Reasons for Despair
Security Concerns
While the economic benefits of a successful, insurgency free, TAPI are listed above, the first and foremost concern of this project is security. Though the consortium is responsible for providing security of the line, it can work only under sovereign guarantees. AON, a risk management services provider company, in a political - risk map of the world in 2011 shows Afghanistan and Pakistan as 'very high risk' countries. Some of the criteria in the country risk profile were risks involved in exchange transfer; war/civil war; strikes, riots, civil unrest,
terrorism; sovereign non payment; political interference; supply chain disruption; legal and regulatory disputes.
Afghanistan
Afghanistan's ability to secure the line even in the presence of the U.S. led coalition forces has been in question; once the NATO forces withdraw from the region in 2014, the doubts will become more grave. A number of districts in Helmand and Kandahar are under Taliban control. A classified United Nations risk assessment map of Afghanistan revealed that the security risks from March to October 2010 in Afghanistan had worsened . There is a strong fear of a resurgence of Taliban forces after the withdrawal of NATO forces. Many believe that any political settlement would include some power sharing agreement between the Taliban and the government in Kabul, while others speculate that the Taliban may be given semi autonomy in the eastern and southern, Pashtun held territories . If either of the options is exercised, the level of governance, the law and order situation and the level of c
ommitment to a project sanctioned by Kabul will become a cause of worry for India.
The pipeline passes through both Pashtun and Baloch dominated areas, where the drug trade is rampant. There is a fear that if the project is successful, it will strengthen
the drug lords because of the economic benefits that will ensue. There are examples of US forces paying the local head of private armies warlords -to guard the supply routes of NATO forces. While in some cases they have managed to secure the area, it has corroded the already unstable authority of the government at the centre.
In response to the insecurity concerning the project, the Afghan government has plans to increase the number of forces to protect the pipeline from 7,000 to 12,000 . In this context, it is good to bear in mind that there are approximately 150,000 US and NATO troops in Afghanistan fighting against a Taliban led insurgency against the Afghan government without much success. The countries involved in the project cannot rely on Afghan forces to guard the line. It has been suggested that Afghan forces could be bolstered with NATO support to protect the pipeline in Afghanistan. However, NATO nations are sceptical about extending their engagement with Afghanistan and the Afghan government would object to such an arrangement. There are examples of repeated closures of pipelines due to the Kurdish separatist armed groups on the Baku-Tabilisi -Ceyhan (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey) Oil pipeline (launched in 2006), a clear failure of the Turkish military to quell them. Similarly, the US led coalition forces and the Iraqi military have also been unsuccessful in putting an end to attacks by insurgents on the Iraqi oil and gas pipelines. After the assassination of Ahmed Wali Karzai, President Hamid Karzai's brother and the head of Kandahar provincial council and Burhanuddin Rabbani, the former president of Afghanistan, the dynamics of the country have further changed.
Pakistan
The security of the pipeline in Pakistan would be under threat from Lashkar - e -Taiba. With Pakistan's military under severe scrutiny given some recent revelations, the degree of protection that can be provided by the state of Pakistan is questionable.
One of the most crucial problems is that the pipeline passes through Baluchistan which is restive and poor, a lethal combination. Armed clashes between the military and the private militia continue. The South Asian Terrorism Portal reports that there have been at least 126 bomb blasts and grenade explosions across the province in 2009 alone . Rocket attacks on gas pipelines, railway tracks, power transmission lines, bridges, communication infrastructure and government and military facilities occur frequently. Ordons News reports that
three gas pipelines in addition to eight other s, including two high pressure ones were blown up in Baluchistan in a span of ten days in February, 2011 . Under
these circumstances, such a sensitive pipeline, especially one where a disruption will have impact on Pakistan and India, will become a glaring target for the militants.
The South Asian terrorism portal also reports an increase in incidents of targeted killings in Balochistan. There are at least six active insurgent groups in the region. If the government and the military of Pakistan are not able to secure their domestic pipelines, how can they guarantee the security of an international one? In fact, the Asia Times reported on 19
th February, 2011 that the Iran - Pakistan gas pipeline project was declared as officially suspended by Iran, at least until next spring, this in spite of Iran having completed most of the
construction work on its part. This pipeline was supposed to pass through the troubled Baluchistan area. While there might be other reasons for the suspension, it cannot be a coincidence , that this decision was announced after the series of attacks on gas pipelines in the region. In the case of the Iran - Pakistan pipeline, Pakistan is liable to pay $8 million for each day the project is delayed after the end of the deadline . It stands to reason that if TAPI takes off, provisions to cover the losses in case the gas is stopped will be necessary. While it is the responsibility of the consortium to maintain the flow of gas to the countries involved in the project, it will be the death knell of any insurance and re - insurance company given the frequency of the terror attacks. Imposing legal and financial instruments will help ensure that the states conform to the agreement; it will also help boost the efforts to secure the pipeline but it will not have any effect on terrorist activities in the region. India, being the last country in the supply line, is vulnerable. Closely linked to the
security issue is the glaring lack of trust between India and Pakistan. An additional cause for concern stems from the threat of leakages and theft along the route not only in Pakistan, but also in Afghanistan. Pakistan alone is losing around 300 million cubic feet per day causing a loss of almost 20 billion Pakistani rupees. This will give rise to a parallel black market and further fund the war lords in the region.
The resolution
Inviting the Right Stakeholders
The involvement of Russia's Gazprom along with Turkmenistan's Turkmengaz and India's ONGC in the consortium for the construction of this project will help secure the pipeline. These organisations have the geostrategic muscle and technical prowess to secure the project. Gazprom, the Russian energy giant has been involved in the construction of several natural gas pipelines across Europe and Central Asia. With 1580.8 trillion cubic metres, Russia has the largest natural gas reserves in the world. Its production and consumption in 2010 was 588.9 billion cubic metres and 414.1 billion cubic metres respectively. It has a highly developed natural gas industry and is the major supplier to Europe. It has one of the world's best, if not the best, technical expertise and personnel for natural gas pipeline construction through difficult terrains. Gazprom has indicated an interest in becoming a part of TAPI. While Turkmenistan may have a problem with Russia, recent reports suggest that Russia and Turkmenistan could agree on new cooperation projects in the oil, gas and transport industries. A Turkish Weekly news article says that Russia's First Deputy Prime Minister, Viktor Zubkov, and Turkmenistan's Deputy Prime Minister, Rashid Meredov, confirmed the two countries intent t o work together in various fields, particularly energy and the fuel sector.
ONGC India may not have been involved in trans boundary projects but they have developed extensive experience in developing cross country networks of oil and gas pipelines in Indi a. ONGC owns and operates more than 22,000 km of pipelines in India, and its presence in the consortium could be valuable in monitoring in Indian interests