Cold Start: A Pakistani perspective

[Patriot]

India has no 'Cold Start' doctrine: Army Chief

NEW DELHI (PTI): Army Chief Gen V K Singh Thursday said India has no "Cold Start" doctrine as claimed in the secret American documents and dismissed the US perception about the Indian Army being "slow and lumbering".

"There is nothing called 'Cold Start' (doctrine) in the Indian Army. We don't have anything called 'Cold Start'," he told PTI reacting to wikileak documents in which US Ambassador Timothy Roemer analyses India's military approach towards Pakistan in the wake of 26/11 attacks.

He also dismissed Roemer's description of the Indian army's mobilisation process as "slow and lumbering", saying that is "his perception" with which he does not agree.

"We don't necessarily agree with that perception. We know what has to be done," Gen Singh underlined.

He said the Indian army has "things in place" and "We practice our contingency depending on situations. We are confident that we will be able to exercise the contingency when the time comes."

Asked about the slow process of modernisation of the Armed forces, Gen Singh explained that it is mainly due to procedures and the fact that authorities want to be cautious to ensure nothing goes wrong.

Gen Singh said "We are aware that the modernisation process is subject to procedures of procurement. It takes at least two years, sometimes it may take more because somebody raises an issue about a company--that this company is doing this and that. It may be blacklisted. It happened in the case of Bofors.

"Procedurally we have problems because this is a democracy and nobody wants to take a chance."

To a question whether with all these problems India could be called a fighting force, he asserted, "100 per cent. We are capable of achieving what we want."

He said that no force anywhere could have 100 per cent modernisation. "Anywhere, ideally, 30 per cent will be old legacy, 30-40 per cent will be in the process of modernisation and another 30-40 per cent will be totally modernised."

The Army Chief said in a big country like India, it will take time because of manufacturing and other issues.

"All that I can say is that whatever we have, whether it is old or otherwise, we are still capable of what we want to achieve," he emphasised.




http://www.brahmand.com/news/India-has-no-Cold-Start-doctrine-Army-Chief/5676/1/14.html

 

[Ray]

It is true that India has no Cold Start Doctrine.

Indeed, there is no doctrine that is named 'Cold Start'.

It does not mean that there is no doctrine for various contingencies in the event of war clouds looming.

Defence deals have other considerations than mere military evaluation. The files move very slowly and up and down and finally it is at the PNC, where other considerations come into play.

The bureaucrat and Ministers have to be sure that there is no comeback to haunt them and so they take an immense amount of time to sew up the deals in their way of looking at the issues!

Hence, things take time and sometimes the delay is so much, the scenario changes and the equipment and the whole deal is near obsolescent.

Mobilisation was tardy and sluggish. One cannot deny that since it was evident in Op Parikrama.

The Defence forces are in a position to take on the Pakistanis even now, but if modernisation is undertaken without seeing Banco's Ghost at every lamp post, it would be helpful and the Defence forces in a better situation that it is currently in.

 

[Yusuf]

Is the govt and army trying to allay some pakistani nerves about cold start by saying there is no such thing. It was very much stated at the highest level about cold start and also conducted 5 major exercises conducted to validate the doctrine and also establish coordination between the army and the AF whose coordination is a must for a successful operation. So all this talk is just to allay some nerves and just keep the enemy guessing.

 

[pankaj nema]

The US will be the first country to start howling if we were to openly make statements about our military doctrines because of Pakistani insecurities

The Chinese posturing in the last 2 years has made India focus on 2 front capabilities and rightly so
Pakistan has gone off the radar for the time being

whether pakistan AND US like it or not armed forces have made many changes after Operation Parakram in their war fighting concepts

What matters is the offensive capabilty .If Pakistan has been crying hoarse about cold start and it has asked USA to intervene it means that they are worried

Pakistan 's last exercices Azm e Nau were centred around India's cold start doctrine

 

[wild goose]

How India's Cold Start is Turning the Heat on Pakistan

http://idrw.org/?p=1995

 

[black eagle]

Army 'Transformation': A 'Radical' One?

Ali Ahmed

The defensive orientation of India's strategic culture was pinpointed by George Tanham in the early nineties. This approach has been much criticised in strategic commentary and in military literature. A consensus for a more assertive strategic culture and posture is in the process of being built up.

A news report suggests that this impetus for change has finally put military reforms on the anvil.1 The proposed changes, due to be effected beginning March-April, are likely to be as follows:

* According to the news report, 'One of the most critical proposals is the creation of a Strategic Command, under which the three Strike Corps would be brought together.'
* Either the South Western or the Southern Command headquarters will be changed into the headquarter of the Strategic Comamnd.
* A proposal for the raising of a mountain strike corps is with the ministry.
* Governmental imprimatur to the plan has in all likelihood been given. The report states: 'A dependable Army source said the plan is now set to be rolled out. A defence ministry source said the ministry would go along with the proposed reforms.'

The change is part of the 'transformation' study undertaken under the leadership of the chief of the army staff, during his earlier stint as eastern army commander. Rumours regarding the study have been around for about three years. Since it was confidential, little discussion has been possible on the subject. Now that the contours of the makeover are in the public domain, more informed analyses and critiques have become possible. This commentary attempts to pinpoint the issues on which a debate is likely to ensue - with the caveat that the report is taken to be partially factual rather than a red herring, for the purposes of sustaining a debate.

Contextualising the change involves locating it in the continuum of organisational evolution. The mechanisation of the eighties had two strike corps poised for riposte or counter offensive, based on the assumption that an offensive, military-led Pakistan would be first off the block. Thereafter, the holding corps were to absorb the offensive and the strike corps would be deployed to either retrieve losses, or better still, to punish Pakistan. The conflict ending would see the two sides at the negotiation table trading the gains made in terms of captured territory -the victor being the one who makes greater territorial gains and suffers less damage. The HQs of the IPKF on its return from Sri Lanka, were re-designated the HQ 21 Corps and the newly raised 33 Mechanised Division was converted into India's third armoured division. India thus managed to gain a 3:2 advantage over Pakistan in terms of strike corps.

The straitened circumstance of the nineties and the opportunity smelt by Pakistan in Kashmir contributed to India's inability to deter proxy war. India had the ability to deter any Pakistani intent to follow up its sub-conventional offensive with a conventional offensive (The 'Op TOPAC' scenario). The nuclear backdrop, the economic circumstances of the early years of liberalisation and coalition governments limited offensive options. The offensive mindset was instead evident on an 'active' Line of Control from the mid nineties onwards. This, among other reasons, culminated in the Kargil War - if Musharraf's autobiography and other Pakistani sources are to be believed. By then the Shakti tests and the counter tests at Chagai had altered the nuclear dimension from 'recessed' to overt.

Increased provocation by Pakistan under nuclear cover to the extent of targeting the Parliament in a terror attack combined with the NDA regime's self-image of being more defence-oriented, fostered the offensive tendency in strategic culture. This has been consciously built into the 'Cold Start' doctrine. The 'holding' corps became 'pivot corps', with a capability for a limited offensive in real time. The strike corps with faster mobilisation were to be launched or located in a game of posturing. This enabled the creation of a wide-front with multiple pivot corps offensives going in and a strike corps under each command, poised in its wake, creating a decision predicament for the adversary whose assets would be under attrition from the air. The disquiet this generated in Pakistan has prompted the Army Chief to lower the profile of Cold Start.

It is at this juncture that 'Transformation' comes into the picture.

The first question is 'why?' The Army HQ gets so involved with the business of running the war or posturing, that it risks losing sight of the bigger picture. Having intervening HQs to manage operational level offensives would allow it to take the strategic view. The latter is particularly important in the nuclear backdrop and in the absence of a CDS. This intervening HQ will free the Army HQ for inter-theatre issues, central logistics, monitoring, advice and support etc, since it is impossible to micro manage a war from the Military Operations room. The ex-Army Chief General V.P. Malik, speaking from his Kargil war experience, underlines the necessity of a wide angled view for the higher HQs thus:

'Continuous control of the escalatory ladder requires much closer political oversight and politico-civil-military interaction. It is, therefore, essential to keep the military leadership within the security and strategic decision-making loop and having a direct politico-military interface.'

The next question logically is 'so what?' This change implies that India has the capability of undertaking deep operations. This may seem anachronistic in the nuclear age. However, the change is not so much for deployment as much as for bolstering the conventional deterrent with an escalation dominance capability. General Malik writes, 'Capability to wage a successful conventional and nuclear war is a necessary deterrent. A war may well remain limited because of a credible deterrence or 'escalation dominance' (which means that one side has overwhelming military superiority at every level of violence).'

This ability is necessary to enable the political decision maker to have confidence in military means. This is better illustrated by General Malik's observation that 'Militarily, the greatest challenge could be in the political reluctance to commit to a pro-active engagement"¦' While political prudence is essential in the nuclear era, it is for a professional military to serve up military options. These have of course to be in cognizance with the nuclear dimension. A counter argument that can be anticipated is that reconfiguring the offensive forces away from gigantic strike forces may be a better way of acknowledging this.

In terms of 'jointness', the strategic command can serve as a precursor to a joint offensive command. Once the CDS is in place at an indeterminate future, the offensives of the pivot corps could be controlled by the Army HQs and those of the strategic command by HQ IDS for better integration with air power and the evolving nuclear scenario. For the initiative to be practical, the command headquarters should instead be an army group headquarter and led by a Colonel-General given the vast ambit of its responsibility.

This makeover indicates that interesting times are in store for the military over the next decade.

The commentary has benefited from the critical inputs given by Brig. (Retd.) Rumel Dahiya.

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ArmyTransformationARadicalOne_aahmed_170111

 

[Ray]

So long as the political leadership lacks the will, this is merely an utopian dream for execution.

The Cold Start was not a BJP issue.

It was formulated by Gen Bipn Joshi, as per the Gen Oberoi and was rejected by the bureaucracy; and then resurrected after the impotence to be credible was displayed in Op Parikrama as the strategic surprise was lost.

The issue is simple. It is not how many command one has or who heads it. What is the crux, is that there has to be a centralised authority to muster all the armed forces to execute a single plan and not the current oneupmanship and territorial turf wars and egos and all will fall in place.

Have that, and all will be in place.

 

[Singh]

So long as the political leadership lacks the will, this is merely an utopian dream for execution.

The Cold Start was not a BJP issue.

It was formulated by Gen Bipn Joshi, as per the Gen Oberoi and was rejected by the bureaucracy; and then resurrected after the impotence to be credible was displayed in Op Parikrama as the strategic surprise was lost.

The issue is simple. It is not how many command one has or who heads it. What is the crux, is that there has to be a centralised authority to muster all the armed forces to execute a single plan and not the current oneupmanship and territorial turf wars and egos and all will fall in place.

Have that, and all will be in place.

Sir, did you notice how Pak raises a hue and cry about Cold Start yet that didn't deter them from 26/11 ?

 

[p2prada]

Sir, did you notice how Pak raises a hue and cry about Cold Start yet that didn't deter them from 26/11 ?

They used our own cold start principles against us. Cold Start would be a big deal once started, but causes very little damage for the enemy to resort to nuclear strikes.

26/11 wasn't as big as the 9/11 attacks, but definitely sent a message as strong as 9/11. So, that way war was avoided in the long run.

Ray sir. What are your opinions on a tri-services command? Is it feasible for us to implement such a structure. Any disadvantages to it?

 

[Anshu Attri]

After Pakistan missile test, India flexes muscle

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/After-Pakistan-missile-test-India-flexes-muscle/articleshow/8031113.cms

NEW DELHI: Diplomatic re-engagement may have begun afresh but both sides are keeping their powder dry. The 1.13-million strong Indian Army is honing its war-fighting machinery with a major combat exercise, codenamed "Vijayee Bhava'' (Be Victorious), in the Thar desert to practice "high tempo'' operations to cut across the border.

Squeamish for long with India's "pro-active conventional war strategy'', or what is colloquially dubbed the "cold start'' doctrine, Pakistan in turn test-fired a new nuclear-capable ballistic missile Hatf-IX on Tuesday.

Given that Hatf-IX has a strike range of only 60 km, it is clearly intended for brandishing as a "battlefield nuclear weapon'' to deter Indian armoured forces from launching rapid thrusts into its territory.

"Pakistan already has the long and medium range Shaheen and Ghauri series of missiles, acquired with help of China and North Korea, to act as the delivery mechanism for strategic nuclear weapons,'' said a senior Indian official.

"So, with this new missile, Islamabad seems to be looking at tactical nuclear deterrence against advancing enemy formations. But it is being foolhardy if it thinks nuclear weapons are war-fighting weapons,'' he added.

India, of course, has its own nuclear and missile plans. It may be steadfast about adhering to a "no first-use'' of nuclear weapons but has made it amply clear that a nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be "massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage''.

The "Vijayee Bhava'' exercise, of course, is more conventional in nature, even though the combat manoeuvres may be simulated under "a NBC (nuclear, chemical, biological) overhang''.

The exercise, which will enter its peak phase in early-May, is being primarily conducted by the armoured corps-intensive 2 Corps, considered to be the most crucial of Army's three principal "strike'' formations tasked with virtually cutting Pakistan into two during a full-fledged war, said sources.

Incidentally, the 2 Corps based in Ambala is aptly called the `Kharga Corps', taking its name and formation sign from the deadly scythe wielded by Goddess Kali to vanquish enemies.

"In 2009, the 2 Corps had conducted the `Hind Shakti' exercise to fine-tune the pro-active strategy, which is all about mobilizing fast and hitting hard at several border points to catch the enemy unawares and gain momentum,'' said a source.

"The `Vijayee Bhava' exercise, which will also include elements from other Western Army Command (WAC) formations like the Jalandhar-based 11 Corps, will further validate operational concepts,'' he added.

With hundreds of tanks, artillery guns and over 30,000 soldiers, the exercise geared for "network-centric operations'' will see the extensive use of satellite imagery, helicopter-borne surveillance systems, spy drones and a wide array of land-based radars to "achieve battlefield transparency''.

As reported by TOI earlier, after Operation Parakram in 2002 took almost a month to reach D-Day readiness, India has reorganized Army formations all along the western front to enable a more swift and powerful offensive punch.

It was under this overall plan that the South-Western Command (SWAC) was created at Jaipur in 2005 as the Army's sixth operational command. With the Mathura-based 1 `Strike' Corps and Bhatinda-based 10 `Pivot' Corps under it, SWAC is responsible for offensive operations on the western front in conjunction with the Western Army Command (Chandimandir), which controls the 2 `Strike' Corps.

The Northern and Southern Army Commands, with the latter having the Bhopal-based 21 `Strike' Corps, at Udhampur and Pune respectively, will of course also play a crucial part in the event of a war but it will be SWAC and WAC which will assume the pivotal roles.

Moreover, both the western and southwestern commands of IAF have also stepped up coordination with the different Army commands in the western theatre to synergize efforts to build "an integrated and organic'' air-land war-fighting machinery.

 

[karna]

Why don't India try to develop and test tactical nuclear delivery systems? Of course it will be an easy task for our scientists.

 

[Tronic]

How powerful are Pakistani nukes anyways? I doubt they could fully destroy a modern Indian metro city.

 

[debasree]

we do not have the capabillity to implement the cold start doctrine,we have to aquire more hardware most modern communication equipments and abolish the infantry battalion and make themselves mechanised,and go for more airboorn troops and air assets then we can think about it,cold start concept is based on limited and swift war like jerman blitz where u paralise urs enemys comand bypassing majore or prolonged battlethe situation demands quick deceision our pollitical deceission makers are lacking this quality.so in the current situation im very very sceptical about the whole thing.

 

[gogbot]

How powerful are Pakistani nukes anyways? I doubt they could fully destroy a modern Indian metro city.

Doesn't matter the resulting radiation fallout would leave the city and surrounding area un-inhabitable for hundreds of years.

And to answer your question , not very powerful , they have yet to demonstrate Fusion Bombs and rely entirely on fission device , as a result their maximum yield is something like 50 kt .

Our bombs are based on a Fusion reaction(H bombs) , and current speculation is that we use 200kt yield devices ,
IF we continued development and testing , we would naturally achieve the 1-5 mt yields of western warheads

But With sophisticated guidance systems 200kt is good enough.

 

[ace009]

indian army is gud and i like it and i want to take a part in indian army,the army soldiers are very braveful persons and they protect our life and make our life is relaxful and cool.
Electronic Cigarette

Who is this guy and what the hell is he talking about? What's with the electronic Cig thing? Adbot?

 

[black eagle]

indian army is gud and i like it and i want to take a part in indian army,the army soldiers are very braveful persons and they protect our life and make our life is relaxful and cool.
Electronic Cigarette

Good lord!!!! what language is that??!!!! Relaxful & cool.... What the cigarette is doing here???

 

[ace009]

I think it is either an adbot spewing electronic cig advts or some chinese guy trying to sell a few of cheap products ... He should be banned. :-D

 

[nitesh]

Indian cold start nuked by Pakistan?

 

[ace009]

I don't know if anyone has posted this already - but I found it rather informative as well as amusing!
IntelliBriefs: Comparison of military power, Pak-India

800-1000 combat air craft, which operate from sixty air bases, including Farkhor airbase in Tajikistan.. Six hundred IAF's strike and air defense fighters are expected to be operational.

Is this true? Farkhor airbase? Isn't that what India proposed, but got shot down by Russia?

 

[Yusuf]

I don't know if anyone has posted this already - but I found it rather informative as well as amusing!
IntelliBriefs: Comparison of military power, Pak-India



Is this true? Farkhor airbase? Isn't that what India proposed, but got shot down by Russia?

There is no air base of the IAF outside India.