1971 Indo-Pak War and foreign involvement

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I have one question for someone more informed. When were the secret Kissinger trip to China and Regan's overtures towards the Chinese revealed? I assume that during the war itself, the American public (or the general public, for that matter) didn't know about that.
The Kissenger trip to China was a purely strategic trip. The trip was to divide Russia and China to prevent them both from forming a communist anti-Western alliance. The trip started an economic alliance with China that more or less pardoned China for annexation of Tibet, war with India, later a war with Vietnam, the economic alliance grew to make China richer, the alliance worked and Soviet Union collapsed.China became a Most favored nation trade status for USA. This guaranteed to make China an economic power and it brings us to the present time where Chinese nuclear proliferation has also been pardoned to Pakistan,n korea,Iran,syria and possibly Libya. It is only now US is starting to change their policy with the Chinese becoming a threat to USA and undermining US interests and voting against USA in UNSC on a regular basis, now USA is turning to India in hopes of containing the monster they created called China.
 
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for the same reason we should be very carefull when it comes to USA for defense euipment because as it is their forgin policy is very shaky ( they may remove their support anytime if they think its national interest is jeprody )
This is very true AJ much of the policy that was layed down by Bush in India-USA strategic partnership in the nuclear deal has been rejected by Obama specifically the reprocessing point, another point of the Bush deal made India an NPT exception now Obama wants India to sign NPT. These are two examples of what can happen in a written agreement when an administration changes, as far as weapon purchases goes we have not really bought any strategic weapons yet from USA and maybe should not especially with Obama's policy, denying parts or sanctions can make expensive weapons useless.
 
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Well only one thing to say NO PERMANENT ALLIES ONLY PERMANENT INTERESTS.This is what they have been following for centuries,and this very reason is the success of that country.It doesn't matter we like it or not they are calling the shots now.

Hope we in the lights of newly found friends, doesn't get far away from our true allies.
This is true Arun, but have we reached a point where we can be claimed to be a US ally?? We have no agreements or pacts that state this in writing except some small logistic agreements, there can be unwriitten or secret agreements that have not been made public especially after all the India/US naval exercises that take place but I have not seen anything formalized yet.
 
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http://www.mesotheliomanews.com/asb...ards/aircraft-carriers/uss-enterprise-cvn-65/

USS Enterprise (CVN-65)


The USS Enterprise (CVN-65), nicknamed “The Big E” like her predecessor from World War II, was ordered for the U.S. Navy on November 15, 1957. Her keel was laid down at Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company in Virginia on February 4, 1958. She was launched on September 24, 1960 and commissioned on November 25, 1961 under the command of Captain Vincent P. de Poix.

USS Enterprise was the world’s first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. She remains the world’s longest naval vessel and the oldest active vessel in the U.S. Navy still under commission as of 2009, with the exception of the ceremonial commissioning of the USS Constitution.

The USS Enterprise spent her early career involved in testing and training exercises. She served as the tracking and measuring station for John Glenn’s Project Mercury space flight in February 1962. Later that year in August, she sailed to the Mediterranean with the Sixth Fleet, returning home to Norfolk, Virginia in October.

Shortly after her return, the USS Enterprise was ordered to Cuba. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, President John F. Kennedy ordered the aircraft carriers USS Enterprise, USS Independence, USS Essex and USS Randolph to support the blockade against Cuba. The crisis was averted by October 28, 1962.

The following years would see more testing and training for the USS Enterprise. She was deployed to the Mediterranean several times, including participation in Operation Sea Orbit, the U.S. Navy’s all-nuclearpowered unit that sailed around the world. She headed to Newport News, Virginia for overhaul and refueling in October 1964.

USS Enterprise was transferred to the Pacific Seventh Fleet in November 1965. The following month, she was launched her aircraft against the Viet Cong at Bien Hoa, the first nuclear-powered ship to engage in combat. She launched 125 sorties on December 2 before setting a record of 165 strike sorties in one day on December 3.

When North Korean forces captured the USS Pueblo in January 1968, the USS Enterprise was ordered into South Korean waters for nearly a month. On January 14, 1969, one of the carrier’s MK-32 Zuni rocket warheads overheated and detonated, setting off a series of fires and other explosions. Although the fire was brought under control quickly, 27 men were killed, 314 others were injured and 15 aircraft were destroyed. She headed to Pearl Harbor for repairs, returning to the Gulf of Tonkin in March.

North Korea shot down an unarmed EC-121 Constellation on April 14, 1969, killing its entire 31-man crew, and USS Enterprise joined Task Force 71 to protect flights over the East Korea Sea. She returned to Newport News for refitting and overhaul later that year, including newly designed reactor cores that would power her for the next 10 years.

The USS Enterprise headed back to Vietnam in early 1971. She rode out three typhoons in July before resuming strikes against North Vietnamese targets and support of American helicopter operations. The carrier operated out of Yankee Station from August to November 1971.

In December, USS Enterprise headed to the Bay of Bengal during the Bangladesh Liberation War. She returned to Yankee Station in May 1972, where she remained during the halt on bombing above the 20th parallel in North Vietnam.

When the United States resumed bombing on December 18, 1972, the USS Enterprise participated in Operation Linebacker II, conducting air strikes and reseeding minefields in Haiphong Harbor. The Vietnamese cease-fire was announced in January 1973, and her aircraft flew their combat sorties over Laos.

USS Enterprise headed back to Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Washington for refitting after the cease-fire. She was now able to support the new F-14 Tomcat aircraft. She became the first aircraft carrier to deploy the F-14s when she was sent to the western Pacific in September 1974.

Typhoon Gervaise struck Mauritius in February 1975. The USS Enterprise headed there for disaster relief. Her crew spent over 10,000 man-hours clearing roads and debris, restoring utilities and providing food, drinkable water, helicopter and medical support to the area.

The USS Enterprise returned to Vietnam in April 1975 as part of Operation Frequent Wind. The North Vietnamese had violated the Paris Peace Accords by invading South Vietnam. Operation Frequent Wind helped evacuate American citizens from Saigon before it fell to the North Vietnamese.

In February 1977, USS Enterprise was ordered to the east African coast when American citizens were taken hostage in Uganda. She and several other ships remained there for a week in preparation for a possible rescue mission, but the hostages were eventually released.

USS Enterprise went in to Washington’s Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in January 1979 for a comprehensive 30-month overhaul. Several years later in April 1983, she ran aground on a sand bar in San Francisco Bay. At the time, she was hosting special guest George Takei, who played Mr. Sulu on the fictional starship USS Enterprise from the television series Star Trek.

The USS Enterprise became the first nuclear-powered carrier to travel the Suez Canal on April 28, 1986. She relieved the USS Coral Sea off the coast of Libya, her first time in the Mediterranean in over 22 years.

Operation Earnest Will began in April 1988, when the USS Enterprise helped escort reflagged oil tankers from Kuwait through the Persian Gulf. She then launched air strikes against Iranian targets as part of Operation Praying Mantis, which began when the USS Samuel B. Roberts hit an Iranian mine in international waters.

USS Enterprise took part in Operation Classic Resolve in December 1989 when President George H.W. Bush provided air support to Philippine President Corazon Aquino during attempted military coup. She remained outside Manila Bay until tensions resolved before heading to the Indian Ocean for her scheduled deployment.

The USS Enterprise finished her around-the-world deployment when she returned to Norfolk, Virginia in March 1990. She then moved on to Newport News for the largest complex overhaul refit the U.S. Navy ever attempted. She was extended from 1,101 feet to 1,123 feet in length and underwent other refits to extend her service life.

In June 1996, USS Enterprise headed out for her 15th deployment overseas. She helped enforce no-fly zones over Bosnia in Operation Joint Endeavor and over Iraq in Operation Southern Watch. She returned to Newport News in February 1997.

During night qualifications on November 8, 1998, an EA-6B crashed into an S-3 Viking on her flight deck. Crews from both aircraft ejected before the crash; three members of the Prowler crew were lost at sea, the remains of the fourth were recovered, and the two crewmen from the Viking were taken to the Naval Medical Center in Portsmouth, Virginia to treat their injuries.

Later that month, the USS Enterprise was visited by former President George H.W. Bush and the crew was treated to a live concert by Hootie and the Blowfish while on a port call in the Persian Gulf. Operation Desert Fox began the following month, when the carrier launched air strikes at Iraqi military targets.

The USS Enterprise launched air strikes against Al Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan for three weeks in October 2001 before returning home. She has supported Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, including the Summer Surge of 2004. She also has participated in testing and training exercises.

The USS Enterprise will remain in commission until 2012 or 2014, depending on the state of the fuel in her nuclear reactors
 

tarunraju

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Really, what a gutsy no-bs PM Mrs. Gandhi was. Maybe she was the last Indian PM to have monopoly over all the political power vested in the PM.
 
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Incredible Indians – Field Marshall Sam Manekshaw - Strat. In

Field Marshall Sam Manekshaw

Field Marshal Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedji Manekshaw is without a doubt the most admired and idolized of our Army Chiefs. He had a charismatic personality combined with a great sense of humor. It was impossible for anyone to not feel overawed in his presence. ‘Sam Bahadur’ as he is popularly known was the architect of India’s victory over Pakistan in 1971. Sam Manekshaw was the first of only two Indian military officers to hold the highest rank of Field Marshal in the Indian Army (the other being Field Marshal K M Cariappa).
Early Life and Education

Manekshaw was born in Amritsar, Punjab to Parsi parents who immigrated to the Punjab from the small town of Valsad on the Gujarat coast. After completing his schooling in Amritsar and Sherwood College (Nainital), he joined the first batch of 40 cadets at the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun on 1 October 1932. He passed out of the IMA in December 1934 and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the Indian Army.

Military Career Achievements

Manekshaw’s military career spanned four decades, from the British era and World War II, to the three wars against China and Pakistan after India’s independence in 1947. During World War II, he was leading a counter-offensive against the invading Japanese Army in Burma. During the course of the offensive he was hit by a burst of LMG bullets and was severely wounded in the stomach. Assuming he would die, an English general pinned his own Military Cross on Captain Manekshaw’s chest, since the medal could not be awarded posthumously. In 1947 fighting broke out in Kashmir after tribesmen supported by the Pakistanis made a series of violent incursions into the region. Manekshaw, a colonel in the Military Directorate and responsible for operations throughout India, devised a masterly strategy for defeating the raiders while lying in his bath. His astute handling of an insurgency in Nagaland while he was GOC-in-C Eastern Command was recognized by award of a Padma Bhushan – one of India’s highest honors – in 1968. He received a Padma Vibhushan in 1972 and, in January 1973, after nearly four decades of military service, was promoted Field Marshal, one of only two Indian soldiers ever to reach that rank.

Architect of 1971 Victory

Manekshaw’s winning strategy began with patience. As army Chief of Staff, he advised Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to wait rather than intervene after a declaration of martial law in East Pakistan threatened to destabilize the region. He organized a coordinated army, air force and navy offensive that began on Dec. 3, 1971, and repeatedly went on the radio to warn the West Pakistani troops that they were surrounded. His brilliant military strategy, decision-making, coordinating skills and above all, his generalship were of high order. Overwhelmed, their commander surrendered within two weeks. The grand strategic objectives were achieved within a short span of 14 days with 93,000 enemy soldiers made to surrender. Not only history was created but also the map of South Asia was altered. The subsequent Simla Accords eventually led to the creation of Bangladesh.

Leadership Redefined

Sam instilled leadership qualities amongst his officers by giving many lectures on leadership skills. These lectures give us an insight into the mind of India’s best military strategist and enable any common man to rise above his inhibitions and lead a life as a leader. First aspect he highlighted was to attain professional knowledge and professional competence. These two skills are acquired by consistent hard work and by consistent study. In a fast moving world you have to be on your toes all the time, ensure that you keep learning each day. This will help you in two ways – First you will know what you are talking about and unless you understand your profession you cannot be a leader. And secondly it will set you apart from the rest and through it you will be able to take much more informed decisions. The next thing you need for leadership is the ability to make up your mind and make a decision and accept full responsibility for that decision. Most important reason why people cannot take a decision is because they lack professional knowledge and competence and they are worried that the decision may backfire. According to the law of averages, if you take ten decisions, five ought to be right. If you have professional knowledge and competence, nine will be right and the one that might not be correct will probably be put right by a colleague. Next comes in absolute honesty, fairness and justice. So a leader makes sure he performs the task in the interests of his subordinates with full dedication and fairness. Last but not the least you need moral courage. Moral courage is the ability to distinguish right from wrong and having done so, say so when asked, irrespective of what your superiors might think or what your colleagues or your subordinates might want. Sam illustrated with an excellent example – In 1971, Pakistan clamped down on the province, East Pakistan, hundreds and thousands of refugees started pouring into India. The prime minister, Mrs. Gandhi had a cabinet meeting with attendees: the foreign minister, Sardar Swaran Singh, the defence minister, Mr. Jagjivan Ram, the agriculture minister, Mr. Fakruddin Ali Ahmed, the finance minister, Mr. Yaswant Rao Chavan and Sam Manekshaw. Indira Gandhi asked Sam to enter East Pakistan so that a popularly elected government could be installed in Dhaka. However Manekshaw had the moral courage to say ‘no’ because a hasty decision might have given an opportunity to China to enter the conflict and with monsoon approaching soon movements would have been confined to roads, the Air Force would not be able to support the army and, ultimately it would have led to defeat for India. However he guaranteed hundred percent victory for India provided if he was left alone, and was allowed to plan, make agreements, and fix a date. In 1962, when the Chinese occupied the Thag-la ridge and Mr. Nehru, the prime minister, sent for the army chief, and said, “I want you to throw the Chinese out.” That Army Chief did not have the moral courage to stand up to him and say, “I am not ready, my troops are not acclimatized, I haven’t the ammunition, or indeed anything.” But he accepted the Prime Minister’s instructions, with the results that the Army was beaten and the country humiliated.

These lessons are extremely valuable and can be adapted by anyone who strives for excellence and wants to lead an organization or a group. Through such anecdotes blended with wit and humor Sam was able to lift the morale of his soldiers and instill in them a feeling of pride and patriotism.

Life after Retirement

In 1973, Manekshaw was elevated to the rank of Field Marshal which was a status that no Indian enjoyed before. But then happened a historic incident triggered by Sam’s spontaneous sense of humor – A reporter asked him what would have happened if he would have joined Pakistan Army in 1947 and he joked by saying that maybe Pakistan would have won the war. This comment was publicly criticized by many who were envious of his stature and was turned into a full blown controversy. Manekshaw stepped down as Army Chief in 1973 and retired from the limelight. In his whole career Manekshaw was treated disrespectfully by the Indian political class, Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon initiated a court of inquiry against Manekshaw for “anti-national” activities in early 1962 on totally false charges and sought unsuccessfully – to penalise him. But despite all these false allegations Sam was always loved and highly respected by the soldiers and officers. His highest contribution to Indian State was when he took charge of Indian Army after Indian army suffered a humiliating defeat in North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), now Arunachal Pradesh and restored the lost pride of Indian soldiers by convincing the troops that the Chinese soldier was not “10 feet tall”. Also he will be remembered as the architect of India’s 1971 victory which enabled our country to assert its supremacy in the subcontinent and ushered a wave of confidence and pride amongst the army and citizens.

He died of complications from pneumonia at the Military Hospital in Wellington, Tamil Nadu in June 2008 at the age of 94. Manekshaw will be best remembered, as “a person who made India stand tall”.
 
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Dhaka to seek evidence from Pakistan, US on 1971 `war crimes’

Dhaka to seek evidence from Pakistan, US on 1971 `war crimes’

April 7th, 2009 - 1:24 pm ICT by IANS -
Dhaka, April 7 (IANS) The UN has named four international war crime experts to assist Bangladesh in the trial of 1971 “war criminals” as the government said it would formally seek evidence from Pakistan and the US on the matter.
Those who collaborated with the Pakistan government during the freedom struggle are referred to as “war criminals” in Bangladesh.

Dhaka wants information and evidence from the US, whose Richard Nixon administration supported Islamabad, to firm up cases against militiamen who are alleged to have killed thousands of unarmed civilians and engaged in rape, loot and arson.

The requests were being made under the International Crimes (Tribunal) Act 1973, said government officials associated with the trial for which the process formally begins Thursday.

The move to conduct the trials has the sanction of parliament.

The political thrust for going ahead with the trial came after Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s landslide victory in last December’s poll.

While the US has in principle approved the trial, a special envoy of Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari cautioned Dhaka against it, saying “this is not the time” and that it would hurt bilateral ties.

“We are going to request all, including Pakistan and the US to provide documents and evidence relating to the genocide committed during the liberation war and about those who were involved in war crimes,” State Minister for Liberation War Affairs A.B.M. Tajul Islam told The Daily Star Monday.

He said although the evidence and documents Bangladesh has are enough to try the war criminals, more documents and evidence are required to make the trials acceptable worldwide.

The names of the four experts were sent Sunday by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s Resident Coordinator Renata Lok Dessallien.

“This will help the government to learn from experiences elsewhere and to avoid possible costly mistakes,” the UNDP letter read.

“The Pakistani government will be asked to provide us with the names of those who had collaborated with the Pakistani occupation forces in 1971,” an official of the liberation war affairs ministry told The Daily Star.

“With the request letter, Bangladesh will provide some documents, including a 1971 official gazette of the erstwhile Pakistan that recognised the Razakars as an auxiliary force of the Pakistani occupying army,” he said.

There are a total of 1,779 war criminals, including 369 members of then Pakistan armed forces, according to an official document.

Some three million civilians were killed by the erstwhile Pakistani occupying forces and their collaborators during Bangladesh’s war of independence, while about 200,000 women were raped, and tens of thousands of homes were torched and plundered.

Bangladesh finally became an independent nation with the help of Indian troops who marched into Dhaka and secured the surrender of Pakistani 90,000 Pakistani soldiers.
 

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I do not agree with your assessment, USA is also pushing Pakistan inside Pakistan,
india was shouting from the rooftops about pakistan's terror machines which, not only USA but even other western countries never heeded. partly because they also had a hand in its creation. only when 9/11 happened and their proteges came to bite them, realisation dawned on them.
what you are referring to is what is happening now. india is facing it 2 decades now. so where were those you are defending??

ask any Pakistani and they will tell you. Also the Pakistan Military and US Military does not enjoy a good relationship.
ofc. one can't get aid and yet play on both the sides. but USA can't push too much 'cos their own skeletons will be laid bare. PA can still play around.

USA has also pushed Pakistan on 26/11 and made sure Pakistan does not support attacks in India.
yes. but why they are cooperating? because some americans too died in 26/11 attack. there have been 1000s of attacks before that. where was the cooperation?

Do you think it was mere luck that after 26/11 almost 11 months gone, no attack has happened in India.
it may not be luck or you think USA is blessing us?
india's internal security and intelligence have been beefed up. our MHA is doing great job. they need to be appreciated.
india is also receiving some intel from US and others which indeed is helpful but it is mutual.

also did they support Pakistan on Kargil.
neither did they help india. they definitely must have known what was happening with all their spy satellites. if they wanted, could have helped india but they did not. infact when india could have recovered all the heights when it was gaining the upper hand, USA brought in cease fire and india lost some heights.
however by bombing belgrade's chinese embassy, it is rumoured but never acknowledged, they dissuaded china from taking advantage of kargil situation.

NATO bombing of the People's Republic of China embassy in Belgrade - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
U.S. Media Overlook Expose on Chinese Embassy Bombing
BBC ON THIS DAY | 9 | 1999: Chinese anger at embassy bombing

I am not saying US is a trustful country, but at the same time it is not true that they always side with Pakistan.
sorry. they have always sided with pakistan. even now 26/11 perpetrators are sitting there in pakistan. can't USA do something about it for it's own citizens who died in 26/11?
 
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LiveFist - The Best of Indian Defence: The Alize 1050 in 1971

The Alize 1050 in 1971
By Rear Adm (Retd) S Ramsagar

The flagship of the Navy, INS Vikrant was undergoing major dry-dock work in Bombay during 1971. Her one boiler was non-operational for weak boiler tubes unfit for flashing up. The tubes were under replacement along with other repair jobs and the ship was not expected to be operational for another year or so. This was the time when refugees were flooding in, owing to suppression and atrocities leashed out by General Yahya Khan on the people of East Pakistan. Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibhur Rehman was arrested and was not allowed to take over the government as an elected majority leader.

INS Vikrant was patched up in a hurry, but her speed was curtailed. This would mean she would be an easy target to Pakistan’s submarines. It was then that the brilliant tactician, Vice Admiral Krishnan, C-in-C Eastern Naval Command, requested NHQ to utilize her on the eastern sea-front. At the speed of 12 knots, INS Vikrant was capable of operating only the erstwhile Bregeut Alize aircraft from her deck. Though the Alizes could be recovered on the carrier, the aircraft could not be launched as Vikrant’s catapult was not yet ready. It was in that situation that yours truly, a day-night qualified Alize QFI, was directed to do carrier trials by doing free takeoffs from the carrier’s deck. The Cdr(E), Cdr Roy Chaudhury (later awarded VrC, for his gallantry and finally retired as a Vice Admiral) was not sure if he could push the ship to at least give minimum speed of 14 knots in case their was no natural wind to assist the free take offs.

The Squadron had done the mathematics and I was sure that the wonderful Alize aircraft can easily do the job in the lightened condition, we initially planned to do the first free take off. Though the rest of the carrier crew were keeping their finger’s crossed, we proved the versatility of the Alize aircraft and not only completed the free take off trials successfully but also did Free Take Offs at full designed loads of the aircraft. Thereafter, Captain Swaraj Prakash (later awarded the MVC for gallantry inthe war and retired as the Vice Chief of Naval Staff) was ordered to move the carrier to the Eastern sector.

The Cobra squadron, INAS 310 under the command of late Cdr Ravi Dhir (who earned his VrC during the war) with me as his Senior Pilot and late Lt Cdr SP Ghosh (also a VrC awardee in the war) as senior Observer ofthe squadron, flew the squadron from Cochin INS Garuda to Chennai Meenambakkam airfield. We operated and trained all the pilots back to ‘ops status’ within 20 days. Cdr Roy Chaudhury with his dedicated engine room department got the catapult ready for operations. From then onwards we were doing the opssorties from the carrier.

As soon as the engineering department managed to flash up the unserviceable second boiler the carrier could give sustained speed of 18 knots for the Hawks quadron also to embark and so they too started flying from the carrier. The grit, devotion and the spirit to achieve the impossible gave one and all total confidence to take on all and sundry. The Carrier with its aircraft was itching to go into action. It was then middle of November 1971. Our ‘Iron Lady’, Prime Minister Madam Indira Gandhi gave the indication to our Chiefs that India may have to go to war with Pakistan.

In the mean time Vikrant was quietly moved to Port Blair in Andaman Islands and finally positioned in Port Cornwallis Lagoon. On third December evening, we heard on radio that Pakistan Air Force struck many of our airfields. Vikrant had just received orders to sail and strike enemy airfields in East Pakistan at the earliest. The briefing by the erstwhile Commander (Air), Cdr Parashar (fondly called by the aircrew as ‘The Superman’) spoke just one sentence “Gentlemen this is it!”

On the morning of 4th, the Hawks struck Dhaka airfield and the harbour. They faced no air opposition but heavy anti-aircraft ground fire. The Alizes being slower anti-submarine and reconnaissance aircraft flew through out the night of 3rd and 4th December providing the carrier force, in depth anti-submarine surveillance and early warning of enemy ships.

On the first day of War, NHQ directed that only thoseships which were of Pakistani origin should be sunk. This resulted in the Alize aircraft flying low over the merchant ships, establishing their identity before attacking them. All the ships seen by our squadron had many women and children, all waving white flags from the open decks. It was suspected that on the first fewdays many Pakistani civilian officials with their families left East Pakistan with all their gold and money.

Only when we received clearance to fire at the shipsthat were coming out or heading towards East Pakistan that the Alize came into their own in the war. As the Hawker hunters were not cleared for night operations, the good old Alize had to do night strikes on enemy targets. We carried out night strikes using 500 pound bombs; we could see tracers coming all the way up to our aircraft and just missing us. We confirmed that the attacks by Hawks during day rendered havoc in the harbour and there was just no enemy fighter opposition.

As there was no enemy air opposition, Captain Swaraj Prakash cleared yours truly to fly over and inspect the beaches for amphibious landing operations. INS Magar and the landing craft recently acquired from Russia were to do this operation. I flew low over the whole length of the beach south of Chittagong and found it totally deserted, so I continued my reconnaissance sortie over the road leading to Chittagong. The road was strewn with abandoned vehicles and people running helter-skelter. As there were no suitable targets to bomb, I continued on to Chittagong. There we saw people looting every house of all its articles. Just then we sighted a wireless station with large transmission towers and a government office. We successfully bombed the wireless station with our 500 lbs bombs but left the government building as it had a red cross on it.

Later we learnt from the Mukti Bahini that this act of ours saved many innocent Bangladeshis in the hospital but successfully destroyed the enemy hiding in the wireless station. My report helped Navy to change the landing operations to directly proceed to Chitagong town. With the help of Bangladeshi fishing vessels guiding our amphibious force, the Navy landed the Ghurkas, for a hero’s welcome by the locals.

As we had no knowledge of the goings on at the Western end of East Pakistan, I was launched to fly all the way up the mutha-mulla river to the Ports of Chelna and Khulna during daylight hours. On reaching Khulna, I noticed that there were five merchant vessels anchored in line in the river. I carried out a daylight rocket attack on one of the ships. Immediately there was heavy anti-aircraft fire from a gunboat, and as my mission was to recce and report on the state of the harbours, I pressed on to Chelna and found the harbor deserted. After reading my report, Admiral Sri Harilal Sarma, FOCEF appreciated that the ships in Khulna were the evacuating merchant ships for the Pakistani troops and so launched Cdr Ravi Dhir and me that same night with five 500lb bombs each. There was very heavy ack-ack fire from shore, with tracers just missing us. We successfully bombed the ships. Our attack was so effective that the ships that were fit to sail cut their anchor chains and sailed out towards the mouth of the river to sea.

The Admiral judged the expected actions of the merchant ships correctly and directed INS Brahmaputra commanded by then Cdr Ramdas (laterto become CNS) to proceed at high speed and await the enemy’s merchant vessels at the mouth of the river. As expected all the ships came out together and as soon as they saw our naval ship, all of them did the ‘scatter’ maneuver, such that Brahmaputra could not stop all of them at the same time. INS Brahmaputra engaged one ship ‘Mini Lady’ and sent a signal to Vikrant that the ships were breaking away in all directions. At that time Hawks were on their way back to the carrier after striking Dhaka. They were directed to strafe the ships with whatever front gun ammunition they had with them. The strike was so successful that all the merchantmen stopped and obeyed the orders given by our frigate and a boarding party under the command of the Executive Officer, Lt Cdr Raj Bajaj of Brahmaputra, boarded the first ship and escorted five ships to Diamond harbor. The night strike by the Breguet Alizes helped Navy capture the evacuation fleet of the Pakistani forces and broke their morale.

Two days later, I was launched to check the situation at the Khulna and Chelna harbours. I sighted at the mouth of the river, a Naval Tug towing two very long boats camouflaged with branches all over. On closer examination, it was noticed that the boats contained troops who were being ferried to the Eastern sector to Dhaka or Chitagong. Immediately I attacked the naval vessel with my rockets. We saw that the tug was still firing its foxl’e gun. As we had expended our rockets we decided to strike with Depth Charges. For a good depth charge attack, the strike had to be done practically skimming over the target. My crew Lt Bhagwat and Lt Pawar both valiantly agreed for the low level strike to prevent the Pakistan forces escaping to safer areas.

After our successful depth charge attack, the enemy hoisted a white flag and turned the vessels on to the beach and abandoned them. Our aircraft was hit by a spray of 20 mm bullets right along the centerline all theway to the rear. Lucky for us the crew sits with the pilot on the left of centre, the navigator on the right and the rear radar operator also sits on the right of the centerline. So all the direct hits on the aircraft missed us by inches but the aircraft lost electrical power, hydraulics and the radome was hit causing a small fire; still the aircraft was able to fly back to the carrier at slowspeed. We had to lower the undercarriage and the hook by gravity.

As we were, long overdue and the carrier was unable to contact us on radio, Vikrant launched young Lt Mohanan (who retired as a Rear Admiral) to look for us. By then we were in visual range and could inform the ship on VHF operating on battery that we were coming in directly for landing. The ship suggested that we use the ‘Net’ for ourlanding but I refused as I knew that once the aircraft uses the net, she would sustain greater damage. I successfully did the night landing and saved the aircraft.

The ground crew over night patched up the eight direct hits the aircraft received and made it operational by next morning. Young Lt Mohanan flew all the way to the beaching point and found all the vessels abandoned and empty of personnel. With this strike and return of the bullet ridden Alize aircraft back safely to the ship the ground crew experienced war at close quarters and it raised their morale high up.

The Cobra Squadron during the war earned five Vir Chakras and one Mention-in-dispatches. The wonderful Alize aircraft performed all its tasks excellently under the able guidance of the valiant Cobra squadron’s crew. So ended the saga of wonderful aircraft, Breguet Alize 1050. She is no more operational in service except in museums. May God bless the soul of the designer of this aeroplane.
 
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1971 India-Pakistan War: Blockade from the Seas

Blockade from the Seas

Using Sea Power
The 1971 war was the first, and only, occasion when the Indian political leadership exhibited a proper understanding of the use of military power for achieving a clear national aim. In past conflicts, Indian leaders either had no clear aim in mind and were merely reacting to events or they were confused about how best to use the military power available to them. During the 1962 India-China war, for instance, the Indian government ordered the Indian Air Force to withdraw its fighter bomber squadrons from the north east and not to hit the invading Chinese. IAF bombers could have changed the course of the 1962 war had it been allowed to hit the thin and tenuous Chinese logistics lines. Similarly, in the 1965 India-Pakistan conflict, the Navy was ordered to keep its ships in port and not engage in any offensive action against Pakistan. The Pakistani Navy was given a free hand and it managed to lob a few shells at one point in the Western Coast. The Indian Navy's chance to see some action came only in 1971 December.

Since East and West Pakistan were two separate geographical entities more than 1,600 miles apart, the only way Pakistani forces in East Pakistan could be sustained was through the sea. The Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, decided that the Navy would be given the strategic task of denying both East and West Pakistan access to war supplies. The aim in short was a complete naval blockade of both parts of Pakistan. The bigger aim was of course to ensure that the conflict was not perpetuated beyond the time required to capture a chunk of East Pakistani territory.

The Indian Navy's best and biggest warship at that time was its sole aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, a carefully preserved World War II vintage carrier built in Britain. Ideally, a task force centred around the Vikrant should have been used to block Karachi, which at that time was West Pakistan's sole deep water port. However, one of Vikrant's main boilers was out of operation and the ship could not maintain the kind of speed required for manoeuvring in a situation where the air threat would be considerable. It was decided that the Vikrant would be used to blockade the ports in East Pakistan, and destroy the riverine craft used by the Pakistanis there.

Vikrant in Action
The day war was declared, the Vikrant, which had been anchored off the northern-most tip of the Andaman & Nicobar chain of islands, moved towards the principal East Pakistani port, Chittagong. The Pakistanis, having learnt that Vikrant was positioned in the Bay of Bengal, despatched one of their submarines, PNS Ghazi, to the east. The Pakistani submarine thought it could sneak into Vizag harbour, the principal naval port in the Indian east coast. It was, however, detected and sunk before it could cause any damage. The Vikrant continued unhindered. Rear Admiral (retired) P.D.Sharma, who was then an aviator aboard the Vikrant, recalls what it was like:

"Fighter pilots practice for years and when they finally get an opportunity to see real action, it is thrilling - it is the moment one has been waiting for all one's life. And it was so for us aboard the Vikrant on 4th December 1971...

"The first sortie was mounted against Cox's Bazaar. Eight Sea Hawks went in led by the squadron commander. I was in the second sortie which attacked Chittagong. This was in the afternoon of the 4th because it took some time for the Vikrant to close in the range to Chittagong.

"We went in low level, pulled up and carried out repeated attacks on the airfield. In the first attack itself we inflicted considerable damage. We withdrew for the night and sailed towards the Mangla-Khulna area. Our next attacks were on those harbours. Then we came back to Chittagong. And by the time we were through with that area, especially Chittagong harbour, Chittagong airfield and the approaches to Chittagong, the scene was something to be seen. The place had been devastated. There were ships that had turned turtle, there were half-sunk ships by the quay side, the airfield was pockmarked with craters and no ship could even think of approaching the place."

The Attack on Karachi
The most dramatic naval plan was drawn up by the Western Naval Command. It was decided that the main attack on Karachi harbour would be launched by tiny PT-15 missile boats instead of regular warships. There were several reasons for this decision. Regular ships without air cover would be vulnerable whereas the tiny missile boats would present difficult, fast-moving targets. Moreover, the Navy wanted to try out the missiles to see how effective they could be in real action, although this kind of use of missile boats, which were designed for coastal defence and not for long range offensive action of any kind, was highly unorthodox. At any rate, three missile boats were chosen for the mission and despatched in the dead of night from Bombay harbour.

Leading the missile boat squadron was Commodore (Retired) Babru Bahan Yadav:"The task given to us was not easy. Our ships were little more than boats and did not have the range to go all the way to Karachi on their own steam. So an oiler was placed about half-way to the target and we were able to refuel and carry on.

"As we neared their coast, we found some of their ships patrolling the area. The boat on my left was detailed to engage the contact. That boat was the first Indian warship to fire a missile in anger. Two missiles were fired and both were direct hits. It is interesting to recall that the radar contact which was on our screen slowly diminished and then suddenly disappeared. We were very jubilant at that time. Later, we found that this has been a Pakistani destroyer.

Very soon another ship was located right in front of my boat. We fired a couple of missiles as well but did not sink it. The boat on our right was ordered to attack the ship. It did so and managed to cripple it completely. We thought we had sunk it but later the Pakistanis claimed that the ship had been badly crippled and put out of action but not sunk. Anyway, as we continued, both the other boats could not keep up and had to turn back. Only Nipat, the boat I was on, could proceed towards Karachi harbour. We pressed on and fired missiles on Karachi which hit the oil installations there. The attack took place just 1 minute before midnight and we could see the flames from the oil installations lighting up the sea. It looked like Diwali (Indian festival of lights and firecrackers)."

It took a few more days for Commodore Yadav's boat to return to harbour as they had to take evasive action and ran out of fuel. In the meanwhile, the Pakistanis who were hunting for the boat put out a message that an Indian vessel had been sunk. Nipat, the only boat not accounted for at that time, was presumed sunk. But Nipat returned, thanks to the ingenuity of its engineers who managed to take out pump oil and use it to run the engines.

The Indian Navy accomplished the task assigned to it within the first few days of the war. No enemy shipping could move in or out of its harbours. Merchant ships did not dare approach Karachi. Control of the seas around both wings of Pakistan was with the Indian Navy.
 

bsn4u1985

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American involvement
The United States supported Pakistan both politically and materially. President Richard Nixon denied getting involved in the situation, saying that it was an internal matter of Pakistan.

Several documents released from the Nixon Presidential Archives show the extent of the tilt that the Nixon Administration demonstrated in favor of Pakistan. Among them, the infamous Blood telegram from the US embassy in Dacca, East Pakistan, stated the horrors of genocide taking place. Nixon, backed by Henry Kissinger, wanted to protect the interests of Pakistan as he was apprehensive of India. Archer Blood was promptly transferred out of Dacca. As revealed in the newly declassified transcripts released by the State Department, President Nixon was using the Pakistanis to normalize relations with China. This would have three important effects: opening rifts between the Soviet Union, China and North Vietnam, opening the potentially huge Chinese market to American business and creating a foreign policy coup in time to win the 1972 Presidential Elections. Since Nixon believed the existence of Pakistan to be critical to the success of his term he went to great lengths to protect his ally. In direct violation of the Congress-imposed sanctions on Pakistan, Nixon sent military supplies to Pakistan and routed them through Jordan and the Shah-ruled Iran.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations George H. W. Bush branded the Indian action as "aggression" at the time and took up the matter in the UN Security Council. The United States believed that should Pakistan's armed forces in the east collapse, India would transfer its forces from there to attack West Pakistan, which was an ally in the Central Treaty Organization. This was confirmed in official British secret transcripts declassified in 2003 War secrets showing that India could have invaded West Pakistan - BBC Nixon also showed a bias towards Pakistan despite widespread condemnation of the dictatorship even amongst his administration, as Oval Office records show. Kissinger wanted China to attack India for this purpose.

When Pakistan's defeat seemed certain, Nixon sent the USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal from the Gulf of Tonkin.NBC Evening News for Tuesday, Dec 14, 1971, the abstract for the show mentions:''USS Enterprise heads to Bay of Bengal for evacuation of Americans in E. Pakistan. Indian ambassador in Washington, DC seeks United States denial with regard to Enterprise mission; State Department refuses. Demonstrators in India charge United States with gunboat diplomacy.REPORTER: John Chancellor. Enterprise arrived on station on December 11, 1971. Originally, the deployment of Enterprise was claimed to be for evacuating US citizens and personnel from the area. Later, Nixon claimed that it was also as a gesture of goodwill towards Pakistan and China. Enterprise's presence was considered an intimidation, and hotly protested by India and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union called this US move as Gunboat Diplomacy''.Clarence Earl Carter, Commander, US Navy, The Indian Navy: A Military Power at a Political Crossroads,AU/AWC/RWP123/97-04, April, 1996, taken from the Federation of American Scientists website. The report saysIn mid-December 1971, a United States naval task force, led by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, entered the Bay of Bengal, ostensibly to evacuate Americans from war-torn East Pakistan. The carrier's deployment, at the height of the third Indo-Pakistani War, also coincided with the presence of several (additional) Soviet warships in the Indian Ocean. Although the initial State Department public release declared the intent of the mission to be "a show of force by the United States for the benefit of both India and the Soviet Union," President Nixon later clarified the event to be a gesture of support for Pakistan and China in light of the increased Soviet naval presence, in addition to the more obvious evacuation efforts. Both India and the Soviet Union lashed out at the American presence, the Soviets labeling it "gunboat diplomacy and gross blackmail against India." . On 6 December and 13 December, the Soviet Navy dispatched two groups of ships, armed with nuclear missiles, from Vladivostok; they trailed U.S. Task Force 74 in the Indian Ocean from 18 December until 7 January 1972.

Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 at AllExperts
 
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Facts of 1971 War: Prez Nixon asked China to menace India - Instablogs

Facts of 1971 War: Prez Nixon asked China to menace India




History says that during the cold war days, India’s relation with United States was not as good as it is now. The recently released official documents in US have disclosed some unrevealed secrets that are now in public. Earlier, it had revealed that how China ‘cheated’ India and forced India to a war in 1962.

Now, a recently-published book has revealed truth behind another war 1971 war. According to the book, the US President Richard M. Nixon was very much frustrated with Indian policy towards East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war.

The documents reportedly exposed that the US President had secretly entreated China to menace India by moving Chinese troops to the Indian border.

A recently-published book ‘Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power’ has thousands of pages of national security files and telephone transcripts of then US national security adviser Henry Kissinger and 2,800 hours of the Nixon tapes in it that has disclosed the US mentality towards India at that time.


American author and historian Robert Dallek has exposed in the book that how Nixon and Kissinger were disappointed with Indian policies and how they tried to bring China in order to prevent the formation of Bangladesh.

At that time, US President Nixon had called Indians as a slippery, treacherous people and Kissinger had called Indians as insufferably arrogant.


According to the book, then Indian PM Indira Gandhi had seen little prospect of any political settlement in this matter. However, she had told Kissinger that she did not want to use force and was open to suggestions.

Later, Kissinger warned India that a war would be a disaster for both countries and it would provoke any Chinese aggression against India.

Kissinger had also in mind that in case of China’s involvement in the matter on Pakistan’s behalf, it might prompt Moscow to teach China a lesson.

Now, everything has become history, but one thing is sure that Indira Gandhi, the then PM, had showed great courage in moving forward to establish Indian supremacy in the region despite of watching two great powers standing against India.
 

bengalraider

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posting from :Defunct Humanity: 1971. The War of Nerves in Bengal Bay
In 1971, December, 3 the World has become an attestor to a new war between India and Pakistan. At afternoon the Pakistani aviation has strike the Indian cities and airstrips. The Indian PM Indira Gandhi put the country in emergency state and gave the order to nip the aggression. Hard clashes were started on the ground in the air, and at the sea.



Historic document: "Confident. December, 10, 1971. Moscow. For the DM Marshal Andrey Grechko. According to the information from our attaché in Delhi in the first day of conflict the Indian destroyer 'Rajput' has sunk a Pakistani submarine by depth charges. In December, 4 and 9, the Indian fast boats have destroyed and damaged 10 Pakistani battle ships and vessels by the P-15 missiles. In addition 12 oil storages was burned in flame. The Commander of the Military Intelligence Service Gen. Pyotr Ivashutin".



In the same day the Soviet Intelligence has reported that the British Naval group with the leadership of 'Eagle' carrier went closer to the territorial waters of India. The Soviet Government immediately sent a unit of battle ships under the leadership of counter-admiral Vladimir Kruglyakov for helping to the fraternal country.



Vladimir Kruglyakov, the former (1970-1975) Commander of the 10th Operative Battle Group (Pacific Fleet) remembes:

"I received the order from the Chief Commander 'To not allow access of the American Navy to the Indian military objects'.



- On the way of American Navy stood the Soviet cruisers, destroyers and atomic submarines equipped with anti-ship missiles.



Vladimir Kruglyakov, the former (1970-1975) Commander of the 10th Operative Battle Group (Pacific Fleet) remembers:


"We encircled them and I have targeted the 'Enterprise' by missiles. I have blocked them and didn’t allow enclosing to Karachi, nor to Chittagong or Dhaka".



On the Soviet ships then were only the missiles with limited to 300 km range. Thus, to be sure the rival is under the hindsight the Russian commanders have had to take the risk of maximal enclosing to the American fleet.



Vladimir Kruglyakov, the former (1970-1975) Commander of the 10th Operative Battle Group (Pacific Fleet) remembers:



"The Chief Commander has order me: 'Lift the subs when they (the Americans) appear!' – It was done to demonstrate, there are all the needed in Indian Ocean, including the nuclear submarines. I have lifted them, and they recognized it. Then, we intercepted the American communication. The commander of the Carrier Battle Group was then the counter-admiral Dimon Gordon. He sent the report to the 7th American Fleet Commander: 'Sir, we are too late. There are the Russian atomic submarines here, and a big collection of the battleships'.



The war was then two weeks long, and it has finished by Pakistani forces surrendering.

The Russian original text:



Океанский атлант



3 Декабря 1971 года мир потрясла очередная война. После полудня авиация Пакистана нанесла разрушительный удар по аэродромам и городам Индии. Премьер-министр Индии Индира Ганди ввела в стране чрезвычайное положение и отдала приказ вооружённым силам об отражении агрессии. Ожесточённые военные действия развернулись в воздухе, на суше и на море.



Совершенно секретно. 10 декабря 1971 года. Москва. Министру обороны СССР. Маршалу Советского Союза Андрею Гречко. "По докладу военного атташе в первый день военного конфликта индийский эсминец "Раджпут" уничтожил глубинными бомбами подлодку ВМС Пакистана. 4 и 9 декабря отряд катеров Индии потопил и повредил противокорабельными ракетами П-15 советского производства 10 пакистанских боевых кораблей и судов, а также сжёг на берегу 12 нефтехранилищ. Начальник ГРУ ГШ ВС СССР генерал армии Пётр Ивашутин.



В тот же день советская разведка получила сведения о том, что к территориальным водам Индии приблизилось английское военное соединение во главе с авианосцем "Игл". На помощь дружественной стране советское правительство направило отряд кораблей под командованием контр-адмирала Владимира Круглякова.



Владимир Кругляков, командующий 10-й оперативной эскадрой ТОФ (1970-1975): "Мне было приказано организовать слежение. Лодки я расставил в Бенгальском заливе и Арависйском море на позиции, а с кораблями пошел на слежение за "Иглом".



Но советским кораблям нечем было бороться с такой защищённой целью, как авианосец "Игл", кроме торпед и артиллерии. Поэтому им на помошь с Владивостока вышли ещё три ракетных корабля и 6 подлодок. Вскоре англичане ушли на юг, к Мадагаскару. А к побережью Индии направилось американское ударное соединение во главе с вертолётоносцем "Триполи" и атомным авианосцем "Энтерпрайз". Под предлогом эвакуации своих граждан из района боевых действий корабли попытались вмешаться в военный конфликт на стороне Пакистана.



Владимир Кругляков, командующий 10-й оперативной эскадрой ТОФ (1970-1975): "Я получил от главнокомандующего: "Не допустить подхода американского военно-морского флота к военым базам Индии".



На их пути стали советские ракетные крейсеры, эсминцы и подлодки, вооружённые кралатыми ракетами.



Владимир Кругляков, командующий 10-й оперативной эскадрой ТОФ (1970-1975): "Я полукругом сзади окружил, и ракеты П-35 нацелили на "Энтерпрайз". Блокировал, но не пропускал их, ни к Карачи, ни к Читтагонгу, ни к Дакке".



На советских кораблях стояли противокорабельные ракеты с небольшой дальностью 300 км. Поэтому, чтобы держать противника под прицелом, командиры шли на риск, максимально к нему приближаясь.



Владимир Кругляков, командующий 10-й оперативной эскадрой ТОФ (1970-1975): "И главком сказал: "Когда они появятся, подними лодки!" Чтобы они увидели, что в Индийском океане всё есть, в том числе и атомные ракетные лодки. Я поднял, и они зафиксировали это дело. Потом я перехватил телеграмму. Командовал этим авианосным соединением контр-адмирал Дэмон Гордон. Он дал телеграмму коммандующему 7-м флотом: "Сэр, мы опоздали. В океане – атомные подводные лодки русских и большая эскадра".



Война продолжалась 2 недели и закончилась 17 декабря поражением Пакистана.
 

bhramos

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1971 Indo-Pak war explains the deep, historic Indo-Russian friendship.

1971 Indo-Pak war explains the deep, historic Indo-Russian friendship

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Er2E_PpVUYw

10 Dec 2009 Translation of the Russian video by Igor ((c) Igor: reproduced with permission): In 1971, December, 3 the World has become an attestor to a new war between India and Pakistan. At afternoon the Pakistani aviation has strike the Indian cities and airstrips. The Indian PM Indira Gandhi put the country in emergency state and gave the order to nip the aggression. Hard clashes were started on the ground in the air, and at the sea.

Historic document: "Confident. December, 10, 1971. Moscow. For the DM Marshal Andrey Grechko. According to the information from our attaché in Delhi in the first day of conflict the Indian destroyer 'Rajput' has sunk a Pakistani submarine by depth charges. In December, 4 and 9, the Indian fast boats have destroyed and damaged 10 Pakistani battle ships and vessels by the P-15 missiles. In addition 12 oil storages was burned in flame. The Commander of the Military Intelligence Service Gen. Pyotr Ivashutin".

In the same day the Soviet Intelligence has reported that the British Naval group with the leadership of 'Eagle' carrier went closer to the territorial waters of India. The Soviet Government immediately sent a unit of battle ships under the leadership of counter-admiral Vladimir Kruglyakov for helping to the fraternal country.

Vladimir Kruglyakov, the former (1970-1975) Commander of the 10th Operative Battle Group (Pacific Fleet) remembers: "I received the order from the Chief Commander 'To not allow access of the American Navy to the Indian military objects'.

On the way of American Navy stood the Soviet cruisers, destroyers and atomic submarines equipped with anti-ship missiles.

Vladimir Kruglyakov, the former (1970-1975) Commander of the 10th Operative Battle Group (Pacific Fleet) remembers: "We encircled them and I have targeted the 'Enterprise' by missiles. I have blocked them and didn’t allow enclosing to Karachi, nor to Chittagong or Dhaka".

On the Soviet ships then were only the missiles with limited to 300 km range. Thus, to be sure the rival is under the hindsight the Russian commanders have had to take the risk of maximal enclosing to the American fleet.

Vladimir Kruglyakov, the former (1970-1975) Commander of the 10th Operative Battle Group (Pacific Fleet) remembers::twizt: "The Chief Commander has order me: 'Lift the subs when they (the Americans) appear!' – It was done to demonstrate, there are all the needed in Indian Ocean, including the nuclear submarines. I have lifted them, and they recognized it. Then, we intercepted the American communication. The commander of the Carrier Battle Group was then the counter-admiral Dimon Gordon. He sent the report to the 7th American Fleet Commander: 'Sir, we are too late. There are the Russian atomic submarines here,:thumbs_thmbdn: and a big collection of the battleships'.

The war was then two weeks long, and it has finished by Pakistani forces surrendering.:thumbs_thmbdn:

8ak - Indian Defence News: 1971 Indo-Pak war explains the deep, historic Indo-Russian friendship
 

bengalraider

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THE BLOOD TELEGRAM:The Blood telegram (April 6, 1971) was seen as one of the most strongly worded Dissent Channel [3] messages ever written by Foreign Service Officers to the State Department[4]. It was signed by 29 Americans. The telegram stated:

Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the West Pak[istan] dominated government and to lessen any deservedly negative international public relations impact against them. Our government has evidenced what many will consider moral bankrupt,(...) But we have chosen not to intervene, even morally, on the grounds that the Awami conflict, in which unfortunately the overworked term genocide is applicable, is purely an internal matter of a sovereign state. Private Americans have expressed disgust. We, as professional civil servants, express our dissent with current policy and fervently hope that our true and lasting interests here can be defined and our policies redirected.

(U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Dissent from U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan, April 6, 1971, Confidential, 5 pp. Includes Signatures from the Department of State. Source: RG 59, SN 70-73 Pol and Def. From: Pol Pak-U.S. To: Pol 17-1 Pak-U.S. Box 2535; [5])

In an earlier telegram (March 27, 1971), Blood wrote about American observations at Dhaka under the subject heading "Selective genocide":

1. Here in Decca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by the Pak[istani] Military. Evidence continues to mount that the MLA authorities have list of AWAMI League supporters whom they are systematically eliminating by seeking them out in their homes and shooting them down
2. Among those marked for extinction in addition to the A.L. hierarchy are student leaders and university faculty. In this second category we have reports that Fazlur Rahman head of the philosophy department and a Hindu, M. Abedin, head of the department of history, have been killed. Razzak of the political science department is rumored dead. Also on the list are the bulk of MNA's elect and number of MPA's.
3. Moreover, with the support of the Pak[istani] Military. non-Bengali Muslims are systematically attacking poor people's quarters and murdering Bengalis and Hindus.
(U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Selective genocide, March 27, 1971[6])

Although Blood was scheduled for another 18 month tour in Dhaka, President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recalled him from that position since his opposition went against their hopes of using the support of West Pakistan for diplomatic openings to China and to counter the power of the Soviet Union.
Archer Blood - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 
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The U.S. perspective in 1971

The U.S. perspective in 1971


RECENTLY, after almost 35 years of independence of Bangladesh, the National Security Council (NSC) of America declassified some very interesting documents relating to the Liberation War of Bangladesh. They clearly show America's policy during the war of Bangladesh in 1971.

The available documents offer many useful insights into how and why Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger made important decisions during the war of 1971. They show in detail how U.S policy, directed by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, followed a course that became infamously known as "The Tilt."

The first part of the documents, from March '71 to the end of May is a record of the genocide. These documents highlight some particular issues, mainly the brutal details of the genocide conducted in East Pakistan in March and April of 1971. It reveals that, in one of the first "dissent cables" questioning U.S. policy and morality, Archer Blood, as consulate general in Dhaka, wrote: "Unfortunately, the overworked term genocide is applicable."

The documents show the role that Nixon's friendship with Yahya Khan and his interest in China played in U.S. policymaking, leading to the tilt towards Pakistan. They expose George Bush Senior's view of Henry Kissinger, and the illegal American military assistance approved by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger to Pakistan following a formal aid cutoff by the U.S. The refugee situation was also known to the U.S government, as an estimated ten million Bengalis had fled across the border to India by May 1971.

The second part of the documents shows the desperate effort of Nixon to give military aid to Pakistan and the international ties among the countries supporting Pakistan. In this part, the U.S first recognises the mukti bahini (freedom fighters) as a force to reckon with.

By using what Nixon and Kissinger called quiet diplomacy, the administration gave the green light to the Pakistanis. In one instance, Nixon declared to a Pakistani delegation that "Yahya is a good friend." Rather than express concern over the ongoing brutal military repression, Nixon explained that he "understands the anguish of the decisions which (Yahya) had to make."

As a result of Yahya's importance in the China initiative and his friendship with Nixon and Kissinger, Nixon declares that the U.S. "would not do anything to complicate the situation for President Yahiya or to embarrass him." In a handwritten letter on August 7th, 1971, to President Yahya, Nixon writes: "Those who want a more peaceful world in the generations to come will forever be in your debt."

Not only did the U.S publicly pronounce India as the aggressor in the war, but also sent the nuclear submarine U.S.S. Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal, and authorised the transfer of U.S. military supplies to Pakistan, despite the apparent illegality of doing so and, though both the countries were under an arms embargo, U.S sent arms to Pakistan via Iran and Jordan.

Excerpts of important documents are placed according to the date so that readers may understand the flow of information and the relevancy of the message at that time.

(Documents gleaned by the author.)

March 28, 1971: U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Selective Genocide: Consul General Archer Blood reports they are "mute and horrified by a reign of terror by the Pakistan military" in East Pakistan. Blood indicates that evidence is surfacing suggesting that Awami League supporters and Hindus are being systematically targeted by the Martial Law Administrators (MLA). He also reports that Prof. Dev, Prof Fazlul Haque , Prof. Abedin, along with many DU teachers and MPA's have been killed.

March 28, 1971, Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, Situation in Pakistan: NSC official Sam Hoskinson tells Kissinger that events in East Pakistan have taken a turn for the worse. It also acknowledges both American recognition of the "reign of terror" conducted by West Pakistan and the need to address the new policy issues that have been created as a result of the terror.

U.S. Embassy (New Delhi) Cable, Selective Genocide: Ambassador Keating (U.S consular of India) expresses his dismay and concern at repression unleashed by the MLAs with the use of American military equipment. He calls for the U.S. to "promptly, publicly, and prominently deplore" the brutality.

U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Killings at University: A. Blood reports an American's observation of the atrocities committed at Dacca University. "Students had been shot down in rooms or mowed down when they came out of building in groups." In one instance, the MLAs set a girls dormitory on fire and then the girls were "machine-gunned as they fled the building."

March 31, 1971. U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable Extent of Casualties in Dacca, & Sitrep: Army Terror Campaign Continues in Dacca; Evidence Military Faces Some Difficulties Elsewhere: Archer Blood reports that an estimated 4,000-6,000 people have "lost their lives as a result of military action" since martial law began on March 25. He also indicates that the MLAs are now focusing on predominantly Hindu areas. Another Cable reports atrocities in DU, that naked female bodies in Rokeya hall DU were found "hanging from ceiling fans with bits of rope," after apparently being "raped, shot, and hung by heels" from the fans. "Mass graves reported by workmen who dug them" "numerous reports of unprovoked planned killing."

April 6, 1971. U.S. Department of State Cable, USG Expression of Concern on East Pakistan: During a conversation with Assistant Secretary Sisco, Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly said: "The army had to kill people in order to keep the country together."

The first “cable of dissent” by A. Blood, April 6, 1971. U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Dissent from U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan: Blood transmits a message denouncing American policy towards the South Asia crisis. The transmission suggests that the U.S is "bending over backwards to placate the West Pakistan [sic] dominated government and to lessen likely and deservedly negative international public relations impact against them." The cable goes on to question U.S. morality at a time when "unfortunately, the overworked term genocide is applicable."

April 28, 1971. Memorandum for the president, Policy Options toward Pakistan: (Secret, 6 pp.) (Nixon's handwritten note.) Kissinger presents Nixon with U.S. policy options directed towards the crisis in East Pakistan. Nixon and Kissinger both feel that the third option is the best as it, as Kissinger writes "would have the advantage of making the most of the relationship with Yahya, while engaging in a serious effort to move the situation toward conditions less damaging to US and Pakistani interests." At the end of the last page Nixon writes: "To all hands: Don't squeeze Yahya at this time."

May 10, 1971. Memorandum of Conversation (3:05 - 3:30 p.m.) between U.S. and Pakistani officials including Henry Kissinger Agha Hilaly: They discuss the potential for a political solution in East Pakistan. Kissinger indicates Nixon's "high regard" and "personal affection" for Yahya and that "the last thing one does in this situation is to take advantage of a friend in need." On the same day (4:45 - 5:20 p.m.), in a meeting of the president and the Pakistani officials including Agha Hilaly, Nixon expresses sympathy for Pakistan by indicating that "Yahiya is a good friend," and in response to the genocide in the East, says he "could understand the anguish of the decisions which [Yahya] had to make." Nixon also declares that the U.S. "would not do anything to complicate the situation for President Yahiya or to embarrass him."

May 26, 1971. Department of State, Memorandum for the President, Possible India-Pakistan War: This memorandum denotes three causes that may lead to an India-Pakistan war and also formally recognises the mukti bahini: (1) Continued military repression in the East, (2) the refugee flow into India, and (3) Indian cross-border support to Bengali guerillas (the mukti bahini).

June 3, 1971 (4:00 P.M.). In a Meeting Kissinger indicates that Nixon wants to give Yahiya a few months to fix the situation, but that East Pakistan will eventually become independent. Kissinger points out that "the President has a special feeling for President Yahiya. One cannot make policy on that basis, but it is a fact of life."

July 19, 1971 Memorandum for Dr, Kissinger, Military Assistance to Pakistan and the Trip to Peking: Saunders discusses U.S. aid to South Asia, noting the connections between U.S. military assistance to Pakistan and Pakistan's role in the China initiative. Kissinger writes: "But it is of course clear that we have some special relationship with Pakistan."

August 7, 1971. Handwritten Letter from President Nixon to President Yahya: Nixon writes to personally thank Yahya for his assistance in arranging contacts between the U.S. and China. At a time when West Pakistani troops were engaging in a repression of East Pakistan, Nixon told Yahiya that "those who want a more peaceful world in the generation to come will forever be in your debt."

August 11, 1971. Meeting of the president, Henry Kissinger and the NSC Senior Review Group: Nixon says that the Indians are more "devious" than the "sometimes extremely stupid" Pakistanis, the U.S. "must not, cannot, allow" India to use the refugees as a pretext for breaking up Pakistan. Despite the conditions in the East, which Ambassador Blood described as "selective genocide," Nixon states that "we will not measure our relationship with the government in terms of what it has done in East Pakistan.”

November 15, 1971. Memorandum for General Haig, Pakistan/India Contingency Planning: The U.S. sends the nuclear aircraft carrier, USS Enterprise, into the Bay of Bengal; representing possible American involvement in the conflict, especially if it expanded to a superpower confrontation.

December 4 and December 16, 1971. White House, Telephone Conversations between Nixon and Kissinger: These records, in Haig's words "confirm the president's knowledge of, approval for and, if you will, directive to provide aircraft to Iran and Jordan" so that these countries will provide aircraft to Pakistan. Nixon express his desire to, "get some PR out to put the blame on India. It will also take some blame off us."

December 7, 1971. Jordanian Transfer of F-104's to Pakistan National Security Council Memorandum for Henry Kissinger. Includes State Department Cable to Jordan and U.S Embassy (Amman) cable: First page has a handwritten Kissinger note in which he suggests "that title should have been omitted." It expresses that "by law," the U.S. "cannot authorise" any military transfer unless the administration was willing "to change our own policy and provide the equipment directly." This would rule out any transfer of American military equipment for Pakistan, supplied by the U.S. or any third party like Jordan.

December 10, 1971. Event Summary by George H.W. Bush, (later president of U.S): UN Ambassador Bush describes a meeting between Kissinger and the Chinese delegation to the United Nations. Kissinger reveals that the American position on the issue was parallel to that of the Chinese. Kissinger disclosed that the U.S. would be moving some ships into the area, and also that military aid was being sent from Jordan, Turkey, and Iran. Some of this aid was illegally transferred because it was American in origin. Bush also reports that Kissinger gives his tacit approval for China to provide militarily support for Pakistani operations against India. Bush expresses his personal doubts about Kissinger's style, in one instance calling him paranoid and arrogant.

December 9, 1971. Department of State Cable, Pakistan Request for F-104s. The transfer of F-104 planes to Pakistan from both Jordan and Iran is under review at "very high level of USG."

December 14, 1971. Department of State, Situation Report #41, Situation in India-Pakistan as of 0700 hours (EST): The State Department notes that eleven Jordanian F-104 fighter aircraft have possibly been sent to Pakistan.

December 15, 1971. Department of State, Situation Report #44, Situation in India-Pakistan as of 0700 hours (EST): Heavy fighting is turning in favour of the Indians, while cease-fire plans continue to be in the works.

Same day. U.S Embassy (Islamabad) Cable: "The present trickle of Mig-19's and F-104's will not hold off the Indians." Writing next to Mig-19's notes "China" and next to F-104's notes "Jordan."

December 16, 1971. Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Memorandum, India-Pakistan Situation Report (As of 1200 EST): India has ordered a unilateral cease fire upon the unconditional surrender of West Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. Fighting continues "between Bengalis and scattered "Mujahid/Razakar/West Pakistani elements." Also, the CIA reports that a squadron of American origin, Jordanian F-104's was delivered to Pakistan on December 13 despite an American embargo on military supplies to both India and Pakistan.

December 29, 1971. U.S Embassy (Tehran), Cable, F-5 Aircraft to Pakistan: The embassy in Iran reports that three F-5A fighter aircraft, reportedly from the U.S, had been flown to Pakistan to assist in the war efforts against India. A Northrop official matches the aircraft to a group of planes originally slated for sale to Libya, This information suggests that not only did Washington look the other way when Jordan and Iran supplied U.S. planes to Pakistan, but that despite the embargo placed on Pakistan, it directly supplied Pakistan with fighter planes.
 
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US role in 1971 B`desh independence war `tragic mistake`: Envoy

'US role in 1971 B'desh independence war tragic mistake'

Dhaka: America's role in opposing the 1971 emergence of Bangladesh was a "tragic mistake", a top US envoy has said.

"Senator Kennedy helped my country to correct the mistake back in 1971 and we expressed that by quickly recognising Bangladesh," US Ambassador in Dhaka James F Moriarty said while speaking at a memorial meeting on Edward Kennedy at the Liberation War Museum here yesterday.


"I think we expressed that view by very quickly recognising Bangladesh after the end of the war. I think you all will recall that we were one of the first countries to recognise Bangladesh," Moriarty said.

The then US administration under President Richard Nixon and secretary of state Henry Kissinger sided with Pakistani military junta during the nine-month Liberation war, crucially backed by India.

The US media largely, several influential US senators including Kennedy widely supported the Bangladesh’s cause when Washington preferred to support Pakistan as Kissinger was engaged in a reconciliation dialogue with Communist China with active mediation of Islamabad.

Several state department officials in Washington, Dhaka and New Delhi too tended to support Bangladesh but several of them was exposed to wraths of Kissinger while one of them Archar Blood, the then US consular general in Dhaka eventually lost his career for his role in support of Independence struggle at that time.

But Moriarty said his country now wanted to look at each country individually and "We don't look at you as a former part of Pakistan or Bangladesh and Pakistan as former parts of India".

Recalling Kennedy's visit to refugee camps in West Bengal, Moriarty said Kennedy drew the attention of the world to the humanitarian disaster for the first time.

"Senator Kennedy's visit and continued support for Bangladesh's independence has a great impact on public opinion. I have no doubt that his efforts led to the early recognition of Bangladesh by the US," Moriarty added.

He said Ted Kennedy's visit to Dhaka in February 1972 was one of the first visits to an independent Bangladesh by an international leader.

"The events, as we have seen this week, bonded Ted Kennedy with the people of this country in a deep way and Senator Kennedy will live on in the hearts of the people of Bangladesh," Moriarty said.

Bureau Report
 

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