, and artillery bombardment. Since the start of the campaign, over 30,000 people have been killed, and more than 300,000 have become refugees. Hostilities continue, with hostage-taking crises erupting in July 1995 and January 1996.
The Drama in Georgia
Another conflict affecting potential oil routes is occuring in the Caucasus republic of Georgia. Russia wants to prevent oil from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan from going the "Western" route through Georgia to Turkey. Moscow's support of civil strife in Georgia is directly connected to its goal of perpetuating conflict in the Caucasus.
From 1991 through the end of 1993, Georgia was in the midst of a bloody civil war which pitted the supporters of Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze and ousted President Zviad Gamsakhurdia against each other. Political violence became chronic. Eventually, the defeated Gamsakhurdia either committed suicide or was murdered under mysterious circumstances in 1993. But even after his victory over Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze faced challenges from warlords and militias.
In exchange for crucial Russian support, Shevardnadze finally was forced to join the CIS in October 1993, a move he had bitterly opposed. When he attempted to read a press release announcing this step, Russian diplomats took it out of his hands and gave him a Moscow-authored text to read. Such was the degree of independence enjoyed by Shevardnadze at the hands of his Russian patrons.
In 1995, Moscow brought pressure on Shevardnadze not to build a pipeline for Azeri oil through Georgian territory. The Georgians wanted to bring oil to the Georgian port of Supsa (between Poti and Tbilisi), from which it then would be exported by tanker to Turkey. However, the Russians demurred. Soon after Shevardnadze refused to cancel the pipeline plan, he was injured in an assassination attempt when a car bomb exploded next to his vehicle on August 29, 1995.
Shevardnadze has insisted repeatedly that Russia was behind this attempt on his life. The suspected culprit -- Shevardnadze's security chief, Igor Georgadze -- has escaped to Russia and continues to threaten Shevardnadze's life.3 Shevardnadze demanded that the Russians extradite the suspect, and the Russian Prosecutor General's Office issued an order for his arrest. However, the Russian Interior Minister refused the extradition, and Georgadze is still at large.
The Fighting in Abkhazia
Another dangerous conflict is smoldering in Abkhazia, a breakaway region in Georgia. The bitter war in Abkhazia, which began in 1992, has claimed over 35,000 lives. It was precipitated by the Russian military backing the Abkhaz separatist minority against the Georgian government in Tbilisi.
One purpose of the Russian intervention was to weaken Georgia and curb Turkish and Western influence in the region. But more important was the Russian goal of controlling access to oil. By acting as it did, Russia gained de facto control over the long Black Sea coastline in Abkhazia. Moscow also was protecting the Russian Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse and moving closer to the Georgian oil exporting ports in Poti, Supsa, and Batumi. In August 1995, Georgia's beleaguered President Shevardnadze agreed to place four Russian military bases on Georgian soil, thus assuring Russia's control of the oil exporting routes via the Black Sea coast.
As Russia became entangled in Chechnya in 1994-1995, and word of Chechen commando training camps operating from Abkhazia spread, Moscow began to show less support for the Abkhaz rebels, who are allies of the Chechens. But Russia also has refused either to close the border with Abkhazia or to deny the separatist government in the Abkhaz capital, Sukhumi, financial and military support. Shevardnadze had hoped that this would be a Russian quid pro quo for his agreement to permit Russian military bases on Georgian territory.
The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Yet another bloody war affecting potential oil pipeline routes is occurring in Nagorno-Karabakh, a small, largely Armenian enclave inside Azerbaijan. The enclave of Karabakh sits astride a potential oil route from the Caspian Sea to Turkey. Populated mainly by Armenians, Karabakh was put under Azerbaijan's jurisdiction in 1921 after Stalin negotiated a treaty in the Transcaucasus between communist Russia and Turkey. Strife between the mainly Christian Armenians and Shi'a Muslim Azerbaijanis broke out in 1988. Full-scale war erupted in 1992, with the Armenians demanding complete independence for Karabakh or its absorption into Armenia.
A cease-fire negotiated in May 1994 has been holding. The Armenians in Karabakh have proclaimed an independent republic, which Azerbaijan refuses to recognize. Thus far, Azerbaijan has suffered political and military defeat at the hands of the Armenians, losing one-fifth of its territory since the collapse of the Soviet Union. One million people, mostly Azerbaijanis, have become refugees as a result of the war. The Azeri capital of Baku has seen the government change three times since 1992.
Russia has supported the Armenians and the Azeris intermittently. In 1992, Moscow proposed that Russia become a guarantor of peace in the region, promising to send in 3,000 peacekeepers, but was rebuffed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a regional security group in Europe.4. The OSCE "Minsk group," which consists of Russia, the U.S., Turkey, France, Sweden, and Italy, has been charged with finding a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict but thus far has met with only limited success. Under Western pressure, Moscow has agreed to a multilateral OSCE peacekeeping force for Karabakh. However, this force has yet to materialize, and there is still no peace agreement between the warring parties.
Azerbaijan: Key Oil Region
The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is important because of the immense oil reserves controlled by Azerbaijan. Since the late 19th century, the oil in Azerbaijan has played a key role in the economies of the Russian empire and the Soviet Union, as well as in the global energy market. International business interests, such as the Nobel and Rothschild families, and even conquerors like Adolf Hitler have all vied at different times for control of Azerbaijan's oil. Even after 100 years of Russian imperial and Soviet exploitation, Azerbaijan still has some of the largest reserves in the world.
At stake today is a $6 billion, 4 billion barrel Caspian Sea shelf petroleum deal between Azerbaijan and a consortium of large international oil companies.5 Put simply, Russia opposes the deal. The Russian oil company Lukoil is part of this international consortium, but other Russian oil interests felt excluded, and the Russian foreign and defense ministries have come out squarely against the arrangement. In addition to demanding that at least 25 percent of the deal go to Russian firms (Lukoil gets only 10 percent), Moscow wants full control of the oil exports.
The Caspian Sea oil deal was facilitated first by President Abulfaz Elchibei, who was overthrown in June 1993 by former Azerbaijani KGB Chief and Brezhnev Politburo member General Heydar Aliev.6 While Elchibei was considered pro-Turkish, Aliev had a reputation for being pro-Russian. It was Aliev who signed the oil agreement in September 1994. On October 9, 1995, the Azerbaijani International Oil Consortium (AIOC) announced that "early" oil (approximately 80,000 barrels a month) would be split between two pipelines. The northern line would go to the Russian port of Novorossiysk (via unstable Chechnya) and the western line to the Georgian port of Supsa in two separate pipelines. This was a compromise decision supported by the Clinton Administration and aimed at placating Moscow, but it failed to do so.
Despite his attempts to accommodate Russia, Moscow apparently considers Aliev too independent. Therefore, the Kremlin is backing Suret Husseinov, a warlord who reportedly has good connections with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev.7 Between 1993 and 1995, four unsuccessful coups were attempted against Aliev, reportedly with Moscow's support. Russia also is playing the ethnic separatism card against Aliev, bolstering the national movement of the Lezgin minority in the north of Azerbaijan and the movement of the Talysh minority in the south.
Aliev has proved himself to be a tough survivor. Although Azerbaijan has joined the CIS, he has managed to resist the pressure to deploy Russian military bases or troops on Azerbaijani soil. However, Moscow probably can outwait Aliev, in the meantime fostering instability in Azerbaijan. Russia will attempt to block any large-scale production or exports of oil from Azerbaijan until such time as a more compliant man can be put in charge.
Oil Politics and Russian Imperialism in the "Near Abroad"
The main threat to the equitable development of Eurasian oil is the Russian attempt to dominate the region in a de facto alliance with the radical Islamic regime in Tehran.8 Russia benefits from instability in the Caucasus, where wars and conflicts undermine independence and economic development while hindering the export of oil from the region's states.9
Moscow has gone beyond words to establish its power in the Caucasus. The Russians are setting up military bases in the region in order to gain exclusive control over all future pipelines. Georgia now has four Russian bases and Armenia has three, while Azerbaijan is still holding out under severe pressure from Moscow. In addition, members of the Commonwealth of Independent States are required to police their borders jointly with Russian border guards, and thus are denied effective control over their own territory.
Attempts to Reintegrate the South
The struggle to reestablish a Russian sphere of influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia started in early 1992. While not a full-scale war, this struggle employs a broad spectrum of military, covert, diplomatic, and economic measures. The southern tier of the former Soviet Union is a zone of feverish Russian activity aimed at tightening Moscow's grip in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. The entire southern rim of Russia is a turbulent frontier, a highly unstable environment in which metropolitan civilian and military elites, local players, and mid-level officers and bureaucrats drive the process of reintegration.10
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, President Boris Yeltsin called for a re-examination of Russia's borders to the detriment of her neighbors, especially Ukraine and Kazakhstan. For example, upon his return from a state visit to the U.S. in September 1994, Yeltsin reiterated Russia's "right" to conduct "peacemaking" in the "near abroad," to protect Russian speakers and to exercise freedom of action in its sphere of influence.11 These statements were echoed on numerous occasions by former Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and other key policymakers in Moscow. In his September 1995 Decree "On Approval of the Strategic Policy of the Russian Federation Toward CIS Member States,"12 Yeltsin outlined plans to create a CIS military and economic union. Some observers have termed this design an informal empire "on the cheap," a "sustainable empire" which is less centralized than the old Soviet Union.13 The aim of such an arrangement would be to ensure Russia's control of the oil and gas reserves in Eurasia.
Competing political interests inside Russia's neighbors often prompt local elites to challenge the faction in power and to seek Moscow's support. For example, Russian oil chieftains in Kazakhstan and military commanders who are still in place in Moldova and Georgia naturally maintain close links with Moscow. Where it lacks troops on the ground, Moscow supports the most pro-Russian faction in the conflict, such as Trans-Dniestrian ethnic Russians in Moldova, the separatist Abkhazs in Georgia, warlords and former communist leaders in Azerbaijan, and pro-communist clans in Tajikistan. This is a classic scenario for imperial expansion. What is common to these conflicts is that without Russian support, the pro-Moscow factions (regardless of their ethnicity) could not have dominated their respective regions, and would be forced to seek negotiated and peaceful solutions. In each case, appeals by the legitimate governments of the Newly Independent States to restore their territorial integrity were ignored by Moscow.
Russian political elites have not overcome the imperialist ideology that inspired both pre-1917 and Soviet expansionism. For today's Moscow bureaucrats and generals, as for their predecessors in St. Petersburg prior to 1917, the turbulent southern periphery is a potential source of political fortunes, promotions, and careers. For Russian politicians in search of a grand cause, re-establishing the empire and paying for it with Eurasian oil revenues is a winning proposition, especially in the murky environment in the aftermath of imperial collapse.
Key Russian Players in the Great Oil Game
The Russian military and security services are by far the most resolute driving force behind the restoration of a Russian-dominated CIS. They are playing a key role in ensuring Moscow's control over the pipeline routes. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Berlin Wall terminated, at least temporarily, confrontation with the West, leaving the Red Army's General Staff, the Russian military intelligence (GRU), and the former KGB desperately seeking new missions. The biggest of these new missions is to establish control over Caucasus and Central Asian oil, establishing a Russian sphere of influence in the process.
The Russian army and security services seek to deny foreign companies the right to export oil without their control. Russian military activities over the last four years indicate an attempt to consolidate strategic control of oil sources and export routes in Eurasia. For example, the war in Chechnya blocked an important pipeline from Azerbaijan through Grozny, and the victory of the Abkhaz separatists, supported by the Russian military, further secured the Russian oil terminals in the ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse. In order to obtain an oil route in the region, Western exporters may be pressured to reach accomodations with the Russian generals.
The Russian intelligence services are also involved. The successor to the KGB's First Chief Directorate, now known as the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia (SVRR) and led until January 1996 by KGB general and now Foreign Minister Evgenii Primakov, published an important document in 1994 on Russia's policies in the "near abroad," called "Russia-CIS: Does the Western Position Require Correction?"14 General Primakov's staff argued that any attempt to integrate the CIS states into the global economy without Moscow's cooperation is doomed to fail. Russia already has effectively stopped Kazakhstani and Azerbaijani joint oil exporting ventures in their tracks.
The states of the CIS's southern tier were coerced by Russia even before they declared their independence from the USSR. Moscow incited local pro-Russian factions, such as Abkhazians in Georgia, Armenians in Karabakh, and hard-line communist pro-Russian clans in Tajikistan, to challenge the independence and territorial integrity of these nascent states. The Russian military provided advisers, hardware, training, planning, and coordination for the military activities in these areas. As a result, hundreds of thousands have been left dead, wounded, or homeless. In addition, these violent conflicts blocked the transit routes to the West for Caspian and Central Asian oil.
The U.S. Role in the Great Game
Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its empire will doom Russia's transition to a democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone has cost Russia $6 billion to date (equal to Russia's IMF and World Bank loans for 1995). Moreover, it has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society. The wars which would be required to restore the Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the region, but for peace, world stability, and security.
As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS, these conflicts may escalate to include the use of weapons of mass destruction. Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, a reconstituted Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and throughout the world. It would endanger not only Russia's neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-imperialist Russia could imperil the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf.15
Domination of the Caucasus would bring Russia closer to the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle East. Russian imperialists, such as radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, have resurrected the old dream of obtaining a warm port on the Indian Ocean. If Russia succeeds in establishing its domination in the south, the threat to Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, and Afganistan will increase. The independence of pro-Western Georgia and Azerbaijan already has been undermined by pressures from the Russian armed forces and covert actions by the intelligence and security services, in addition to which Russian hegemony would make Western political and economic efforts to stave off Islamic militancy more difficult.
Eurasian oil resources are pivotal to economic development in the early 21st century. The supply of Middle Eastern oil would become precarious if Saudi Arabia became unstable, or if Iran or Iraq provoked another military conflict in the area. Eurasian oil is also key to the economic development of the southern NIS. Only with oil revenues can these countries sever their dependence on Moscow and develop modern market economies and free societies. Moreover, if these vast oil reserves were tapped and developed, tens of thousands of U.S. and Western jobs would be created. The U.S. should ensure free access to these reserves for the benefit of both Western and local economies.
In order to protect U.S. and Western interests in Eurasia and ensure free and fair access to the oil reserves of the region, the United States should:

Strive to preserve the independence and economic viability of the New Independent States in the region. In cooperation with Britain, Germany, and France, the U.S. should prevent the reconstitution of Moscow's sphere of influence in the southern CIS. The West should not grant Moscow carte blanche in the "near abroad" in exchange for cooperation in Bosnia. The U.S. should lead other Western countries in implementing programs that support independent statehood, free-market development, and the rule of law in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Central Asian states. Training for the civil and security services of these countries should be stepped up, and economic reforms, including privatization of industries and agriculture, should be continued. Moreover, sanctions on technical and humanitarian assistance to Azerbaijan, imposed at the height of the Karabakh conflict, should be lifted to increase Washington's leverage in settling the conflict there.

Ensure that Russia is not a dominant, but rather an equal partner in developing the oil resources of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russian oil companies should be assured of equitable access to the development of oil resources and pipeline projects. The strategic goal of the West should be the creation of a level playing field that allows Russian and Western corporations to participate in the development of Eurasian energy resources on an equal footing. If cooperation from Russia is not forthcoming, the U.S. should oppose attempts by the Russian security establishment to impose a single direction for the pipelines -- i.e., north, via Russian territory. This kind of geopolitical diktat would give Moscow an unacceptable level of control over the flow of oil to Western markets and would make the West vulnerable to Russia's political whims. The U.S. government should demand that Russia stop fostering conflicts in the area. At the same time, Washington should promise that the interests of Russian companies operating in the region will be taken into account in current and future oil consortia.
Work through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and through bilateral channels, to defuse ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus. The OSCE has been charged by its members with settling the conflicts in Chechnya, Abkhazia, and Karabakh. This authority is recognized by Russia. So far, the OSCE has not been successful. To become more so, the OSCE should step up efforts to bring together the leaders of the Newly Independent States and separatist ethnic groups so they can find acceptable political solutions to the conflicts in the region. The OSCE should assign senior politicians to mediate in order to prevent new conflicts, particularly between the Azerbaijanis and the Lezgin and Talysh minorities in Azerbaijan, or between the Georgians and the Adzhar minority. An OSCE-sponsored conference to promote minority rights in the Southern CIS would be in order. The U.S. and its allies should support the OSCE's efforts and initiate a bilateral dialog with leaders of the ethnic groups to assist them in finding a modus vivendi in their countries.

Strengthen secular Muslim societies, notably Turkey and Azerbaijan, against Islamic militant groups. Both Russian ambitions and Islamic radicalism threaten the pro-Western orientation of regimes in the region. Economic development, support for basic human rights, and cultural affinity with the West are important to prevent a radicalization of Islamic politics in the region. An important ally in this regard is Turkey. The U.S. should support Turkey's bid for membership in the European Union. Turkish efforts have been sidetracked by the Europeans because of Ankara's crackdown on the Kurds last year. Washington should urge the Europeans to refrain from rejecting Turkish Westernizers and pushing the Turks into the hands of militant Islamists.

Support the Western oil route through Turkey to reduce oil transportation hazards in the Bosphorus Straits. As an important U.S. ally and founding NATO member, Turkey has raised serious concerns regarding tanker exports of Eurasian oil through the narrow and twisting Bosphorus Straits. Istanbul, the largest city in Turkey, would be endangered by the nonstop tanker traffic the exports of vast new quantities of Eurasian oil would require.
The Straits today are one of the busiest maritime passages in the world. The shipping of more oil from Eurasia would clog the already crowded waterway. Recent accidents involving burning tankers prove that Turkish concerns are justified. Free access to shipping via the Straits was envisaged in the 19th century, when the volume of traffic was twenty times lower than today. Therefore, the safest (and cheapest) route for Eurasian oil, which is preferred by Western oil companies, is a large pipeline from the Caucasus via Turkey to the Eastern Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.
Conclusion
The struggle for Eurasian oil is a multifaceted game. It involves security, geopolitical, and economic interests not only Russian and Eurasian, but American and Western as well. In Russia, nothing less than democracy is at stake. If Russia pursues a cooperative engagement with the West in the Caucasus, it will strengthen its economic and political integration with the West. However, if it chooses to challenge the West and reverts to its old imperial ways, Moscow likely will become increasingly hostile toward the West in other areas as well.
The oil and gas reserves of the Caucasus and Central Asia are vital to Western geostrategic and economic interests in the 21st century. They have the potential to secure prosperity and economic growth bolstered by low oil prices. In addition, these resources are key to ensuring revenues and, with them, the sovereignty of the Newly Independent States. In addition, the wealth brought by oil can fuel both economic and democratic development in the Caucasus and Central Asia, fostering the independence and freedom of countries which serve in turn as an obstacle to potential Russian imperial expansion.
The Russian military and political establishment is attempting to impose a sphere of influence on the CIS and secure control of the region's oil. If a hardliner wins the Russian presidential elections in June 1996, these efforts may redouble. A major campaign to assert influence in the Russian "near abroad" would be a setback for U.S. interests. In addition, control of the Caucasus and Central Asia would allow Russia geographical proximity to, and closer cooperation with, the anti-Western regimes in Tehran and Baghdad. Together, an anti-Western Russia, Iran, and Iraq, if they desired, could pursue a common interest in driving up the price of oil.
To counter this prospect, the U.S. and the West need to convince the Russians to approach the oil question in Eurasia as an economic, not geopolitical, opportunity. The U.S. should reassure Russia that its companies will be included in future economic ventures in the region. Russian companies alone do not have the technological and financial resources to develop the hydrocarbon reserves of Eurasia. They will need Western oil companies to do that.
To become richer, Russia needs American and Western help. To foster peace and stability in Eurasia, America needs Russian help. A modus vivendi can be reached only if Russia accepts that the principles of free markets, democracy, and state sovereignty take precedence over the outdated geopolitical practices of the past century.

Dr. Ariel Cohen is a Research Fellow in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
 

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The Balfour Declaration of 1917


The Balfour Declaration was made in November 1917. The Balfour Declaration led the Jewish community in Britain and America into believing that Great Britain would support the creation of a Jewish state in the Middle East.

On November 2nd 1917, Arthur James Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary of the time, wrote to Lord Rothschild. The Rothschild's were considered by many Jews to be one the most influential of all Jewish families – they were certainly one of the wealthiest. Their influence in America was considered to be very important to the British government.

Balfour declared his support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in the area known as Palestine – though there had to be safeguards for the "rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine". This communication was accepted by the Jewish community as Great Britain's support for a Jewish homeland. Other nations that fought for the Allies offered their support for the declaration.

However, from a Palestinian Arab point of view, the same area had been promised to them for siding with the Allies in World War One and fighting against the Turks who were fighting on the side of the Germans.

Therefore, when Britain was given Palestine to govern as a League of Nation's mandate at the end of the war, both the Jews and the Arabs believed that they had been betrayed as both believed that they had been promised the same piece of land. After 1918, politics in the Middle East was to become a lot more complicated as many Jews took the Balfour Declaration as read and emigrated to Palestine. The Arabs there saw the increasing number of Jews moving to the region as a threat to their way of life and problems quickly multiplied.

The Balfour Declaration was a short letter by Arthur Balfour to arguably one of the most influential Jewish families - the Rothschild's. It was assumed that the letter gave the British government's support to the creation of a Jewish homeland.below is that letter....

 
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The Great Game in South Asia: British Dogma versus American Democratic Ideals


Amongst the more exciting books I have been able to catch up on recently is 'The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition' by Narendra Singh Sarila, a former Indian diplomat and prince. It deals with what he very convincingly portrays as the British plan to partition India, mainly to protect what it saw as its own strategic interests.

I had been told about the book long ago, by its publishers in India, when I mentioned to them my own study of Paul Scott's seminal account of the last days of the British Raj. That was entitled 'Partition and Divided Selves: British Inadequacies in Paul Scott's Raj' and explored his literary exposition of the British betrayal of, not just the Indians, but also their own ideals.

I had long thought Scott the most exciting and accomplished of British writers who began their career after the Second World War. He could draw a whole range of characters and enable us to understand the emotional and psychological springs of their interactions, and he did this through illuminating evocation of the social and political background. In the process he made us understand the impact of their milieu on their characters as well as the effect their own compulsions and actions had on the world around them.

Since his subject was the partition of India, a phenomenon that still continues to affect the world at large, and in particular our region, what he had to say still repays study. He makes clear through one of his more positive characters his view of the moral implications of what the British engendered – ""The creation of Pakistan is our crowning failure"¦Our only justification for two hundred years of power was unification. But we've divided one composite nation into two."' Significantly, the tragedy is not just for the Indians (and I refer here to the original composite state, the massacre of whose people, Muslims as well as Hindus and Sikhs, Scott movingly portrays) but for the British too, for he notes that India was 'the place where the British came to the end of themselves as they were.'

However my subject here is Sarila's work, not Scott's, interesting as it would be to look at that too in greater detail. Certainly I believe the Americans should, for what Sarila makes clear is how brilliantly the British took the Americans for a ride. Unlike Scott, who sees some decent elements amongst the British, and suggests that these were overcome – because of the solidarity the former felt obliged to extend to people of their own race and colour – by the dogged determination of the prejudiced, Sarila sees all important decision makers amongst the British as ruthless in their opposition to a united India.

The rationale for this was very simply the strategic importance of India, and the continuing belief that Russian expansionism southward was the great bugbear that had to be protected against. The British thought that the Indian Congress would not prove a reliable ally in this exercise, and therefore wanted to detach a portion of India which would be tied to them for defensive purposes.

Roosevelt, though more idealistic than Churchill, could understand this worry, but his view was that solid alliances with India and China, as emerging democracies, would be the best solution. The manner in which the British made mincemeat of this ideal is related forcefully by Sarila, as with for instance the removal of Colonel Louis Johnson, Roosevelt's original envoy, who seemed sympathetic to Congress – which led Churchill to wire to Harry Hopkins, perhaps Roosevelt's most influential adviser, that 'We do not at all relish the prospect of Johnson's return to India. The Viceroy is much perturbed at the prospect.'

Ironically, it was the Muslim card that proved the British trump in this instance, even though it was clear that the Muslims at large in India were not anxious for partition, or initially supportive of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, whom Sarila presents as the chosen instrument of British imperial policy. Of course Jinnah himself was emphatically secular in his approach, so perhaps neither the British nor the Americans later can be blamed for failing to understand that, by basing their strategy on religious distinctions, they were paving the way for more dramatic distinctions. But the British policy of pushing politically moderate Muslims (including the Pathans who had been solid supporters previously of the Indian Congress) into Jinnah's extremist camp led inevitably to theoretical concerns about identity, since naturally a new country could not base its existence either on Jinnah's ambitions or on Britain's own strategic requirements.

Sarila's account, it should be noted, is presented not in terms of recriminations, but for a better understanding of how productive policies should be formulated and implemented in the future. He concludes with also highlighting the 'errors of judgment of the Indian leaders' that contributed to partition, and trusts that awareness of all the causes 'might help India and Pakistan in search for reconciliation'.

Fortunately that now seems a priority for both countries, though we have to note that one of the most worrying aspects of the initial act of partition was a sense of fragility. In India the better judgment of later politicians (albeit not always, it should be added), plus solid economic and social strategies, has now ensured a united nation. Pakistan however went through the trauma of its own partition, and has still not overcome the deep cultural divides between even its current provinces, divides the British ignored, perhaps believing that religious conformity would suffice to bridge them.


Paul Scott : 1920 - 1978
Indian unity and strength are now obviously seen as advantages by America, and I would have thought the same would apply to Britain too. However, as Paul Scott notes, Britain is full of adventurers with their own agenda, and one can never be too vigilant. The recent British coverage of the Indian election suggested an almost pernicious glee about what were presented as powerful nationalist tendencies in the South and the possibility of a hung Parliament. Of course journalists are anxious for sensational stories, and they could well have believed what they were saying, but one cannot ignore the possibility of particular mindsets amongst their informants.

For Sri Lanka, study of what Sarila has to say is also important, given continuing British animosity to Sri Lanka, as exemplified most recently in its seminal role in trying to hold up GSP+. The common belief is that all this is due to electoral politics, and the performances of so many British politicians at the Global Tamil Forum suggest that they are anxious, given the vagaries of their electoral system, to avert the swings that the LTTE-oriented diaspora might precipitate. But I think we also need to worry about at least a few individuals continuing to play the Great Game – and I think a reading of Sarila's book would also help to convince the Americans, who seem to have been unduly influenced by the British in recent months, that the predilections and prejudices of friends can sometimes be dangerous.
 
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Who Partitioned India?​

K V S Rama Sarma
[(Book Review)]

The Shades of Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition by Narendra Singh Sarila; Harper Collins Publishers India, New Delhi; pp. 116; Rs 500.

How did India's partition come about? This question has bothered many an Indian and political leader. The matter is so complex, the characters involved were so important and the forces at work were so diverse and powerful that so far no one has been able to answer this controversial question convincingly. Narendra Singh Sarila, who took upon himself this unenvia-ble task, has made a tremendous effort to fill this gap. As an ADC of Lord Mountbatten and later as a diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service, he utilised his postings at London and New York to study hitherto undisclosed documents and worked hard in the archives in New Delhi to rather conclusively establish that the partition was the result of a great game played by major powers, with Britain taking the lead. The undivided India with a strong desire for independence had become a pawn in the power-rivalry of the big powers. Britain comes out of this interesting volumes as a power that was on the verge of losing control in Asia of a big nation like India which proved to be a great and dependable source for revenue, the military and a strategic vantage point. Britain was determined by hook or by crook to retain some foothold in this region largely due to the fear of the Soviet thrust towards the south and the warm waters of Arabian Sea.

Another powerful factor that bothered the British—Tories and Labour Party alike—was their obsession with the oil resources, termed as the "wells of power" in West Asia. To pursue its objective, Britain spared no effort in exploiting Islam as a political tool and encouraged and supported to the hilt Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Britain and Jinnah had in fact used each other with full knowledge of each other's objectives. If Jinnah's megalomaniac nature and hunger for power led him to seek a separate Muslim country through partition, Britain took full advantage of his readiness to offer a land base to the Western powers in return for the help rendered to fulfil his dream. The main reason for Britain in general, and Churchill in particular, to pamper Jinnah was the British belief that a nationalist (Hindu-dominated) India would not play second fiddle to Britain's political and military game. Britain and Jinnah succeeded also due to, as Sarila says, some 'mistakes' committed by the Congress leaders.

According to Sarila, Britain was led to seriously suspect the Soviet Union after the "the USSR's powerful victory over Germany in 1945 had increased Joseph Stalin's ambitions to extend his country's influence into territories on its periphery; indeed he had already started to do so in Eastern Europe." To the Soviet Union's southern border lay the region of the Persian Gulf with its oilfields—the wells of power—that were of vital interest to the West. Under the circumstances, Britain could ill afford to lose control over the entire Indian sub-continent that had served as its military base in dominating the Indian Ocean area and the countries around the Persian Gulf for more than half a century; and this was the main source of manpower for the Imperial Army. Once the British realised that free India would not extend them military cooperation, they "settled for those willing to do so by using religion for the purpose". The British found that if Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League party, succeeded in his plan to detach the northern borders of India abutting Iran, Afghanistan and Sinkiang (China) and establish a separate state, Pakistan, Western influence in the region would not suffer after India won freedom.
However, Britain had to fight a lone battle for a foothold in the subcontinent as the US was keen to wipe out British influence in Asia after India attained freedom. In fact the US pressurised Britain to ensure that India remained united while the British were keen on partition. Sarila says: From 1949 onwards, Roosevelt's objective was to evolve a post-war order for Asia free from European colonialism. Churchill trumped this pressure by playing the Muslim or the Pakistan card.

The Americans played a strong role in favour of India's independence, though this is rarely recognised. This book also dispels the general belief in India that the British Labour Party was more friendly to the Indian freedom sentiment than the Tories. Sarila says that a week after the partition was announced on June 3, 1947, Ernest Bevan, the British Foreign Minister under Attlee, told the British Labour Party's annual meeting in Margate that the division of India "would help to consolidate Britain in the Middle East". Even Attlee comes out in the book as a person for whom the strategic concerns expressed by the Tories were more important than the spirit of the freedom of the colonies. Sarila also gives an insight into events like the recent Afghan turmoil. He quotes Sir Henry Rawlinson, President of the Royal Geographical and Asiatic Societies, in his book England and Russia, that if the "Czar's officers acquire a foothold in Kabul the disquieting effect will be prodigious".

Thanks to the Congress party's movement under Gandhiji, it was widely known that the British would have to quit India sooner or later. As this idea sunk deeper, the British too had begun visualising conditions after India's independence. This sentiment strengthened after the Congress party insisted on complete independence following the war as a condition for supporting the British war effort. No wonder, on May 5, 1945, when Germany surrendered, Prime Minister Winston Churchill ordered the post-hostilities planning staff of the War Cabinet for an appraisal of the "long term policy required to safeguard the strategic interests of the British Empire in India and the Indian Ocean". Sarila says:

the central point of this report was that Britain must retain its military connection with the subcontinent so as to ward off the Soviet Union's threat to the area.

The report underlines the "strategic importance of India to Britain". It also mentions the possibility of detaching Baluchistan from India. The policy of "divide and rule" was devised by the British after the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny not to divide India, but to control it.

It is, however, wrong to suggest that Britain wanted India to be weak, although it was strongly believed India may not remain united due to its heterogeneous character, the North-South divide and the Hindu-Muslim conflict. Though Britain had managed to have a "limb amputated", as Sardar Patel had said, it played an important role in helping the Princes, whose territories constituted one-third of colonial India, to merge with free India. They also handed over Andaman and Nicobar and Laccadive Islands to India. In agreeing to Jinnah's project, the British also managed to "whittle down Jinnah's territorial demands to the minimum required for Britain to safeguard its defence requirements". Sarila says that the plan for smaller Pakistan was not worked out by Mountbatten in 1947 as generally believed but by Lord Wavell in 1945.

Mountbatten implemented the plan by persuading the two parties to accept it.
Kashmir is another issue on which Britain takes the blame, according to Sarila. He says that

Britain's pro-Pakistan policy on Kashmir was based on its desire to keep that part of its old Indian Empire which jutted into Central Asia and lay along Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and China in the hands of successor dominion that had promised cooperation in matters of defence.

While Britain had not accepted the accession of J&K to India, the US had, "unless proved otherwise in a plebiscite". So much so, that in the UN Security Council, while Britain had opposed the withdrawal of the Pakistani troops from Pakistan occupied Kashmir, the US insisted that they should.

The author, Sarila, has quoted from official documents for every point he conveys and that makes this book a "must read" for political thinkers, writers as well as political leaders. Finally, he says that the awareness that it was global politics, Britain's insecurity and the errors of judgment of the Indian leaders that resulted in the partition of India might help India and Pakistan in search for reconciliation.

Written in a lucid style and presented objec-tively, this book is indeed a historical document worth preserving.

The author is the Managing Editor of the Congress Sandesh. The views expressed in the article are his own.
 
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GREAT GAME FOR BALKANISATION OF INDIA

- by Syed Mohammad 19 Aug 2009
This story has been read 469 times. Category: News
Topic: Will Obama's pep talk in Saudi put an end to terrorism?
This Great Game as is often called, needs to be kept in mind by all peace loving, secular Indians to thwart attempts at balkanization of what today remains as India.
The Pakistani Punjabi-dominated ISI's influence on MRI is evident even in the Punjabi-centric pronunciation of the word 'Mughalstan' (without the "i"), instead of the typical Urdu pronunciation (Mughalistan). Islamic Jihadis in India have been well-armed and well-funded by the neighbouring Islamic regimes, as part of op topac – the late Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq's grandiose plot to balkanize India.
SIMI has championed the "liberation of India through Islam" and aim to restore the supremacy of Islam through the resurrection of the Khilafat (Islamic Caliphate), emphasis on the Muslim Ummah (Islamic) and the waging of Jihad on the Indian state, secularism, democracy and nationalism – the basic keystones of the Indian Constitution – as these concepts are antithetical to Islam. The Indian Mujahideen have sent several emails claiming responsibility for several bombings in Lucknow, Varanasi and Faizabad (in Uttar Pradesh), Bangalore, Jaipur, Ahmedabad and New Delhi in 2007 and 2008. The emails refer to notorious Islamic conquerors of India (Mohammed bin Qasim, Mohammad Ghauri and Mahmud Ghaznawi) as their role-models, refer to Hindu blood as "blood to be the cheapest of all mankind" and taunt Hindus that their "[Hindu] history is full of subjugation, humiliation, and insult [at the hands of Islamic conquerors]"
The Indian Mujahideen's emails warn the Hindus to "Accept Islam and save yourselves" and or else face a horrible fate: – "Hindus! O disbelieving faithless Indians! Haven't you still realized that the falsehood of your 33 Cr dirty mud idols and the blasphemy of your deaf, dumb, mute and naked idols of Ram, Krishna and Hanuman are not at all going to save your necks, Insha-Allah, from being slaughtered by our [Muslim] hands?"
Jammu & Kashmir
It is an open secret that wherever the Muslims are in a majority, the rights and freedom of the non-Muslims are severely curtailed. Take for example Kashmir. It's the only state in India which is a Muslim majority and let us see what happened there. Hundreds of temples were razed, Hindus were forced to flee, their women were raped, children were killed and houses forcibly occupied. The entire Kashmiri Pandit population have either been driven out of Kashmir or converted between 1990 and 2000.
The Muslims in Kashmir have been enjoying a special status under Constitution's Article 370, hardly any central law is enforced there, the number of income-tax payers is among the lowest and unlike other poor states, J&K gets 90 per cent central financial assistance as grants and only 10 per cent as loans. Still there are complaints that a 'Hindu central government discriminates'.
Northern India
In the backward Mewat region of Haryana (and Rajasthan), Muslims form 66% of the local population. In 2005, the Congress (I) state government in Haryana quietly created a Muslim-majority district called Mewat, by vivisecting Gurgaon district. This move strengthened the clout of Islamic groups in the region. After all, it was in Haryana's Mewat region in 1992, that Muslim mobs in Nuh town had hacked Hindus, destroyed Hindu temples and brazenly slaughtered cows openly on streets after seizing them from Gau Shalas (cow shelters). Today, the mass conversion of Hindu villagers to Islam, purchasing tens of thousands of Hindu girls for use as sex-slaves, cow-slaughter and social boycott of Hindus is common in Muslim families in Mewat. The average Muslim birth rates of 12-15 children per household in Mewat is increasing even more by cases like the Mohammed Ishaq family where the patriarch has sired 23 kids from his wife, Bismillah.
Next door, Bihar has a 17% Muslim population and religious tensions are simmering.
West Bengal and Assam: The Weakest Links in the Chain According to the 2001 census, the Muslim population is 28% of the total West Bengal population. In Assam, the Muslim population comprises at least 31% of the total state population.
DGFI & ISI Plan To Capture West Bengal and Assam Through Vote Machinery
To facilitate Mughalistan and the concomitant partition of India and Bengal, the DGFI-ISI have jointly planned to change the demography of West Bengal and Assam on a priority basis.
Now in its most advantageous position, the DGFI & ISI's joint collaboration is now promoting activities of Mughalistan in Kolkata, Howrah & other districts. The Dhaka-based Mughalistan Research Institute has identified various areas marked as "Mini Pakistan" in W.Bengal & Eastern India. This Mughalistan, as we know, comprises the entity of Greater Pakistan, right from Afghanistan to Myanmar including Bangladesh, whole of W. Bengal, Assam & many other portions of India. This Pan-Islamic movement gets petro-dollars from the Arab World and fake Indian Currency from Pakistan and Bangladesh for the maximum manifestation of their plans. The Muslim infiltration from Bangladesh gives oxygen to the Pan-Islamic movement in India.
The Big Picture
Lest one mistakenly thinks that Mughalistan is the culmination of the Islamisation of India and that somehow the rest of India will be spared its fate, it must be stressed that this second partition of India is only the beginning. In Hyderabad of Andhra Pradesh, northern districts of Karnataka and certain areas of Maharashtra, the growth of Muslims is very high. Likewise, in Kerala, the Muslims now constitute 25% of the state's population. Malappuram district was carved out to create a Muslim majority district by the Communist government headed by E.M.S Namboothiripad. Today, the entire Malappuram district enforces the weekly holiday on Friday (not Sunday) for schools and businesses, while Hindus in neighbouring Kozhikode (Calicut) and Kannur are intimidated through high-profile massacres like in Marad.
All Indians, secularists and nationalists alike, must act quickly. We should ponder upon the future of India that we will bequeath to our children in the near future, if the plan of Mughalistan is allowed to proceed unhindered. Indians have to start taking responsibility for their future generations. We must do everything in our might, to ensure that the tide of Islamic expansionism is restricted and reversed, beginning right now.
The common man should take all possible measures politically, socially and economically to single-mindedly achieve this goal.
 
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Geopolitics mistakes wich were the origin of the conflict of Kashmir




The causes of the conflict of Kashmir were many, which you will be able to see at the end of this document - the access to the specific and better documented sites. This Web site proposes a thought of the particular topography of Kashmir and which were, at the time, the root of the conflict of Kashmir.

Geography is a means of knowledge which also takes into account the heights of the mountains, the lengths of rivers, etc. the social and economic situation of the time, so that it basically, meets a fundamental need which allows to act on the ground. Geography makes use of this information and it's, more or less high degree of accuracy, enables the people to have an important advantage in a conflict. To behold the geographic keys is to have the base of geopolitics and the military strategy. The punishment of a geographical ignorance is inevitably war. The particular topography of Kashmir, extremely mountainous, had unevitable consequences on the problems of an already complicated partition.
At the time of the partition, the principal economic situation of Kashmir was forgotten because it was less necessary to seek the richness in its earth, rather than in the immense and unexpected richness that the mountains can offer - thus water was the forgotten element of the partition. By declaring that Kashmir was "the jugular vein of Pakistan" Jinnah underlined a geographic fact of considerable strategic importance. In these areas, water is not only "necessary" to life, it is "life itself" and this expression becomes very important especially at this latitude which is equal to the deserts of Baloutchistan, the Rajasthan and Takla makham, where the rainfall is even less than in the Sahara. The partition of 1947 deprived Pakistan of its river sources of Penjab of Jelhum, Chenab, the delighted one, Beas and Sutlej - rivers which gave birth to the name of the Penjab province. These five river, the sources are in Kashmir, are vital for the economy of the country. The Indus basin in which the majority of the Pakistani population lives, concentrates all the richness of the country and it is supplied by water of various rivers and their affluents. This richness, as well as the formidable icecap of the northern areas, comes from one and the same origin, Kashmir. Without speaking about the sacred character of the Indus river, to conquer these highlands, would allow Pakistan to control the whole Indus flow whose source can be found on the annexed Tibetain grounds of the Chinese ally. The speed by which the partition was set up as well as the geographical ignorance of North Kashmir at that time in the middle of the last century, probably was of great importance in the conflict of Kashmir which opposed India, China and Pakistan. On August 15, 1947, date of the partition, the geography was not better known than in 1937, when Shipton wrote his book "Blank on the map" the title describes the sorry character of these forgotten Arctic areas by humans. The layout of the borders between India and Pakistan, at the time of the partition, was decided upon by a special commission between the 21st and the 24th of July 1947 in only 11 days. These 11 days were not long enough for the commission to decide on the Kashmir borders, whose geography was, in many cases, always vague or even unknown. The considerable amount of information reported by the Survey of India, followed by explorations of Goldwin Austen, Conway of Baltoro, Shipton in the areas of Panmah, Shaksgam and Biafo, the Bullock couple in the areas of Hispar and Siachen, were all ignored. The first existance of Kashmir is the probable consequence of this ignorance.
In 1962, the area of Aksin Shin, remote aand backwards, was added to India for the same reasons. This negligent Indian strategy, which lead to the loss of their territory, because, at first sight, it seemed without economic value, will have serious consequences to the conflict of Kashmir especially regarding the credibility of the Indian military forces.The origin of the second Pakistani Indo war and the acceleration of the nuclearisation of the conflict of Kashmir. Lastly, during the crisis of Kargil in 1999, India had much trouble to get rid of the Pakistani forces as well as the infiltrated Kashmiries, because, with their excellent knowledge of their homeland and good resistance to altitude, they held an advantage over the Indian military. These exemples particulary show up to what point geographic knowledge is of major importance when war is at stake.This had unquestionable consequences on the conflict of Kashmir especially in this part of the world where ground is very difficult.


Geographers in Kashmir
Geographical science, when shared with the art of war, is in the interest to control territory. The obvious link between geography and war is the cartography. Already in the 19th century, the British Raj, wanting to affirm his domination in Asia, trusted the British officers who travelled the remote mountains and back are as of the north, with the cartography of the Indian sub continent and its borders. They were long, difficult and perilous missions. Sir Godwin Austen, as well as George Everest were Survey Officers of India. They devoted their lives to writing pages of figures, going through cold and inhospitable places, sometimes disguised as natives, sometimes illness took over, but they always continued to add their contribution to this enormous task, the establishment of a detailed chart of the sub continent. From the south of India in 1808, the great Survey Officers progressed step by step. The Everest (Peak XV) was only identified in 1848 and K2 in 1856, after half a century of exploration.

G. Hayward
In the 19th centuary, all of the sheltered kingdoms of the Himalayas were prohibited, for eg, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim as well as Kashmir. One can measure the exclusiveness of these regions and the difficulty of going through their mysteries by reading "Voyage in Tibet" written by Alexandra David Neel and also "Annapurna, first 8000" where Herzog was the first one of the Westerners to open the doors of Kathmandu in 1950. The high, remote back valley of Kashmir, which have a more septtentrional climate than the Himalayas in the South and are closed by snow during the winter, are separated by unclimable mountains. They sheltered various populations who lead a self-sufficient life and were not very open to dialogues. The rulers and the kings of these high valleys made war from one valley to another. The tradition of armed robbery damaged their reputation and brought misfortune to the travellers who went to these high valleys. Karakorum meant " the black mountains", which refers less to their colour than to the danger of the paths that the merchants of the silk road were obliged to use. These rulers and heads of tribes kept and strongly protected geographical information which had come into their valleys. The geographicers were then compared to spies. George Hayward, explorer and geographer, paid with his life for his curiosity. He was assassinated in 1870 in Darkot by mir it Walli who worried about the disclosure of the cartography of his valley. These mirs still reigned as masters of their valleys in 1947, at the time of the partition, the country was still completely closed in. These difficulties made good geographic knowledge impossible regarding these highlands and consequently the good partition of Kashmir of 1945, was wrong.

Alexandra David Neel
It is difficult to find precise maps of the Kashmir area, they are held by the major states of the armies for obvious strategic reasons. It is still the case in all the massives of the Himalayas. It is curios to note that cartography can be used as a propaganda media, which makes it very political. It is enough to consult several maps of the Indian sub continent to notice that at what point the borders of the 3 countries in Kashmir are changing. Recently, to please the 3 opponents, the World Bank "disadvised" its cartographic Service not to produce maps of the Indian peninsula which could be too precise and show the Kashmir area. Another example, the official altitude of K2 of 8611m was questioned in 1976 by a Pakistani expedition which recalculated its altitude up to 8760m. Another expedition, American this time, recalculated its altitude with the help of a satellite to 8858m, i.i. higher than Everest. For the highest mountain top not to be in Nepal any more (a country politivcally dominated by India) but in Pakistan has obvious political repercussions (the altitude of K2 was later recalculated by Italians and was closer to that of origin). Recently, India opened for expeditions, the powerful tops of the eastern Karakorum, even tough there are violent arguments about this. Expeditions must obligatorily be composed of the Indian army. To conquer the tops, and to make false altitudes in order to represent political borders without definition, are sometimes necessary excercises and part of a means to obtain political goals. The war that the 3 opponents delivered in Kashmir is also part of this manipulation and we may suggest that the territory is also part of a psychological war.

The real dispute about Siachen territory really started when India worried about the climbing permits granted to the mountaineers by the Pakistani authorities, in the region that was not yet clearly defined in the 1980 maps. India saw a means to expand and started to train its picked groups of soldiers in the 80ties in the arctic, having their men go through hardships and extreme conditions, hardships based on cold weather conditions (this is still the case today as part of the Indian manoeuvres will take place jointly with their US partners in Alaska). After the Indian invasion of the Siachen glacier, Pakistan precisely calls this as " cartographic aggression " coming from India, indirectly pointing out the importance of cartographic gaps of these remote areas and the consequences of a never-ending conflict of Kashmir. Now it is necessary for the bellingent to defend the nation up to the far territories of its ice.

An extraordinary event was that in 1947 or 1949 none of the governments nor the superior officers who set up and co-signed the line of control (LOC) on the topographic maps, thought it necessary to go as far as the Chinese border. Did they have the geographical knowledge of these remote areas to be able to decide and trace some kind of a border? Probably not. The written agreement only states that after the NJ9842 point, the line goes as "far as the north up to glaciers". This huge inaccuracy leads to the dispute of the two countries who intend to become owners of this area, 35 yrs later, the Siachen glacier in 1984.

The Siachen war started precisely where the geographical maps ended in the north of the NJ9842 point. India claimed its border as from the high mountains of Saltoro up to the top of Gasherbrun (8068m) by going through the strategic passes of Bilafond and Sia. The Siachen glacier is therefore Indian according to Delhi, based on a hydrographical argument: the Nubra river that flows downstream from Siachen and that irrigates Indian Ladakh, must belong to them up to its source. Pakistan, however, demands the border set up in 1949, which means, the one that separates the Siachen glacier into two, the upstream belonging to them by right.
Today, the new military technics of observation (in particular satellite observation, drones,"¦) and the reinforcement of communication means, improve the monitoring of the control line and stabilize the concerned forces. Invations, similar to those of 1962 and even 1999, are no longer possible, even more so because these extremely mountainous areas cannot be used as fast and significant openings. It only allows the infiltration of small groups of armed men whose terrorist activity in Kashmir is still currently more significant either – befor or after the winter, when the high passes are accessible after the melting of snow.


Not to know all about this mountainous area was probably one of the many causes of the conflict of Kashmir. Perhaps the enclosure and the very mountainous topography of this part of the world will, in the future, avoid some misunderstandings. Today, in a conflict context, geographical information refering to Kashmir is kept secret defense. Certain territories, like the glacier of Siachen, the solid mass of Kailash or Aksin Chin, remain of very difficult access, they are isolated by mines and the control line remains solid. They are much more accessible to a satellite exploration than to a human exploration, it is always "Blank on the Map".
 
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ajtr

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Geopolitics mistakes wich were the origin of the conflict of Kashmir




The causes of the conflict of Kashmir were many, which you will be able to see at the end of this document - the access to the specific and better documented sites. This Web site proposes a thought of the particular topography of Kashmir and which were, at the time, the root of the conflict of Kashmir.

Geography is a means of knowledge which also takes into account the heights of the mountains, the lengths of rivers, etc. the social and economic situation of the time, so that it basically, meets a fundamental need which allows to act on the ground. Geography makes use of this information and it's, more or less high degree of accuracy, enables the people to have an important advantage in a conflict. To behold the geographic keys is to have the base of geopolitics and the military strategy. The punishment of a geographical ignorance is inevitably war. The particular topography of Kashmir, extremely mountainous, had unevitable consequences on the problems of an already complicated partition.
At the time of the partition, the principal economic situation of Kashmir was forgotten because it was less necessary to seek the richness in its earth, rather than in the immense and unexpected richness that the mountains can offer - thus water was the forgotten element of the partition. By declaring that Kashmir was "the jugular vein of Pakistan" Jinnah underlined a geographic fact of considerable strategic importance. In these areas, water is not only "necessary" to life, it is "life itself" and this expression becomes very important especially at this latitude which is equal to the deserts of Baloutchistan, the Rajasthan and Takla makham, where the rainfall is even less than in the Sahara. The partition of 1947 deprived Pakistan of its river sources of Penjab of Jelhum, Chenab, the delighted one, Beas and Sutlej - rivers which gave birth to the name of the Penjab province. These five river, the sources are in Kashmir, are vital for the economy of the country. The Indus basin in which the majority of the Pakistani population lives, concentrates all the richness of the country and it is supplied by water of various rivers and their affluents. This richness, as well as the formidable icecap of the northern areas, comes from one and the same origin, Kashmir. Without speaking about the sacred character of the Indus river, to conquer these highlands, would allow Pakistan to control the whole Indus flow whose source can be found on the annexed Tibetain grounds of the Chinese ally. The speed by which the partition was set up as well as the geographical ignorance of North Kashmir at that time in the middle of the last century, probably was of great importance in the conflict of Kashmir which opposed India, China and Pakistan. On August 15, 1947, date of the partition, the geography was not better known than in 1937, when Shipton wrote his book "Blank on the map" the title describes the sorry character of these forgotten Arctic areas by humans. The layout of the borders between India and Pakistan, at the time of the partition, was decided upon by a special commission between the 21st and the 24th of July 1947 in only 11 days. These 11 days were not long enough for the commission to decide on the Kashmir borders, whose geography was, in many cases, always vague or even unknown. The considerable amount of information reported by the Survey of India, followed by explorations of Goldwin Austen, Conway of Baltoro, Shipton in the areas of Panmah, Shaksgam and Biafo, the Bullock couple in the areas of Hispar and Siachen, were all ignored. The first existance of Kashmir is the probable consequence of this ignorance.
In 1962, the area of Aksin Shin, remote aand backwards, was added to India for the same reasons. This negligent Indian strategy, which lead to the loss of their territory, because, at first sight, it seemed without economic value, will have serious consequences to the conflict of Kashmir especially regarding the credibility of the Indian military forces.The origin of the second Pakistani Indo war and the acceleration of the nuclearisation of the conflict of Kashmir. Lastly, during the crisis of Kargil in 1999, India had much trouble to get rid of the Pakistani forces as well as the infiltrated Kashmiries, because, with their excellent knowledge of their homeland and good resistance to altitude, they held an advantage over the Indian military. These exemples particulary show up to what point geographic knowledge is of major importance when war is at stake.This had unquestionable consequences on the conflict of Kashmir especially in this part of the world where ground is very difficult.


Geographers in Kashmir
Geographical science, when shared with the art of war, is in the interest to control territory. The obvious link between geography and war is the cartography. Already in the 19th century, the British Raj, wanting to affirm his domination in Asia, trusted the British officers who travelled the remote mountains and back are as of the north, with the cartography of the Indian sub continent and its borders. They were long, difficult and perilous missions. Sir Godwin Austen, as well as George Everest were Survey Officers of India. They devoted their lives to writing pages of figures, going through cold and inhospitable places, sometimes disguised as natives, sometimes illness took over, but they always continued to add their contribution to this enormous task, the establishment of a detailed chart of the sub continent. From the south of India in 1808, the great Survey Officers progressed step by step. The Everest (Peak XV) was only identified in 1848 and K2 in 1856, after half a century of exploration.

G. Hayward
In the 19th centuary, all of the sheltered kingdoms of the Himalayas were prohibited, for eg, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim as well as Kashmir. One can measure the exclusiveness of these regions and the difficulty of going through their mysteries by reading "Voyage in Tibet" written by Alexandra David Neel and also "Annapurna, first 8000" where Herzog was the first one of the Westerners to open the doors of Kathmandu in 1950. The high, remote back valley of Kashmir, which have a more septtentrional climate than the Himalayas in the South and are closed by snow during the winter, are separated by unclimable mountains. They sheltered various populations who lead a self-sufficient life and were not very open to dialogues. The rulers and the kings of these high valleys made war from one valley to another. The tradition of armed robbery damaged their reputation and brought misfortune to the travellers who went to these high valleys. Karakorum meant " the black mountains", which refers less to their colour than to the danger of the paths that the merchants of the silk road were obliged to use. These rulers and heads of tribes kept and strongly protected geographical information which had come into their valleys. The geographicers were then compared to spies. George Hayward, explorer and geographer, paid with his life for his curiosity. He was assassinated in 1870 in Darkot by mir it Walli who worried about the disclosure of the cartography of his valley. These mirs still reigned as masters of their valleys in 1947, at the time of the partition, the country was still completely closed in. These difficulties made good geographic knowledge impossible regarding these highlands and consequently the good partition of Kashmir of 1945, was wrong.

Alexandra David Neel
It is difficult to find precise maps of the Kashmir area, they are held by the major states of the armies for obvious strategic reasons. It is still the case in all the massives of the Himalayas. It is curios to note that cartography can be used as a propaganda media, which makes it very political. It is enough to consult several maps of the Indian sub continent to notice that at what point the borders of the 3 countries in Kashmir are changing. Recently, to please the 3 opponents, the World Bank "disadvised" its cartographic Service not to produce maps of the Indian peninsula which could be too precise and show the Kashmir area. Another example, the official altitude of K2 of 8611m was questioned in 1976 by a Pakistani expedition which recalculated its altitude up to 8760m. Another expedition, American this time, recalculated its altitude with the help of a satellite to 8858m, i.i. higher than Everest. For the highest mountain top not to be in Nepal any more (a country politivcally dominated by India) but in Pakistan has obvious political repercussions (the altitude of K2 was later recalculated by Italians and was closer to that of origin). Recently, India opened for expeditions, the powerful tops of the eastern Karakorum, even tough there are violent arguments about this. Expeditions must obligatorily be composed of the Indian army. To conquer the tops, and to make false altitudes in order to represent political borders without definition, are sometimes necessary excercises and part of a means to obtain political goals. The war that the 3 opponents delivered in Kashmir is also part of this manipulation and we may suggest that the territory is also part of a psychological war.

The real dispute about Siachen territory really started when India worried about the climbing permits granted to the mountaineers by the Pakistani authorities, in the region that was not yet clearly defined in the 1980 maps. India saw a means to expand and started to train its picked groups of soldiers in the 80ties in the arctic, having their men go through hardships and extreme conditions, hardships based on cold weather conditions (this is still the case today as part of the Indian manoeuvres will take place jointly with their US partners in Alaska). After the Indian invasion of the Siachen glacier, Pakistan precisely calls this as " cartographic aggression " coming from India, indirectly pointing out the importance of cartographic gaps of these remote areas and the consequences of a never-ending conflict of Kashmir. Now it is necessary for the bellingent to defend the nation up to the far territories of its ice.

An extraordinary event was that in 1947 or 1949 none of the governments nor the superior officers who set up and co-signed the line of control (LOC) on the topographic maps, thought it necessary to go as far as the Chinese border. Did they have the geographical knowledge of these remote areas to be able to decide and trace some kind of a border? Probably not. The written agreement only states that after the NJ9842 point, the line goes as "far as the north up to glaciers". This huge inaccuracy leads to the dispute of the two countries who intend to become owners of this area, 35 yrs later, the Siachen glacier in 1984.

The Siachen war started precisely where the geographical maps ended in the north of the NJ9842 point. India claimed its border as from the high mountains of Saltoro up to the top of Gasherbrun (8068m) by going through the strategic passes of Bilafond and Sia. The Siachen glacier is therefore Indian according to Delhi, based on a hydrographical argument: the Nubra river that flows downstream from Siachen and that irrigates Indian Ladakh, must belong to them up to its source. Pakistan, however, demands the border set up in 1949, which means, the one that separates the Siachen glacier into two, the upstream belonging to them by right.
Today, the new military technics of observation (in particular satellite observation, drones,"¦) and the reinforcement of communication means, improve the monitoring of the control line and stabilize the concerned forces. Invations, similar to those of 1962 and even 1999, are no longer possible, even more so because these extremely mountainous areas cannot be used as fast and significant openings. It only allows the infiltration of small groups of armed men whose terrorist activity in Kashmir is still currently more significant either – befor or after the winter, when the high passes are accessible after the melting of snow.


Not to know all about this mountainous area was probably one of the many causes of the conflict of Kashmir. Perhaps the enclosure and the very mountainous topography of this part of the world will, in the future, avoid some misunderstandings. Today, in a conflict context, geographical information refering to Kashmir is kept secret defense. Certain territories, like the glacier of Siachen, the solid mass of Kailash or Aksin Chin, remain of very difficult access, they are isolated by mines and the control line remains solid. They are much more accessible to a satellite exploration than to a human exploration, it is always "Blank on the Map".
 
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The New 'Great Game':part 1-Birth of Radical Islamist Militancy




The Great Game -Renewed. Lord Curzon famously stated " who ever control West Asia controls the world". In his view this entailed the exercise of a predominant influence over the destinies of Persia and Afghanistan- a role he reserved for British India. Today we have many nations desperate to aquire that role? NATO and ISAF led by the USA, fighting Al-Qaeda and the Pakhtuns (Taliban); Even Russia and China not ignoring their strategic interests in the area ;and of course the traditional rivals India and Pakistan always ready to fight a proxy war in Afghanistan.This article –and a few others to follow- will look at the issues at stake today - primarily from Pakistan's point of view.But first an over view of the make up and strategic importance of Central Asia.
The Demo-Graphy Of Central Asia. Once upon a time not so long ago the worlds biggest Empire possessed unimaginable land, wealth and potential. However, lacking the vision to manage what it possessed; it chose the wrong friends and made the wrong enemies resulting in an inevitable humiliation at the hands of a 'despicable band of holy warriors'. China which should have been it's biggest helper lifted not a finger to assist; and India which should have been it's biggest friend shed not a single tear -in fact jumped on to the opposing band wagon with glee.
The monolith fell, and instead of the USSR we suddenly had fifteen sovereign states. In this series of articles we are concerned with only six of them now termed as the Central Asian Republics. They literally had independence thrust upon them –for none of them had lifted even a finger in any show of protest against USSR rule, or showed any solidarity with the coup of Boris Yeltsin. Yet after the events of Dec 1991 they had no choice except to be independent!
Central Asia can be termed 'central' as well as 'a single region' for more reasons then one. First it comprises most -but not all the territory - of what was formerly known as Turkistan, also as 'inner Asia', because of it being a land locked part of Asia; Second culturally and politically it lies in between many distinct civilizations –Roman Christianity to the west; Slavic Christianity and Communistic to the North; Chinese to the East and Islamic to the South. Third demographically and economically too it lies some where in the center –all have high rates of fertility and a high percentages of population engaged in agriculture, low per capita incomes and low rates of labor productivity as well as life expectancy. Fourth all of them have experienced Russian colonial rule and therefore have similar inefficient and corrupt post colonial government structures.
The political structures are highly centralized and based on feudally empowered ruling local elites working with the masters; while the economic structures are based on the classic definition of economic exploitation, in that the colonies were producers and suppliers of cheap agricultural as well as mineral raw material –with the additional imposition of the communistic pattern of organization in that the masters fixed what and how much had to be produced by each region. This also resulted in some startling discrepancies; in that some regions despite their primitive base gained remarkably advanced technological infrastructures and equipment–including nuclear and space technology!
Last but not least like the colonial experience every where else; despite Russian attempts to eradicate their Islamic values, in all these regions, Islam remains deeply embedded in their social and political psyche.This gives rise to ideas of regional and global Islamic unity. Although again - like else where in the Muslim world - what exactly this means remains unclear!
Endless border disputes –again like the legacies left by colonial powers else where- are a source of constant internal friction preventing any unity for common welfare and development. All of Uzbekistan's borders for instance are in dispute with its neighbors!



The Mineral Wealth Of Central Asia. -Azerbaijan situated on the Caucasian Isthmus between Armenia and the Caspian Sea, is a major oil producing country. Turkmenistan (488,000 sq. mi) has enormous oil, gas, coal and other natural resources and directly adjoins Afghanistan to the south. Uzbekistan (172,000 sq. mi) also has vast resources in oil, gas, coal, copper and gold; and is a big cotton producer. It too adjoins Afghanistan. Tajikistan (55,000 sq. mi) also has a frontier with Afghanistan, and, has very rich deposits of oil, gas, coal, lead, zinc, uranium, radium etc. Kyrgyzstan Adjoining Tajikistan has a relatively well-developed industrial and agro-industrial base. It has a border with China to its east. Kazakhstan (1,000 000 sq. mi) has absolutely vast reserves of coal, oil, gas, manganese, copper, bauxite, gold, uranium and many other minerals. It is highly developed both agriculturally as well as industrially. Possessing much of the former Soviet aerospace and defense industries, it also has common borders with both Russia and China.
Historically too the region has always been valued for it oil potential alone. The two great World War I oil fields were in Texas and the Caspian Sea region of Imperial Russia. In WW II also Adolph Hitler launched Operation Blau to capture the Caspian Sea oil fields.



The Strategic Importance Of Afghanistan/Pakistan. In order to appreciate the strategic importance of Afghanistan /Pakistan, we have to first realize that any power which possess the major route for transit of trade revolving round Central Asia's vast oil, gas and mineral resources will gain immensely in wealth, power and prestige. With this in mind let us have a look at all the likely routes out of the area:
1.The Routes Through The Caspian Sea. These are the most desirable route from the point of view of the EU.They are also the shortest routes out of the area and some have been operational since WW1.More over they allow for the possibility of the trans-shipment to Africa and SE Asia. This route empowers Europe. The more important sub-routes are:
"¢ Kazakhstan through Russia to Novorossiysk (Route 1) Built in 1997 by the Caspian Sea Consortium this route helps maintain Russian control of oil shipment from the region.
"¢ Old Russian Line from Baku To Novorossiysk (Route 2) .This historic line Chechnya to Novorossiysk was closed because of the Chechens' continuing struggle. Russia has recently completed a bypass around Chechnya and reactivated the pipeline.
"¢ A Wider Northern By-Pass(Route 3).Russia has proposed exporting oil north to join its existing pipeline system at Novorossiysk .This development would remove the pipeline further from Chechnya and help maintain regular flow of Caspian Sea and Kazakh oil.
"¢ The Tran Caucasus Route. (Route 4). The Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) built an initial line from Baku through Georgia to the Georgian port of Supsa on the Black Sea. It is pumping a limited amount of oil since l999.This is relatively inexpensive option, but the oil still has to move from Supsa by oil tanker through the Black Sea and the Bosporus. Turkey controls the traffic between the Black and Mediterranean Seas and does not want increased oil tanker traffic through the straits because of environmental concerns. Russia objects to this route because none of the pipeline passes through Russia. Further, this pipeline runs through domains of many fractious mountain tribes.
"¢ Pipe Line To Turkish Mediterranean Port Of Ceyhan (Route 5).The AIOC is considering this line. The route runs through Azerbaijan and Armenia, whose war over Nagorno-Karabakh is at a stalemate. Thus, the Baku-Armenia-Ceyhan route is not a near-term option. Should this conflict be settled, the route also passes through the Kurdish part of Turkey where a suppressed insurrection still simmers.
"¢ Clinton Alternative To Route 4.The Clinton administration tried to promote a pipeline route from Baku to Tbilisi to Supsa (Route 4) and then underwater from Supsa to Turkey where it would cut across Kurdish Turkey to Ceyhan. An underwater pipeline from Turkmenistan across the Caspian Sea to Baku would back this pipeline. This expensive option required regional political acceptance and Oil Company backing—neither of which the Clinton administration could obtain.
Since development of any of the above routes empowers Russia and Europe, development seems to be against long term US strategic interests. Even though pipe lines have existed in the area for long, the geopolitical and logistical nightmare involved in constructing and operating Tran Caucasian pipelines through Azerbaijan and Georgia are emphasized as formidable! Turkey (a key U.S. ally in the region) remains determined to restrict any use of the Bosphorus as a route for oil to Europe citing pollution! The possibility of such a route being affected by an outbreak of hostilities between Greece and Turkey is pointed out as a further obstacle.
Finally any European attempts at developing its own sphere of influence in Central Asia have been ruled out by two American initiatives. First, as we shall see later in this series of articles US has instigated Islamic insurgency in Chechnya. Second it engineered the dis -integration of the former Republic of Yugoslavia and carried out bombardment of Belgrade. This effectively established mutually contentious client states in the area, while also preventing the use of small sea/river tankers into Europe via the Danube, at least for the time being.
2.The China Route (Route 9). China itself as well as the Pacific Rim is potentially huge markets. The pipe line would run from western Kazakhstan through China to the Pacific serving Chinese, Japanese and Korean markets (Route 9). It requires an enormous outlay of $10 to $14 billion. The Chinese have signed a memorandum of understanding to build a shorter $3.5-billion pipeline that would stop in China proper. It empowers China.
3.The Iranian Routes (Route 7). Iran's preferred route is a pipeline south from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf (Route 7). It is the shortest, cheapest and easiest route to an open port. Iran has an extended pipeline system in place, and Turkmenistan opened a gas pipeline into Iran in December 1997. The United States opposes this pipeline and tries to enforce sanctions, but other nations' oil firms ignore the sanctions and cut oil deals with Iran. US firms continue lobbying in Washington, DC, for improved relations with Iran. It empowers Iran.
4.The Afghanistan-Pakistan Route (Route 8). The pipe line would run from Central Asia through Herat /Kandahar in Afghanistan, on to Quetta and Gwadar/Karachi ports in Pakistan. The pipe line is relatively cheap at $1.9 billion. More over this is the only route supported by a deep water port at Gwadar allowing for bulk transportation of both Oil and minerals through super tankers. Presently the US remains opposed to development of Gwadar because of fears it would provide the Chinese a shorter approach to the Gulf. The US is therefore busy in attempts to establish hegemony in the region through exploitation of Afghanistan –Pakistan friction and China-India rivalry.USA would prefer this route over all others provided it can establish firm grip on the area to prevent any Chinese influence .This is because it is the only exit the US has a chance of controlling; also it is a route which does not empower Europe, USSR, China or Iran.The route empowers Pakistan a nation the US aims at controlling.



Pakistan-Afghanistan Friction. This dates back to 1893 with the British creation of The "Durand line" as a buffer between the Czars and the British Empire. After the British departure Kabul refused to recognize Pakistan, challenging the legitimacy of its borders. India jumped in to encourage Afghan claims - supported by its ally the USSR. Despite the tension in the Frontier Pakistan's founding father Muhammad Ali Jinnah had already pulled out troops from the Pashtun areas, confident that Pakistan had the allegiance of the tribes. Subsequent events were to prove him correct.
Even though by 1956-57 Indian and USSR interference had created a full-blown 'Afghan Problem' for Pakistan,till as late as the early 70's no military presence would be needed. Aslam Khattak then first First Secretary and later Ambassador in Kabul started a proposal for a Pakistan-Afghan confederation.The response was encouraging . Following a visit by the President and PM of Pakistan to Kabul,both sides agreed to work for a confederation in which the two regions would be autonomous in all matters , except for defence, foreign policy, foreign trade and communications. The Prime Minister's office would rotate between the two,while King Zahir Shah would be the constitutional monarch of The Republic. Even the Americans agreed to help in a big way,and actually got into post-confederation details.
But Daud on a return visit to Pakistan was fired at while inspecting a shipyard at Karachi.The bullet ricocheted off a ship to hit Aslam Khattak instead. Ghaffar Khan was released from prison and sent to Kabul, to help remove resultant mis-understanding.He agreed to help provided a referendum was held on the issue of One Unit.Pakistani President Mirza agreed to do so.Even the American Ambassador in Karachi also assured Ghaffar Khan through the American Ambassador in Kabul that the referendum would be held. But it wasn't. And great chance to change the course of history was thus missed.
Yet Pakistan never faced a threatening military posture from Afghanistan till the mid-70s. This pattern stayed in place even during the two wars with India (1965 and 1971).
The Birth of Militancy Inside Afghanistan/Pakistan. In 1973 Prince Daud staged a Soviet assisted coup to oust King Zahir Shah. The Daud regime not only raised the issue of Pashtunistan (Afghans claims to Pakistan provinces of NWFP and Baluchistan), but also for the first time moved the Afghan army closer to the borders. More importantly KHAD the Afghan Intelligence agency (aided and abetted by the Russian KGB and Indian RAW as all three were allied in those days) used several Pakistani tribal leaders (Sardars) to start as uprising in the tribal areas of Baluchistan and parts of NWFP.
Z.A. Bhutto's government retaliated by supporting the disenchanted elements within Afghanistan. These included Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Masud and Gulbadin Hikmatyar. Thus relations in the 1970s began with each country supporting the other's dissidents on a purely nationalistic agenda on a quid pro quo basis; and till the mid-70's Pakistan army was busy fighting a bitter insurgency in the province of Baluchistan – with the help of it's 'Militants' within Afghanistan. There was no question of an Islamic Jehadi motivational base for either; as 'enemies' of both sides were Muslim. As we shall see this was to come much later when the CIA would conceive the theory of turning 'Afghan militants' into 'Islamic militants' for use against the 'USSR'.
The Birth of Islamic (Wahabi) Radical Militancy. We have noted the birth of Afghan militancy following a pro-Soviet coup in Afghanistan and attempts at destabilization of Baluchistan. A natural consequence should have been the involvement of the USA and CIA on the Pakistani side in a communistic vs. free world conflict as was the norms of the time; more so as both sides were Muslims. Yet two development on the inter –national stage were to give it an irretrievable 'Wahabi' lusture which US supported militancy carries to this day. The first was the vast growth in Saudi wealth due to sharp rise in oil prices. The second was the castration of CIA as a result of post Watergate repercussions!
"¢ Saudi Wealth. In 1973, rise in oil prices brought great wealth to Saudi Arabia. Between 1973 to 1979 over $70 billion of this was used for furthering Wahabi Islamist purposes. Private Saudi citizens donated additional billions to private charities such as the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) which built 575 new mosques in Indonesia alone. The King Faisal mosque in Islamabad –and its seminary- was also funded by Saudi money. Alex Alexiev calls this "the largest world wide religious campaign ever mounted". It was this large scale preaching of Wahabism (an exclusively Saudi brand of mistrust of infidels as unfit to survive, branding of rival Muslim sects as apostates to be killed, and emphasis on a violent exterminative jihad against all others who count as infidels as a means of gaining paradise) which laid the groundwork for the defamation of Islam and the spread of terrorist groups in the name of Islam world wide.
"¢ The Castration Of CIA. It started with FBI, and Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward discovering what seemed to be CIA fingerprints in the Watergate burglary. The agency was not involved, but it's refusal to cooperate in unveiling Nixon's obstruction of justice led directly to the firing of its director, Richard Helms, who was replaced by William E. Colby. In the preliminary congressional inquiries staffers had stumbled upon a number of domestic operations by the CIA. Colby acquiesced in unmasking these and soon assembled a list of CIA sins which ran into 693 typed pages – these later became famous as the "Family Jewels."
The crown jewel in the lot was a program known as Operation Chaos involving CIA surveillance of antiwar protesters - the program being disclosed to the New York Times by Colby himself. This marked a turning point in public attitudes toward spying.
Overnight in public eyes the CIA became, a shadowy, sinister organization. President Ford called former CIA Director Helms into the Oval Office for advice. Helms reminded Ford that "The CIA is the president's creature," and defended Operation Chaos, to which Ford replied, "I plan no witch hunt, but in this environment I don't know if I can control it."
Starting in 1976 a witch hunt lasting five years did ensue! Democratic Senator Frank Church of Idaho, as chairman of the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence, castrated the free worlds best intelligence agency; famously depicting it as a "rogue elephant."
The Safari Club- An Alternate Super Intelligence Agency. In September 1 1976, a group of countries got together and established a newly formed secret cabal of intelligence agencies called the Safari Club. It included France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Iran. The club was a brain child of Alexandre de Marenches, head of the French external intelligence service SDECE.It was likely formed with the connivance of CIA to compensate for it's paralysis after Watergate - as a means of circumventing US Congress which had tied down the CIA! Acutely conscious of the Soviet threat these countries had decided that if the US could not do anything to counter it, they would!
Millions were spent to create an operational capability. But much more was required to be done to create its financial arm. The group needed a network of banks to help manage and conceal the enormous transactions needed to finance its intelligence operations. Saudi Intelligence Minister Kamal Adham was given the task to create one.
With the blessing of CIA director George Bush Sr, he would transformed the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), a small Pakistani merchant bank, founded in 1972 by a Pakistani partner of Adham (Agha Hasan Abedi); into a world-wide money-laundering machine, buying additional banks around the world to create the biggest clandestine money transfer and whitening network in history.
The Rise Of BCCI.Adham, and other intelligence heads worked with Abedi to contrive "a plan that seemed too good to be true. The bank (BCCI) would solicit the business of every major intelligence – and therefore terrorist, rebel, and underground - organization in the free world. The intelligence collected - and links forged in the process - would be shared with these 'friends' of BCCI." CIA operative Raymond Close worked closely with Adham during the Congressional inquiry years to help identify and tap "into CIA's hordes of misfits and malcontents to help man a 1,500-strong group of assassins and enforcers." Soon, BCCI became the fastest growing bank in the world. Time magazine would later describe BCCI as not just a bank, but also "a global intelligence operation and a Mafia-like enforcement squad. Operating primarily out of the bank's offices in Karachi, Pakistan; the 1,500-employee network has used sophisticated spy equipment and techniques, along with bribery, extortion, kidnapping and even, by some accounts, murder. It stops at almost nothing to further the bank's aims the world over."
Saudi Prince Mohammed al-Faisal also set up Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt (FIBE) as part of the banking empire. The "Blind Sheikh," Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman was one of its founding members. Growth of Islamic banking would directly help the growth of the Islamist movements, and allow the Saudis to pressure poorer Islamic nations, like Egypt, to shift their policies to the right. FIBE worked closely with BCCI. Investigators would later find that BCCI held $589 million in "unrecorded deposits," $245 million of which were placed with FIBE! BCCI at a later stage was also 'discovered' to be deeply implicated in illegal arms and narcotics trade .But all this was to happen way in the future, when CIA wanted to get back into the driving seat!
The Activities Of Safari Club. Thus was the Safari Club established .It funded – off the books - covert operations for a 'ghost' CIA made up of fired agents close to ex-CIA Director George Bush Sr. and Theodore Shackley. Shackley would remain at the center of this "private, shadow spy organization within the CIA" until he was fired in 1979; when the Safari Club was exposed due to the Iranian revolution-Iran being one of the members ! It must be noted here that this "Super Spy Club" inevitably gave a front seat to Saudi, Arab and Iranian 'Islamist' interests. The club seems to have remained active till about 1982 when de Marenches stepped down from being head of French intelligence .By this time the issue of the witch hunt of CIA within the USA also seems to have been resolved, and the CIA was keen to get back into the driving seat. Yet as we shall see next ;the then junior officers –as they rose in rank- would continue to retain their Islamic imprint ,as they shaped Americas -and the CIA's- future policies.
During the initial period the Safari Club played a secret role in political dramas of many countries mostly Islamic and in Africa or the Middle East. Its first operation: A rebellion in Zaire was put down by Moroccan and Egyptian troops, using French air support.It then turned to deal with the Soviet infiltrations in Ethopia, Somalia and Djibouti and Peoples republic of Yemen. It also acted to repel Libyan aggression against Chad and Sudan. It also played a role in the US-Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979. Through out 1970-80 huge amounts of Saudi money backed by Safari Club covert activity helped countries like Syria,Jordan,North Yemen, Angola, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Uganda, Mali, Nigeria, Ziare, Guinea, Pakistan, Bangladesh, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Philippines –and some reports suggest even South Vietnam; survive Russian backed Libyan or leftist in roads. In most countries Saudi 'Wahabi Jehadi' proselytizing inevitably accompanied the cash.
The Safari Club and the 'rogue CIA' also played a major role in supporting Pakistani ISI backed Afghani militants.Pakistani operation was remarkably successful and by 1977 the Afghan government of Sardar Daud was willing to settle all outstanding issues in exchange for a lifting of the ban on the National Awami Party and a commitment towards provincial autonomy for Pashtuns.This was also the period in which Moro operations in the Philippines achieved their most outstanding success.
Planning For A Russian Vietnam: 1977-1982. During the period 1977 to 1982 a major re-orientation of US policy is apparent specially in the mid-east and SE Asia.To what extant the Safari Club influenced the shape of things must remain a field of conjecture;yet the circumstantial evidence is pretty clear that the Carter administration had "no clear policy" due to internal divisions and confusion – and also that Saudi(Muslim) influence was considerable through elements of the 'rouge CIA' which was beginning to emerge out of the shadows to merge into the main stream re-activated CIA.
"¢ Setting The Stage. In the year 1977-79 a number of remarkable events (mentioned below) took place affecting our region. An analysis of these helps us to understand how the original concept of a defensive and deterrent Islamic Jehad was shaped into one of Americas most potent intelligence assets – global Islamic(Wahabi) militancy or Islamic Terrorism:
In The USA Zbigniew Brzezinski took over as President Carter's National Security Adviser. He established the Nationalities Working Group (NWG) for weakening the Soviet Union through Islamic militancy .By December 1978; he formalized his theory around the idea of turning the Muslim world into 'an arc of crises. It was based on the ideas of British expert Dr. Bernard Lewis, who advocated the balkanization of the entire Muslim near East along tribal and religious lines. The chaos would spread in what he also calls an "arc of crisis" and ultimately destabilize the Muslim regions of the Soviet Union.
BCCI Even Buys The CIA's Bank! The same year The Safari Club made a bid to buy CIA's bank! A group fronted by Kamal Adham, bought First American Bank shares. It was the biggest bank in the Washington, D.C. - and since long the CIA's principal banker. In 1981, the Federal Reserve after asking CIA for the mandatory clearance allows the sale! The CIA held back what it knew, including the fact that Adham was Saudi intelligence minister. But Adhami and his group were acting on behalf of BCCI.Thus by 1982 BCCI becomes (illegally) the owner of CIA's bank. The CIA did not inform the Treasury Department about this link till as late as 1985.In fact CIA continued using both BCCI and First American. The Safari Club and its financial arm the BCCI were fully in place –even within USA by 1982!
Brzezinski's Islamic Militant Policy Implemented In Pakistan. In Pakistan on 5 July 1977 Pakistan's socialist minded Prime Minister Z.A.Bhutto - an advocate of the policy of independence from US domination through a combination of 'Islamic socialism' and a pro-China foreign policy ; as well as the architect of Muslim unity(held first Islamic summit at Lahore) and Pakistan's nuclear program - was eliminated in a coup by General Zia –ul-Haq .Zia had already proved his worth as an American ally in Jordan , where he massacred the PLA to save the Jordanian throne for the Americans.
Apparently the US stopped all economic and military aid to Pakistan as a result of the coup .But in actual fact aid continued flowing in a big way for the militants and their Islamisation process through the Safari club and the rouge CIA; and planning was soon expedited to draw in and kill the Russian bear in Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan Daud suspected of having gone 'soft' on Pakistan was removed through a pro-Soviet coup on April 1978.This served as the ideal start point for implementing Brzezinski's policy. Aid to Pakistan was resumed .The CIA commenced beaming of radio propaganda into Afghanistan, and a program and started for turning the Afghan mujahideen into radical Wahabi Islamic fighters. Zia proved invaluable at this stage.
He allowed a free hand to the CIA approved Wahabi Islamic doctrine to gain a firm foothold in Pakistan. Passing pro-Islamic legislation, he allowed FIB (Faisal Islamic bank) to start Islamic banking systems, and created Islamic courts. Most importantly, he imposed a new religious tax which was used to create tens of thousands of madrassas, or religious boarding schools, where "Islamic text books' printed in USA and approved by CIA were taught. These schools would be used to train and indoctrinate a large portion of future Islamic militants using courses developed in the USA.
"Radical Islamist ideology began to permeate the military and the influence of the most extreme groups crept into the army," writes journalist Kathy Gannon in her book I is for Infidel. The BBC later commented that Zia's "Islamization" policies created a "culture of jihad" within Pakistan that continues until present day. Mean ISI took over to continue the field work and launched a massive campaign of terrorism, assassinating hundreds of teachers and civil servants in Afghanistan."
For Iran, in November 1978 former Under Secretary of State George Ball was appointed as advisor to President Carter! This is most amazing for he was known to hold the view that the US should drop support for the Shah of Iran in favor of the radical Islamist opposition of Ayatollah Khomeini. Later during his exile The Shah would note with bitter hind sight,"It should have been clear to me that the Americans wanted me out. What else was I to make of the Administration's sudden decision to call George Ball as advisor on Iran?"
For Al-Qaeda around 1978-79(the details are fuzzy) Osama Bin Laden visited the US and Britain -or both -ostensibly for the treatment of his son Abdul Rahman born with hydrocephalus. However the required treatment-an operation - was never carried out. More likely he went there to get his final briefs first hand!
1979-The Bear Trap Is Sprung. Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile in France on January 16, 1979.By February Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi is deposed and Ayatollah Khomeini took over as Iran's new leader. At first the US was taken aback by the new fundamentalist Islamic government, and Brzezinski contemplated a military coup to stop Khomeini.
In March, there was a major revolt in Herat province. Russian Intelligence noted that it had support from outside-particularly Iran. This convinced Brzezinski that Khomeini was fiercely anti-communist, and he soon decided that Iran's new government can become part of his "arc of crises. The US embassy remained open, and more US officials come to Iran to begin tentative talks. The CIA started working (re-working) with Iranian intelligence to destabilize the pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan.
By April 1979, US officials start having their first meetings in Pakistan with opponents of the Afghan government. Robert Gates –a junior officer then , but later to become CIA Director - recalls that in one such meeting on March 30, 1979, Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocumbe wondered aloud whether there is "value in keeping the Afghan insurgency going, 'sucking the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire.'"
In May a CIA special envoy also meets these Afghan mujaheddin leaders at Peshawar. All of them have been carefully selected by the Pakistani ISI. One of them is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a drug dealer, and brutal warlord. His extreme ruthlessness is considered a plus. Over the next 10 years over half of all US aid to the mujaheddin will go to his faction. In June /August there are further large scale army mutinies within Afghanistan.
According to the official US version CIA aid to the Mujaheddin began after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan. How ever President Carter had formally approved covert aid in July. And as Brzezinski's confessed later on: "that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention". Charles Cogan, who later headed the CIA covert aid program to Afghanistan, will call Carter's approval on 6th July a "very modest beginning to US involvement." In fact, this is not correct because the' Safari Club' along with the 'rouge CIA' had been aiding the rebels since well before 1978.
Haizullah Amin over throws Daud in a military coup in October 1979, and invites the Soviets.
In early November 1979, Brzezinski had secretly met with Iranian Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, as well as Iran's foreign minister and defense minister, in Algiers. But shortly before the meeting, the US agrees to allow the Shah, dying with cancer, to come to the US for medical treatment. Khomeini is enraged, and on November 4, just three days after the Algeria meeting begins, students take over the US embassy in Teheran. Brzezinski's (Safari Club's?) attempts to create an alliance with Khomeni's Iran collapse.
On December 8 1979 The Soviets invaded Afghanistan; surprisingly on December 26 Russian troops turn against the invitee and kill him! Later declassified high-level Russian documents show that the Russian leadership believed Amin to have had secret contacts with the US embassy and was probably a US agent; and that because of this "the right wing Muslim opposition" has "practically established their control in many provinces"¦ using foreign support." They therefore installed a communist regime led by Babrak Karmal which was openly hostile to Pakistan. The Russians will later be proved correct when in a 1998 interview, Brzezinski, revealed that earlier in the year Carter authorized the CIA to destabilize the government, provoking the Russians to invade and later topple Amin's government! It seems Russia had been invited into Afghanistan by a Khomeini cultivated US agent – even though Iran was no more a part of the team!
Brzezinski wrote a memo to President Jimmy Carter after the Soviet invasion suggesting that success in Afghanistan could give the Soviets access to the Indian Ocean. He advised that US should continue aid to the Afghan Mujaheddin. He also added, "This means more money as well as arms shipments to the rebels and some technical advice." He concludes the memo with, "[W]e must both reassure Pakistan and encourage it to help the rebels. This will require a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid, and alas, a decision that our security problem toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our nonproliferation policy." Carter accepted Brzezinski's advice. Pakistan would be rewarded to become a nuclear power in exchange for help in implementing Brzezinski doctrine of Islamic Militancy!
Over the next decade CIA and Saudi Arabia would channel a huge amount of money through ISI, (estimates range up to $40 billion total for the war) to support the Mujaheddin guerrilla fighters opposing the Russians, forcing the USSR into a decade-long war which it could ill afford. It was as Brzezinski insisted, a war that brought about "The demoralization and finally the collapse of the Soviet Empire". In my next article I shall show how this covert operation involving 'radical Islamist militants' was developed and implemented by CIA.
 

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The New Great Game: Part-2; Global Islamic Jihad –

A Strategic Asset Of The USA?

Hassan Rizvi , Lahore

Pakistan :
This is a rather lengthy article, and I was delaying publishing it on Instablog for this reason. Yet I see that terrorism is on the rise in India too. Unfortunately my frequent predictions that after Afghanistan and Pakistan, India because of it again getting involved in Afghanistan would soon itself become a hot bed of terrorism appear to be coming true. This article is therefore being published to give a bird eyes view of the issues to the general public who blame Islam and Pakistan for the rise of global terrorism. Unfortunately the subject is such that despite my best efforts I could not make it any shorter.

In Part-1 we studied the background to the US involvement in Afghanistan. Essentially Curzon's great game of containment of Russia had been turned on its head by the India. It decided that it's interests would best be served by allying with the Russian. The resulting rise in Afghan militancy against Pakistan supported both by Russia and India, invited the ire of the Shah of Iran as well as the Saudi's who viewed Russian interference as an attempt to reach the warm waters and oilfields of the Persian gulf.

We also saw how Alexandre de Marenches head of French Intelligence exercised central influence on development of events in this region. His creations the Safari Club along with the BCCI, took on the load of containment of world wide Soviet penetration at a time when CIA was 'castrated' due to Congressional inquiries. He too was convinced Russia wanted access to the warm waters of the Gulf through Afghanistan. Just three weeks before the Russian Invasion of Afghanistan when Arnaud De Bochgrave of Newsweek asked for advise where to go to in order to get the best breaking news story he replied," If I were you, I would go to Kabul'!

Finally we saw how building up on this Brzezinski conceived the idea of trapping and 'bleeding' the Russians in a Vietnam of their own – using Islamic militants. In this article we will see exactly how – after having drawn the USSR into Afghanistan – the USA went about achieving this objective.

It is important to note here that till the time of this US involvement suicide bomber was an unknown phenomena in Pakistan but had been discovered and first used by the Tamil rebels of Sri Lanka. Also the rest of the Muslim world, specially the Arabs had not been involved in Pakistan's war with Afghanistan – hence global Radical Islamic Jehadi was an un invented commodity.

From 'Cold War' to 'Détente' to 'Global Jihad'.

Even in the early stages of the cold war the US had realized that religion was the most potent foe of the atheistic communist doctrine; and that the dynamic and fast growing religion of Islam was much more anti-communistic then even Christianity. Since WW2 it sought to contain communism using Muslim allies.

Nevertheless the division of US ally Pakistan into two by Russian backed ally India in 1971 – made US helplessness apparent world wide. The perception gained ground – within US government itself as well as – around the world, that the USSR had achieved nuclear parity while the US had been seriously weaken by Vietnam. To counter this the US decided to use it's relations with Pakistan as a bridge to improved relations with China and thus contain the USSR.

Following on the heels of a secret visit to China by Kissinger, in February 1972 Richard Nixon met with Mao Zedong and Chou En-Lai at Beijing to announce a stunning rapprochement. A fear of encirclement by adversaries lead the Soviets towards détente. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks started in May 1972, resulting in the signing of the SALT II treaty, on June 18, 1979. With this the 'cold war' came to an end.

But the post Watergate functioning of the Safari Club awakened the Americans to the possibility of re-energizing their fading dreams for a Pax-Americana. The work already done by The Safari Club in Afghanistan; Pakistan's visible determination to avenge their recent defeat in East Pakistan (1971) through a defeat of the Russo/Indian axis in Afghanistan; as well as Carters keenness to avoid the stigma of direct US involvement; enamored Brzezinski with plans of drowning the USSR in a flood of Jehadi fighters drawn from around and within the USSR.He started taking just enough interest to provoke a Soviet Invasion.

The successful enticement of Soviet troops into Afghanistan raised the love affair another notch into a marriage of convenience. US President Jimmy Carter withdrew the SALT II treaty from the Senate, describing the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as "the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War". In 1980, Ronald Reagan went further vowing to increase military spending and confront the Soviets everywhere. After getting elected he revived the B-1 bomber program, installed US cruise missiles in Europe, and announced his experimental Strategic Defense Initiative, i.e. "Star Wars". Also he dramatically increased support for Afghan War,while Richard Pipes the head of the NWG at the time, predicted that with the right encouragement Soviet Muslims will "explode into genocidal fury" against Moscow.

It would turn out to be a marriage in which the willing bride 'Pakistan' –as well as other Muslim in-laws – would be wooed with all sorts of enticing visions, heedless of the consequences! Meanwhile much had to be done before the marriage could be consummated-and so Brzezinski set about the task of arranging the party.

The guests would include China, Egypt, Saudi Arabia –and but for the fiasco of the Shah having been allowed permission for medical treatment in USA –even Khomeini's Iran. The plan involved their co-operation with the west in assembling, training, equipping and raising against Russia; the largest, most efficient and most motivated guerilla force the world had ever seen.


Outline Plan. Brzezinski came up with a plan to recruit Muslim fighters not only from Islamic countries around the globe, but also from Muslim minorities in other countries including the west. They would be motivated by the concept of Islamic Jihad; believing that God had ordered them to defeat the Godless Russians invaders. Their earthly reward would be glory, good pay and massive earnings through drug trade for the leaders; while in case of death they would be Shaheeds (mytrs) and would gain paradise!

The CIA would co-ordinate the global effort and provide special forces(green berets and SEALs/SAS) to train Islamic Jehadi leaders and instructors all over the globe; and along with Saudi and Egyptian help recruit and dispatch these Islamic fighters to Pakistan's ISI .The USA and Saudi Arabia would also finance and equip the entire war effort. Pakistan's ISI (along with its special forces SSG) would be responsible for the recruitment and training of local Jehadi fighters, as well as the training of those arriving from outside. More over Pakistan would serve as the sole pipeline for the operational control, re-supply and logistics including payments to all fighters within the theatre of operations.

It will be revealing at this stage to see which particular countries were relevant to this US plan; and why?

Egypt. Anwer Sadat a close ally of the Americans had been isolated in the Muslim world ever since he made his peace treaty with Israel. The Al Azhar University at Cairo was recognized through out the Muslim world as the fore most religious institution. The Muslim Brotherhood also had branches through out the world, and like Pakistan's Jamat e Islami advocated the establishment of an ideal Islamic state based on the teachings of The Holy Quran.The support of Anwer Sadat was vital for gaining access to Egyptian bases as regional collection and dispatch points of arms and equipment to Mujahideen in Afghanistan; while the support of two above mentioned institutions was the key to raising a huge army of Egyptian fighters for the envisioned global Jihad. In addition it was hoped that Anwer Sadat's identification with the Global Jihad might serve to end his isolation in the Muslim world.

Pakistan. It was the bride Brzezinski must woo at all costs if his global Jihad was to succeed. Already engaged in covert operations against Afghanistan for the last five years, it had the required intelligence already in place. Moreover being the country most jeopardized by the Russian invasion, it could be counted on to be the most zealous in the fight. The Jamat e Islami founded by Maulana Mahdoodi had a wide following in Pakistan –and also branches world wide. It also advocated the use of militancy for the achievements of its aims if necessary, and had prepared many of its followers to fight in Afghanistan as well as Kashmir. Enlisting its support would greatly facilitate the recruitment drive both in Pakistan as well as globally.

Saudi Arabia. We have already discussed the important role it played in the Safari Club both with regards to spreading of the teachings of Wahabi radicalism world wide, as well as the financing of covert operations. It enjoyed enormous respect as an ally amongst all sections of Pakistanis. More over as the custodians of the Holy Kaaba it commanded respect through out the Muslim world. Its importance both as financers as well as enablers of massive recruitment world wide, in support of global Jihad could never be under estimated.

China. Both as a regional power, as well as a country with which Pakistan had close ties, getting China on board for any major undertaking was unavoidable. More over its large Muslim population and Russian origin weaponry would be invaluable in provision of both recruits and equipment which could not be pinned on the Americans
.

But US relations with Pakistan were at low ebb because of a US anti-nuclear proliferation embargo. So Assistant secretary of State Warren Christopher was sent on a mission to woo the bride, soon Brzezinski would follow with the formal proposal. He would go first to Egypt then Pakistan; while US Defense secretary Harold Brown would go to China.


The Initial US Effort. Soon after Warren Christopher's wooing mission to Pakistan; in January 1980 Brzezinski visited Egypt .From that date the airbase at Qena- already in US use for reconnaissance flights against Iran – was also made available for airlifting supplies to Pakistan. Later Aswan was also made available, and Egypt started sending it's own out of date surplus Russian equipment for use by the Mujahideen.An old arms factory near Halwan was converted to produce copies of Russian weapons for dispatch. Later Representative Charlie Wilson would travel to Israel to meet w Zvi Rafiah; and Israel would also feed captured Egyptian, Syrian and PLO equipment-including T-55 tanks- into this supply route .Over time much useful equipment including artillery and mortar shells and even Strela missiles were sent. By summer of 1980 Cairo west airbase was also made available; and by end of 1980 US special warfare troops (SEALs) were based in Egypt to impart training to Egyptian instructors-including Al-Zawari- who in turn would train the Egyptian recruits.

From Egypt Brzezinski flew straight to Pakistan. Pakistan viewed the Russian invasion of Afghanistan as a God sent opportunity to strike a tough bargaining position. The ISI chief Akhtar A. Rehman was keenly in favor of using Afghanistan as a Vietnam for the Russians, yet Zia was determined to strike a tough deal. He asked for and got the US to turn a blind eye to Pakistan's perusal of its nuclear ambitions. He also got the US to accept that all arms, supplies, finance and training must be provided through Pakistan and not directly by CIA.

Later when US coordinated aid started flowing Zia insisted on absolute adherence to this condition. He further specified that the countries supporting must maintain absolute secrecy and repeatedly deny if necessary any shipment. Second the arms were to start immediately and be sent to Pakistan by fastest means available, but not less then two plane loads per week. Third the remaining supplies must be regular, and could come overland (China and Iran) or via sea from others (USA, UK, France, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia etc)

Henry Kissinger had already used the close ties between Pentagon and Pakistan military to build a link with China. Now after Brzezinski's visit to Pakistan, US defense secretary Harold Brown flew to China where he secured Chinese assent and active help for the global Jihad.

Osama Bin Laden. It will be worthwhile at this stage to focus on the role of Osama bin Laden-the man who was to be painted post 9/11 as the maniacal leader of Al-Qaeda Islamic terrorist network.

In his book CIA's Beardman claims that Osama bin Laden was never aware of the role he was playing on behalf of Washington. This is likely an attempt at distancing the CIA from Osama as a result of 9/11,for enough evidence is available to prove that not only was Osama aware of US effort in support of the Afghan war, but also that he was closely involved in routing it to the Arab fighters.

What is certain is that Osama Bin Laden appeared on the scene immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Leaving Saudi Arabia together with a group of supporters and heavy engineering equipment he arrived in Pakistan in 1979. According to Prof. Michel Chossudovsky, Osama was 22 years old in 1979, when he was trained in an ISI sponsored guerilla training camp near Peshawar, Pakistan. It is said that the ISI wanted a Saudi prince to head the Saudi contingent as proof of the Saudi commitment for the anti-Soviet effort. They failed to get royalty, but a person from the influential bin Laden clan was considered good enough.

Richard Clarke, counter terrorism head during the Clinton and Bush administrations, believes Osama was handpicked for the job by the head of Saudi intelligence (Turki) .The Saudis deny he was ever their agent, but it is known that he regularly met with Prince Turki and Saudi Interior Minister Prince Naif. Turki's chief of staff Ahmed Badeeb one of bin Laden's teachers in high school even said: "I loved Osama and considered him a good citizen of Saudi Arabia." Badeeb will later say bin Laden developed "strong relations with the Saudi intelligence and with our embassy in Pakistan. We were happy with him. He was our man".

It seems clear therefore that Osama was hand picked soon after the Soviet invasion to play a middleman's role between Saudi intelligence and ISI. More over the status of his relations with the CIA though cloudy, are also thus clearly established. The truth is that although Osama was neither recruited by the CIA, nor was their agent; once the US had decided to come in a big way; as the middleman between Saudi intelligence and ISI it was inevitable that he would get closely involved with the CIA too.

Numerous charities and foundations coordinated by Saudi intelligence in close liaison with Safari Club were already in existence and financing covert operations world wide. In addition as per Indian claims Pakistan had already set up 37 training camps in Pakistan ,49 in Azad Kashmir, and 22 camps in Afghanistan to supply fighters for Afghanistan and Kashmir. Now that the USA had also committed the CIA to globalization of the covert fight in a big way, it too would have to set up front organizations for undertaking the required financial and recruitment drive.

The CIA would be the main coordinator globally and the ISI would co-ordinate everything within Pakistan. Staying within this arrangement, Osama was possibly placed in charge of co-coordinating and marrying up the existing Arab global effort with the one to be set up by the CIA/ISI.

Soon after his training in Pakistan Osama left for a visit to the USA in 1980, and also reportedly was seen in the UK in 1981.Nothing is certain about the reasons for the visit. Barnett Rubin, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations claims that about this time in the USA, - a man "enlisted" by the CIA who had "close connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi intelligence, and the Muslim World League." – was given the role of looking after the financing and recruitment of foreign Jehadi. Slate writes, "Azzam trotted the globe during the 1980s to promote the Afghan jihad against the Soviets".

Now this Azzam also later became known as Osama's mentor. Was Osama also trotting alongside him on the same mission? It would appear to be so, for in 1984 Azzam set up the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), also known as Al-Kifah in Peshawar, a Pakistani town bordering Afghanistan.Osama bin Laden soon took it over from him.Azzam moved back to the US to set up its first American branch in New York – known as the Al-Kifah Refugee Center. As we shall see in a later part of the article Azzam then enlarged the network to 30 branches! All US branches were CIA backed, and served both as financial as well as recruitment centers.

It becomes obvious that the office at Peshawar was a set up for tying in the CIA effort with the effort already in place in Pakistan. Thus the MAK center at Peshawar is in a position to receive –through Pakistan's ISI- not only the money of private Arab charities, but also all CIA funds and equipment for Arab fighters. It would become the main center for funneling foreign funds and fighters from all over the globe into the Afghan war.

In fact back in 1982 the CIA had become unhappy with the 'Afghan native' fighters due to rivalry ridden infighting, and wants more Arab fighters as Arab were easier to 'read' and also 'one-dimensionally anti-Soviet '.CIA Director William Casey visited Pakistan to sign an agreement committing CIA's support for recruitment of Muslim from around the world. In addition to the Gulf States, this would include Turkey, the Philippines, USA, UK and China.

Azzam and Osama were probably tasked after this by their respective handlers to set up a suitable funnel for the purpose. They came up with the MAK center at Peshawar. From here Osama could keep a tab on and control the financing and feeding of all foreign fighters into the Afghan Jihad. The entire initial data base was initially also held by him. Researcher Kurt Nimmo writes:" This database of Islamic fighters was labeled in Arabic, 'Q eidat ilmu'ti'aat', which is the exact translation of the English word database. But the Arabs commonly used the short word 'Al Qaeda" which is the Arabic word for 'base.'" Robin Cook, British Foreign Secretary from 1997 to 2003, also confirms this: "al-Qaeda was originally the computer file of the thousands of mujaheddin who were recruited and trained with help from the CIA to defeat the Russians."

Thus starting soon after the Russian Invasion in 1979, US efforts had by 1984 laid the foundations for converting the discordant Pakistani covert war against the Soviets, into a global Jihad- code named 'Operation Cyclone'. Even by end of 1982 the rate of flow of equipment would rise to 10,000 ton annually, and the flow of foreign fighters also increases.
Operation Cyclone-The US led Global Jihad Against Russia

Afghan Mujahideen Leaders Meet US president Regan in America
NSDD 166.In March 1985, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 166, (NSDD 166). William Casey director of CIA described it as the largest covert operation in history. It authorized stepped-up covert military aid to the mujahideen, and laid down a new goal for the Afghan war: Total defeat of Soviet troops in Afghanistan through covert action leading to a Soviet withdrawal.

The new covert U.S. assistance began with a dramatic increase in arms supplies — a steady rise to 65,000 tons annually by 1987."In addition to arms, it provided very specialized training, state of the art military equipment including surface to air missiles, military satellite maps and latest communications equipment
The U.S. supplied support package had three essential components-organization and logistics, military technology, and ideological support for sustaining and encouraging the Afghan resistance. The ISI increased its staff to over 150,000 military and intelligence officers, bureaucrats, undercover agents and informers. In the final stages U.S. counter insurgency experts worked closely with the Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) even in organizing Mujahideen groups and in planning operations inside Afghanistan.

Eventually the entire Afghan nation, supported by tens of thousands of PakistaniJihadis and some 35,000 Muslim radical Jehadis from 40 countries would join the fight. Most of the funding would be from the United States and Saudi Arabia with a significant part generated from the Golden Crescent drug trade.

MAK offices in the US in the late 1980s. [Source: National Geographic]
Recruitment. We have already seen how Abdullah Azzam ,a CIA agent mentored Osama in setting up his financial and recruitment fronts ;and also the main funnel at Peshawer.Azzam also followed this up by expanding the US net work to 30 branches. For this reason Slate calls him "the Lenin of international jihad."

The war lords in Afghanistan recruited their own followers. These were reinforced by fighters from all over the world. In Pakistan the Jamat i Islami set up recruitment centers all over the country-including Kashmir. Recruitment centers were also opened in many other countries including the Middle East, Turkey, UK, Philippines and China. These were funded by MAK (through CIA and ISI) but operated and run through mosques and Islamic centers in respective countries.

Training. Initially key Pakistani officers and some Afghan mujaheddin leaders were trained by Navy Seals and Green Beret officers at Camp Peary, near Williamsburg, Virginia, which is said to be the CIA's main location for training spies and assets. Other training took place at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Harvey Point, North Carolina, and Fort A. P. Hill, Virginia. US consular official Michael Springmann reports fighters from many Middle Eastern nations getting US visas, apparently to train in the US for the Afghan war.

Training was imparted in how to detect explosives, surveillance, how to recruit new agents, how to run paramilitary operations, and more. They are taught to use different weapons, including rockets, mortars, missiles, remote-controlled mines and bombs, and sophisticated timers and explosives.

Guerrilla training was integrated with inspirational Jihad lectures, featuring CIA sponsored speakers. They could be CIA-trained Afghan fighters traveling on a CIA-issued visa; or clean-cut Arabic-speaking Green Beret lecturing on the glory of being 'warriors of the Lord.' People like Azzam, Abdul-Rahman, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, could often turn up as star guest speakers to deliver fiery sermons on themes like 'Blood and martyrdom are the only way to create a Muslim society' or 'the world opposes our objectives, because it is the enemy of Muslims.' Predominant themes were that Islam was a complete socio-political ideology, and that this was being violated by the atheistic Soviet invaders who must be killed, and that the Islamic people in Afghanistan are warriors of Allah through Jihad.

Instructor's training centers staffed by Green Berets and SEALs were set up in 1980 both in Egypt and Pakistan. Fearing a diplomatic incident, US and British troops rarely ventured into Afghanistan, but up to 1982 the British SAS did provide weapons training even in Afghanistan. After Russian soldiers found the passports of two British instructors in a training camp this was discontinued; and UK enrolled mujaheddin were trained in secret camps in remote parts of Scotland.

The instructors thus trained were used in turn to train tens of thousands more in camps set up by ISI in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Radical Indoctrination. Under NSDD 166, Washington also supported and financed the process of religious indoctrination. The CIA spent $ 51million to create and supply Afghan school children with textbooks filled with violent images and militant Islamic teachings, part of covert attempts to breed radicalism from the grass roots. Nebraska academic Thomas Gouttierre led the textbook project.

These were filled with talk of Jihad and featured drawings of guns, bullets, soldiers and mines, violent images and militant Wahabi teachings. Children are even taught to count with illustrations showing tanks, missiles, and land mines.Mathmatics involved posing the children with problems like how many second would it take for a bullet aimed by a Jehadi to crack open the head of an infidel Russian, given the velocity. The primers are so radical that even the Taliban regime would continue using these American-produced books!

Financing The Jihad Through Drug Trade. The history of the drug trade in Central Asia is closely connected to the CIA's operations. Prior to the covert operations opium production in Afghanistan and Pakistan was small- and directed to regional markets. There was no local production of heroin, but within two years of the onslaught of the CIA operation in Afghanistan, "the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands became the world's top heroin producer." (Alfred McCoy, Drug Fallout: the CIA's Forty Year Complicity in the Narcotics Trade. The Progressive, 1 August 1997).

CIA involvement started with a small suggestion in1981. Alexandre de Marenches head of the Safari Club met President Reagan at the White House. He proposed 'Operation Mosquito' a joint French-American-ISI operation to produce fake Russian newspapers with articles designed to demoralize Soviet troops. He also suggested US supply of drugs to Soviet soldiers. It is claimed that the idea was rejected, but soon after fake issues of the Soviet army newspaper did appear in Kabul; and also large qualities of cocaine, hashish, opium, and heroin become available to Soviet troops. At that time cocaine was only grown in South America!

In 1982, a secret memo will exempt the CIA from reporting on drug smuggling conducted by CIA officers or assets. Obviously the CIA wished to use the proceeds of the Afghan drug trade to finance its operations. Alfred McCoy's study confirms that" Under CIA and ISI protection, Afghan resistance opened heroin labs on the Afghan and Pakistani border. Among the leading heroin manufacturers were Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an Afghan leader who received about half of the covert arms that the CIA shipped to Pakistan. In 1995 the former CIA Director of this Afghan operation, Mr. Charles Cogan, admitted sacrificing the drug war to fight the Cold War. "Our main mission was to do as much damage to the Soviets. There was fallout in terms of drugs, yes, but the main objective was accomplished. The Soviets left Afghanistan." (Alfred McCoy, Testimony before the Special Seminar focusing on allegations linking CIA secret operations and drug trafficking-convened February 13, 1997, by Rep. John Conyers, Dean of the Congressional Black Caucus)

The Pakistan backed Taliban government which came to power in 1996 virtually eliminated this trade, with opium production declining by more than 90 percent. But in the immediate wake of the US led invasion of Afghanistan, opium production has again increased 33 fold from 185 tons in 2001 under the Taliban to 6100 tons in 2006. In 2007, this was approximately 93% of the global supply of heroin, and valued in excess of 190 billion dollars a year. (Michel Chossudovsky, Global Research, 6 January 2006)

The Operational Structure Of Jehadi Groups.The entire Jehadi fighting force was united under the banner of Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen which was an alliance of seven Afghan parties fighting against the Soviets : Islamic Party (Khalis), Islamic Party (Hekmatyar), Islamic Society (Rabbani), Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (Sayyaf), National Islamic Front for Afghanistan (Gailani), Afghanistan National Liberation Front (Mojaddedi), and Revolutionary Islamic Movement (Mohammadi).Although the alliance took its formal shape in the 1985, it had de facto existed as a political bloc since May 1979, when the Pakistani government decided to limit the flow of foreign financial aid, mainly from USA and Saudi Arabia, to the said seven organizations, thus limiting infighting amongst numerous smaller groups-while simultaneously cutting of the flow to doubtful and undesirable groups.

The seven parties between themselves controlled a number of affliated commanders –the highest operational rank amongst the Jihadis. Significant commanders typically led 300 or more men,but there were many commanders with lesser number of fighters.Each commander controlled several bases to dominate a district or a sub-division of a province.Some of the legendary commanders of the Afghan war were:

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar the favored warlord of the ISI and CIA. Casey was said to be particularly fond of him as both shared a goal of extending the fighting beyond Afghanistan into the Soviet Union itself. He was a ruthless fighter, who also led several raids into USSR territory. He was also a major drug trafficker. Almost half of all the covert weapons directed at Afghanistan were sent to his group.

Another ISI and CIA favorite was Jalaluddin Haqqani. In the 1980s, he was cultivated as a "unilateral" asset of the CIA, helping to protect Osama bin Laden, who was building his own militia to fight the Soviet forces. Originally a member of the Hezb-i Islami ,he was the first resistance leader to capture a city, Khost, from the Najibullah government. After the fall of Kabul to the Mujahideen in 1992, he was appointed justice minister in the first Mujahideen government. He attracted generous support from prosperous Arab countries compared to other resistance leaders. Haqqani was not originally a member of the Taliban. In 1995, just prior to the Taliban's occupation of Kabul, he switched his allegiance to them. In 1996-97, he served as a Taliban military commander north of Kabul, and was accused of ethnic cleansing against local Tajik populations. During the Taliban years in power, he served as the Minister of Borders and Tribal Affairs and governor of Paktia Province.

The GID's (Saudi Intelligence Agency) favorite was Abdul Rasul Sayyaf a Pashtun warlord .He was a member of Akhwan-ul-Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood), founded in 1969 by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Dr. Syed Burhanuddin Rabbani, which had strong links to TheMuslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Fluent in Arabic. His tenure as an Ustad (Professor) at the Shariat in Kabul ended in 1973 when he fled to Pakistan after an unsuccessful plot to overthrow President Daoud Khan . Sayyaf then headed the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, and fought against Soviet occupying forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s, forming a close relationship with Osama bin Laden . Together in the Jalalabad area they established a training camp network, later used by Al-Qaeda personnel, with bunkers and emplacements. In 2001 he was the only Pashtun leader allied with the United Front (Northern Alliance) –and therefore the US – in its war against the governing Taliban prior to the fall of Kabul. In this period though wielding little clout as a military leader, he was able to maintain a small army paying men under his command with donations he received from his Arab benefactors. He is also the one who trained the dreaded Abu Sayyaf terrorist group of the Philippines.

Ahmed Shah Massoud of the Panjshir valley north of Kabul,one of the most independent,charismatic and effective of Mujahideen commanders.He was also the most well read and certainly the most militarily proficient amongst them all.His tragedy was that in a land over which all sorts of powers vied for control he dreamed of a democratic and free Afghanistan.With the result that he was always relatively poorly supplied.Opposed to both Russian as well as Pushtun domination,he is credited by some western writers of having caused over 60% of the Russian losses-but found little favour with the ISI or Saudis. By the end of the war he was leading at least 10,000 trained troops-the only semblence to an army amongst mujahideen commanders- and had expanded his political control of Tajik dominated areas to Afghanistan's northeastern provinces.His Northern alliance later also provided the base for the US invasion of Afghanistan.After the Russian withdrawl he remained the lone obstacle preventing Taliban and Pakistani domination of the country.However in this final stage he was being supported by the Russians,the Iranians and the Indians-and perhaps covertly even by the US.

The fighters under the warlords operated through over 4000 bases spread all over Afghanistan.The bases served as sources of supply and control.

Hierarchies of organization above the base level were attempted,but the results varied depending on regional, ethnic and sectarian considerations. In the Pashtun areas of the east, south and southwest; tribal structure, with its many rival sub-divisions, provided the basis for military organization and leadership. Mobilization depended on the traditional fighting allegiances to quickly raise a tribal lashkar (fighting force). In favorable circumstances such formations could quickly reach more than 10,000. Normally they could be formed to besiege towns,but because of the independent nature of Pashtun ,the Lashkar durability was necessarily short-and most seiges ended in failures.Despite the proven ability to cause fearfully unacceptable attrition in hit and run missions,such troops were woefully inadequate for purposes of capturing or holding any major cities and bases in operations against trained troops.

Mujahideen mobilization in non-Pashtun regions was very different. The Persian and Turkish speaking regions of Afghanistan lacked strong political representation in a state dominated by Pashtuns. Prior to the invasion, non-Pashtuns possessed very few firearms and little military tradition upon which to build an armed resistance. Here the leadership for mobilization was found from amongst pious learned or charismatically revered pirs (saints).The military leadership being closely tied to Islam helped avoid the infighting common amongst the Pashtun and led to some of the most effective mobilization during the war.

Thus Ahmed Shah Massoud of the Panjshir valley north of Kabul,one of the most charismatic and effective commanders rose from within their ranks.By the end of the war he was leading at least 10,000 trained troops-the only semblence to an army amongst mujahideen commanders- and had expanded his political control of Tajik dominated areas to Afghanistan's northeastern provinces.His Northern alliance later also provided the base for the US invasion of Afghanistan.

The mujahideen leaders were skilled at sabotage operations. They concentrated on both civilian and military targets, knocking out bridges, closing major roads, blowing up power lines, pipelines, radio stations, government office buildings, air terminals, hotels, cinemas,ambushing patrols, attacking convoys, disrupting the electric power system and industrial production, and attacking police stations and Soviet military installations and air bases. From 1985 through 1987, an average of over 600 "sabotage acts" a year were recorded. The mujahideen would often launch 800 rockets per day. Between April 1985 and January 1987, they carried out over 23,500 shelling attacks on government targets. They also made heavy use of land mines .

Mujahideen Attacks Within The USSR.In 1985, the CIA, MI6 (Britain's intelligence agency), and the Pakistani ISI agreed to launch guerrilla attacks from Afghanistan into then Soviet-controlled Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, attacking military installations, factories, and storage depots within Soviet territory. The task was given to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.According to, Mohammad Yousaf, a high-ranking ISI officer at the time the attacks on the Soviet Union actually began in 1985:"These cross-border strikes were at their peak in 1986. Scores of attacks were made across the Amu (River)"¦ Sometimes Soviet citizens joined in these operations, or came back into Afghanistan to join the mujaheddin. That we were hitting a sore spot was confirmed by the ferocity of the Soviets' reaction. Virtually every incursion provoked massive aerial bombing and gunship attacks on all villages south of the river in the vicinity of our strike."

The Soviet Withdrawl.By 1987 the USSR decided it has had enough! Its Politburo decided that the Soviet-Afghan War must end "within a year"and by November 1987 both the CIA and the ISI are aware of this. As a result of an agreement signed in Geneva, between Afghanistan and Pakistan the Soviet Union pledged to withdraw all of its troops from Afghanistan by February15, 1989. On that exact date the last of its soldiers were out of Afghanistan.

But they left a Soviet backed Communist regime holding the fort at Kabul. None of the players – including the USSR – expected this regime to survive for more then three months. Yet even though it was acceptable to neither the mujahideen fighters or even their principle backers – it would survive for three years!

Conclusion. This article conclusively proves that 'Global Islamic Jihad' was forged as an instrument for the pursuit of US strategic interests ,and that it proved itself as a worthwhile CIA asset in Afghanistan. It's very first operation – "Operation Cyclone" – the organizing and launching of the biggest covert operations the world had ever seen; proved a remarkable success; enabling the USA and it's Jehadi allies to attain the stated goal of defeating and forcing the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan.

Yet as we have seen in some of the remarks of US officials it was an instrument forged to pursue goal stretching far beyond the immediate objective of defeating the Russian in Afghanistan. It is here that except for some success in Yugoslavia –Bosnia and Kosovo-and Chechnya; the idea back fired very badly.

In the first place the unexpected resistance of the Najeeb government upset US planning and forced the ISI as well as the CIA to continue funding the Mujaheddin for another three years. In the process the conflicting tactical and strategical compulsions of the many strange bed fellows in 'Global Jihad' started to surface. Leadership at all levels –US, Pakistani, Afghan as well as Arab – failed to rise to the occasion.Obsessed by their own objectives -now that the common enemy was removed- each group would fail to show any unity of purpose, or even the flexibility and accommodation required to attain the fruits of their massive effort. This in turn would propel the war uncontrollably into unexpected and unchartered territory!

To begin with –amongst the various Afghan mujahideen groups – the concept of 'holy war' seemed to give way immediately to an ethnic based struggle for leadership and control of the Afghan capital. Pakistan having a huge Pashtun population in it's tribal area, and, also interested in retaining control over Afghanistan as a means of strategic depth as well as access to Central Asia; was increasingly drawn in on the side of Gulbadin Hikmatyar and the Pashtuns.

The USA aiming for quick stability in order to implement it's greater game in Central Asian Republics and Yugoslavia – and also perhaps to lessen Pakistani and Pakhtun influence on Afghan issues – supported the concept of a more broad based government. This brought it in conflict with the issue of Pakhtuns domination- an issue the US never seemed to be inclined to support. Never the less because of Pakistani hold on Pakhtun commanders, the US had little choice but to appear to go along with what Pakistan was doing, while continuing to do what ever was needed to pursue its own objectives.

The death of General Zia in a mysterious plane crash tended to sabotage Pakistani influence on Pashtun commanders; how ever even if-as some say- engineered by CIA the crash proved counter productive, as for some time thereafter neither the US nor Pakistan had much control over the war lords in Afghanistan.

The uncontrolled mujahideen parties now committed enormous atrocities on their own citizens, and, destroyed whatever infrastructure was left as they battled each other for control of Kabul and the major cities. The country was politically divided with warlords holding sway on ethnic basis; ruthlessly suppressing their own citizens-and eliminating their opponents. The rise of the Pashtun Taliban in 1994 – a Pakistani attempt to re assert control – was therefore tolerated for a while even by the US, in the hope that this would bring the required peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Similar differences also developed between Bin Laden and his mentor Azzam. We have already noted that Azzam was a CIA man, while bin Laden was an ISI/GID man; Bin Laden sided with the "Islamic Party" lead by the Pashtun Hekmatyar, while Azzam tried to impose the US option of peace between the Mujahideen faction and the Jama'a Al Islamiya faction under the leadership of Rabani and Masuod. Azzam even issued a Fatwa forbidding Jehadi fighters from participating in the power struggle in Afghanistan. These differences thus appear to be an early reflection of the differences between the outlook of the US and pro Pashtun parties to the conflict.

One early effect of this on the set up of Arab fighters within Afghanistan was that Bin Laden disengaged from Azzam and was forced to move to Sudan to begin 'independent' operations. In November 1989 Azzam was murdered in New York under mysterious circumstances and Bin laden became the sole ideological leader of the organization of Arab fighters- Al-Qaeda. In 1990 Al-Zawahiri the leader of the Egyptian fighters in Afghanistan also moved to Sudan to join Bin Laden. But even at this stage both The ISI as well as Osama seems to have been part of the US operations involving the use of Al-Qaeda Jehadis in Chechnya and Yugoslavia.

Peace did not come even after the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan; Osama would return to Afghanistan-and Hikmatyar the CIA and ISI's blue eyed boy would flee to Iran! Ahmed Shah Masud would form the Northern alliance and continue battling the Taliban.Osama allied with Al-Zawahiri would announce that peace is not possible until Masud is killed. Musud in turn would speak to the EU parliament warning against terrorism and an imminent major terrorist attack in the near future. Soon Masud would be assassinated by men posing as press photographers. Two days later 9/11 would occur. The USA would embark on its invasion of Afghanistan using the deceased Masud's Northern alliance as a base.

What are we to make of all this? Did the creation of an instrument of global Jihad have unforeseen and undesirable ramifications for the USA? Did Osama at some stage along the line develop major differences with the CIA – leading to 9/11 and his subsequent vilification as the leader of the terrorist organization al-Qaeda? Was the difference much deeper and involved a gradually widening chasm between the CIA and ISI itself?

In the next article God willing I propose to wind up the subject in the light of the events relating to the rise and fall of the Taliban – and culminating in 9/11 and the presence of US troops in Afghanistan.
 

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24 March 2010
Sri Lanka – The New Great Game

Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe
FDI Associate
Summary
The defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009 brought an end to Sri Lanka's civil war. But the conflict also shed light on a bitter geopolitical struggle taking place against the backdrop of the declining influence of the West and the emerging influence of India and China.

Analysis
Sri Lanka's foreign policy tilt away from the West has taken on a new dimension in recent years, especially since President Mahinda Rajapakse's coalition government was elected to office in November 2005. When full-scale hostilities with the LTTE commenced in July 2006, Western pressure on Sri Lanka — specifically from the European Union and the United States — increased markedly, with substantial reductions in aid coming amidst demands for a ceasefire and resumption of peace talks. Yet there was more to Western demands than just a push for peace — the measures also reflected implicit Western disapproval of Sri Lanka's growing ties with China and Iran, which had been fostered not only as a means of enhancing economic growth, but also to provide a 'This is not a lesson that Sri Lanka taught the West. It is a victory of the developing countries and the global south "¦ Geneva was a miniature diplomatic Dien Bien Phu or Bay of Pigs for the EU.' counter-weight to such pressure from the West. It ultimately gave Sri Lanka the strategic autonomy to defeat the LTTE.
'Sri Lanka, confronted with the choice of economic blackmail or finding an accommodation with terrorism, had to strengthen its ties with alternative partners', Dr. Palitha Kohona, Sri Lanka's Foreign Secretary, told BBC News. Consequently, while China's importance grew, so too did that of Iran, which provided soft loans and investment in major infrastructure projects such as the US$450 million ($492 million) Uma Oya hydroelectric project and the US$750 million ($819 million) upgrade of Sri Lanka's only oil refinery at Sapugaskande. In its efforts to defeat the LTTE, Sri Lanka moved to strengthen bilateral relationships with countries outside the Western orbit to reduce political and economic pressure (which was seen as supporting the bifurcation of Sri Lanka and as being largely sympathetic to the Tamil diaspora and the LTTE), while also containing India — including pressure
from the state of Tamil Nadu — to avoid a scenario like Operation Liberation in 1987, when India extended a lifeline and prevented the defeat of the LTTE. As the conflict drew to a close in the first half of 2009, there were a spate of diplomatic incidents that reflected growing tensions between Sri Lanka and the West. Sri Lanka rejected Britain's appointment of Des Browne as Special Envoy to Sri Lanka and declined entry to Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt. In addition, a joint visit in April 2009 by British Foreign Secretary David Miliband and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner to secure a ceasefire led to a further souring of relations. That same month, Sri Lanka's application for a US$1.9 billion ($2.07 billion) loan from the International Monetary Fund met with US resistance. 'We have raised questions about the IMF loan at this time. We think it is not an appropriate time to consider that until there is a resolution of the conflict,' said US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the time.Sri Lanka, for its part, felt that after nearly three decades of conflict, and the deaths of 100,000 people, it had good reason to reject any developments that could have prevented the total defeat of the LTTE, something that could have occurred with Western support for a ceasefire or evacuation of the LTTE leadership.In addition, with the LTTE on the verge of defeat, there were determined attempts by the West, led by the EU, to table a resolution against Sri Lanka at the United Nations Security Council, a move that China and Russia vetoed on all five occasions.Following the LTTE defeat in May, the EU sought to pursue a motion against Sri Lanka for war crimes investigations at the UN Human Rights Council, which collapsed when 29 countries of the 47-member council voted in solidarity with Sri Lanka. India itself came out strongly in support of Sri Lanka at the Council and later even criticised the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.Commenting on Sri Lanka's diplomatic feat, Sri Lankan Ambassador to the United Nations, Dayan Jayatillaka, said:'This is not a lesson that Sri Lanka taught the West. It is a victory of the developing countries and the global south. It was not a defeat of the Tiger Diaspora alone. It was the defeat of a powerful bloc of forces. Geneva was a miniature diplomatic Dien Bien Phu or Bay of Pigs for the EU.' The unfolding events earlier this year underscored the fact that Sri Lanka's confrontation with the West, which has seen relations plummet to their lowest point since the 1970s, has had less to do with human rights and more to do with a fierce geopolitical struggle for influence. There is little doubt that Sri Lanka's move to broaden relations with China and Iran, its rejection of Western demands in its internal affairs, the timing of its victory over the LTTE, and its acceptance in June 2009 as a Dialogue Partner to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) were crucial in influencing the West's attempts to take punitive action against Sri Lanka — moves which served to further strengthen Sri Lanka's relations with
China.
Getting Cosy with China
Sri Lanka has generally enjoyed cordial ties with China since relations were first established with the recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1950 and the signing of the Rubber- Rice Pact in 1952. Since then, and especially in the last decade, trade between the two countries has steadily expanded, culminating in the signing of a China-Sri Lanka Joint Communiqué in September 2005. This served as a benchmark for future expansion of the bilateral relationship, which Gotabaya Rajapakse, Sri Lanka's Defence Secretary, recently highlighted in Lakbima News: 'The president went to China three times, I went five times,' he said. 'Sometimes, the president speaks to the Chinese premier by phone. We have set up good relations. We have understood who is important to us.' The growing ties have benefitted Sri Lanka in a number of ways. For example, China was willing to supply arms to Sri Lanka at concessionary prices when India was restricted in the type of military assistance it could provide due to opposition from its state of Tamil Nadu.Also, China demonstrated an interest in investing in the development of Sri Lanka's infrastructure by providing interest-free loans and preferential loans at subsidised rates. As a result, Chinese aid and commercial investments have increased markedly throughout
President Rajapakse's term, most notably the Hambantota Port Development Project (US$1billion); Norochcholai Coal Power Plant Project (US$855 million); the Colombo-Katunayake Expressway (US$248.2 million) and the National Performing Arts Theatre (US$21.2 million).Indeed, from 2006 to 2008, Chinese aid to Sri Lanka grew fivefold, replacing Japan as Sri Lanka's largest donor.
'This is not a zero sum game where our relationship with China is at the expense of our relationship with India.We cleverly balanced the relationship.' China, for its part, views Sri Lanka as a strategically vital gateway for securing access to shipping arterials in the Indian Ocean. Hambantota will be more than three times the size of Colombo harbour and is designed to function as a Service and Industrial Port when fully completed, 14 years from now. It also has the potential to be developed into a major transhipment port. In addition, the port will be able to accommodate a new generation of mega-ships and is to include four terminals (12 berths), bunkering and refuelling facilities, liquefied natural gas refinery, aviation fuel storage facilities, bonded export processing zone and dry docks. The project is expected to generate more than 6000 jobs directly for the
impoverished south of Sri Lanka, and another 50,000 indirectly in what is also President Rajapakse's home constituency. As the main symbol of growing Sino-Lankan relations, the new Hambantota port (construction of which began in January 2008) will serve as a key transit point for oil and gas tankers accessing the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Malacca Straits and the ports of Gwadar in Pakistan and Sitwe in Burma. Hambantota will also serve as a key maritime transit point to China's expanding investments among Indian Ocean island nations. However, the strategic value of Hambantota and its commercial/naval potential has raised Indian suspicions of China's intentions in what it sees as its sphere of influence, and in the process has contributed to an escalating India-China rivalry.

Indian Concerns
India has long been concerned with China's increasing inroads into Sri Lanka and has demonstrated its displeasure on numerous occasions. In early 2007, Indian National Security Advisor MK Narayanan criticised Sri Lanka for attempting to purchase a Chinese built JY-11 3D radar system on the grounds that it would 'overarch' into Indian airspace. 'It is high time that Sri Lanka understood that India is the big power in the region and ought
to refrain from going to Pakistan or China for weapons, as we are prepared to accommodate them within the framework of our foreign policy,' he said. There have also been tensions surrounding the construction of the massive Colombo South Harbour Development Project and mining rights to the Mannar Basin. But India's concerns over Chinese investment in Hambantota are not based solely on military grounds and Sri Lanka is said to have initially offered the project to India, which declined it for undisclosed reasons. One reason may have been political and commercial considerations, and India's ambitions to upgrade its own ports in southern India, namely Vizhinjam, Tuticorin, and Cochin. Historically, there has been a fierce and longstanding rivalry between Indian and Sri Lankan ports, particularly Colombo, which dominates the region's lucrative transhipment trade.
b. Raman, a retired senior Indian intelligence official formerly affiliated with India's key external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing, is quoted as saying: 'Presently, the Colombo port enjoys a better reputation in international shipping circles than the ports in South India. The turn-over time for ships in Colombo is much less than in the ports of South India. The Sri Lankan authorities are worried that the Colombo port might lose the advantages presently enjoyed by it vis-à-vis the ports in South India when the construction of the Sethusamudram Canal and the work of modernisation of the ports in South India undertaken by the Government of India is completed.' Such views do much to put the Hambantota port issue in context — the facility will diminish India's ability to compete. India's dilemma is compounded by Sri Lanka's ambition to harness
its strategic location astride Indian Ocean shipping arterials, with Dr. Priyath Bandu Wickrama, Chairman of the Sri Lanka Port Authority, noting: 'Over 200 ships sail this route [daily] and we want to attract them. Our vision is to consolidate the position of Sri Lanka as the premier maritime logistic centre of the Asian region.'
Getting the Balance Right
As Rajapakse recently stated, the end of Sri Lanka's civil war has ushered in a new era in the nation's foreign policy. But in the aftermath of the LTTE defeat, there is likely to be growing strategic rivalry between India and China, something which will also complicate Sri Lanka's relations with the West.So far, at least, Sri Lanka appears to have successfully balanced the competing interests of India and China. 'There are elements in America and India who would like to raise the China bogey,' former Sri Lankan diplomat Jayantha Dhanapala told the Lakbima News. 'This is not a zero sum game where our relationship with China is at the expense of our relationship with India. We cleverly balanced the relationship.' If he is right, and if Sri Lanka handles its foreign policy judiciously, the country could continue to benefit from the new Great Game in the Indian Ocean.
***** About the author: Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe is an analyst who has published widely on South Asian and Indian Ocean political and security issues. This SAP is based on an article originally published in The Diplomat, 28 October 2009. Published by Future Directions International Pty Ltd. Desborough House, Suite 2, 1161 Hay Street, West Perth WA 6005 Australia. Tel: +61 8 9486 1046 Fax: +61 8 9486 4000 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.futuredirections.org.au
 

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Energy fuels new 'Great Game' in Europe


The giant Russian energy company, Gazprom, which controls the world's largest reserves of natural gas, has issued a stark warning to the European Union saying it must decide if it wants to continue receiving supplies of Russian gas.
Speaking in an interview for the BBC's Newsnight programme, Gazprom deputy chairman Alexander Medvedev warned that Europe was now at a crossroads.
"Only three countries can be suppliers of pipeline gas in the long-term - Russia, Iran and Qatar. So there is no other choice than to deal with these suppliers," he said.
"Europe should decide how to handle this situation"¦ and if Europe doesn't need our gas, then we will find a way of selling it differently."
The threat comes as the EU scrambles to find alternative energy suppliers following the crisis in January, when Russia shut down the main pipeline into Europe for two weeks in a price dispute with the key transit country, Ukraine.
The EU currently relies on Russia for a quarter of its total gas supplies. Of the bloc's 27 member states, seven are almost totally dependent on Russian gas.
'Changing attitudes'
Bulgaria was the hardest hit, losing its supplies in the midst of the coldest winter for years. An estimated 800,000 homes were left without proper heating and vital factories were forced to either cut production or shut down altogether. Business leaders say total losses amounted to $300m (£187m).
"It was very unpleasant," says Dragomir Simeonov, as he plays with his young son in their small apartment in the Bulgarian capital, Sofia.
They had endured much of January with minimal heating.
"This is the 21st Century, we live in the European Union and such crisis should not impact on us. We should be more secure," he adds.
Mr Simeonov is the voice of his nation. He is one of Bulgaria's best-known radio presenters.

Bulgarian business leaders say the gas shortages in January cost them $300m

"It was a huge shock. We thought we had good relations with Russia and that we'd be supplied at all times regardless of what happened between Moscow and Ukraine," he says.
"We thought Russia would protect us."
Business leaders feel equally betrayed. They say the crisis came just after Bulgaria had renewed its contract with Gazprom, which had resulted in a steep increase in gas prices.
They had assumed this was a trade-off for long-term deliveries and more reliable supplies.
"As a result of the crisis, there's been a complete change in the attitude in Bulgaria [towards Russia], in public opinion, in the business community and in the government," says Ivo Prokopiev, chairman of the Bulgarian Confederation of Employers and Industrialists.
"Everybody realises now we have to focus on our energy independence."
Increasing demand
But is it already too late for Bulgaria and Europe as a whole to escape the addiction to Russian gas?
It is now a vital issue for the EU and it is leading to increasing friction with Moscow in what being described as a new "Great Game" between Russia and the West over energy supplies.
Gazprom is already manoeuvring cleverly in this game, pushing ahead with highly ambitious plans which would strengthen its hold over Europe.
Despite the sharp fall in oil and gas prices which have hit Gazprom hard, the company is determined to build two new pipelines to Europe at a total cost of at least $20bn (£12.5bn).



The first pipeline, called Nord Stream, would go from western Russia under the Baltic Sea to Germany, while the second, called South Stream, would go from Russia's south coast under the Black Sea to Bulgaria, eventually ending up in Italy.
Gazprom wants to pump gas under the sea directly to Europe so it can avoid transit countries such as Ukraine which lie along the existing land routes.
It argues this will improve Europe's energy security. But it will also give Russia the ability to pump much more gas to Europe.
Mr Medvedev of Gazprom believes that by 2020, Russia's share of the European gas market will increase from 26% to 33% "because local production is going down and demand is increasing".
Energy 'weapon'
Construction of the first stage of the Nord Stream pipeline is already underwayThe Gazprom workers can be found deep in the mosquito-infested forests of Western Russia about two hours' drive from St Petersburg.
We were allowed onto an old airbase once used by Soviet nuclear bombers, where pipes have been piled up ready to be welded together.
We were then taken to see completed parts of the pipeline being laid in a freshly-dug trench stretching through the forest far into the distance.
It was an impressive operation and it was advancing steadily towards the coast.
Workers told us they expected early next year to reach the Baltic Sea, where the pipeline will disappear under the water on its way to Germany, assuming all the necessary environmental agreements are signed with countries bordering the sea route.
The pipeline is due to start delivering gas in 2011, with a second pipe ready by 2014 that will double the capacity.
Energy expert Marshall Goldman, a professor at Harvard University, is convinced that Europe is sleep-walking into an increasingly dangerous level of dependence on Gazprom, a state-owned company with close links to the Russian government.
"Russia is using energy as a political weapon and I would argue that it is stronger than during the Cold War when it had nuclear weapons," he says.

Nord Stream will go from west Russia under the Baltic Sea to Germany
"The Europeans have to have a better appreciation of just how powerful a weapon energy is. Anybody who links up with that gas pipeline and becomes dependent on Russia is very much at their mercy."
He argues that Europe has already been divided by Moscow's skilful political use of its energy resources.
Individual EU countries such as Germany which have signed big bilateral energy deals with Russia, he says, have "started pulling their punches, fearful of provoking the Russians" when it comes to raising sensitive political issues with Moscow.
Nord Stream is being built by a consortium which includes top German and Dutch energy companies, and which has the former German chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, as chairman of its shareholders' committee.
It also has some backing from the European Commission, which describes it as a "project of European interest".
Competing projects
While the Commission seems unconcerned by the long-term implications of Nord Stream, there is real worry about Gazprom's other big pipeline project, South Stream.
No construction work has begun on it yet, but Gazprom insists feasibility studies will be completed this year and the pipeline will be built across the Black Sea to Bulgaria and into the heart of Europe by 2015. Austria is home to one of the largest gas-storage facilities in Europe

For Europe this could spell disaster. It could kill off one of its most important schemes for breaking away from its dependency on Russia.
For five years, the EU has been pushing for a pipeline to be built from the Caspian region to Austria which would carry gas from Central Asia, the Caucasus and Middle East.
Crucially, the pipeline called Nabucco would not go across any Russian territory.
But like South Stream it would enter Europe via Bulgaria and possibly use several of the same European transit countries.
There are serious doubts that both Nabucco and South Stream are viable.
One European Commission official told the BBC that there was now a "war of gas pipelines" going on with Russia, with "harsh competition as each side tries to gather support for its plans".
'No escape'
This "war" is being fought on two fronts - firstly securing the gas supplies in the Caspian region and secondly signing up transit countries.

South Stream has secured initial backing from several European states
Gazprom holds many of the trump cards. It already has the pipelines and agreements in place to buy gas from the major Central Asian suppliers and is currently in talks with Azerbaijan.
South Stream also has initial backing from Bulgaria, Serbia, Italy, Greece and Hungary, which have agreed to carry out feasibility studies as transit states.
Austria and Slovenia are reportedly close to signing similar agreements.
And in a sign of growing confidence, a plan was recently announced to double the capacity of the pipeline.
Nabucco on the other hand is still struggling to find sufficient sources of gas to make it viable and ironically may end up transporting Russian gas.
"We did not eliminate from the very beginning of our project any source," says Reinhard Mitschek, managing director of the Nabucco pipeline consortium.
"We will transport Russian gas, Azeri gas, Iraqi gas."
Meanwhile Gazprom has also been extending its influence in Europe by investing in energy companies and facilities in many countries across the continent. These include strategic gas storage facilities vital for Europe's energy security in a time of crisis.
While the European Commission insists it has several plans other than Nabucco to lower the dependency on Russia, it also admits there is no real escape.
"We'll continue to work with Russia because Russia has energy resources," says European Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs.
"I think I could be confident there will be no interruption from Russia of supplies because we really have been working on an early warning mechanism and personal contacts."
But this is cold-comfort for those hardest-hit during the crisis in January such as the people of Bulgaria.
And Moscow itself is now openly saying that competition for energy supplies in areas including Central Asia and the Caspian Sea could lead to military conflicts along its borders over the next decade.
A security strategy document, published in May, was signed by the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.
Watch Richard Galpin's full report on Newsnight on Tuesday 9 June 2009 at 10.30pm on BBC Two.
 

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cross-posting from indo- iran thread

India-Iran Defence Cooperation

As Asian Nations work towards integrating familiar areas of mutual interests, defence cooperation by and large, serves as a significant tool that complements diplomatic enterprise. Collaboration in the realm of defence is widely considered a visible manifestation of a strategic relationship thereby fostering bilateral ties including political and economic relations and specific national security interests, crucially counting military capabilities. Of all the controversies that have surrounded Iran of late, specifically the debate surrounding Tehran's nuclear programme, India has made lucid efforts to project the Iranian case as symbolic of the sovereignty of New Delhi's foreign policy orientations. The complexities of Indo-Iranian ties could be attributed to the 'American angle' that looms large over this equation as New Delhi walks a tightrope whilst its ties with the United States (US) burgeon. In addition, fostering a close relationship with Israel also proves to be a litmus test for New Delhi vis-à-vis Tehran.

Iran holds particular importance for India as it provides unique access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, two theaters in which India seeks to project greater influence.1 As New Delhi promulgates a "look-east" policy to develop and sustain a multifaceted presence in the greater Middle East, Iran unquestionably is an instrumental player in this set up.2

Defence and Military-to-Military Collaboration

India and Iran's strategic partnership has significantly put in place military and energy deals estimated over $25 billion. The wide-ranging cooperation involving all three military services is quite a turnaround in the existing strategic situation in Southern Asia especially since the last two decades. In fact, the 2005-06 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi claimed that Indo-Iranian cooperation had "acquired a strategic dimension flourishing in the fields of energy, trade and commerce, information technology and transit."3

The establishment of the Indo-Iran Joint Commission in 1983 was instrumental in so far as forging New Delhi's defence and military ties with Tehran. As the protracted Iran-Iraq war drew to a close in 1988, Tehran felt the need to rebuild its conventional arsenal and for this purpose initiated the process of purchasing tanks, combat aircraft and ships from Russia and China. Further, Iran reportedly solicited Indian assistance in 1993 to help develop new batteries for three Kilo-class submarines it had purchased from Russia. The submarine batteries provided by the Russians were ill-suited to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf, and India possessed substantial experience operating Kilo-class submarines in warm water.4 In addition, Iran remains inclined to acquire Indian assistance for other upgrades to Russian-supplied military hardware, which includes MiG-29 fighters, warships, subs, and tanks.

Defence ties between India and Iran further evolved post signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defence cooperation in 2001. It was in the same year that India's Defence Secretary, Yogendra Narain, met his Iranian counterpart, Ali Shamkani, and supposedly discussed arms sales to Iran including Indian Konkurs anti-tank guided weapons and spare parts.5 India and Iran are hopeful that New Delhi will become a source of conventional military equipment and spare parts for Iran, provide expertise in electronics and telecommunications and hold joint training exercises with Iranian armed forces. Tehran also seeks New Delhi to provide combat training for missile boat crews as well as simulators for ships and submarines and purportedly anticipates that India provide midlife service and upgrades for fighters, warship, and subs in Indian dockyards.6

Bilateral defence and security ties received a boost as Iranian President Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Mohammad Khatami paid a state visit to India in January 2003 where he was the guest of honour at India's Republic Day. In a landmark accord, the two nations agreed upon future Iranian access to Indian military technology. According to the New Delhi Declaration:

The Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Iran are resolved to exploit the full potential of the bilateral relationship in the interest of the people of the two countries and of regional peace and stability"¦ with a vision of a strategic partnership for a more stable, secure and prosperous region and for enhanced regional and global cooperation"¦ Explore opportunities for cooperation in defence in agreed areas, including training and exchange of visits.7

The declaration called upon the two states to broaden their strategic collaboration in third countries-a clear reference to Afghanistan. Significantly, the New Delhi Declaration, apart from expressing discomfort with mounting US military presence in Persian Gulf, sought to upgrade defence cooperation between India and Iran specifically in the following areas:

* Sea-lane control and security.
* Indo-Iran joint naval exercises.
* Indian assistance to Tehran in upgrading its Russian made defence systems (yet to fructify).
* Establishment of joint working groups on counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics.

According to reports, India would purportedly be given access to Iranian military bases in the event of a war with Pakistan.8 India reportedly hoped that the 2003 New Delhi Declaration would pave the way for upgrades of Iran's Russian-made conventional weapon systems by India. While Indo-Iranian deals along these lines have not yet materialized, Iran has sought Indian advice in operating missile boats, refitting Iran's T-72 tanks and armored personnel carriers, and upgrades for MiG-29 fighters.9 Although there was a clear mention of military ties expanding further, the US State Department expressed concern but dismissed any anxiety over the developments stating that New Delhi had reassured Washington that the agreement "doesn't involve military and technical assistance."10

Two months after President Khatami's visit to India, in March 2003, Tehran and New Delhi conducted their first joint naval maneuvers in the Arabian Sea. Sea-lane control and security, as well as discomfort with the emerging US presence in the Persian Gulf, were partially responsible for this exercise. Another exercise was held in March 2006. Defence cooperation beyond this, however, has been sporadic and low-level.11 The timing of the second naval exercise in March 2006 was crucial as it overlapped with President George Bush's visit to Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. Given its timing, the conduct of the exercise signaled to Tehran and Washington alike that Washington will not dictate India's foreign policy.12 As a matter of fact the joint naval drill in 2006 prompted US Congressional criticism, but both the Bush Administration and Indian officials insisted the exchange emphasised mutual sport activities rather than military techniques13-in what was an obvious effort to play down the growing spotlight over this development.

According to reports appearing in September 2007, Iran is negotiating with India to purchase advanced radar systems designed for fire control and surveillance of anti-aircraft batteries. Iran is seeking an unspecified number of Upgraded Support Fledermaus radar systems from the Indian state-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd (BHEL). The deal could touch a staggering $70 million and mark the first major defence agreement between New Delhi and Tehran. However, New Delhi faces intense pressure from Washington to not to sell the radars to Iran, as it is convinced that the request is part of Iran's military effort to protect its nuclear weapons facilities in question. The upgraded Super Fledermaus is a monopulse radar used in 35-mm air defence batteries and designed to detect low-flying objects, such as unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). The digital system contains a built-in simulator as well as a signal jammer. Crucially, BHEL has gone on record and confirmed Iran's request for these upgraded radars. Executives at the plant stated that Iran sought the same fire control and surveillance radar that the company upgraded for the Indian Army way back in 2001.

Adding on to the nascent military ties, India has also developed intelligence outposts in Iran, including the Indian consulate in Zahedan and a relatively new consulate in Bandar Abbas, which will permit India to monitor ship movements in the Persian Gulf.14 The two countries have not only undertaken to cooperate in space research but collaborate as well.15 Moreover, India can also offer medium-technology weapons such as medium-range howitzers, and more prominently, jointly train with the Iranian forces.



As India assists Iran to construct railway spurs linking its rail network to that of Central Asia, the process considerably reduces Pakistan's strategic leverage over these landlocked states thus providing them alternative corridors to the sea. New Delhi has undertaken vital development of Iranian port facilities along with the construction of road and rail links. Indian engineers have contributed immensely towards the upgradation and development of the Iranian port of Chahbahar. In fact, India's Ministry of External Affairs has claimed: "New Delhi and Tehran have agreed to 'join hands' in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and to support the development of 'alternative access routes' to that country (bypassing Pakistan) via Iran's Chahbahar port."16 This shall presumably facilitate trade and is part of a larger Indian Ocean to North Sea initiative involving Russia and others, and mainly centered on the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. Moreover, India is developing Chahbahar and is laying railway tracks to connect it to Zaranj in Afghanistan, proclaiming that this would be a commercial port. Additionally, India has constructed the 218 kms long Zaranj-Delaram highway that now links Afghanistan to the Iranian port of Chahbahar as part of the Afghan circular road that connects Herat and Kabul via Mazar-e-Sharif in the north and Kandhar in the south- thereby providing easier access to Afghanistan and possibly even further, to Central Asia via Iran.17

Attaining Strategic Congruence through Defence Cooperation

Defence cooperation proves critical in facilitating regional security and further cementing alliances with nations in the extended neighbourhood. Defence cooperation with Iran would go far so as to project India's role in the regional security structural design. Assessing the opportunities available for military cooperation with Iran, it is evident that Tehran is searching for sustained support in modernisation of its armed forces which have been suffering from lack of access to advanced technology, maintenance and spares support. Developing early stakes in the process would be a major advantage for India. For this purpose, commencing a defence dialogue could be envisaged, which could be progressed based on international and regional developments, providing opportunities for greater cooperation with Iran without necessarily impinging upon India's relations with other states in the region or with the United States.18 The band of opportunities is not necessarily sequential or time constrained and could be envisaged in the following fields:

* Assistance in modernisation of defence forces to include supply of arms and equipment as per India's national policy from time to time
* Defence research and development (R&D) assistance
* Strategic defence dialogue
* Training and exercises
* Courses
* Defence infrastructure development
* ITisation of the armed forces
* Maintenance assistance, supply of spares and ancillaries.19

It would also be evident that there are very limited reverse spin offs that would be accrued to the Indian military. However, defence cooperation would very effectively serve the larger aim of building a strategic relationship with Tehran as and when such an opportunity becomes visible or is envisaged. Being situated on Pakistan's western borders, Iran provides significant politico-strategic advantage for India. This provides a strong congruence of Indo-Iranian interests in ensuring a moderate regime in Kabul that is not a client of Pakistan. Afghanistan is critical to India's security and Iran can provide a major stabilising influence there. Accordingly, engagement of Iran implies an engagement with its armed forces and the need for fostering military-to-military relations. This could translate into sharing of intelligence regarding terrorist groups operating out of Afghanistan and curbing the activities of narcotics smugglers and drug traffickers. India and Iran have a major stake in keeping the Gulf waterways open for trade and energy flows. Towards this end, India and Iran envisaged naval cooperation for sea-lane control and security. Indo-Iranian naval exercises such as the ones held in March 2003 and 2006 need to be resumed in future. Furthermore, bilateral naval exercises could also encompass anti-piracy operations and cooperation.20 As far as Army-to-Army cooperation is concerned, it could entail the following:

* Joint anti-terrorist exercises.
* Provision of course vacancies for Iranian officers at the National Defence College (NDC) and Defence Services Staff College (DSSC).
* Provision of training for UN peacekeeping operations.
* Training in English language and IT skills for Iranian armed forces personnel.
* Offer assistance in training as well as maintenance and repair of key Russian equipment like Kilo submarines and MiG-29 fighters.
* Maintenance and repair and training support for Iranian T-72 Tanks, BMP infantry carrier vehicles [BMP-I and BMP-II] and Russian origin artillery equipment (105 mm, 130 mm and 122 mm towed Artillery Field Guns).
* Provision of spares would be a major component of military ties.
* India could consider selling Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH) and jet trainer aircraft.

Despite these many forms of collaboration, more than a few constraints are likely to curtail the extent to which India might reach out to Iran in defence association. Assistance in these areas would be contingent upon scaling down of Iran's hostility levels with the US and Israel. India receives major quantities of cutting edge equipment from Israel and as such cannot be seen as undermining its security by upgrading the perceived threat from Iran. New Delhi's camaraderie with Iran especially in the field of defence collaboration incessantly carries a potential risk of putting it at odds with simultaneous improvement in ties with Israel and the US. The field of defence cooperation is subjected to close scrutiny and sensitivity as it comes under the scanner of the US and Israel. Nevertheless, refuting to view international relations as a zero-sum game, India's Ministry of External Affairs stated in January 2005: The United States has its relationship with Pakistan, which is separate from our own relationship with them"¦ Our relationship with Iran is peaceful and largely economic. We do not expect it to affect our continuing good relations with the United States.

During an April 2006 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was inquired about New Delhi's relationship with Tehran. Of immediate interest to some Senators was an American press report on Iranian naval ships visiting India's Kochi port for "training." Indian officials downplayed the significance of the port visit, and Secretary Rice challenged the report's authenticity.21 Secretary Rice did however, sent a message across when she stated, "The US has made very clear to India that we have concerns about their relationship with Iran."22 Furthermore, Israel has also raised concerns vis-à-vis New Delhi's defence ties with Iran resting upon apprehension that India could divert Israeli military technology to Iran-a nation it describes as the "epicenter of terrorism." During Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to India in September 2003, Sharon was reported to have demanded explicit guarantees from India that it would not transfer any technology acquired from Israel to any third country, especially Iran.23

Yet another episode that established India's autonomous foreign policy approach came in March 2007 when Washington conducted its war games in the Persian Gulf-its largest show of force in the region since the 2003 intervention in Iraq involving USS Eisenhower and USS Stennis. This coincided with the visit of the Iranian Naval Chief to India-a reflection of the importance that Iran attached to its growing defence ties with India.24 Additionally, a naval cadet training ship visited India, and in 2007, the Indian government allowed a limited number of Iranian officers to participate in joint training courses with officers from several other countries.25

Conclusion

India will have to compete for influence in Iran and military-to-military ties would go a long way in cementing relations with Iran. Iran lies at the core of the world's energy heartland formed by the Middle East and Central Asia. As such, enlightened self-interest demands that India should engage Iran in a constructive manner to safeguard its significant geopolitical and energy security stakes.

As of now, defence cooperation between the two countries appears low and patchy with ample scope for gaining momentum. Closer ties between New Delhi and Tehran especially in the realm of defence cooperation shall be of critical significance to both nations even as it might impact upon the West Asian politico-strategic dynamic. Despite the fact that resisting unvarying US pressure towards keeping its diplomatic and political channels open vis-à-vis Tehran, New Delhi should maintain an independent line while strategizing its foreign policy sans any threads binding the same. Thus, in a move that could radically alter the geopolitics of the region, Indian and Iranian defence cooperation could well prove to be an essential tool of foreign policy thereby strengthening mutual trust and enhancing security and stability in the region. It shall further be a significant pointer towards the emerging strategic calculations in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2010/05/india-iran-defence-cooperation.html
 

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http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100524_germany_after_eu_russian_scenario

"This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"

Germany After the EU and the Russian Scenario

for full article visit the link

the Polish government recently announced that the United States would deploy a battery of Patriot missiles to Poland.
While the Patriot does not enhance America's ability to protect itself against long-range ballistic missiles from, for example, Iran, it does give Poland some defense against shorter-ranged ballistic missiles and substantial defense against conventional air attack.
Russia is the only country capable of such attacks on Poland
We return to the question that has defined Europe since 1871, namely, the status of Germany in Europe. As we have seen during the current crisis, Germany is clearly the economic center of gravity in Europe, and this crisis has shown that the economic and the political issues are very much one and the same. Unless Germany agrees, nothing can be done, and if Germany so wishes, something will be done. Germany has tremendous power in Europe, even if it is confined largely to economic matters. But just as Germany is the blocker and enabler of Europe, over time that makes Germany the central problem of Europe.
The German problem is the same problem it has had since unification: It is enormously powerful, but it is far from omnipotent. Its very power makes it the focus of other powers, and together, these other powers can cripple Germany. Thus, Germany is indispensable for any decision within the European Union at present, and it will be the single center of power in Europe in the future — but Germany can't just go it alone. Germany needs a coalition, meaning the long-term question is this: If the EU were to weaken or even fail, what alternative coalition would Germany seek?

The casual answer is France, as the two economies are somewhat similar and the countries are next-door neighbors. But historically, this similarity in structure and location has been a source not of collaboration and fondness but of competition and friction.
A great deal of potential synergy exists between the German and Russian economies. Germany imports large amounts of energy and other resources from Russia. As mentioned, Russia needs sources of technology and capital to move it beyond its current position of mere resource exporter. Germany has a shrinking population and needs a source of labor — preferably a source that doesn't actually want to move to Germany. Russia's Soviet-era economy continues to de-industrialize, and while that has a plethora of negative impacts, there is one often-overlooked positive: Russia now has more labor than it can effectively metabolize in its economy given its capital structure. Germany doesn't want more immigrants but needs access to labor. Russia wants factories in Russia to employ its surplus work force, and it wants technology. The logic of the German-Russian economic relationship is more obvious than the German-Greek or German-Spanish relationship.
This would leave many countries extremely uneasy. The first is Poland, caught as it is between Russia and Germany. The second is the United States, since Washington would see a Russo-German economic bloc as a more significant challenger than the European Union ever was for two reasons. First, it would be a more coherent relationship — forging common policies among two states with broadly parallel interests is far simpler and faster than doing so among 27. Second, and more important, where the European Union could not develop a military dimension due to internal dissensions, the emergence of a politico-military dimension to a Russo-German economic bloc is far less difficult to imagine. It would be built around the fact that both Germans and Russians resent and fear American power and assertiveness, and that the Americans have for years been courting allies who lie between the two powers. Germany and Russia would both view themselves defending against American pressure.
A few months ago, the Poles and Americans conducted military exercises in the Baltic states, an incredibly sensitive region for the Russians. The Polish air force now flies some of the most modern U.S.-built F-16s in the world; this, plus Patriots, could seriously challenge the Russians. A Polish general commands a sector in Afghanistan, something not lost upon the Russians. By a host of processes, a close U.S.-Polish relationship is emerging.
A Russian-German relationship could logically emerge from this. If it did, the Americans and Poles would logically have their own relationship. The former would begin as economic and edge toward military. The latter begins as military, and with the weakening of the European Union, edges toward economics.

as a side note, it is important to note the Russian interaction with Germany. there was a discussion about whether the Russians were more European or Asian in nature. it is only telling that every time the Russians need to import something, whether culture or technology, they look westward to Europe. this latest Russian interest in European military technology is a continuation of the historical trend, whereby Russia periodically engages in massive import of European advances.
 

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http://webcache.googleusercontent.c...ente+Would+Look+Like&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=in
What a U.S.-Iran Entente Would Look Like


AT STRATFOR WE TRY TO KEEP TRACK OF minute details related to global events. At the same time though, we do not allow ourselves to get bogged down in the proverbial weeds or trees. Instead we focus on the forest as a whole and what the forest will look like over a temporal horizon.

So, while everyone else Tuesday was obsessing over the latest U.S. plans for a fresh round of sanctions against Iran, we were trying to understand what the world would look like if the United States and Iran brought three decades of hostility to an end. Most people would deem the exercise as ludicrous given Tuesday's events. But STRATFOR has long been saying that with no viable military options to attempt to curb Iranian behavior, and an inability to put together an effective sanctions regime, Washington has only one choice, and that is to negotiate with Tehran on the issues that matter most to both countries.

We are not just talking about the nuclear issue, but rather the key problem of the balance of power between a post-American Iraq and the entire Persian Gulf region. The agreement signed in Tehran by the leaders of Iran, Turkey and Brazil is the first public evidence that the two sides could agree to disagree in roughly the same way the United States and China did in the early 1970s.

While both Washington and Tehran have a lot to gain from a detente, an end to their hostile relationship — which at the moment is far from assured — would have immense implications for a number of players in the region and around the world. This is a subject that has been intensely discussed among our analysts who cover the various regions of the world. Rather than craft a flowing narrative on their ruminations, STRATFOR presents them here in raw form.

An Iran with normalized relations with the United States is a challenge for both Washington and Tehran. The former more so than the latter because it is about the United States according recognition upon a state not because it has accepted to align itself with U.S. foreign policy for the region, but because there are no other viable options for dealing with Tehran. The United States can live with Iran driving its own agenda because of geography, but geography becomes the very reason why many U.S. allies are worried about an internationally rehabilitated Tehran. These include the Arab states, particularly those on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf, and Israel. Iran already has the largest military force in the region — which will only grow more powerful once Tehran is no longer encumbered by sanctions. It will, however, be some time before Iran is able to meaningfully project or sustain conventional military force, though it already exercises considerable influence via regional proxies. Even now, despite all the restrictions, it is still able to finance its regional ambitions — a situation that would only improve once foreign investments pour into the Iranian energy sector.

For the Persian Gulf Arab states, Iran's return to the global energy market is as much a threat as its military power. Israel is already dealing with the rise of hostile Arab non-state actors, an emergent Turkey and an Egypt in transition, so from its point of view a rehabilitated Iran only makes matters worse for Israel's national security. To a lesser degree, the Turks and the Pakistanis are concerned about Iran returning to the comity of nations. Ankara wants to be the regional hegemon and does not want competition from anyone — certainly not its historic rival. The Pakistanis do not wish to see competition in Afghanistan, nor do they want their relationship with the United States affected.

The United States has been hobbled by the memories of the 1979 hostage crisis for a generation now, while the importance of oil to the global system makes security in the Persian Gulf an unavoidable commitment for American forces. During the Cold War, when the United States did not have to worry about Gulf security or Iranian ambition, the United States was emotionally, militarily and diplomatically free to encircle the Soviets, parlay with the Chinese, induce the Europeans to cooperate, dominate South America and use Israel to keep the Middle East in check. We are in a radically different world now. But once the United States lets go of the expensive and unwieldy security and emotional baggage caused by Iran, Washington's ability to reshape the international system should not be underestimated. And that says nothing of what an Iran with a free hand would do to its backyard.

The trajectory of this hypothesized rapprochement coincides with the trajectory of increasing U.S. military capacity. Though U.S. ground combat forces remain heavily committed now, this will change in the years to come. This trajectory is already taking shape, but a U.S.-Iranian entente would accelerate the process. A United States with a battle-hardened military accustomed to a high deployment tempo without the commitments that defined the first decade of the 21st century will have immense capability to deploy multiple brigades to places like Poland, the Baltic states or Georgia. Its naval deployments will be able to spend less time in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf and more time loitering in places like the South China Sea. These capabilities will certainly create friction with states like Russia and China. The United States is on this trajectory with or without Iran, but with a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement, it is possible on a more rapid timetable and to a greater degree.

An Iranian-U.S. rapprochement would be a relief to Europe. The Europeans are exhausted by having to keep up with U.S.-Middle Eastern problems, and while the Iranian imbroglio has not forced the Europeans to commit any troops, they are worried that it may in the future. Europeans, especially the French and the Germans, would welcome a Tehran-Washington reconciliation from an economic perspective as well. Both want to use Iran as a market for high-tech products, and France has its sights set on the South Pars natural gas field in the Gulf. Iranian natural gas reserves, estimated to be the second largest in the world, would potentially fill the Nabucco pipeline and give Europe an alternative to Russian energy exports.

Russia has no interest in seeing the United States and Iran come to terms with each other. Iran may be a historic rival to Russia, but it's a rivalry the Russians have been able to manipulate rather effectively in dealing with the United States. Building Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant and threatening to sell S300 strategic air defense systems to Iran are Russia's way of capturing Washington's attention in a region that has consumed U.S. power since the turn of the century. Moscow may be willing to give small concessions over Iran to the United States, but its overall interest is to keep Washington's focus on Tehran. The more distracted the United States is, the more room Russia has to entrench itself in the former Soviet space and keep Europe under its thumb. If the United States manages to work out an understanding with Tehran and rely more heavily on an ally like Turkey to tend to issues in the Islamic world, then it can turn to the pressing geopolitical issue of how to undermine Russian leverage in Eurasia.

East Asia's major powers would, in general, favor a U.S. rapprochement with Iran. Japan, China and South Korea, the world's second, third and 13th biggest economies respectively are all major importers of oil and natural gas. If the United States were to lend its support to Iran as a preeminent power in the Middle East, it would not only open up Iran's energy sector for greater opportunities in investment and production, but also relieve the Asian states of some of their anxiety about instability in the region as a whole, especially in the vulnerable Persian Gulf choke point through which their oil supplies are shipped. Moreover, these states would leap at new opportunities for their major industrial giants to get involved in construction, energy, finance and manufacturing in Iran, which would all be facilitated by American approval. A U.S.-Iranian entente would pose a problem only to China. Not only would it bring yet another of China's major energy suppliers into the U.S. orbit and strengthen U.S. influence over the entire Middle East, it would also shrink China's advantage as a non-U.S. aligned state when it comes to working with non-U.S. aligned Iran. Nevertheless, the economic possibilities of China working with Iran without provoking American aggression would likely outweigh the concerns over U.S.-Iranian vulnerabilities. That is unless an Iranian-facilitated withdrawal from Washington's wars resulted in the United States putting more pressure on China.
 

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