India and geostrategy

[ajtr]

COMMENT: The 'Great Game' resumes —Zafar Hilaly​

The trouble with the role we have chosen to play in Afghanistan is its inherently contradictory nature. An interested party cannot play the role of an honest broker. The conflict of interest is too glaring

Hamid Karzai has finally decided to break with the Northern Alliance partners and return to his Pashtun roots for deliverance from the Taliban and the Americans. This, one feels, is the reason behind his brusque sacking of his national intelligence chief and his interior minister, both belonging to the Northern Alliance.

Pakistan's response was immediate, namely, to begin brokering deals between those elements of the Taliban who are friendly to us and the government in Kabul. Our sole condition for engaging in this thankless task — of which we claim we are past masters, although our record suggests otherwise — is the elimination of Indian influence. Any enemy of India, however antediluvian, cruel or vicious, is our friend and vice versa. That is the way it has been and that is how it will stay until India and Pakistan manage to inject a degree of sanity into the hatred their respective establishments harbour for each other.

At the moment our Taliban ally is the father and son team of the Haqqanis. In an earlier period it was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Whether we will succeed will depend, not so much on retaining Karzai's support as much as obtaining that of the Americans who, in the final analysis, call the shots in Kabul. Hence, it is inconceivable that our effort should have been undertaken without some encouragement from the US, if not an actual 'go' signal from Washington. It is also inconceivable that the Haqqanis and Pakistan did not independently get clearances from Mullah Omar. Without Omar on board, no deal that may emerge is sustainable.

So, once again, the Great Game has begun, or rather, the decades old 'time out' has ended. Needless to say, the Northern Alliance, India and Iran will not remain idle, and neither will Russia.

The defunct KGB, avowedly Putin's first love, had long wanted to recover lost Soviet territories in spirit, if not in fact. And with the Americans preoccupied up to their gills in Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia has indeed made a remarkable comeback, so much so that Russian influence in the Central Asian Republics has never been more pronounced than today. Russia is often the arbiter in their incessant squabbling and even on domestic issues Russian support can often decide the outcome. Hence, with its clout in Central Asia restored, Russia can afford to return to participate in the Great Game.

Nor will India, like British India, let all the blood and treasure it has expended in Afghanistan go waste. A predicament in which Delhi would not have found itself had it resisted its instinct to step in and take advantage of any situation that can add to Pakistan's discomfiture. As India manoeuvres to maintain its stake in Afghanistan's future, its relations with Pakistan will commensurately worsen.

It is strange how puny players can alter the course of events by inveigling mighty ones to step in where angels fear to tread. In any case, India hardly needs any prodding. New Delhi is perpetually consumed by one idea and it is, invariably, the wrong one when it comes to Pakistan. That is not to say that our fixation with India is any less unhealthy.

Iran, of course, has kept all its options open. With the Taliban whom it is accused of occasionally arming; with al Qaeda whom it is accused of giving refuge to and as often denies; with Pakistan; with India; with Russia and, of course, with the Northern Alliance of which, at all times, it has remained the patron. Iran has one goal: discomfiture of the US, which the US reciprocates in spades.

As for the Americans, to them the intricacies of the Great Game are novel. Very shortly they will not understand what is going on in Afghanistan. To them it will be the "unspellables killing the unpronounceables". Their goals are power, predominance, crush rivals, and subdue nature. They are eager, restless, and positive because they are superficial. They have their heart set on the means and seldom think of the end. Secretly they prefer a clear defeat to a messy stalemate because they know that they will not know how to deal with the latter. Iraq is a shining example.

The trouble with the role we have chosen to play in Afghanistan is its inherently contradictory nature. An interested party cannot play the role of an honest broker. The conflict of interest is too glaring. Moreover, the deeper we find ourselves enmeshed in the Afghan snake pit, the more likely we are to come off the worse for all our good intentions. That happened after the Soviet withdrawal. So much so that eventually the Taliban, whom we helped fund, train and lead, ended up telling us to stop interfering. Colonel Imam, for all the help that he rendered the Taliban, is now languishing in some grotto while his erstwhile pupils determine his fate.

What then is the alternative for Pakistan? Actually, a fairly simple one and, in the words of Benazir Bhutto: "To let the dust settle in Afghanistan where it will." In other words, to let the Americans stew in their own mess till eventually they are driven out by American public opinion aided by murderous Taliban attacks. And, meanwhile, to cleanse our lands of the presence of those who use our territory to wage war on the US, India or anyone else. And, if this means that we will have to take on Haqqani and his ilk then to do so, because such is the contagion that they have spread stretching from the furthermost edge of FATA to Karachi, which eventually, as surely as night follows day, we will have to confront or else succumb. Currying support from murderous villains who pose as our well-wishers is delusory. It is a sign of weakness and not strength and casts doubt on our commitment to democracy and progressive Islam.

Pakistan must look to itself and not others for its security and well-being. The responsibility begins and ends with us. Befriending the likes of the Taliban and indulging their abhorrent mindset suggests that we have a low opinion of ourselves. Importuning the Americans does the same. And that is an impression that no self-respecting nation can afford.

 

[Ray]

In this context one could read the Heartland Theory that forms a part of Military Geography Study

The Heartland Theory of Halford J. Mackinde

 

[ajtr]

In this context one could read the Heartland Theory that forms a part of Military Geography Study

The Heartland Theory of Halford J. Mackinde

Thanks for posting that article Ray sir.

 

[ajtr]

Back to Mackinder. Really?​

TED R. BROMUND
Robert Kaplan's cover story in the latest issue of Foreign Policy — their "Big Think" issue — centers on "The Return of Geography." The premise is that this is the era of realism, which brings with it the "revenge of geography in the most old-fashioned sense." Indeed, Kaplan argues, realism is based on geography, the "bluntest, most uncomfortable, and most deterministic" of all realities. And that is a good thing, for the time has come for a return to the Victorian era when "mountains and the men who grow out of them were the first order of reality; ideas, however uplifting, were only the second."

As a description of the Victorian era, this leaves a good deal to be desired: Marx, the issue's cover boy and for many years a resident of the Victorian British Library, would not have agreed that geography was destiny. But once you get past Kaplan's 2007-era fixation with how badly the Iraq War is going, and if you ignore his bizarre claims that, for instance, "local, ethnic, and religious sources of identity . . . are best explained by reference to geography," the essay settles down. After passing by Fernand Braudel, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Nicholas Spykman in quick review, Kaplan lays the crown of modern realism on the head of Sir Halford Mackinder, the great British scholar of geopolitics and author of, among other works, an influential 1904 essay on "The Geographical Pivot of History."

Mackinder divided the world — in 1904 — into three areas: the pivot (the landlocked portions of Russia), the inner circle (Britain, Europe, the Middle East, India, South East Asia, and Japan), and the outer circle (the Americas). The story of history was the pressure the pivot brought to bear on the inner circle, and the efforts of the inner circle — aided by the outer — to resist. For Mackinder, the crucial geopolitical development was the rise of railways, and industrialization more generally, which were reducing the historic advantage of sea-power, and, specifically, of Britain's hegemony over the inner circle. The flash point, he believed, was the border of India, for it was there that Britain and Russia would meet.

Kaplan is trying to update Mackinder for the modern age, while retaining his emphasis on the controlling role of geography. As he puts it, today we need the "authors who thought the map determined nearly everything, leaving little room for human agency." Understandably, Kaplan points to Eurasia — extending from Japan through the Middle East, and north into Russia — as the zone of destiny. It might be objected that including everything except Europe, the Americas, and Africa does not provide much focus, but, for Kaplan, that is the problem: "contra Mackinder, Eurasia has been reconfigured into an organic whole." The division between the pivot and the inner circle has been erased, and "A Eurasia of vast urban areas, overlapping missile ranges, and sensational media . . .[with] constantly enraged crowds" constitutes the "shatter zone" of the future, with the familiar array of problems — from Syrian meddling in Lebanon to the rise of the Chinese navy — all fitting into it.

These problems do exist. But Kaplan's thesis that Eurasia is now an organic whole sorts ill with his claim that geography matters more than ever. Just because something happens in physical space does not make it geography, and all Kaplan's supposedly unifying developments — urbanization, religious radicalism, and bad governments here, there, and everywhere — are very much driven by people and ideas. His praise for Mackinder is therefore curiously appropriate, because Mackinder was one of those rare authors who combined great sense and tremendous nonsense in very close proximity. His insight into the declining advantage of sea power, and the advantages of industrialization, were keen — much keener than those of his contemporary, the great navalist Mahan. But when it came right down to it, he was simply reiterating the conventional wisdom of his day: that Britain's greatest strategic challenge was the Russian threat to India, enabled by the expansion of the Russian railway system.

This was entirely wrong. The greatest threat to Britain turned out to lie on the Franco-German border, a location to which Mackinder devoted no attention whatsoever. When in 1919, in a book on Democratic Ideals and Reality, which still repays reading, he turned to the question of what should be done to secure Europe after the Great War, Mackinder tacitly recognized his earlier failure. In 1904, what mattered to him was the pivot area. By 1919, Mackinder evolved an entirely new thesis, which he presented as a logical development of his old one: as he put it, who controlled Eastern Europe controlled the pivot, who controlled the pivot controlled Eurasia, and who controlled Eurasia controlled the world. In other words, the key to world power lay in Poland and the Balkans, and in the rivalry between the German and Slav, the rivalry that had sparked the Great War.

In 1919, that — again — was conventional wisdom, dressed up as insight derived from careful study of the enduring features of geography. In fifteen years, Mackinder moved from emphasizing the centrality of controlling Siberia and the threat to India to emphasizing the centrality of German-Russian rivalry and the importance of Poland. Any theory supposedly based on immutable realities that can jump around so rapidly, and so obviously in response to the concerns of the day, is not worth very much. Mackinder was not wrong about everything — the emphasis on Poland looked pretty good in 1939 — but that simply goes to show that, like Kaplan, he was intelligent, well-informed, and wrote about a lot of problems. Anyone with those qualifications who does the same is likely to get similar results, even if they are mostly dispensing the verities of the day.

Mackinder made real and enduring contributions in a few areas — centrally, the creation of the British institutional emphasis on geography — and he did advance a few insights of enduring value. But in essence, he was a fairly standard-issue late Victorian imperialist of the Joseph Chamberlain school of imperial unity through protectionism. His recommendations were, mostly, the conventional wisdom of that school, though enlivened by a sweep and authority of presentation that few contemporaries matched. He is still read today, and that, too, is a real achievement: not many from that school can say the same. And it's a good thing that he's read: he is no more irrelevant to our day than many of the other great Victorian thinkers. But to place him the pillar as the key to his age and ours is more than he, or any other single thinker, deserves.

 

[ajtr]

A non-polar world​

Posted By Ian Bremmer Friday, June 18, 2010 - 1:50 PM Share

For the sixth time in less than four years, the U.N. Security Council has voted to impose new sanctions on Iran in connection with its nuclear program. Nothing new there. U.S. officials wanted stronger measures, but the Chinese in particular pushed back hard. Nothing new there either. The sanctions, which are still significantly tougher than earlier models and include tightened restrictions on arms sales, new headaches for Iranian shipping, and an assault on the finances of the Revolutionary Guard and about 40 Iranian companies, will not persuade Iran's government to renounce its nuclear ambitions. Nor is there anything new there.

The real news is that Turkey and Brazil voted no. That's a diplomatic coup for Tehran, which in five previous UNSC votes had won virtually no support. Qatar voted no on the first round of sanctions in July 2006. Indonesia abstained on the fourth round in March 2008. Support from regional heavyweights like Turkey and Brazil (and an abstention from Lebanon) give Iran something tangible to build on as its embattled government works to ease its isolation and to persuade other governments to resist U.S. and European calls for further sanctions outside the U.N. process.

President Ahmadinejad's recent dance card-a Russia/Turkey summit on security just before the sanctions vote and a trip to Beijing just after-illustrates the value of that strategy.

But there's a larger point here about the current state of international politics. It's getting harder for Washington to exercise international leadership. With 10 percent unemployment, an ambitious legislative agenda, an oil spill, and mid-term elections to worry about, President Obama has limited time and energy to invest in grand strategy on foreign policy. Managing geopolitical risk has also become much more complicated in a world that has shifted from a G7 model of international leadership to a G20 model that brings countries like Brazil and Turkey to the international bargaining table. And there is no emerging power willing and able to fill the gap left by new limits on American power and resources, because European powers, China, Russia and others who might lead on key transnational issues are likewise occupied with complex challenges at home.

In other words, no one is really steering this ship, and we can't expect it to sail smoothly through troubled waters.

 

[ajtr]

Germany And Russia Moving Closer Together​

By George Friedman
German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle will brief French and Polish officials on a joint proposal for Russian-European "cooperation on security," according to a statement from Westerwelle's spokesman on Monday. The proposal emerged out of talks between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev earlier in June and is based on a draft Russia drew up in 2008. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will be present at the meeting. Peschke said, "We want to further elaborate and discuss it within the triangle [i.e., France, Germany and Poland] in the presence of the Russian foreign minister."
On the surface, the proposal developed by Merkel and Medvedev appears primarily structural. It raises security discussions about specific trouble spots to the ministerial level rather than the ambassadorial level, with a committee being formed consisting of EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and Russia's foreign minister.
All of this seems rather mild until we consider three things. First, proposals for deepening the relationship between Russia and the European Union have been on the table for several years without much progress. Second, the Germans have taken this initiative at a time when German foreign policy is in a state of flux. And third, the decision to take this deal to France and Poland indicates that the Germans are extremely sensitive to the geopolitical issues involved, which are significant and complex.
Reconsidering Basic Strategy
The economic crisis in Europe has caused the Germans, among others, to reconsider their basic strategy. Ever since World War II, the Germans have pursued two national imperatives. The first was to maintain close relations with the French — along with the rest of Europe — to eliminate the threat of war. Germany had fought three wars with France since 1870, and its primary goal was not fighting another one. Its second goal was prosperity. Germany's memory of the Great Depression plus its desire to avoid militarism made it obsessed with economic development and creating a society focused on prosperity. It saw the creation of an integrated economic structure in Europe as achieving both ends, tying Germany into an unbreakable relationship with France and at the same time creating a trading bloc that would ensure prosperity.

Events since the financial crisis of 2008 have shaken German confidence in the European Union as an instrument of prosperity, however. Until 2008, Europe had undergone an extraordinary period of prosperity, in which West Germany could simultaneously integrate with East Germany and maintain its long-term economic growth. The European Union appeared to be a miraculous machine that automatically generated prosperity and political stability alongside it.
After 2008, this perception changed, and the sense of insecurity accelerated with the current crisis in Greece and among the Mediterranean members of the European Union. The Germans found themselves underwriting what they regarded as Greek profligacy to protect the euro and the European economy. This not only generated significant opposition among the German public, it raised questions in the German government. The purpose of the European Union was to ensure German prosperity. If the future of Europe was Germany shoring up Europe — in other words, transferring wealth from Germany to Europe — then the rationale for European integration became problematic.
The Germans were certainly not prepared to abandon European integration, which had given Germany 65 years of peace. At the same time, the Germans were prepared to consider adjustments to the framework in which Europe was operating, particular from an economic standpoint. A Europe in which German prosperity is at risk from the budgeting practices of Greece needed adjustment.
The Pull of Russia
In looking at their real economic interests, the Germans were inevitably drawn to their relationship with Russia. Russia supplies Germany with nearly 40 percent of the natural gas Germany uses. Without Russian energy, Germany's economy is in trouble. At the same time, Russia needs technology and expertise to develop its economy away from being simply an exporter of primary commodities. Moreover, the Germans already have thousands of enterprises that have invested in Russia. Finally, in the long run, Germany's population is declining below the level needed to maintain its economy. It does not want to increase immigration into Germany because of fears of social instability. Russia's population is also falling, but it still has surplus population relative to its economic needs and will continue to have one for quite a while. German investment in Russia allows Germany to get the labor it needs without resorting to immigration by moving production facilities east to Russia.
The Germans have been developing economic relations with Russia since before the Soviet collapse, but the Greek crisis forced them to reconsider their relationship with Russia. If the European Union was becoming a trap in which Germany was going to consistently subsidize the rest of Europe, and a self-contained economy is impossible, then another strategy would be needed. This consisted of two parts. The first was insisting on a restructuring of the European Union to protect Germany from the domestic policies of other countries. Second, if Europe was heading toward a long period of stagnation, then Germany, heavily dependent on exports and needing labor, needed to find an additional partner — if not a new one.
At the same time, a German-Russian alignment is a security issue as well as an economic issue. Between 1871 and 1941 there was a three-player game in continental Europe — France, Germany and Russia. The three shifted alliances with each other, with each shift increasing the chance of war. In 1871, Prussia was allied with Russia when it attacked France. In 1914, The French and Russians were allied against Germany. In 1940, Germany was allied with Russia when it attacked France. The three-player game played itself out in various ways with a constant outcome: war.
The last thing Berlin wants is to return to that dynamic. Instead, its hope is to integrate Russia into the European security system, or at least give it a sufficient stake in the European economic system that Russia does not seek to challenge the European security system. This immediately affects French relations with Russia. For Paris, partnership with Germany is the foundation of France's security policy and economy. If Germany moves into a close security and economic relationship with Russia, France must calculate the effect this will have on France. There has never been a time when a tripartite alliance of France, Germany and Russia has worked because it has always left France as the junior partner. Therefore, it is vital for the Germans to present this not as a three-way relationship but as the inclusion of Russia into Europe, and to focus on security measures rather than economic measures. Nevertheless, the Germans have to be enormously careful in managing their relationship with France.
Even more delicate is the question of Poland. Poland is caught between Russia and Germany. Its history has been that of division between these two countries or conquest by one. This is a burning issue in the Polish psyche. A closer relationship between Germany and Russia inevitably will generate primordial fears of disaster in Poland.
Therefore, Wednesday's meeting with the so-called triangular group is essential. Both the French and the Poles, and the Poles with great intensity, must understand what is happening. The issue is partly the extent to which this affects German commitments to the European Union, and the other part — crucial to Poland —is what this does to Germany's NATO commitments.
The NATO Angle
It is noteworthy the Russians emphasized that what is happening poses no threat to NATO. Russia is trying to calm not only Poland, but also the United States. The problem, however, is this: If Germany and Europe have a security relationship that requires prior consultation and cooperation, then Russia inevitably has a hand in NATO. If the Russians oppose a NATO action, Germany and other European states will be faced with a choice between Russia and NATO.
To put it more bluntly, if Germany enters into a cooperative security arrangement with Russia (forgetting the rest of Europe for the moment), then how does it handle its relationship with the United States when the Russians and Americans are at loggerheads in countries like Georgia? The Germans and Russians both view the United States as constantly and inconveniently pressuring them both to take risks in areas where they feel they have no interest. NATO may not be functional in any real sense, but U.S. pressure is ever-present. The Germans and Russians acting together would be in a better position to deflect this pressure than standing alone.
Intriguingly, part of the German-Russian talks relate to a specific security matter — the issue of Moldova and Transdniestria. Moldova is a region between Romania and Ukraine (which adjoins Russia and has re-entered the Russian sphere of influence) that at various times has been part of both. It became independent after the collapse of communism, but Moldova's eastern region, Transdniestria, broke away from Moldova under Russian sponsorship. Following a change in government in 2009, Moldova sees itself as pro-Western while Transdniestria is pro-Russian. The Russians have supported Transdniestria's status as a breakaway area (and have troops stationed there), while Moldova has insisted on its return.
The memorandum between Merkel and Medvedev specifically pointed to the impact a joint security relationship might have on this dispute. The kind of solution that may be considered is unclear, but if the issue goes forward, the outcome will give the first indication of what a German-Russian security relationship will look like. The Poles will be particularly interested, as any effort in Moldova will automatically impact both Romania and Ukraine — two states key to determining Russian strength in the region. Whatever way the solution tilts will define the power relationship among the three.
It should be remembered that the Germans are proposing a Russian security relationship with Europe, not a Russian security relationship with Germany alone. At the same time, it should be remembered that it is the Germans taking the initiative to open the talks by unilaterally negotiating with the Russians and taking their agreements to other European countries. It is also important to note that they have not taken this to all the European countries but to France and Poland first — with French President Nicolas Sarkozy voicing his initial approval on June 19 — and equally important, that they have not publicly brought it to the United States. Nor is it clear what the Germans might do if the French and Poles reject the relationship, which is not inconceivable.
The Germans do not want to lose the European concept. At the same time, they are trying to redefine it more to their advantage. From the German point of view, bringing Russia into the relationship would help achieve this. But the Germans still have to explain what their relationship is with the rest of Europe, particularly their financial obligation to troubled economies in the eurozone. They also have to define their relationship to NATO, and more important, to the United States.
Like any country, Germany can have many things, but it can't have everything. The idea that it will meld the European Union, NATO and Russia into one system of relationships without alienating at least some of their partners — some intensely — is naive. The Germans are not naive. They know that the Poles will be terrified and the French uneasy. The southern Europeans will feel increasingly abandoned as Germany focuses on the North European Plain. And the United States, watching Germany and Russia draw closer, will be seeing an alliance of enormous weight developing that might threaten its global interests.
With this proposal, the Germans are looking to change the game significantly. They are moving slowly and with plenty of room for retreat, but they are moving. It will be interesting to hear what the Poles and French say on Wednesday. Their public support should not be taken for anything more than not wanting to alienate the Germans or Russians until they have talked to the Americans. It will also be interesting to see what the Obama administration has to say about this.



Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/germany-and-russia-moving-closer-together-2010-6#ixzz0rdV51J3T

 

[ajtr]

Great Game Unfolds​

Thursday, June 24, 2010 | Email | Print | | Back

G Parthasarathy

The members of Saudi Arabia's royal family are legendary for their discretion and aversion to making strong statements. The monarch is, after all, not only the ruler of the kingdom but also bears the title and responsibility of being the Custodian of Islam's holiest sites. Within the closely knit royal family, Prince Turki Faisal can be regarded as a figure who enjoys respect because of his educational background, his diplomatic abilities and his stewardship of the kingdom's security services. As the youngest son of former King Faisal and nephew of king Abdullah, Prince Turki was head of the kingdom's Al Mukhbarat al-A'amah (General Intelligence Directorate) and has been Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to the UK, Ireland and also the US.

With his educational background of academic studies in Princeton and London universities and as a classmate of Mr Bill Clinton in Georgetown University, Prince Turki is regarded as a Saudi royal well disposed towards and well connected in the US. Moreover, as head of the Saudi Intelligence, Prince Turki realised that it was not in the kingdom's interest to patronise the recalcitrant Taliban leader Mullah Omar, who arbitrarily rebuffed his efforts to get him to expel Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan during a stormy meeting in 1998 which the Prince had with Mullah Omar in Kandahar.

Prince Turki, however, surprised an audience in Riyadh last month by characterising American policies in Afghan- istan as "inept", averring: "The way this (US) Administration has dealt with President Hamid Karzai beggars disbelief and amazement." He advised the US Administration to "hunt down terrorists on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and get out and let Afghan people deal with their problems".

Saudi Arabia is not alone getting exasperated by American flip-flops in Afghanistan. Like India and Afghan- istan's Central Asian neighbours — Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan — Russia is deeply concerned about any prospects of the Taliban returning to power in Afghanistan. Moreover, in recent years, as the Taliban expanded its control over territories in southern Afghanistan, drug smuggling across Afghanistan's borders with Iran and its Central Asian neighbours has shot up, with Russia emerging as the world's largest per capita consumer of heroin. Over 30,000 Russians die every year from heroin addiction and another 80,000 experiment with heroin for the first time.

Though Russia's President Dmitry Medvedev and Mr Obama agreed to closely cooperate last year, the Russians allege that they receive precious little by way of American cooperation in dealing with the drug menace. Iran, which faces an equally serious problem of heroin addiction, has lost hundreds of its law-enforcement personnel in shootouts with drug smugglers operating across its borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The Obama Administration's National Security Doctrine speaks of building a "stable, multi-dimensional relationship with Russia, based on mutual interests". It also asserts: "We will seek greater partnership with Russia in confronting violent extremism, especially in Afghanistan." Sixty per cent of supplies for American forces in Afghanistan — comprising fuel, food and some equipment — are now routed through Pakistan, with around another 30 per cent coming by train through Russia and Afghanistan's neighbouring Central Asian republics. A wider US-Russian strategic dialogue could seek to increase American supplies for its forces in Afghanistan via Russia and Central Asia, thus reducing the strategic salience of the supply routes through Pakistan. One of the major reasons why Pakistan brazenly continues to support the Taliban is that it knows that American dependence on supply routes through its territory is so large, that there is precious little the US and its Nato allies will do to eliminate terrorist havens on its soil. Reduction of dependence on Pakistan for sustaining operations in Afghanistan is, therefore, crucial in coming years.

It is time India resorts to some innovative diplomacy to bring together regional and interested powers to enable Afghanistan to adopt a policy that King Nadir Shah advocated in 1931, when he proclaimed, "Afghanistan must maintain friendly relations with its neighbours as well as all friendly powers that are not opposed to its a national interest. Afghanistan must give its neighbours assurances of its friendly attitudes while safeguarding the right of reciprocity." During World War I, Amir Habibullah Khan steered a path of neutrality for Afghanistan, despite pressures to back Turkey. Afghanistan joined the League of Nations in 1934, waiting until the Soviet Union joined, so as not to appear to be taking sides in favour of the UK. In 1937, Kabul concluded the Saadabad pact, a non-aggression treaty with Iran, Iraq and Turkey. King Zahir Shah's Government proclaimed its official and legal neutrality during World War II.

Afghanistan's problems are, even today, exacerbated by developments and rivalries beyond its borders. Both Russia and China would welcome a return to stability and an end to Taliban-style extremism in the country. They are, however, holding back from providing whole-hearted support for the US-led Nato forces in Afghanistan, because of suspicions about a long-term American military presence in Afghanistan, undermining their interests in Central Asia. Iran, which has extended significant economic assistance to the Karzai Government and was in the forefront of opposition to the Taliban leadership, shares similar concerns about the US's presence in Afghanistan.

India and Pakistan 'likewise' share mutual suspicions about the role of each other in Afghanistan. The Bonn Conference saw a request from participants to the UN "to take measures to guarantee national sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Afghanistan, as well as the non-interference by countries in Afghanistan's internal affairs." This is possible only, if in the words of Indian diplomat C R Gharekhan and former US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Karl Inderfurth, the international community recognises that to attain "the long-term goal of a peaceful and stable Afghanistan, it must have better and more reliable relations with its neighbours and near neighbours, including Pakistan, Iran, China, India and Russia".

India should supplement its economic assistance with a diplomatic effort that enables countries in Afghanistan's neighbourhood to ensure that Afghanistan's territory is not utilised to undermine the security of other countries, near and far, while guaranteeing observance of the principle of non-interference, in its internal affairs. One hopes that in the meantime, the Americans will get their act together in dealing with the threats Afghanistan faces from across its disputed border with Pakistan, the Durand Line. Virtually no Pashtun in either Afghanistan or Pakistan recognises the Durand Line as the international border.

 

[ajtr]

India's strategic advantage over China in Africa​

Constantino Xavier

June 30, 2010
India lacks the material capabilities and the profile to emulate or directly compete with China in Africa. At the same time, it cannot ignore Beijing's formidable influence and areas where both actors' interests are increasingly clashing. The solution could reside in a long-term exploration of specific sectors in which India's relatively untapped added value can be transformed into a strategic advantage over China.

Emulationists vs. Singularists
Invite anyone to talk about Africa in New Delhi and you will almost certainly end up discussing China and listening to a lamenting chorus on India's incapacity to hold on to the "dragon's safari". These disillusioned voices represent the hawkish emulationists – those who believe that India should follow and match Chinese moves in Africa step by step, without any delay or hesitation. For these fans of realpolitik principles, it is all about competition: Africa is just another strategic context in which India will have to blindly follow and match China's manoeuvres, if it wants to keep its great power ambition intact.1

On the other hand, you have the singularists (including an increasing number of disillusioned emulationists) who, at the other extreme, refuse any possible comparison with China and underline India's "absolute uniqueness". In this perspective, an Africa policy is actually unnecessary. These liberal Indian optimists take particular pleasure from African accusations depicting the Chinese as "mercantilist mandarins". Overtly confident, singularists therefore refuse the emulationists' competitive logic and like to believe that Africans will eventually recognize the costs of the Chinese model and opt for India as their privileged partner.

Both approaches have failed to serve Indian interests in Africa and have often led to sub-optimal policy-making. On the one hand, emulationist strategies have paid a high price because they ignore the fact that India simply lacks the financial and political capabilities to compete with the Chinese. For example, India's public oil, gas, mining and infrastructure companies have a long record of bids and chances lost to the Chinese, starting with the 2006 Angola debacle2 and, more recently, in a large Ethiopian rail project.3 On the political front, the 2008 India-Africa summit in Delhi attracted merely 14 African heads of state and senior government leaders, as compared to 48 who had been in Beijing two years earlier.

Nor have singularist strategies proven effective. While encouraging a profound self-confidence in the merits of a supposed "Indian model" (which no one really cares to define) this option has often bred strategic inertia. The result is a general disinterest in looking at India's presence in Africa in comparative terms and a consequent undervaluation of the continent's importance to India's external interests.

How then to overcome this extremist stalemate and optimize India's presence in Africa? China's clout in Africa gives it an uncontestable advantage over India: trade volume and preferential tariff lines; quality, speed and effectiveness of aid and credit lines; regularity of bilateral dialogues or strategic partnerships; intensity of defence relations; scope of diplomatic influence"¦ Beijing is ahead of Delhi in most, if not all these indicators. Thus, instead of emulating China or, on the other hand, refusing any comparison with its Northern neighbour, India should identify attributes that distinguish it positively from China and that could therefore be explored as a strategic advantage in the long run.

Business model: "teaching how to fish"
Unlike the state-centric Chinese model largely focused on resource extraction and necessary infrastructure, India's economic presence in Africa is marked by the predominance of its private sector, including a significant number of small and medium enterprises.4 Beyond resources and infrastructure, India has carved out niches such as information and telecommunication technologies, education and health services.

The Indian sponsored Pan-African e-Network (in partnership with the African Union) links 53 countries through tele-medicine, -education and -governance, and plays a crucial role in fostering skills and human resources that are critical for Africa to develop in a sustainable way. These projects require considerable investments but, in the long term, they will pay off as African countries start to recognize India's added value in contributing not only to the quantity, but also to the quality of their economic growth.

Moving beyond the narrow Chinese economic focus on resources will also protect African countries from the "Dutch disease" – the dependence on the export of natural resources and a high exchange rate that stifles productivity and international competitiveness of the domestic industrial and services sectors. While China's economic relations with Africa are actually fuelling this perverse effect, India's business model offers healing instruments by stimulating local productivity, especially in the private sector. New Delhi should not shy away from underlining and publicizing this in bilateral and multilateral settings: instead of just "giving fish" and perpetuating Africa's dependence on external powers, it is teaching the continent how to fish itself.

African countries are already inclined to recognize Delhi's added value in fostering sustainable economic growth: India remains the sole Asian member country of the African Union's Capacity Building Foundation. And India's Technical and Economic Cooperation programme (ITEC) has seen such success among the thousands of African students and diplomats who have chosen India for training since the 1960s, that it is now undergoing rapid expansion.5

Location: proximity and overlapping security interests
There are no direct flights linking Johannesburg with Shanghai or Beijing, but Mumbai is less than nine hours away from this major South African air hub. And the only direct flight connecting Ethiopia to Beijing stops over in New Delhi. Connected by the Western Indian Ocean, India and Africa share a geographical proximity and several contact points that need to be explored.

By 2008, India had emerged as the largest contributor to UN mandated operations in Africa, with a cumulative effort totalling more than 30,000 personnel involved in peacekeeping, humanitarian, and electoral missions.6 But this commitment does not, per se, offer a direct advantage over the Chinese, who are also building up their military presence across the continent.7

Instead, it is on the East African coast that India faces a specific advantage as a potential security provider. The piracy threat along the Somali and East African coast, often stretching wide across the ocean, offers the Indian Navy a superb opportunity to develop its blue water ambitions. By keeping these crucial sea lanes of communication and strategic chokepoints (including the Gulf of Aden and the Mozambique channel) secure, and by developing the naval capabilities of the East African states through increased joint exercises, creation of new listening posts, and the supply of vessels, India will increase its delivery capacity and assume a strategic position, at least in the East African security context.

India's recent initiative to host the first annual Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in Delhi (from which China was excluded), as well as its commitment to revive the moribund Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation8 are important steps in exploring proximity to and overlapping security interests with Africa as an advantage over China. Occasional tactical triangulations with other security partners, such as the IBSA naval forces, the new AFRICOM, or the EU and NATO naval forces in the Gulf of Aden, could further leverage this advantage.

Democracy: the regime advantage
At the height of the "China in Africa" hype, African governments were often said to be keen to replicate China's centralized and illiberal political architecture.9 Delhi's emulationists often despise India's democracy as a central obstacle to their country's external performance and often envy the Chinese authoritarian capacity in "getting things done" in Africa. However, little suggests that African governments have in practice attempted to replicate the political features that sustain the great Chinese transformation since 1978.

Instead, unprecedented levels of sustained economic growth have actually reinvigorated Africa's democratic competitiveness and pluralist institutions.10 Without falling into the temptation to export or impose its political institutions on Africa, India could perhaps shed its traditional inhibitions and start practicing its moralistic foreign policy discourse on democracy and human rights. As a founding member of the Community of Democracies, Delhi faces the opportunity to explore this "regime advantage" over China in Africa, at least in subtle and indirect ways.

For example, nine African delegations attended the International Conference on Federalism hosted by New Delhi in 2007, including Nigeria's Vice-President who expressed his country's interest in learning from India's successful experience with federal democracy. Several African countries have expressed interest in working with the Election Commission of India to study and replicate India's unique electronic voting system. India's vibrant base of local government institutions and its independent judicial system based on the rule of law are two other areas in which India can share its unique expertise through technical cooperation, thus responding to specific African interests and, at the same time, outflank China.

Diplomacy: Southern power
China and India are both situated in the Northern Hemisphere, but paradoxically are also competing ferociously to become leaders of the "Global South", be it during the trade negotiations at Doha or, more recently, at the climate change summit in Copenhagen. But as a traditional "bridging" or "positive power",11 India has a distinct advantage: in stark contrast to the radical ideological and interventionist Chinese moves during the 1950s and 1960s, Delhi played a much more constructive diplomatic role in supporting the African independence movements in the United Nations.

India's leading role as a "Colombo Power" in creating the Non-Alignment movement at Bandung and its central role within the Afro-Asian UN block of the 1960s has thus earned it a persisting respectability as a "Southern power". For example, unlike China, it is a founding member of the G-77 of developing nations and held its presidency twice.

India is also a member of the influential Commonwealth organization and at the heart of the impressive Southern trilateral (and tri-continental) India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) axis that gives it a strategic advantage to engage with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and Sub-saharan Africa. This profile offers Delhi a distinct advantage that, unfortunately, remains largely unexplored because many of the old time Africanist diplomats who served in the Ministry of External Affairs have retired over the last decade.

Diaspora: the privileged access channel
A final potential advantage resides in the cultural proximity between Africa and India. The large Indian diaspora plays a vital factor in this regard: a 2001 estimate identified close to one hundred thousand Indian citizens residing in Africa, with more than half in Eastern and Southern Africa. On top of this more recent immigrant community, there are more than one million people of Indian origin who have settled in Africa for many generations (close to one million in South Africa; 25,000 in Madagascar; 15,000 in Zimbabwe; and 8,000 in Nigeria).12

Unlike the more recent and radically segregated Chinese "labour diaspora" that has often led to frictions and protests in Africa, these communities of Indian origin are fully integrated and often interested in offering their business expertise as consultants to Indian investment projects. Their local contacts also often present Delhi with privileged channels to access key political figures and represent Indian interests in moments of crisis. In Liberia, for example, the local Honorary Indian Consul, a local businessmen of Indian origin, stayed on in Monrovia throughout the various civil wars when most other diplomatic missions had to close down.13

At the same time, beyond geographic proximity, India also offers a much more familiar and open society: racism against Africans in India is not uncommon, but well below the levels experienced in China. For the increasing number of African investors and students who seek opportunities abroad, English-speaking India therefore offers a much more attractive destination: an increasing number of African businessmen permanently reside in Delhi and Mumbai, and more than 10,000 African students enrol annually in Indian universities, many of them sponsored by the Indian government.14

Exploring the advantage
Shashi Tharoor, the former Indian Minister of State for External Relations, who focused on relations with Africa, underlined that "we have an opportunity to enjoy a privileged position in many African countries that we would be foolish not to develop."15 This "opportunity" resides precisely in the five dimensions discussed above, where India offers Africa an added value that, strategically explored, could lend it a long-term advantage over China and other competitors.

Focusing on these specific sectors, beyond the options much in vogue with offensive emulationists or passive singularists, will also help India to clarify its priorities, optimize its policy-making process and infuse its Africa policy with greater strategic depth.

 

[ajtr]

Actually, It's Mountains​

Sometimes the toughest obstacles are the naturally occurring ones.

BY ROBERT D. KAPLAN | JULY/AUGUST 2010

Geography, it has been famously said, is the most fundamental cause behind political fortune because it is the most unchanging. The truculent personalities of Prussia and czarist Russia, to say nothing of their successor states, had much to do with their being land powers with few natural borders to protect them, whereas Britain, the United States, and Venice could each in its own way champion liberty because they have had the luxury to be protected from meddlesome neighbors by expanses of surrounding water. Precisely because geography is so overpowering and unchanging a factor in a state's destiny, there is a danger of taking it too far. So rather than believing that geography inevitably dooms states to failure, think of it as yet another complexifying factor for the weakest of countries. Their difficult geographies should spur us to action, rather than lead us to despair.

And difficult they are. Consider Africa, where nearly half of the top 60 countries in the Failed States Index are located, in most cases south of -- or at least at the southern extremity of -- the Sahara. Although Africa is the world's second-largest continent, with an area three times that of Europe, its coastline south of the Sahara is about a fifth as long and lacks many good natural harbors. Few of tropical Africa's rivers are navigable from the ocean, dropping as they do from interior tableland to coastal plains by a series of falls and rapids. The Sahara hindered human contact with the north for too many centuries, so that Africa was little exposed to the great Mediterranean civilizations. All this has combined to afflict Africa with the burden of geographic isolation.

Unlike the most remote African countries, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia have, thanks to their proximity to the Indian Ocean, had access to global trade from the Middle East and Asia since late antiquity and the Middle Ages. But these countries have their own problems related to geography. Kenya is burdened by tribalism in its interior, Ethiopia by its mountainous and drought-prone landscape, and Somalia by the fact that it constitutes sprawling desert populated by clans that have little or nothing in common. Somalia also has the longest coastline on mainland Africa, close to major sea lines of communication. And given that piracy is the maritime ripple effect of anarchy on land, it is no surprise that Somali piracy has become an international problem.

Yemen, on the opposite shore of the Gulf of Aden from Somalia, is equally burdened. Its 22 million people are running out of groundwater, and thus its prognosis is not good. Like Ethiopia, Yemen is riven by mountains, meaning its central government has difficulty accessing vast reaches of this deeply fragmented country. The regime must keep peace through a fragile balance of tribal relations because no one tribe or sect has been able to establish an identity for the Yemeni state. The defining aspect of Yemen is the diffusion of power rather than the concentration of it. For example, since ancient times, the Wadi Hadhramaut, a 100-mile-long oasis in southeastern Yemen surrounded by great tracts of desert and stony plateau, has through caravan routes and Arabian ports maintained closer relations with India and Indonesia than with other parts of Yemen itself.

Iraq, 1,400 miles to the north, combines the Kurdish mountains with the Mesopotamian plain and desert, putting ethnic groups together that either were previously on their own or part of a multinational empire. Keeping them united in an artificially conceived state required levels of force unseen even in the Arab world, as evinced by the rules of Saddam Hussein and the previous military dictators going back to 1958.

Head east to Afghanistan and Pakistan, whose geographic woes are such that neither country's borders have much logic. In the west, Afghanistan is an extension of the Iranian plateau. In its northeast, the Hindu Kush mountains separate the Pashtun tribal belt straddling Afghanistan and Pakistan from the demographic homelands of the Tajiks and Uzbeks; Afghanistan's most natural borders are thus situated in the middle of the country. Pakistan is an artificial puzzle piece that, unlike India, has no logical frontiers, so different, territorially based ethnic groups exist uneasily together.

To the southeast, Burma's geographical predicament is equally precarious. The country, though rugged and underdeveloped, is as large as France and is formed around the lush cradle of the Irrawaddy River valley, surrounded by highlands on three sides. In general, ethnic Burmans live in the valley, and the minority ethnic groups such as the Karen, Karenni, Shan, and Kachin live in the sprawling hill country. It was to control the irregular armies of some of these tribal groups, which make up a third of the population, that Burma's military took power in the first place in 1962. So, behind Burma's benighted, authoritarian regime lie structural problems of ethnicity and geography.

And it's not just rivers and mountains that complicate the development of fragile states. For African countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sudan, as well as Iraq and Burma, there is the geographic factor of oil, natural gas, and strategic minerals and metals to contend with. Political elites often fight over the spoils, only adding to instability.

None of these places is doomed. Human agency can triumph over determinism. But we should not be naive either: Geography is one more strike against them.

 

[ajtr]

India at Strategic Crossroad​

The disturbing events of state of emergency, nationalization, depressed economy of India for more
than two decades, assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, Afghan war in the
1980s, separatists movements in Kashmir, Punjab have triggered major research in finding out the causes
of these events and the direction of course of history of India and people of India and Hindus in the new
century and beyond.
Threats to Indian Nation-State and Indian Civilization
External Threats:
These can be grouped under threats to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India, threats to the
economic growth and prosperity and business interests of India, and threats to the lives of Indian citizens
inside and outside India due to state-sponsored terrorism
Internal Threats:
If a nation intent on bringing down a powerful rival whose philosophy, as originally founded, was
strong and entirely opposite from that nations own—a country that it would not want to confront militarily
from the outside—how would that country go about it? The answer is simple—helps them destroy
themselves from the inside. When the rival country is destroyed from within, it is done by using that
country's own people, no blood is spilled in combat and the physical infrastructure is left undamaged.
Internal threats can be grouped as threats to the National Unity as manifested by divisive events
such as riots and alienation of different sections of society (a breakdown of law and order in safeguarding
the lives and property of Indian citizens), threats of anti-social elements (gangs, state mafia etc.) to the law
and order as well as economy in the country, threats from the secessionist and divisive elements in various
parts of the country both covert and overt (ably aided and abetted by purveyors of first group or some
form of indigenous movements that are expressions of anti-government feelings in alienated sections of
population), and threats from Illegal aliens and refugees from across the border (threat of reduction in per
capita income due to human inflows an also potential of anti-national activities of such aliens). Threats
due to political instability and weak political structure due to manipulation from major powers are also
discussed. The causes of the threat are discussed in this document.
The discussion will include the emergence of fissiparous tendencies due to faulty economic and
fiscal policies i.e. the inter-states regional imbalances and the intra-state regional imbalances in economic
development. Also discussed are Language as a divisive factor, the emergence of cultural sub-nationalism,
social fabric and religious / caste milieu, and the changing demographic profile in the coastal and border
areas.
Civilization Threats:
This threat can be classified as threat to the Indian civilization ethos through the aiding and abetting
of internal potentially divisive elements by external agencies (such as Madrassa funding by Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, possible divisive agendas of Christian missionary organizations from overseas, especially in
NE) and threat to the 'asmita' of India due to the divisive agendas of anarchist media, leftist parties and
intellectuals. This threat will be discussed in detail in this document and looks at the trends which show
how the civilization memory of indic and Indus valley are being erased in a long term plan. The final goal
is to erase the 'idea of India' and the civilization identity from the people of India and break the state into
warring factions.

 

[ajtr]

The Long View from Delhi: To Define the Indian Grand Strategy for Foreign Policy​

Strategist retired Admiral Raja Menon and economist and director of ICRIER (Indian Council for Research in International Economic Relations) Rajiv Kumar are the joint authors of a book titled, "The Long View from Delhi: To Define the Indian Grand Strategy for Foreign Policy". It was released last month at a book launch event at the Hudson Institute in Washington.

For a start let me say that it's a monumental work on the alternative scenarios and foreign policy choices India is likely to face in 2020. If India's Ministry of External Affairs is looking for defining scenarios to address policy issues, it will find them here.

In brief, as a press release by the authors says, the book uses a proven method, net assessment (NA), evolved through rigorous work and empirical analysis to help Indian policy makers envisage possible alternative future scenarios that the country is likely to be faced with in 2020 and to prepare for them by identifying the main drivers of future developments. Net Assessment was first used in the United States in the 1970s to assess the possible outcomes of US-Soviet competition.

The book spells out the following four possible global scenarios in 2020:

1)The first is one in which the US reinvents itself and surges forward on the tide of development of alternate energy sources.

2)The second envisages a scenario in which the relative power of the US declines and a multipolar world emerges in which regional powers rise to run their regions unilaterally – India in South Asia, China in continental Asia, and the US with Brazil in the Americas. While globalisation reduces political rivalry between nations, there is no co-ordinated action against terrorism and rogue, non-state actors.

3)The third scenario is one in which the US and China establish a duopoly and begin to co-operate in controlling world institutions, leaving former friends of the US, including India, without a platform. India will then be faced with the choice of either joining the duopoly or facing isolation.

4)The final scenario is one in which economic growth in both the United States and China remains depressed while India grows at a sustained annual rate of nine to ten per cent. The world takes longer to recover from the recession, international bodies become weak and the US becomes more isolationist. India becomes a powerful entity by 2020 but has not yet developed mechanisms to play the role of a constructive global or regional power.

Of these, the worst-case scenario from India's perspective is the emergence of a US-China duopoly where China remains hostile to India and the US is unavailable as a balancing power.

The book outlines a strategy that will help India tackle the challenges posed by the possible shift in global power arrangements.

It includes:

*A strong focus on achieving sustained economic growth with equity as that helps India to withstand a possible duopoly

*A hedging military strategy that enables India to switch theatres between North-Continental and South Maritime, abolishing all institutions for passive territorial defence and unifying military command

*A technology strategy that gives the private sector its head with government joint ventures and subordinates the human resource development and science and technology ministries to that of service providers with measurable outputs to ride a possible US wave of alternate energy innovation

*A national security strategy that creates mechanisms that conjoins the NSA system to the parliamentary system

*A domestic strategy that reforms all domestic institutions, particularly the police and the civil service, under external supervision and

*The recreation of a foreign policy apparatus that can implement this strategy abroad.


The challenges that India will face in implementing this strategy will come from:

· The rise of a galloping China with perceived unsolvable disputes with India and ruled by a monolithic, single party

· The fundamentalist threat from an unstable Pakistan in a close alliance with China

· The region being overwhelmed by Chinese economic blandishments to support regimes politically hostile to India

· The fraying of international institutions

· A degraded neighbourhood because of economic compulsions in Bangladesh, continued political upheaval in Nepal, simmering discontent and low level conflict in Sri Lanka and jihadi threat in Pakistan and

· The loss of naval superiority in the Indian Ocean.

The book also raises questions about whether India has operational mechanisms needed to implement the strategy that it has outlined. It points out that the lack of a strategic core, which directs policy and oversees implementation, is a major lacuna that needs to be addressed urgently.

The Long View from Delhi: To Define the Indian Grand Strategy for Foreign Policy


http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/7845910

US-India Friendship
http://www.usindiafriendship.net/

 

[Jeypore]

and the US with Brazil in the Americas

Maybe, I might be dumb regarding geo-political things, but this is not possible!!!

 

[Jeypore]

The book spells out the following four possible global scenarios in 2020:

1)The first is one in which the US reinvents itself and surges forward on the tide of development of alternate energy sources.

2)The second envisages a scenario in which the relative power of the US declines and a multipolar world emerges in which regional powers rise to run their regions unilaterally – India in South Asia, China in continental Asia, and the US with Brazil in the Americas. While globalisation reduces political rivalry between nations, there is no co-ordinated action against terrorism and rogue, non-state actors.

3)The third scenario is one in which the US and China establish a duopoly and begin to co-operate in controlling world institutions, leaving former friends of the US, including India, without a platform. India will then be faced with the choice of either joining the duopoly or facing isolation.

4)The final scenario is one in which economic growth in both the United States and China remains depressed while India grows at a sustained annual rate of nine to ten per cent. The world takes longer to recover from the recession, international bodies become weak and the US becomes more isolationist. India becomes a powerful entity by 2020 but has not yet developed mechanisms to play the role of a constructive global or regional power.

Of these, the worst-case scenario from India's perspective is the emergence of a US-China duopoly where China remains hostile to India and the US is unavailable as a balancing power.

The book outlines a strategy that will help India tackle the challenges posed by the possible shift in global power arrangements.

I think the book is made of bunch of self narsissitic ideals!!!

 

[ajtr]

Reassessing a "New Great Game" between India and China in Central Asia​

Introduction
Evoked with the British-Russian rivalry in the 19th century in mind, the
"New Great Game" currently raises questions of who would fight for the
power vacuum in Central Asia left over by the dissolved Soviet Union,
and for what purposeful interests. The "New Great Game" has three
major players, namely, the United States, Russia, China, and more
modest actors, such as India and Iran. The future of Central Asian
countries depend partly on compromise between the U.S. and Russia
which is almost analogous to the 1907 agreement between Tsarist Russia
and Great Britain.1
The short-term impetus for it was actually the 9/11 attack on U.S. soil
and the subsequent American led military operation in Afghanistan,
which intensified the interests of great powers towards Central Asia. The
current growing Chinese presence in the region and the "Look-North"
policy of India call for the assessment of a possible future "Great Game"
involving both Beijing and New Delhi. Competition between China and
India does not appear to be inevitable as both countries are now
concentrating on growing their own respective economies. As a result, it
is possible that they decide to strengthen their cooperation to develop and
explore the Central Asian energy market.

Central Asia as a Geopolitical Theater for Big Powers
Geopolitics is a special type of interaction between geography and
politics. It is about the implementation of a state strategy by identifying
the most advantageous terms, and creating the most favorable atmosphere, in order to preserve the highest level of state interests while
ensuring minimum losses.2 Four elements are essential, namely, politics,
economics, geographical location and ideology. Together, they constitute
a social structure prism for the analysis of political phenomena. The main
requisite to ensure stability and durability is by mutual coordination with
these elements as core. If these elements are in sync, stability will ensue.
If not, it could, in the worse case scenario, lead to an irreversible process
whereby the whole structure would be reorganized.3
The sudden deployment and withdrawal of American forces from
Central Asia after 9/11 has destabilized the balanced-of-power in the
region. Both Russia and China worry about America's possible intrusion
into the Chechen and the East Turkistan irredentist movements. As a
result, Russia further intensified its military contacts with Central Asian
countries, and in 2003, Moscow deployed its own military forces at Kant
Air Base in Kyrgyzstan. Meanwhile, China has strengthened its
connection with Central Asia. Through the development of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), Beijing has actively sought to develop
good and friendly relations with its Central Asian neighbors. During the
2005 SCO Summit in Astana, the SCO leaders called on the U.S. to set a
time-table for the withdrawal of US military forces from Central Asia.
China's interests towards Central Asia are mainly concentrated in
four areas: maintaining stable and peaceful borders with Russia and
Central Asian states; preventing international linkages between
separatist forces in Xinjiang and outside Islamic extremist groups. The
increasing need to secure access to Central Asian energy resources; and
lastly, extending its influence in economic and even political terms
beyond this region, so as to get a better geopolitical position. With
China's rapidly growing energy demands and petroleum imports, Central
Asia has become increasingly important to it for energy security.
For India, Central Asia is an important security element in its
relationship with Pakistan, and in the stabilization of Afghanistan.
Possible threats from Islamic extremist groups could also invigorate
elements active in Kashmir. In regard to the balance-of-power among the
great powers in the Central Asian region, India has to restructure the
India-Russia partnership, remain alert to China's Central Asian
penetration, forge a cooperation framework with the United States, and
address its historical rivalry with Pakistan.

Chinese and Indian Energy Policy in Central Asia
China has become the second largest petroleum consumer of the world
since 2004 and the Central Asian petroleum resources would enable
Beijing to reduce its dependence on the Middle East. After several rounds
of fiercely competitive bidding with Western and Indian oil companies
for Kazakh oil, China's National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)
managed to secure a deal with the Kazakh government and in 2005
acquired PetroKazakhstan, from a Canadian company. Kazakhstan was
reportedly initially wary of allowing a Chinese company to take over its
strategic oil assets for fear that China could control its energy resources.
CNPC eventually managed to reassure the Kazakh government, and
acquired the company.
The deal has not only added to CNPC's existing stakes in
Kazakhstan's petroleum sector, but also moved China into a better
position to expand into other oil projects in the country and, ultimately,
westwards into the Caspian Sea, with more geographical advantage and
less political risk. At the time of writing, CNPC's last acquisition,
MangistauMunayGas, was negotiated on an equal basis with
KazMunayGas in spring 2009.4 Another sector in which China has
recently become very active is construction of gas pipelines transporting
Central Asian gas into China: the Sino-Turkmen gas pipeline entered
into service in December 2009. Although these project costs are
significantly higher, China is basing its decisions on political, rather than
economic calculations. The main priority has been to diversify its energy
access routes as it seeks to secure overseas energy resources.
India's energy strategy in Central Asia remains modest compared to
the Chinese. In 2009, after several years of discussions, ONGC-Mittal
Energy (OMEL) eventually signed an agreement for the joint
exploitation of the Satpayev offshore block, in the northern Caspian Sea,
but the project still needs to be finalized. Turkmenistan has offered to do
oil swaps involving both Iran and India and with possible Russian
participation.5 Since 2006 Gazprom plans to create a joint-venture with
Iran to transfer and market gas to India.6 In spite of these various
agreements, India is not yet among the top ten countries involved in the
exploitation of oil and gas resources in Central Asia. It will have
difficulties finding a place on this list considering the already established involvement of Russian and Western companies, and the Chinese stakes
in this area.
With regards to trade, some Indian commodities, such as tea,
pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals, have established a foothold in the
Central Asian market.7 However, the Indian government has been
experiencing difficulties in creating a secure environment for Indian
companies to enter the Central Asian market. Meanwhile, India has been
trying to improve connectivity between South and Central Asia. New
Delhi, Moscow and Tehran signed an agreement in St. Petersburg in 2000
to send Indian cargo to Russia through a North-South corridor. Indian
goods can now be sent from Mumbai or Okha to the Iranian hub of
Bandar Abbas via the Hormuz Strait in the Persian Gulf. From here,
containers are reloaded on trucks or railway wagons and dispatched to the
Iranian port of Anzali on the Caspian Sea. From Astrakhan, trucks can
further head to European destinations because of the availability of a
well-developed road and rail network.

Strategic Implications for the "New Great Game"
Peace and stability in post-Soviet Central Asia and Afghanistan seem to
be one of the most crucial factors for India's security. In Central Asia, the
race for military bases for countering terrorism, and the regime change
experiments through "color revolutions" have added a new dimension to
the "New Great Game". Analysts have in the past felt that the real
competition was between U.S. and Russia. However in the 2000s, China
has created a huge profile for itself in the region through trade, energy
deals, military cooperation, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
In the years to come, India will be expected to play a role as a regional
balancer in the backdrop of this increasing Chinese penetration, and
declining Russian presence.
The recent promotion of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline supported by
both the U.S. and the EU has implications for other regional players. The
U.S. actually has no ambition entirely to control the Caspian basin. Their
core interest is to control the oil transportation routes, in particular, the
promotion of pipelines that bypass Russia and Iran, so as to reduce the
two's regional influence. The final aim of the U.S. is to establish
democratic societies and states in Central Asia, and to support U.S.
friendly regimes in the backyard of Russia and China as a means to
counter-balance these two great powers in the Eurasian continent.
Within this context, the U.S. and EU are likely to welcome greater
Indian presence in Central Asia because they regard India as a democratic ally. Meanwhile, the Central Asian leaders are less wary of
India because New Delhi has never expressed any desire to exports its
own democratic ideals abroad.
China's recent activities in Central Asian energy resources certainly
increased Moscow's anxiety; however their relations are for the moment
more cooperative than competitive. Both Moscow and Beijing share the
common interest in reducing U.S. influence in the region. The political
maneuvering between these great powers is likely to continue until a new
balance is achieved. Currently, the main actors that benefit the most
from this "New Great Game" are the political regimes in Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. By pursuing multi-vectored policies,
these Central Asian states are using such rivalry as a means to maximize
their own benefits and interests, and reduce over-dependence on any
particular great power. This is most visible in the multi-pipeline strategy
touted by these Central Asian states; as such a diversification strategy
would provide them with greater space for maneuvering between great
powers, thereby ensuring regime survival and state autonomy. In the
years to come, the Central Asian states are likely to seek better relations
with India, not only for economic purposes, but as a means to diversify
security relations so that India could act as an additional geopolitical
counterweight within the region.

Conclusion
Local actors such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan have
managed to capitalize on the existing great power competition for their
own benefit. These local leaders' pragmatic push to advance their own
regime and national interests has certainly made Central Asian
geopolitics more complex.
With their geographical proximity, Russia and China have better
access to Central Asia and both have a common priority to reduce the
U.S. influence in the region. They have supported local authoritarian
regimes, and massively invested in energy sectors. Russian focus has
mainly orientated towards Kazakhstan's gas so as to secure a monopoly
for Gazprom over gas export to Europe - a very profitable activity - at
very high expenses. China, meanwhile, has offered generous grants and
financial aid to ensure its acquirement of oil in Kazakhstan and gas in
Turkmenistan.
In the 2000s, the U.S., EU and India were the relatively weaker
players in this "New Great Game". The bid by Washington and Brussels
to promote democratic institutions in the region was interpreted as an
attempt to undermine the current regimes; subsequently this has reduced
their influence with the Central Asian leaders. As for India, it is thus far
experiencing limited success in its attempt to promote its own geopolitical and economic interests in the region. However, this author
expects India's presence and influence in Central Asia to grow as
potentially local leaders would eventually seek to use India as an
additional counterweight in the region.

 

[ajtr]

Souter Takes The Call​

As the Great Game repeats itself, India must wake up to Karzai's new moves
The Taliban are massing at the gates of Kabul, much as the US-backed mujahideen once did in the late '80s.
The horror of being squeezed in an Indian nutcracker forces Pakistan to risk all to keep the Taliban in play.
"In the '80s when we were killing Russians for them, we were freedom fighters. Now we're just warlords."
They promised full compensation, and so were allowed to burn the opium...but the money never came.
WILLIAM DALRYMPLE

In 1843, shortly after his return from Afghanistan, an army chaplain named Rev G.H. Gleig wrote a memoir of the disastrous First Anglo-Afghan War of which he was one of the very few survivors. It was, he wrote, "a war begun for no wise purpose, carried on with a strange mixture of rashness and timidity, brought to a close after suffering and disaster, without much glory attached either to the government which directed, or the great body of troops which waged it. Not one benefit, political or military, was acquired with this war. Our eventual evacuation of the country resembled the retreat of an army defeated".

It would be difficult to imagine any military adventure today going quite as badly as the First Anglo-Afghan War, an abortive experiment in Great Game colonialism that ended with an entire East India Company army utterly routed by poorly equipped tribesmen, at the cost of Rs 80 billion and over 40,000 lives. But this month, almost 10 years on from NATO's invasion of Afghanistan, there were increasing signs that the current Afghan war, like so many before them, could still end in another embarrassing withdrawal after a humiliating defeat, with Afghanistan yet again left in tribal chaos, possibly partitioned and ruled by the same government which the war was originally fought to overthrow.

Certainly it is becoming clearer than ever that the once-hated Taliban, far from being defeated by the surge, are instead beginning to converge on, and effectively besiege, Kabul in what is beginning to look like the final act in the history of Karzai's western-installed puppet government. For the Taliban have now reorganised, and advanced out of their borderland safe havens. They are now massing at the gates of Kabul, surrounding the capital, much as the US-backed mujahideen once did to the Soviet-installed regime in the late '80s. The Taliban controls over 70 per cent of the country, where it collects taxes, enforces the sharia and dispenses its usual rough justice. Every month their sphere of influence increases. According to a recent Pentagon report, Karzai's government only controls 29 out of 121 key strategic districts.

Last month marked a new low with the Taliban inflicting higher levels of casualties on both civilians and NATO forces than ever before and regaining control of the opium-growing centre of Marja in Helmand, only three months after being driven out by American forces amid much gung-ho cheerleading in the US media.Worse still, there are unsettling and persistent rumours that Karzai is trying to reach some sort of accommodation with elements in Pakistan that aid and assist the Taliban: the ISI head, Lt General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, has secretly been shuttling to and from Islamabad to meet Karzai, and last month, General Kayani, head of the Pakistani army, visited Kabul.
This followed the sacking of Amrullah Saleh, Karzai's very pro-Indian security chief. Saleh is a tough, burly and intimidating Tajik with a piercing, unblinking stare, who rose to prominence as a mujahideen protege of Ahmed Shah Masood, the legendary, India-backed Lion of the Panjshir. Saleh brought these impeccable credentials to his job after the American conquest, ruthlessly hunting down and interrogating any Taliban he could find, with little regard for notions of human rights.

The Taliban, and their backers in the ISI, regarded him as their fiercest enemy, something he was enormously proud of. When I had dinner with him in Kabul in May, he spoke at length of his frustration with the Karzai government's ineffectiveness in taking the fight to the Taliban, and the degree to which the ISI was still managing to aid, arm and train their pocket insurgents in Waziristan, Sindh and Balochistan.

Saleh's sacking in early June merited much less newsprint than last month's sacking of General Stanley McChrystal. Yet in reality, McChrystal's departure reflects only a minor personnel change, no important alteration in strategy. The sacking of Saleh, however, gave notice of a major and ominous change of direction by President Karzai.

Bruce Riedel, Obama's Afpak advisor, said when the news broke: "Karzai's decision to sack Saleh and (Hanif) Atmar (head of the interior ministry) has worried me more than any other development, because it means Karzai is already planning for a post-American Afghanistan."The implication is that Pakistan is encouraging some sort of accommodation between Karzai and the ISI-sponsored jehadi network of Sirajuddin Haqqani, which could give over much of the Pashtun south to Haqqani, but preserve Karzai in power in Kabul. The Americans have been party to none of this, and administration officials have been quoted as being alarmed by the news.

India's expulsion from Afghanistan, or at least a severe rolling back of its presence, can be presumed to be a demand on the ISI shopping list in return for a deal. Under Karzai, India had increasing political and economic influence in Afghanistan—it opened four regional consulates, and provided around $662 million of reconstruction assistance. Pakistan's military establishment has always believed it would be suicide to accept an Indian presence in what they regard as their strategic backyard, and is completely paranoid about the still small Indian presence—rather as the British used to be about Russians in Afghanistan during the days of the Great Game.

MEA sources say there are less than 3,600 Indians in Afghanistan, almost all of them businessmen and contract workers; there are only 10 Indian diplomatic officers as opposed to nearly 150 in the UK embassy. Yet the horror of being squeezed in an Indian nutcracker has led the ISI to risk Pakistan's own internal security and coherence, as well as its strategic relationship with the US, in order to keep the Taliban in play, and its leadership under watch and ISI patronage in Quetta, something the Wikileaks documents amply confirmed.
If it is true that Karzai is tilting away from NATO and India, and towards Pakistan, it would represent a strategic victory for the Pakistani military, and a diplomatic defeat for India—though the ISI will have to first deliver the Taliban, who still say they are unwilling to negotiate with Karzai. It also remains to be seen whether Pakistan can be defended from the jehadi Frankenstein's monster its military has created: the recent bomb blasts in Lahore at the shrine of Datta Sahib would seem further evidence to indicate not. The other question is whether India can succeed in its reported attempts to resuscitate the Northern Alliance as a contingency against the Taliban's takeover of the south, possibly in conjunction with Russia, Iran and the Central Asian 'stans'.
Either way, within Afghanistan, it's a grim picture. Already, it's now impossible—or at least extremely foolhardy—for any foreigner to walk even in Kabul without armed guards; it is even more inadvisable to head out of town in any direction except north: the strongly anti-Taliban Panjshir Valley, and the towns of Mazar and Herat, are really the only safe havens left for non-Afghans in the entire country, despite the massive troops levels all over. In all other directions, travel is only possible in an armed convoy. This is especially so around the Khoord Kabul and Tezeen Passes, immediately to the south of Kabul, where around 18,000 East India Company troops, many of them Indian sepoys, were lost in 1842, and which is today again a centre of resistance against foreign troops.

***

The trajectory of the current war is in fact beginning to feel unsettlingly familiar to students of the Great Game. In 1839, the British invaded Afghanistan on the basis of sexed-up intelligence about a non-existent threat: information about a single Russian envoy to Kabul was manipulated by a group of ambitious, ideologically-driven hawks to create a scare—in this case, about a phantom Russian invasion—thus bringing about an unnecessary, expensive and entirely avoidable war.

Initially, the hawks were triumphant: the British conquest proved remarkably easy and bloodless. Kabul was captured in a few weeks, the Afghan army melted into the hills, and a pliable monarch, Shah Shuja, was placed on the throne. For months the British played cricket, went skating and put on amateur theatricals as if on summer leave in Simla; there were even discussions about making Kabul the summer capital of the Raj. Then an insurgency began which slowly unravelled that first heady success, first among the Pashtuns of Kandahar and Helmand, and slowly moving northwards until it reached Kabul, making the occupation impossible to sustain.

What happened next is a warning of how bad things could yet become: a full-scale rebellion broke out in Kabul; the two most senior British envoys were killed, one hacked to death by a mob in the streets, the other stabbed by resistance leader Wazir Akbar Khan during negotiations. It was on the retreat that followed, on January 6, 1842, that the 18,000 East India Company troops, and maybe half that many Indian camp followers, were slaughtered by marksmen waiting in ambush amid the scree of the high passes, shot down as they trudged through the icy depths of the Afghan winter. After eight days on the death march, the last 50 survivors made their final stand at the village of Gandamak. As late as the 1970s, fragments of Victorian weaponry and military equipment could be found lying in the screes above the village. Even today, the hill is said to be covered with bleached bones.
Only one man lived to tell the tale of that last stand (if you discount the fictional survival of Flashman): an ordinary footsoldier, Thomas Souter, wrapped his regimental colours around him to prevent them being captured, and was taken hostage by the Afghans who assumed that an individual so colourfully clothed must command a high ransom. It is a measure of the increasingly pertinent parallels between that war and today's that one of the main NATO bases in Afghanistan was recently named Camp Souter.

In the years following 1842, the British defeat became pregnant with symbolism. For the Victorian British, it was the greatest imperial disaster of the 19th century. For the Afghans, it became an emblem of freedom from foreign invasion, and the determination the Afghans have never lost to refuse to be controlled by any foreign power. It is again no accident that the diplomatic quarter of Kabul, the Afghan Chanakyapuri, is named after the general who oversaw the rout of the British: Wazir Akbar Khan.

For Indians, who provided most of the cannon-fodder, the war ironically became a symbol of possibility: although many Indians died on the march, it showed the British were not invincible, and a well-planned insurgency could force them out; a few years later, in 1857, India launched its own anti-colonial uprising, partly inspired by what the Afghans had achieved.

This destabilising effect on South Asia of the failed Afghan war has a direct parallel in the disastrous blowback from the war we currently see in Pakistan's tribal territories. Indeed, the ripples of instability lapping out from Afghanistan and Pakistan have now reached even New York: when Faisal Shazad was asked by cia interrogators why he tried to bomb New York, he told them of his desire to revenge those "innocent people being hit by drones from above".

***

Last month, while researching my new book on the disaster of 1842, I only narrowly avoided the same fate as my Victorian forbears. The route of the British retreat backs onto the mountain range that leads to Tora Bora and the Pakistan border, an area that has always been a Taliban centre. I'd been advised not to venture there without local protection, so had set off that morning in the company of a tribal leader who was also a minister in Karzai's government: a huge mountain of a man named Anwar Khan Jigdalik, a former village wrestling champion who had made his name as a Hizb-i-Islami commander in the jehad against the Soviets.

It was Jigdalik's ancestors who inflicted some of the worst casualties on the British army of 1842, something he proudly repeated several times as we drove through the same passes. None of this, incidentally, has stopped him from sending his family away to the greater safety of Northolt. Jigdalik drove himself in a huge suv; a pick-up full of heavily armed bodyguards followed. We left Kabul—past the blast walls of the NATO barracks, built on the very site of the British cantonment of 170 years ago—and headed down a corkscrewing road into the line of bleak mountain passes that link Kabul with the Khyber Pass.

It's a dramatic, violent landscape: faultlines of tortured strata twisted in the gunpowder-coloured rockwalls rising on either side. Above us, the dragon's backs of jagged mountain tops were veiled in an ominous mist. As we drove, Jigdalik complained bitterly of the western treatment of his government: "In the '80s, when we were killing Russians for them, the Americans called us freedom fighters," he muttered as we descended the first pass. "Now they just dismiss us as warlords."
At Sorobi, where the mountains debouche into a high-altitude ochre desert dotted with encampments of nomads, we left the main road and headed into Taliban territory; a further five trucks full of Jigdalik's old mujahideen fighters, faces wrapped in keffiyehs and all brandishing rocket-propelled grenades, appeared from a side road to escort us.

At Jigdalik, on January 12, 1842, some 200 frostbitten Company soldiers found themselves surrounded by several thousand Pashtun tribesmen. The two highest-ranking British soldiers went off to negotiate and were taken hostage, while a companion, James Skinner, son of Sikandar Sahib, was murdered. Only 50 infantrymen could break out, under cover of darkness.

Our own welcome was, thankfully, somewhat warmer. It was my host's first visit home since he became a minister, and the proud villagers took their old commander on a nostalgia trip through low hills smelling of wild thyme and rosemary, and up through mountainsides of hollyhocks and white poplars. Here, at the top, lay the remains of Jigdalik's old mujahideen bunkers and entrenchments. Later, the villagers feasted us, Mughal style, in an apricot orchard: we sat on carpets under a trellis of vine and pomegranate blossom, as course after course of kebabs and mulberry pulao were laid in front of us.

During lunch, as my hosts pointed out the various places in the village where the British had been massacred in 1842, I asked them if they saw any parallels with the current situation: "It is exactly the same," said Jigdalik. "Both times the foreigners have come for their own interests, not for ours. They pretend to be our friends. They say, 'We are your friends, we want democracy, we want to help.' But they are lying."

"Since the British went, we've had the Russians," said Mohammad Khan, our host in the village and the orchard owner. "We saw them off too, but not before they bombed many of our houses." He pointed at a ridge full of ruined houses on the hills behind us. "Afghanistan is like the crossroads for every nation that comes to power," said Jigdalik. "We do not have the strength to control our own destiny—our fate is determined by our neighbours."

"Next it will be China. This is the last days of the Americans."

"Each state in America is the same size as Afghanistan," said Jigdalik, nodding in agreement with his villagers. "If they'd wanted to help us, they could have. But we're still in a miserable state. All the money that came in: none of it was given to Afghans—just to their own contractors, or wasted in corruption. What has been done with all the millions sent here? Can you see any improvements? Now the moment has passed, their power is slipping."

"So you think the Taliban will come back?"

"The Taliban?" said Mohammad Khan. "They are here already. At least after dark. Just over that pass," he pointed in the direction of Gandamak and Tora Bora. "That is where they are strongest."

It was nearly 5 pm before the final flaps of naan were cleared away, too late to head on to the site of the British last stand at Gandamak. Instead, we went to Jalalabad, where we discovered we'd had a narrow escape: the feast had saved us from walking straight into an ambush. It turned out there had been a huge battle that day between government forces and villagers supported by the Taliban at Gandamak, on exactly the site of the British last stand. In Afghanistan, imperial history seems to be repeating itself with uncanny precision.

The next morning in Jalalabad we went to a jirga, to which the grey beards of Gandamak had come, under a flag of truce, to discuss what had happened the day before. The story was typical of many I heard, and revealed how a mixture of corruption, incompetence and insensitivity had helped give an opening for the return of the once-hated Taliban.

As Predator drones took off and landed incessantly at the nearby airfield, the elders related how the previous year government troops had turned up to destroy the opium harvest. They promised full compensation and were allowed to burn the crops; but the money never turned up. Before planting season, the villagers again went to Jalalabad and asked for assistance to grow other crops. Promises were made; nothing was delivered. They planted poppy, informing the authorities that if they again tried to burn the crop, the village would have no option but to resist. When the troops turned up, about the same time as we were arriving at Jigdalik, the villagers were waiting for them, and had called in the local Taliban to assist. Nine policemen were killed, six vehicles destroyed and 10 hostages taken.

After the jirga, one of the tribal elders came over and we chatted for a while over a glass of green tea. "Last month," he said, "some American officers called us to a hotel in Jalalabad for a meeting. One of them asked me, 'Why do you hate us?' I replied, 'Because you blow down our doors, enter our houses, pull our women by the hair and kick our children. We cannot accept this. We will fight back, we will break your teeth, and when your teeth are broken you will leave, just as the British left before you. It is just a matter of time.'"

"What did he say to that?"

"He turned to his friend and said, "If the old men are like this, what will the younger ones be like?" In truth, all the Americans here know their game is over. It is just their politicians who deny this."

 

[Rage]

Didn't want to start a separate thread for this, so putting it here:

India commits to two power projects in Laos: Assistance of $72.5 million

 

[ajtr]

India to maintain strategic autonomy: PM​

New Delhi: Emphasising the country's "strategic autonomy", Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Monday said it was "an article of faith" and India was "too large a country to be boxed into any alliance or regional or sub-regional arrangements, whether trade, economic or political."

He said if India had to sustain its nine to 10 percent growth, it needed foreign capital inflow, both portfolio and direct investment, the best of modern technology and access to markets of the advanced economies and the country had to modernise its infrastructure.



For all this, India needed to maintain a healthy relations with all major powers, he added.

On the global terms, the Prime Minister said, there was a shift of economic and political power to Asia, with the Asia-Pacific region, including the South East Asia needing more attention from India.

"This must seep into our defence and foreign policy planning as never before. This is a palpable desire on the part of the countries of this region to enhance cooperation with us which we must reciprocate," he added.

Noting that some of the "toughest challenges" lay in India's neighbourhood, Dr Singh said the country would not realise its growth ambitions unless peace and stability was ensured in South Asia.

Describing the nations of the Gulf region, West and Central Asia as "natural partners", he said India had tangible interests in these regions, among which energy security was most important.

"We have to ensure adequate availability of commercial energy to support our growth targets. This requires not only diversification of the sources of our energy imports but also widening of our overall energy mix. It is in this context that we need to operationalise our nuclear energy option, which holds great promise and is a necessity," he added.

Referring to the global economic crisis of 2008, Dr Singh said India had weathered it better than most large economies, as there was a continental sized economy and large internal market. But the challenge, he said, would be to ensure that growth was balanced across all regions and reached all sections of society.

"Given our youth demographic profile, we will also have to ensure access to good quality education and health services to all. We have to put in place a National Skill Development Mission to empower our youth which will yield positive results," he added.

Dr Singh also assured the armed forces that the country would accord priority to equipment, training and welfare of soldiers and retired defence personnel.

"We will do all that is necessary to ensure the armed forces attract the best talent in the country," he added.

 

[ajtr]

China wants India in state of low-level equilibrium: PM​

NEW DELHI: Despite his unflagging efforts to improve relations with India's neighbours -- especially, India and Pakistan -- Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Monday sounded somewhat frustrated by the continuing "pinpricks" from Beijing and Islamabad.

Asked during an interaction with editors on Monday about China's recent needling of India by referring to Jammu & Kashmir as "India-controlled Kashmir", Singh agreed that Beijing could be tempted to use India's "soft underbelly", Kashmir, and Pakistan "to keep India in low-level equilibrium".

He said this actually underscored his repeated emphasis for India and Pakistan to resolve their differences and reach a good equation. Not only would continued differences give countries like China the opportunity to exploit, but also impede progress in South Asia.

"China would like to have a foothold in South Asia and we have to reflect on this reality. We have to be aware of this," he said. He, however, also said that it was his firm belief that the world was large enough for India and China to "cooperate and compete" at the same time.

After his meetings with the Chinese leadership, including with President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, Singh said he was of the feeling that Beijing wanted to sort out the outstanding issues with India. "However, this leadership will change in two years. There is a new assertiveness among the Chinese. It is difficult to tell which way it will go. So, it's important to be prepared."

On Pakistan, Singh appeared more reconciled than ever before to the roller-coaster character of the bilateral ties. He said he believed in engagement with Pakistan, irrespective of the set-up in Islamabad. "Engagement is a better way to convey our concerns to Pakistan. Conveying them through the media isn't the best way."

He said that despite his belief in engagement, the government respected the popular sentiment post 26/11 and cut off all dialogue with Pakistan. "We felt this would be a lever for us to press Pakistan to address our concerns. But as that didn't happen, we went to Thimpu and restarted the process for dialogue."

With a wry smile, he added, "You can't guarantee anything about Indo-Pak relations. So, the meeting between the two foreign ministers (S M Krishna and Shah Mehmood Qureshi in Islamabad) was very low. I hope Qureshi will accept Krishna's invitation and come to India."

Read more: China wants India in state of low-level equilibrium: PM - The Times of India China wants India in state of low-level equilibrium: PM - The Times of India

 

[ajtr]

cross-posting................

India Must Master the Great Game​

The smart response to brash diplomatic moves from China is a levelheaded one.

Strategic tensions between Asia's rising giants, China and India, are palpably worsening. While there's enough blame for this situation to go around, much of it does lie with China. But India also needs to rethink its approach to great power rivalry in order to manage the contest sensibly.

Last week, China denied a visa to an Indian general on the grounds that he was based in the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir. On Sunday, Chinese warships visited Burma for the first time. This stoked Indian fears of encirclement, a fire already lit by Beijing's port construction in Pakistan and Sri Lanka and its indefinite antipiracy presence in the Gulf of Aden.

By Tuesday, India's external affairs minister was telling parliament that Beijing was showing "more than normal interest" in Indian Ocean affairs. The opposition seized on media reports of Chinese troops being based in Pakistan's northernmost corner of Kashmir. And the China chill was lead item at a meeting of the prime minister's national security committee.
In recent years, Beijing has stepped back from earlier indications that it was willing to negotiate the disputed border, over which the countries fought a war in 1962. The state-run media have begun to attack India for supposedly hegemonic designs, with some publications hinting at the merits of a confrontation. Beijing has taken offense at visits by the Dalai Lama and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, over which China has rekindled a long-dormant sovereignty claim.

In April, Canadian researchers exposed the systematic penetration of Indian government computers from locations in China. And Chinese support for Pakistan shows no sign of abating, although these days it involves nuclear energy reactors rather than bomb designs.

For its part, the India military's transparent reinforcement of its border deployments—however long overdue—has fed Chinese claims to be the aggrieved party. And India's clamorous media and excitable strategic commentariat have fanned the fears. The echo-chamber of Indian television treats rumor as news—false reports of border incursions in Ladakh last September were widely repeated. This makes formulating a rational China policy harder still.

New Delhi must act calmly but firmly in response to the latest challenges. China relations should be governed in part by the notion that discretion is the better part of valor.

There are mixed reports about whether India intends to snap all defense ties with China in response to the visa affront. To do so openly and clumsily would be a mistake—precisely the kind that China made with its suspension of Sino-U.S. military dialogue over this year's Taiwan arms sales. Mistrust and wounded pride are not rational reasons to strangle the communications channels that might prevent military encounters from escalating into war. Nor should New Delhi sacrifice the upsides that its complex interactions with China have produced in recent years: India's largest trading relationship; dialogue on climate change and global finance; and a leadership-level hotline arrangement, however little-used.

But India does have several opportunities to play the game of strategic diplomacy more adroitly, in part thanks to China's own wider missteps in maritime Asia. From the waters off South Korea to the South China Sea, Beijing's recent assertiveness has gone down badly with many states, including South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia and Australia. These nations, like the United States, are keen to boost economic and security ties with India. New Delhi could credibly portray its rocky relations with Beijing as being of a kind with their own, and cultivate security partnerships accordingly.

While China has legitimate interests in Indian Ocean security thanks to its shipping and energy-importation, India has a growing and justified stake in sea lanes east of the Malacca Strait, too. Its seaborne trade with Asia-Pacific powers is rising rapidly—China, ironically enough, foremost among them. So the Indian Navy has a rationale to step up exercises with partners beyond its old horizons. And if India seeks energy from locations far afield, whether Sakhalin gas or Vietnam's claimed zone of the South China Sea, then China with its own global quest for fuel can hardly feign surprise.

In more familiar waters, India has plenty of scope to expand its maritime surveillance and patrolling. This could be combined with support to weak, well-situated nations such as Mauritius, Madagascar and Maldives, as strategist C. Raja Mohan has argued.

For instance, it might not be too late for Indian commerce to play a role in the second stage of building Sri Lanka's China-funded Hambantota port, due to begin receiving cargo ships in November. Engagement of this type could be a springboard to cooperation with external powers, including China. Once it is bargaining from a position of confidence in its own regional relationships instead of paranoia over China's, India's strength will become apparent.

Despite its promising return to 8.8% economic growth, India is right to follow the advice of its former Naval Chief Sureesh Mehta to not try to match China's military weapon-for-weapon, dollar-for-dollar. Instead, New Delhi could pursue something like the asymmetry that Beijing seeks against Washington, including in the maritime, cyber and nuclear realms. A mix of development, deterrence and diplomacy will make India ready for rivalry.

Mr. Medcalf is director of the international security program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney.

 

[Illusive]

India invites China to explore partnership in road building

Dharamsala, September 18 - India and China have agreed to work towards signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in building Road Transport and Highways including border roads, media reports said. Under the MoU, both sides would seek to enhance cooperation in highway construction, exchange of technology and investments in the sector.

Indian Minister for Road Transport & Highways Kamal Nath met Mr Li Shenglin, Chinese Minister of Transport, in Beijing on Wednesday. Nath is leading a high level business delegation of Indian Companies to China.

Nath said that India has embarked on a massive National Highway development programme that proposes to build 7000 km of National Highways every year over the next few years. Nath invited Chinese construction companies and Chinese financial institutions to enhance their engagement with India. Several Chinese companies are already participating in the National Highway Development Project of India.

Nath also met Mr Lou Jiwei, Chairman, China Investment Corporation (CIC) and Mr Dai Xianglong, Chairman of National Social Security Fund (NSSF) and invited them to invest in the National Highways sector of India and briefed them on the high returns that the sector promises to offer.

Nath said he was willing to address Chinese concerns over cap on foreign investment under Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) regulations by considering the possibility of negotiating an economic cooperation agreement in future.

Nath believes Chinese engineering firms had recognised the huge opportunities in India, and were surprised that India had awarded as many as 188 highway projects with a combined length of 7,500 km this year alone.

India in October last year asked China to stop its projects in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) in view of "long-term relations." "Pakistan has been in illegal occupation of parts of the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir since 1947. The Chinese side is fully aware of India's position and our concerns about Chinese activities in Pakistan occupied Kashmir," External Affairs Ministry spokesman Vishnu Prakash told reporters last year.

Chinese president Hu Jintao met with the Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani last year and reportedly outlined a major project to upgrade the Karakoram highway connecting the two countries overland and offered China's help in the Neelam-Jhelum hydroelectric project in PoK.

India invites China to explore partnership in road building - www.phayul.com