neo29
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Most of the countries across the globe, big and small, have created the post of Chief of Defense Staff (CDS), who acts as single point military adviser to the government on military strategy, doctrines, and their requirements and in nuclear powered countries the CDS advises the head of state on nuclear doctrines and its use. The CDS also brings in synergy between the various branches of the armed forces which is crucial to win a war in the
changing geo-political scenario. But 60 years after Independence, India that has the second largest standing army, fourth largest air force and fifth largest navy strangely lacks it.
Particularly in India's context, as the country evolves as a strong economic and military power and as our nuclear arsenal and doctrine evolves, a CDS is must to take swift decisions on the use of the military or in the event of a retaliatory nuclear strike (we have committed to a no-first-strike).
In India the armed forces, the ones who fight on the field, are totally out of the loop in decision making and policy discussions due to perpetual fear of the Indian politicians that handing more power to the military would be counterproductive (so called fear of military becoming too powerful). Even during the Phokran tests in 1998, the military was informed just before the detonation that too just in case Pakistan resorts to any misadventures on the border and the military was taken by surprise when India disclosed that it has Chemical weapons.
The lack of a CDS has been felt during all the wars and even during peace times particularly during the 1962 with China where we faced a humiliating defeat. It was well known fact at that time that we had a better air force than the Chinese, but it was never called in due to the fear of expanding the conflict.
Well, had the air force been employed we would have read history in a different way. Fortunately, during the 1971 war for the liberation of Bangladesh, Field Marshal 'Sam Bahadur' Manekshaw donned that role and was steadfast in his assessment that we had to wait till December to strike and resisted the pressure from the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to move into East Pakistan which was to later become Bangladesh.
We all know the course of history in which 93,000 Pakistani soldiers surrendered and the largest such instance after World War II and is a case study on military strategy in military schools across the globe. But in the 1999 Kargil conflict the story is back to square one with lack of coordination within the services delaying a quick response. The Indian Army requested the Air Force for air strikes on the high altitude mountains where Pakistani forces have entrenched, but the Air Force asked the army to get the nod from the government. That took a fortnight and by then the causalities mounted on our side. That shows the sad
state of affairs and gives a glimpse at the level of coordination between the services.
In the India armed forces, each service feels that it alone can win battles and it alone has the primary role in national defense. There is an urgent need to address this. With Pakistan going nuclear, a long protracted conventional battle is ruled out as any major issue would attract international attention and the "International Community" would step in with diplomatic pressure on the government.
Hence, the room for action is very limited and for this, there is need for a greater synergy between the forces and mounting a swift and coordinating response is the order of the day to make tactical gains by launching punitive strikes across the border but not big enough to initiate a nuclear standoff. The CDS can bridge the services and give a fillip to this need. The need for a CDS has been long acknowledged but that remains there.
Both the Kargil Review Committee and the subsequent GOM (Group of Ministers) report in 2001 on reforming the national security system during the NDA government had stressed the need for a CDS to provide single-point military advice to the government and manage the country's nuclear arsenal. Though the political establishment agrees to the need, there has been no concerted effort by successive governments in this direction.
The lackadaisical approach is only complicating things with India rapidly modernizing its military spending tens of billions of dollars and the raising strategic profile of the country in the region and the world at large. What we need is better synergy between the services in terms of strategy and on the field, evolving doctrine and so on. Presently, there is a post called the Chief of Staff Committee (COSC) rotated among the three services but doesn't have any power over the others which is not of much help.
The Indian CDS should be a four or a five star general above the rank of the three service chiefs with power over them but at the same time does not interfere and undermine them. He should head the tri-service strategic Andaman Nicobar command and look after the strategic forces command and all issues related to Indian nuclear doctrine and also issues of procurement and evolving strategy in consultation with the service chiefs and with the
government. The three service chiefs meanwhile can concentrate on their individual service and to keep it battle ready.
It's high time for Indian political establishment to brush aside the unwanted fears and address the issue with utmost priority as the country assumes a prominent role and a powerful voice on the world stage.
idrw.org security magazine Dec issue
changing geo-political scenario. But 60 years after Independence, India that has the second largest standing army, fourth largest air force and fifth largest navy strangely lacks it.
Particularly in India's context, as the country evolves as a strong economic and military power and as our nuclear arsenal and doctrine evolves, a CDS is must to take swift decisions on the use of the military or in the event of a retaliatory nuclear strike (we have committed to a no-first-strike).
In India the armed forces, the ones who fight on the field, are totally out of the loop in decision making and policy discussions due to perpetual fear of the Indian politicians that handing more power to the military would be counterproductive (so called fear of military becoming too powerful). Even during the Phokran tests in 1998, the military was informed just before the detonation that too just in case Pakistan resorts to any misadventures on the border and the military was taken by surprise when India disclosed that it has Chemical weapons.
The lack of a CDS has been felt during all the wars and even during peace times particularly during the 1962 with China where we faced a humiliating defeat. It was well known fact at that time that we had a better air force than the Chinese, but it was never called in due to the fear of expanding the conflict.
Well, had the air force been employed we would have read history in a different way. Fortunately, during the 1971 war for the liberation of Bangladesh, Field Marshal 'Sam Bahadur' Manekshaw donned that role and was steadfast in his assessment that we had to wait till December to strike and resisted the pressure from the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to move into East Pakistan which was to later become Bangladesh.
We all know the course of history in which 93,000 Pakistani soldiers surrendered and the largest such instance after World War II and is a case study on military strategy in military schools across the globe. But in the 1999 Kargil conflict the story is back to square one with lack of coordination within the services delaying a quick response. The Indian Army requested the Air Force for air strikes on the high altitude mountains where Pakistani forces have entrenched, but the Air Force asked the army to get the nod from the government. That took a fortnight and by then the causalities mounted on our side. That shows the sad
state of affairs and gives a glimpse at the level of coordination between the services.
In the India armed forces, each service feels that it alone can win battles and it alone has the primary role in national defense. There is an urgent need to address this. With Pakistan going nuclear, a long protracted conventional battle is ruled out as any major issue would attract international attention and the "International Community" would step in with diplomatic pressure on the government.
Hence, the room for action is very limited and for this, there is need for a greater synergy between the forces and mounting a swift and coordinating response is the order of the day to make tactical gains by launching punitive strikes across the border but not big enough to initiate a nuclear standoff. The CDS can bridge the services and give a fillip to this need. The need for a CDS has been long acknowledged but that remains there.
Both the Kargil Review Committee and the subsequent GOM (Group of Ministers) report in 2001 on reforming the national security system during the NDA government had stressed the need for a CDS to provide single-point military advice to the government and manage the country's nuclear arsenal. Though the political establishment agrees to the need, there has been no concerted effort by successive governments in this direction.
The lackadaisical approach is only complicating things with India rapidly modernizing its military spending tens of billions of dollars and the raising strategic profile of the country in the region and the world at large. What we need is better synergy between the services in terms of strategy and on the field, evolving doctrine and so on. Presently, there is a post called the Chief of Staff Committee (COSC) rotated among the three services but doesn't have any power over the others which is not of much help.
The Indian CDS should be a four or a five star general above the rank of the three service chiefs with power over them but at the same time does not interfere and undermine them. He should head the tri-service strategic Andaman Nicobar command and look after the strategic forces command and all issues related to Indian nuclear doctrine and also issues of procurement and evolving strategy in consultation with the service chiefs and with the
government. The three service chiefs meanwhile can concentrate on their individual service and to keep it battle ready.
It's high time for Indian political establishment to brush aside the unwanted fears and address the issue with utmost priority as the country assumes a prominent role and a powerful voice on the world stage.
idrw.org security magazine Dec issue