Anti-Radiation Missiles vs. Radars

[asianobserve]

Okay, i now found the citations to the dual mode passive radar/IR seeker on ARMIGER, it's called "ARAS" developed by Diehl BGT Defence.

The ARMIGER is roughly the same weight as the HARM. The ARMIGER will have a GPS/IMU, as would the AGM-88D, to overcome the ARM problem when the emitter shuts down. In addition to the GPS/IMU the ARMIGER will have a new technology passive radar/high-resolution imaging infrared red dual-mode seeker (called ARAS). xxx

https://books.google.com.ph/books?id=K_T4M-nA6JYC&pg=PA600&lpg=PA600&dq=aras+dual+mode+seeker&source=bl&ots=uREALvq9ZC&sig=xGsqoQtGEFyVn5RYfDGlji2oYnQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj5w9aUvoPZAhUMNbwKHcWqA-gQ6AEIKDAA#v=onepage&q=aras dual mode seeker&f=false

BGT carried out captive carry trials of its ARAS dual-mode seeker in 1997, with additional trials also planned for 1998.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/three-nations-study-anti-radiation-missile-35891/

So you're wrong again. The dual-mode seeker on ARMIGER was not developed by Dassault Electronique, it was purely a German effort.

 

[Armand2REP]

Re Luftawffe's selection of AARGM as its HARM replacement, read this article:

http://www.defence24.com/aargm-miss...nato-rebuilds-its-anti-radiation-capabilities

A modification kit for missiles with a limited shelf life on an aircraft to be retired in the near future is not exactly a replacement. It is more like a short-term stopgap.

 

[asianobserve]

A modification kit for missiles with a limited shelf life on an aircraft to be retired in the near future is not exactly a replacement. It is more like a short-term stopgap.

ARMIGER is already cancelled and is not going back after the Germans got burned with very high expense of developing an advanced ARM. So the only viable solution for the Germans is to acquire AARGM if it wants to continue having an ARM capability.

Germany will not induct a lot of ARM into its fleet. This is a specialized weapon so unless somehow Germany can make France or other European countries join in its ARMIGER follow-up program then it cannot develop an ARM by itself and will have to rely on American AARGM.

 

[Armand2REP]

ARMIGER is already cancelled and is not going back after the Germans got burned with very high expense of developing an advanced ARM. So the only viable solution for the Germans is to acquire AARGM if it wants to continue having an ARM capability.

Once it is done with the Tornado it is not going to have an ARM capability. There are no plans to integrate AARGM on the Eurofighter.

Germany will not induct a lot of ARM into its fleet. This is a specialized weapon so unless somehow Germany can make France or other European countries join in its ARMIGER follow-up program then it cannot develop an ARM by itself and will have to rely on American AARGM.

There is not going to be a follow-up programme. ARMs are obsolete in the age of AESA. We will give access of CERES to our European allies and they can use our new Smartglider family of stand-off weapons designed to take out the whole range of targets.

 

[asianobserve]

There is not going to be a follow-up programme. ARMs are obsolete in the age of AESA. We will give access of CERES to our European allies and they can use our new Smartglider family of stand-off weapons designed to take out the whole range of targets.

You keep on repeating this claim as if it's a mantra. ARM will be important in SEAD as long as there are radars. But because ARM are very expensive and highly specialized weapons (only few are needed) so only very few countries will induct them. For the rest who cannot afford them they will naturally fall back on to what they already have (multi-role weapons) like smart bombs and cruise missiles, all inferior to ARMs in SEAD role.

 

[asianobserve]

Germany will replace its Tornados with new platform (F-35 or EF) but will most likely retain SEAD capabilities. And if German politicians get their way and make Luftwaffe chose the EF then they will need the AARGM-ER under development since the unstealthy EF will have a hard time conducting SEAD against modern Chinese or Russian SAMs.

 

[asianobserve]

BTW, the German MOD is considering the option of integrating AARGM with the EF. Certainly, if the EF is chosen to replace Tornado then we'll definitely see the integration of AARGM into it.

 

[asianobserve]

Interestingly, in 2014 the NATO alliance agreed in Wales that by 2025 50% of NATO SEAD capabilities will be handled by Europeans. And one of the cornerstone of NATO SEAD is ARM.

So ARM is not going away in Europe. Meteor is even proposed to be modified to take on an ARM role.

https://armadainternational.com/2017/08/the-need-for-sead/

 

[asianobserve]

Another takeway from the above-mentioned Armada article is that NATO EW in SEAD environment will use more artificial intelligence (AI) to keep up with advances in adversary radar tech. But the primary SEAD approach will still be airborne platforms.

 

[Armand2REP]

You keep on repeating this claim as if it's a mantra. ARM will be important in SEAD as long as there are radars. But because ARM are very expensive and highly specialized weapons (only few are needed) so only very few countries will induct them. For the rest who cannot afford them they will naturally fall back on to what they already have (multi-role weapons) like smart bombs and cruise missiles, all inferior to ARMs in SEAD role.

I keep repeating a fact because it is a fact. An anti-radiation missile does not have a seeker sensitive enough to detect and intercept an AESA radar at stand-off ranges. The payload big enough to do that would have to go on nothing smaller than an MQ-9. At that point it becomes useless to have an anti-radiation seeker because the aircraft conducting the mission is the only thing big enough to have the sensors for targeting. With sensor fusion and data links, the anti-radiation seeker serves no purpose against a radar it cannot detect until it is almost on top of it.

 

[The Ultranationalist]

Anti radiation missile fascinate me the most as thery are going to be instrumental in taking out porki air defense system and then our flyboys will take care of the so called momin airforce with antique warplanes. But first we need our home grown anti radiation missiles fully opertional and matured.

 

[asianobserve]

It seems that the Israeli Air Force has been poking the integrated Syrian-Russian Air Defense system in Syria:

Israeli Military Exposes Vulnerabilities in Joint Russian-Syrian Air Defense
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 14 Issue: 135
By: Roger McDermott
October 24, 2017

On October 16, the Israeli Air Force launched a precision attack, in the Damascus area, against a Russian-supplied S-200 air-defense battery under the control of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). The aerial raid was conducted partly in response to a March incident involving its aircraft being targeted by air-defense assets in Syria (Gazeta, October 16). The Israeli operation, reportedly successful, was met with a muted response in both Russian and Syrian media, perhaps linked to the attack coinciding with the bilateral meeting, in Tel Aviv, of Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and his Israeli counterpart, Avigdor Lieberman (see EDM, October 17). Indeed, the coverage and rhetoric in response to the attack on the S-200 battery contrasted sharply with reporting on earlier incidents involving the Israeli Air Force operating in Syria (Riafan.ru, October 16).

Most Russian media preferred to focus on the bilateral meeting between Shoigu and Lieberman and their respective delegations, making clear that Moscow is seeking to end its operations in Syria—though it does not intend to withdraw its forces from this Middle Eastern country. The Russian Aerospace Forces (Vozdushno Kosmicheskikh Sil—VKS) commenced operations in Syria in September 2015, in support of the Bashar al-Assad regime and allegedly focused on countering terrorist groups in Syria, including the Islamic State. But from the onset, Russia’s force-protection efforts were stepped up and reinforced by the creation of a series of “air-defense bubbles,” with deployment of strategic and tactical assets ranging from the S-400 to the Pantsir-S1. These air-defense systems were intended to fulfil a number of functions, from protecting Russian bases to sending strategic signals to other actors about the need for de-confliction and caution due to the VKS operations. During the process of building the air-defense network, Moscow also entered an agreement with Damascus to form a joint Russian-Syrian air defense (Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, May 10, 2016).

A de-confliction agreement between Israel and Russia has reportedly functioned well. Though, in recent months, the Israeli military has launched targeted attacks in Syria and has frequently conducted reconnaissance flights using Lebanese air space. In March 2017, while carrying out routine aerial reconnaissance from Lebanon, an Israeli Air Force platform was fired on from a battery of S-200 surface-to-air missiles (SAM). In the aftermath, both sides traded threats. Finally, on October 16, the Israeli Air Force took action against a Syrian SAM system, located 50 kilometers east of Damascus, though it honored the de-confliction agreement with Moscow and provided warning to the Russian military of the unfolding operation (Krasnaya Vesna, October 16).

Pavel Ivanov assessed the incident and its implications in a detailed article in Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, noting that the result of the operation remains unclear, with Damascus claiming only partial damage was inflicted. First, Ivanov noted some of the key features of the Israeli attack. The Israeli Air Force deployed advanced versions of the F-35. An undisclosed number of F-15Is or F-16Is were used as well, though it is not clear if they launched cruise missiles to strike the target or GPS-guided bombs. Other reports allege the SAA SAM system fired on Israeli jets first (Wynetnews.com, October 16). The warning given to the Russian side was described as occurring in “real time,” suggesting it was close enough to the actual attack not to allow any room for interference or assistance to the SAA (Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, October, 24).

As Ivanov observes, Israel’s real security interests in Syria lie in concern about chemical weapons, countering Hezbollah and monitoring the rise of Iranian influence. To date, Israeli attacks within Syria have proved to be targeted, carefully avoiding the risk of escalation and paying close attention to Russia’s ongoing operations in the country. However, Ivanov raised some concerns, similar to ones that were aired in the aftermath of the United States’ cruise missile strike on al-Shayrat in April 2017. Specifically, Ivanov scrutinized the real value of Russian air-defense systems and the much-publicized air-defense bubbles in Syria. He identified that the SAA fields Buk-M2Es and the Pantsir-S1s among other systems. Ivanov highlighted the importance of identifying the missile or bomb type used in the Israeli attack to try to evaluate whether these air-defense systems might have had a role to play. The S-200, Buk-M2E or Pantsir-S1 certainly did not prevent the attack; but if the ordnance was a cruise missile, then in theory the Pantsir-S1 could have proved effective. Ivanov concludes that the SAA forces are to blame due to “poor training” standards. He also raises the possibility that the S-200 battery was not the intended target, but that the Israeli Air Force sought to take out a new asset in the hands of Hezbollah (Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, October, 24).

A number of issues undermine Ivanov’s analysis and may mask deeper vulnerabilities of Russian air-defense assets in Syria. First of all, blaming the SAA for “poor training” is odd in the sense that the Russian military, with the use of numerous “advisors,” has been actively training the SAA over the past two years—presumably also in the use of Russian-designed and -supplied air-defense systems. Moreover, the Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer author makes no mention of the joint air-defense agreement between Damascus and Moscow, or the fact that Russian VKS operations are mostly intended to aid the al-Assad regime: allowing a foreign power to degrade SAA air defense assets close to the Syrian capital surely represents questionable support. Of course, there may be other factors involved that are not public and that disposed Moscow to effectively turn a blind eye to the incident (Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, October, 24; Riafan.ru, October 16).

The Israeli action in the area around Damascus on October 16 has apparently not damaged relations with Russia. It has, however, served to again (see EDM, April 10, 11) raise questions about some Russian air-defense assets in the SAA. The Israeli military has proved cautious about undertaking operations in Syria. When engaging targets, it appears to take steps to avoid damage to Russian forces: its air force either circumvents Russia’s air defense bubbles, or simply flies through them. Targeting an SAA-controlled S-200 battery is by no means a game changer, and may have been calculated to send a message to Damascus that the Israeli Air Force is free to act when necessary in Syria and with force protection. Nonetheless, Moscow’s relative silence on the incident is interesting in itself.

https://jamestown.org/program/israe...erabilities-joint-russian-syrian-air-defense/

 

[asianobserve]

Then there is this assessment from Israeli Debka publication on the same Oct. 16 raid:

Why Russian-made air-defense missiles miss Israel Air Force raiders

In the last fortnight, missiles fired by Syria’s Russian-made air defense systems twice missed hitting Israeli air force planes – the first time on Oct. 16, when Israeli planes flew over Lebanon, and the second time on Wednesday, Nov. 1, when Israeli jets were reported to have struck Syrian military targets near Homs.

These incidents gave Western and Russian military experts their first glimpse of some of the aerial tactics employed by Israel, and also some of the operational flaws inherent in the Russian-Syrian air defense network spread out across Syria.

That network works on the “air defense bubbles” method, which is called in professional parlance “anti-access/area-denial-A2/AD exclusion zones.” It is composed of anti-air missiles systems designed to hit flying objects at a wide range of altitudes and distances, and is supported by two tiers of ground-to-ground and shore-to-sea missiles. The entire set-up is backed by ship-to-air missiles installed on Russian warships cruising nearby.

The “bubble” is equipped with long-range surveillance radar, which gathers data and beams it to the stationary or mobile command center, which then selects the appropriate missile battery for downing or intercepting hostile aircraft or missiles. Available too is “engagement radar,” which guides the missile on its way to target.

A variety of advanced Russian air defense systems have been installed in Syria. Among them are the Pantsir-S1 or Buk-M2E, the S-400, S-300 and S-200. Integrated in the bubble of advanced weapons are 6 Syrian battalions which include ageing Russian-made SA-2 and SA-5.

The Russians operate the network from an air defense command at their air base at Khmeimim in Latakia, together with the joint command they have set up with Syria.
Russian sources claim that the Israeli Air Force, for its Oct. 16 flight in Lebanese skies, lofted different types of fighter-bombers, including the new F-35 stealth plane and a number of F-16 andF-15 jets. After an Syrian SA-5 battery east of Damascus shot missiles at those planes and missed, Israel conducted a separate air raid to destroy the battery. Western experts say the Russians are not certain whether they used cruise missiles or GPS-guided bombs. The Russians say their command center heard of the Israeli air strike after it had started, too late to activate an anti-air missile.

What the Russian argument reveals is that its three-tier air defense system can respond to attacks from planes and missiles approaching Syria, but not when missiles or guided bombs are aimed at Syrian targets from outside its borders, such as over Lebanon or the Mediterranean. The Israeli Air Force is using this flaw to bomb targets in Syria without being exposed to the risk of being shot down or intercepted by Russian air defense batteries.

The Russian and Syrian systems were unified under a joint command after a massive US Tomahawk cruise missile attack on Syria’s air base at Shayrat on April 7. In the ensuing seven months, the unified command has discovered its inability to strike back at hostile aircraft flying just beyond Syrian airspace, which release their ordnance without warning.

The Russian system appears to lack the capacity to differentiate between the Israeli planes when they drop bombs or missiles or identity the types of ordinance used – both of which are essential data for determining which air defense systems are best suited to activate in response.

DEBKA’s military sources add: This may not be the only flaw in Russia’s air defenses; the Israeli Air Force may also be exploiting others. At the same time, the Israelis may possibly be allowed to get away with it thanks to a Russian decision to turn a blind eye to their maneuvers against Syria and Hizballah. If that is the case, Israel had better be prepared for them to change their minds at some point and use all the resources to put a stop to Israeli aerial incursions.

https://www.debka.com/russian-made-air-defense-missiles-miss-israel-air-force-raiders/

And that is just a minor anti-SAM operation by Israel. Imagine the full force of the anti-SAM assets of NATO being employed against Russian sourced SAM sites. Interestingly, NATO is watching and learning from Israeli testings of Russian integrated air defense system in Syria.

 

[asianobserve]

Anti radiation missile fascinate me the most as thery are going to be instrumental in taking out porki air defense system and then our flyboys will take care of the so called momin airforce with antique warplanes. But first we need our home grown anti radiation missiles fully opertional and matured.

It's good to have your own ARM as you can tailor it to your needs. The only drawback in developing it yourselves is the cost since the export market is very limited and even your own need for such missile will not be as much as ordinary A2A missiles, as the Germans has learned.

 

[Armand2REP]

@asianobserve You believe that ARM is the future of SEAD but not even the US believes that and are developing a missile very similar to the Smartglider concept of France.

The Gray Wolf program seeks to develop low-cost, subsonic cruise missiles that use open architectures and modular design to allow for rapid prototyping and spiral growth capabilities. The AFRL is developing the missiles to feature networked, collaborative behaviors (swarming) to address Integrated Air Defense (IAD) system threats around the world. The Gray Wolf missile design will allow for maximum mission flexibility.

"Lockheed Martin's concept for the Gray Wolf missile will be an affordable, counter-IAD missile that will operate efficiently in highly contested environments," said Hady Mourad, Advanced Missiles Program director for Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control.

https://news.lockheedmartin.com/201...llion-for-Networked-Affordable-Cruise-Missile

Smartglider

 

[asianobserve]

@asianobserve You believe that ARM is the future of SEAD but not even the US believes that and are developing a missile very similar to the Smartglider concept of France.

The Gray Wolf program seeks to develop low-cost, subsonic cruise missiles that use open architectures and modular design to allow for rapid prototyping and spiral growth capabilities. The AFRL is developing the missiles to feature networked, collaborative behaviors (swarming) to address Integrated Air Defense (IAD) system threats around the world. The Gray Wolf missile design will allow for maximum mission flexibility.

"Lockheed Martin's concept for the Gray Wolf missile will be an affordable, counter-IAD missile that will operate efficiently in highly contested environments," said Hady Mourad, Advanced Missiles Program director for Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control.

https://news.lockheedmartin.com/201...llion-for-Networked-Affordable-Cruise-Missile

Smartglider

ARM will always be the primary weapon for SEAD. But there will be other weapons for it as you mentioned which gives SEAD forces a wide latitude of options in going after advanced SAMs.

Regarding Graywolf project, welll it does not seem ato be copying from MBDA's Smart Glider program. The Graywolf program is an attempt to develop a cheap swarming anti radar system. The Smart Glider on the other hand is a stand-alone expensive smart munition.

Aside from ARRGM, the US has also fielded (operational) JASSM and the naval variant LRASM that can operate as Anti-SAM missiles. Just look at how the LRASM avoids pop-up AD bubbles while on autonomous cruise mode:

 

[asianobserve]

USN just successfully tested the next generation anti radiation missile, AARGM-ER...

First Live-Fire Test Of The Navy's New Long-Range Anti-Radiation Missile Was A Success

The Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-Extended Range is moving closer towards deployment as a formidable and versatile air-to-surface weapon.

www.thedrive.com