Tactical nuclear weapons in South Asia: the need to disavow, develop and deploy

[LETHALFORCE]

http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Fil...F-42A0-8DBA-EA7BBACE5812/en/08_Open+Forum.pdf


Tactical nuclear weapons in South Asia:
the need to disavow development and deployment



India and Pakistan have a window of opportunity at this time to disavow the development and deployment of very low-yield nuclear weapons in the sub-kiloton or 1–2 kiloton range. Weapons such as these have apparent utility on a battlefield, and in compact forms can even be fired from artillery guns. They may have limited blast damage radii measured in hundreds of meters, cause relatively low levels of casualties, and are aimed primarily at military targets. The control of such weapons, once deployed, is problematic, as their control may be delegated to battlefield commanders. They couldalso be more susceptible to misuse than strategic weapons kept under a more centralized command structure.

Recently, the United States National Academy of Sciences issued a report on Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.1 The panel of experts that wrote the report concluded, amongst other matters, that India and Pakistan probably need additional tests to develop low-yield compact weapons in the 1–2 kiloton and lower range, though they might be able to do so with great difficulty using sub-critical or very low-yield clandestine tests. Given their current moratorium on tests and their need for additional tests, it is possible therefore that India and Pakistan have not yet developed small and compact nuclear weapons of very low-yield—although India demonstrated such a capability through its sub-kiloton tests in May 1998.

Pakistan has a ‘first use’ policy towards nuclear weapons—that is, Pakistan will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if faced with a sufficiently threatening conventional defeat of its armed forces. This is similar to the American policy of Flexible Response enunciated by the United States Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1962 that ‘the United States is also prepared to counter with nuclear weapons any Soviet conventional attack so strong that it cannot be dealt with by conventional means’. Pakistan’s policy implies that ‘first use’ may be directed against Indian conventional forces, such as forward airfields, armoured columns and troop formations. Pakistan’s first use is not likely to be an allout pre-emptive strike against Indian nuclear capabilities and cities. This creates a problem for Indian strategic thought—if Pakistan’s first use of nuclear weapons is tactical in nature, and limited to an attack on Indian military forces, perhaps even primarily on Pakistani territory, India’s reliance on deterrence based on punitive retaliation could be called into question.

Without the possession of tactical nuclear weapons, and without the option of a flexible, measured and proportionate response, the Indian Prime Minister may be faced with the grim options of eithercalling for a massive and suicidal attack against Pakistani cities in response to a limited tactical use of a low-yield nuclear weapon by Pakistan or surrendering. This could well be called the ‘incredible nuclear deterrent’, rather than India’s professed aim to create a ‘credible minimum nuclear deterrent’! Further, if India has no tactical nuclear weapons, then Pakistan will expect a massive retaliation from India for Pakistan’s use of a tactical weapon. This could create an incentive for Pakistan to launch a more massive pre-emptive strike, if Pakistan were ever faced with the situation of being forced to use a tactical nuclear weapon for gains against a conventional Indian force.

One might mistakenly conclude, therefore, that the development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons of low-kiloton yields by India and Pakistan is apparently beneficial—in that, if deterrence fails, the destruction caused by a nuclear exchange restricted to small tactical weapons may be limited, though there are no guarantees that the exchange would not escalate out of control. In actuality, the development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons will be detrimental—making the use of nuclear weapons more probable, and deterrence less stable.

India’s Draft Report of the National Security Advisory Board on the Indian Nuclear Doctrine does address the issue of India’s possible response to tactical nuclear weapons use by an adversary though not very explicitly—and probably purposefully and rightfully so, to maintain ambiguity regarding India’s resolve to escalate in a crisis. The draft doctrine states that India’s ‘peacetime posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor that … any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor’ [emphasis added]. The phrase ‘any nuclear attack’ obviously includes a tactical nuclear attack. The Indian draft doctrine further states that India will ‘not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail’. This raises the possibility that even against the use of a tactical nuclear weapon, India may escalate to a far greater retaliation—that is, one that is unacceptable, assuming that a smaller retaliation with tactical nuclear weapons may be acceptable to the aggressor.The question is—what is ‘punitive retaliation’ and ‘unacceptable damage’? By remaining deliberately ambiguous, and not stating explicitly that the Indian punitive response will be proportionate, the Indian draft doctrine creates doubts for any potential aggressor, and increases in the aggressor’s mind the potential risks associated with the use of tactical weapons. The Indian draft doctrine, however, also states that the ‘strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security’ will decide the ‘actual size components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces’. Therefore, ‘punitive retaliation’ could well be a measured and proportionate response as long as it is unacceptable to the aggressor. The doctrine, therefore, holds open the possibility of India developing and deploying tactical nuclear weapons.

The problem for India and Pakistan with developing and then deploying tactical nuclear weapons is that this will make imagining ‘limited nuclear war’ more feasible and weaken deterrence. A limited nuclear war is certainly preferable to an all-out devastating nuclear exchange directed at major cities
and agricultural and industrial infrastructure. However, the capability to engage in a limited nuclear exchange increases the likelihood of such an exchange actually occurring.

Therefore, now may be the time for both India and Pakistan to unilaterally declare that they will not develop and deploy tactical nuclear weapons.2 It is possible that an agreement between India and Pakistan disallowing the development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons of low-kiloton range may be of value to both in terms of strengthening deterrence stability. Such an agreement could pave the way for developing the infrastructure for intrusive monitoring and verification that will be needed in the future if the two countries ever decide to limit or eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. In the interim, instead of a mutually agreed upon framework, the two countries could simply adopt unilateral pledges to never develop and deploy tactical nuclear weapons.

A similar situation exists between India and China regarding tactical nuclear weapons—that is, it would be destabilizing for either or both to deploy such weapons against the other. China has already developed tactical nuclear weapons. India and China have pledged ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons. They could strengthen their pledges by stating that they will also never deploy tactical nuclear weapons against the other. India could take the lead in this regard in South Asia. India could make a pledge similar to its ‘nofirst use’ policy. Reserving the right to develop tactical weapons if needed, India could pledge that it would never be the first to develop and deploy tactical nuclear weapons against an adversary.

Gaurav Rajen
The writer is an independent researcher and consultant on nuclear and environmental affairs
based in New Mexico, United States of America. The views expressed here are entirely his own.

Notes
1. National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Technical Issues Related to Ratification of the ComprehensiveNuclear Test Ban Treaty, 2002, Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Washington, DC, National Academy Press, available at <http://www.nap.edu/books/0309085063/html/> or <http://www.nap.edu/html/ctbt/>.

2. If either country has already developed tactical nuclear weapons (there is considerable ambiguity regarding thenature of each country’s nuclear weapons capability), then the declaration could be to never deploy such weaponsagainst the other.

 

[Martian]

After reading the article, it appears that India is in a bind. If Pakistan uses tactical nukes to destroy large masses of Indian troops on Pakistani soil, will India risk escalation? If India escalates then the risk increases of a full-scale nuclear exchange. If India does not escalate then India will have to swallow the massive troop losses without retaliation. Damn if you do and damn if you don't; it looks like a lose-lose proposition.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

This why the author is proposing the need for agreements with Pakistan and China to prevent this kind of scenario, it would be better for all parties and could ease tensions and possibly lead agreements regarding larger weapons in the future?

 

[Martian]

Perhaps everyone should learn from the centuries of warfare in Europe. It accomplished absolutely nothing. Millions of people died. But the imaginary borders on a map meant nothing in the end. With the advent of the EU and the freedom of travel between EU countries, the country borders are pretty meaningless.

I think that it's time that everybody grow up and build more bridges and conduct more trade between nations. With more countries waving nukes at one another, it could be a matter of time before millions of people die for nothing again.

 

[Yusuf]

Pakistan has no technology to make tactical nukes. India does and it can make them if required.
If their are indications of pakistan making tactical nukes, India will do so as well. So no question of India being in a bind.

China has NFU so it can be assumed they will not use tactical nukes.

 

[Officer of Engineers]

Conventional military systems have replaced tac nukes as of 15 years ago ... with far more effectiveness and far less ramifications, Only dumbasses favour a tac nuke over distributed submunitions and in case of hardened targets, a dual delivery of a primary earth penetrating HE to be followed by a thermobaric blast.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Pakistan has no technology to make tactical nukes. India does and it can make them if required.
If their are indications of pakistan making tactical nukes, India will do so as well. So no question of India being in a bind.

China has NFU so it can be assumed they will not use tactical nukes.

yusuf I have read reports that Pakistan may have tactical nukes some coming from Indian military??

www.outlookindia.com | "Yes, Pakistan Has Tactical Nukes"

If Pakistan does not have how difficult would be for them to obtain from China or N.korea?

---------- Post added at 01:32 PM ---------- Previous post was at 01:32 PM ----------

Tactical Nuclear Weapons, the Menace No One Is Talking About -- Politics Daily

Tactical Nuclear Weapons, the Menace No One Is Talking About

All hail the U.S. and Russian negotiators who begin work this week on a new strategic nuclear weapons reduction treaty, a worthy goal. But Presidents Obama and Medvedev, who agreed on the outlines of the treaty at their Moscow summit, seem to have overlooked thousands of nasty nuclear weapons bristling right under their noses in Europe: Russian and American tactical nukes.

About 4,500 of these war-fighting weapons, mostly bombs and short-range missile warheads, are stored in Europe and in western Russia. They are not a subject of the strategic nuclear arms talks announced in Moscow. In fact, they are not part of any arms control treaty or negotiation.

The security of the facilities where they are stored, including underground U.S. bunkers across Western Europe, has come under question. The Russians have at least eight times as many of these weapons as the United States has deployed in Europe, an imbalance that a panel of senior American experts recently called "stark and worrisome.''

In the shifting geopolitics of post-Cold War Europe, tactical nuclear weapons play an increasingly important role in Russian military doctrine, a brute reminder of Russian power against the growing influence of the West along its borders. For instance, the Russians are working to fit tactical nuclear warheads onto submarine-launched cruise missiles, a weapon that "will play a key role'' in Russian strategy, according to Vice Adm. Oleg Bursev of the Russian General Staff. "Their range and precision are gradually increasing,'' he said this spring.

On the U.S. side, the arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe serves as a powerful symbol of America's guarantee of protection to its European allies, including former Soviet satellites such as Poland and the Czech Republic. Small wonder, given the military and political clout of these armaments, that the summit agreement to reduce nuclear weapons never mentioned tactical nukes.

"I'm not surprised -- tactical nuclear weapons is a much tougher issue,'' said Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the nonpartisan Federation of American Scientists.

Strategic nuclear weapons are the big, obvious ones, the warheads mounted inside the nose cones of intercontinental ballistic missiles blasted from underground silos or submarines. They also include the heavy thermonuclear bombs carried by long-range bombers. These strategic weapons, hundreds of times more powerful than the 1945 Hiroshima bomb, are too terrible ever to be used. They are not for war-fighting; they are for deterrence. The United States has missiles humming away in their silos, pointed at Russia (and elsewhere), so that the Russians wouldn't dare shoot. And Medvedev has his missiles pointed at us. This, say nuclear strategists, makes us safe.

Tactical nukes are a different matter. These are bombs carried on ordinary jets, like F-16s, and mounted on short-range ballistic missiles. This class of weapons might still include the nuclear land mines and nuclear artillery shells that were deployed by the tens of thousands in Europe during the Cold War. The United States and Russia both say they've gotten rid of these weapons, but intelligence services on each side harbor doubts.

The U.S. tactical weapons, mostly B-61 thermonuclear bombs, are stored in underground vaults in Belgium, Holland, Germany, Italy, and Turkey, where they are under the control of U.S. Air Force munitions support squadrons. The arrangement is that in wartime, they'd be handed over to the host nation to use in its own aircraft as part of a NATO military operation. The Air Force, in a worldwide inspection of its nuclear facilities, looked at these bases in 2007 and found that "most sites require additional resources to meet DOD [Department of Defense] security requirements.''

Part of the problem, according to the Federation of American Scientists, which obtained the internal Air Force report, is that the base security provided by the host nations varies widely, with some bases being guarded by military conscripts with little training or experience.

Almost nothing is known publicly about Russia's tactical nuclear weapons storage sites. The exact numbers and types of tactical nuclear weapons also are secret. Kristensen puts the number of deployed Russian weapons at 2,050, with an additional 5,390 in deep storage. Deployed U.S. weapons are said to number "less than 500.''

"Russia enjoys a sizable numerical advantage,'' the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, a blue-ribbon panel headed by former Defense Secretary William Perry, reported this spring. Russia "stores thousands of these weapons in apparent support of possible military operations west of the Urals,'' the report said. Whatever the number, strategists are coming to consider these weapons as an increasingly destabilizing factor in Europe.

Ultimately, of course, there is concern about miscalculation in an escalating confrontation over, say, Georgia. Many conflicts start unintentionally, and the tactical nuclear weapons are close at hand for saber-rattling purposes.

A more immediate problem looms, however. As Russia and the United States reduce their strategic nuclear weapons, the relative clout of tactical nukes rises. The existing imbalance in tactical nukes "will become more apparent" and U.S. allies will be "less assured,'' the commission said.

As Kristensen described it to me, the concern is that "as you cut down the deployed strategic forces, you end up with more tactical than strategic weapons deployed and that begins to create some problems. In the U.S., we don't have very many non-strategic [tactical] nuclear weapons compared to the Russians. If we agree to go down to very low levels of strategic weapons, that begins to matter to strategists.''

Especially to strategists concerned about maintaining a strong "nuclear umbrella'' over its friends and allies in Europe. Let's say, however improbable, that Moscow and Washington agree to throw tactical nuclear weapons into the arms reduction negotiations that Obama and Medvedev agreed to this week.

How likely is a deal? Not very, experts suggest.

For one thing, tactical nukes are small and easily hidden. And their "delivery vehicles'' -- arms-control jargon for the aircraft or missiles that carry them -- are also used for other purposes. Reliably counting these weapons and verifying reductions is devilishly difficult, the experts say.

Another reason is that the numbers are too important to each side to think seriously about reductions. Russia's conventional military forces are smaller and vastly inferior to those of the United States, and Russian analysts see their nuclear weapons as a critical counterbalance. Russia also needs its tactical nukes to deter problems along its long border with China.

On the U.S. side, a key goal is keeping Europeans reassured that Russia can't muscle them around. It's not that Washington would fire off its tactical nuclear weapons in a crisis, but that simply withdrawing the weapons would make some vulnerable European nations -- Lithuania comes to mind -- uneasy. And "uneasy'' is something to be avoided in a crisis.

The blue-ribbon commission, in laying out a proposed U.S. approach to the issue, succinctly demonstrated the problem: The United States should go after deep cuts in Russian tactical nukes, but go easy in cutting its own.

"All allies depending on the U.S. nuclear umbrella,'' it said in a statement that probably mirrors the Kremlin's own thinking, "should be assured that any changes in its forces do not imply a weakening of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees.''

Tactical nukes, then, will stay.

---------- Post added at 02:16 PM ---------- Previous post was at 01:32 PM ----------

more detailed information

Tactical nuclear weapons: emergent ... - Google Books

 

[SATISH]

Yes tactical nukes are a menace. We have the Prithvi as a tactical delivery system and we have had sub-kiloton and low yield nukes for long. The major delivery system for these kind of warheads are the Cruise and ballistic missiles. I doubt Pakistanis will have a sub-kiloton artillery shell which we are presumed to be having. Tactical nukes are too costly for a country like Pakistan to mount on artillery shells and unguided rockets. Hence they will preserve most of their Uranium for their strategic weapons and with the change in doctrine of the armed forces and the fear of escalation Pakistan might refrain from using them. And conventional weapons with high accuracy have replaced tactical nukes. Mention the word 'NUKE' and the world starts squabbling.

 

[SATISH]

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Just an overview on which platforms tactical nukes can be placed...people most of the time think the nukes are placed only on missiles which is not the case...they can also be mounted on artillery shells and MBRL rockets.

 

[Yusuf]

Use of tactical nukes have been discontinued as OoE has said. It doesn't make sense these days. If an army uses tac nukes against a say defensive formation, then how will it advance in a contaminated scenario? But by using nukes it has made itself naked to a retaliatory strike.

Also LF discount news of pak having tac nukes. Miniaturizing is not in their grasp. Besides paks only blackmail is striking indian cities with it's missiles tipped with nukes. So they are not going to waste anytime on using tacs.

But again tac nukes don't make sense at all on the battle field. It is a cold war relic.

 

[hit&run]

Use of tactical nukes have been discontinued as OoE has said. It doesn't make sense these days. If an army uses tac nukes against a say defensive formation, then how will it advance in a contaminated scenario? But by using nukes it has made itself naked to a retaliatory strike.

Also LF discount news of pak having tac nukes. Miniaturizing is not in their grasp. Besides paks only blackmail is striking indian cities with it's missiles tipped with nukes. So they are not going to waste anytime on using tacs.

But again tac nukes don't make sense at all on the battle field. It is a cold war relic.

Tactical nukes can be used on already over powered but malignantly resistant remained pockets of enemy forces . Again the question is does Forces think of contamination of environment etc..when at war. Mentioned scenario can also serve the query whether forces want to entrenched through that contaminated area or not. Operational doctrines are flexible and can be multifactorial in terms of completing the mission; may or may not require physical presences of forwarding forces into those abandoned/contaminated ghostly towns/areas.
I may be wrong and not sure tac. nukes were available; but tactical nukes were the choice of weapon and may have saved Nagasaki and Hiroshima like mass destruction if used on resistant Japanese in WWII.

 

[Yusuf]

Tactical nukes can be used on already over powered but malignantly resistant remained pockets of enemy forces . Again the question is does Forces think of contamination of environment etc..when at war. Mentioned scenario can also serve the query whether forces want to entrenched through that contaminated area or not. Operational doctrines are flexible and can be multifactorial in terms of completing the mission; may or may not require physical presences of forwarding forces into those abandoned/contaminated ghostly towns/areas.
I may be wrong and not sure tac. nukes were available; but tactical nukes were the choice of weapon and may have saved Nagasaki and Hiroshima like mass destruction if used on resistant Japanese in WWII.

Conventional advances have negated the use of tactical nukes. Your troops will not go into a contaminated area even in the event of a war. How can they advance knowing they will run into radioactive zone? Beats the purpose of destroying the enemy resistance. But then, by using nukes, you have set your self up for an escalation from the enemy and they may use strategic nukes.

 

[hit&run]

Conventional advances have negated the use of tactical nukes. Your troops will not go into a contaminated area even in the event of a war. How can they advance knowing they will run into radioactive zone? Beats the purpose of destroying the enemy resistance. But then, by using nukes, you have set your self up for an escalation from the enemy and they may use strategic nukes.

yes you are very right with your approach i have also supported the same in my previous posts,
I was rigid with the same approach, but since then i have read few good articles and have concluded (may be wrong) by sticking on my previous stand as you mentioned above.
that operational doctrines don't mind exceptions, tactical nukes can discourage enemies (1.already overpowered but now 2. scattered/insurgent 3.in their own territories, 3.giving hard times with a trivial possibility that is 4.still capable of reuniting or may retaliate with dirty bombs and have logistical support able to cause massive damage) in detail.
This perception is based on what US did in Iraqi Int. Airport!?; where Iraq was already overpowered.
Wasn't US scared of retaliation from iraqi forces from their so called WMD/CWs?

Do you think after conventional war, the war ends abruptly itself?

 

[Martian]

"Wasn't US scared of retaliation from iraqi forces from their so called WMD/CWs?"

I watched a program (on the History Channel?) on the US-Iraq war. The program claimed that the US threatened to nuke Tikrit, Saddam's home town, if Saddam used chemical weapons on US troops. If Saddam had escalated and used CWs then the US threatened to vaporize Saddam's tribe, including all of his relatives in Tikrit. Knowing the US history of using nukes on Japan, I think Saddam chickened out.

"The town is among westerners perhaps best known for being the birthplace, in 1937, of Saddam Hussein" See Tikrit - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

On 14 August 1991, Defense Secretary Cheney stated that "t should be clear to Saddam Hussein that we have a wide range of military capabilities that will let us respond with overwhelming force and extract a very high price should he be foolish enough to use chemical weapons on United States forces."(12) The American government reportedly used third-party channels to privately warn Iraq that "in the event of a first use of a weapon of mass destruction by Iraq, the United States reserved the right to use any form of retaliation (presumably up to and including nuclear weapons)."(13) See http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/ds-threats.htm

 

[LETHALFORCE]

tactical nukes maybe a cold war relic, but Russia is still estimated to have anywhere from 5000 to 7000 weapons even today,so it must fit in somewhere in their strategy to have so many. But the context we are looking at is India and Pakistan. For Pakistan to use tactical nukes against India is even more practical than using larger nukes. The use by Pakistanis would possibly be in the following scenarios:

1)space threshold is crossed -loss of significant territory
2)Military threshold is crossed-loss of significant numbers of army of air force
3)Economic strangle hold by India-Blockade of ports,manipulation of water supply or other economic warfare
4)Domestic Destabilization-Internal subervsion of pakistani politics that threaten to destabilize the country

All of these scenarios have occured or India has been accused of doing. Nuclear weapons in a sense are also cold war weapons but India and Pakistan are pursuing them with a passion, NPT,CTBT,FMCT are all from or during the cold war era and both countries are non signatories to all cold war treaties, so the cold war in a sense is alive and well in the subcontinent. The scenarios above are defensive pakistani scenarios. Since pakistan does not have a no first use policy Pakistan can also use these wepaons in an offensive way.

1)attack on Indian Naval forces
2)attack on Indian ground forces inside pakistan
3)attack on Indian ground forces inside India
4)attack on Indian airfields
5)attack on Indian nuclear assets (reactors etc...)
6)attack on Indian infrastructure (dams in Kashmir)
7)used with larger nukes to overwhelm Indian BMD a salvo of tactical nukes followed by larger nuclear missile strikes

Pakistan is reportedly not able to make these weapons yet, but that may change in the future or in the near future and these weapons may be pursued in large numbers because of an added bonus INDIAN BMD WOULD NOT BE EFFECTIVE against these weapons. If a tactical nuke is used first by Pakistan in any of the above scenarios does India escalate by using larger nukes or absorb the loss?

 

[hit&run]

"Wasn't US scared of retaliation from iraqi forces from their so called WMD/CWs?"

I watched a program (on the History Channel?) on the US-Iraq war. The program claimed that the US threatened to nuke Tikrit, Saddam's home town, if Saddam used chemical weapons on US troops. If Saddam had escalated and used CWs then the US threatened to vaporize Saddam's tribe, including all of his relatives in Tikrit. Knowing the US history of using nukes on Japan, I think Saddam chickened out.

"The town is among westerners perhaps best known for being the birthplace, in 1937, of Saddam Hussein" See Tikrit - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

On 14 August 1991, Defense Secretary Cheney stated that "t should be clear to Saddam Hussein that we have a wide range of military capabilities that will let us respond with overwhelming force and extract a very high price should he be foolish enough to use chemical weapons on United States forces."(12) The American government reportedly used third-party channels to privately warn Iraq that "in the event of a first use of a weapon of mass destruction by Iraq, the United States reserved the right to use any form of retaliation (presumably up to and including nuclear weapons)."(13) See Nuclear Threats During the Gulf War

I am not getting your post Martian,
Anyhow your post is revealing that there was a possibility of WMD/CWs retaliation by Iraqi forces on US. The whole war was fought on the fact that Iraq has WMD/CW and may use it on US. Countless depleated uranium (U238) bombs/ were used in op. Desert storm and in second iraqi war. Use of Tac. Nuke in Bagdad on already overpowred Iraqi forces suggest that US was scared or was not in a position to take any chances and was determined to punish that high saturation of iraqi forces in Bagdad.

 

[roma]

the way i see the suitability of tactical nukes is as follows ;

1. THey have to be (obviously ) within part of the overall poilcy or doctrine of the INdian defence estab .

2. That policy should have at the centre of its missle development doctrine, the pilllar that missile defence is an important the core or backbone of our defence

3. as such india should be mass-producing missiles and nuke warheads.

4. then tactical nukes can take their appropriate place with the SPECTRUM of missiles plus nuke warhead system(s) .

5. without such a COMMITMENT , tactical nukes are a "neither here nor there" weapon and as some other respected member(s) of this forum have mentioned , even conventional weapons could do a better job and not raise eyebrows that "india has used nukes."

 

[LETHALFORCE]

BMD would be ineffective for BABUR with a nuclear warhead,it would also be ineffective against a salvo of cruise missiles. Pakistan can also air deliver tactical nukes with the F-16's from USA or even possibly use there MIRAGES. Pakistan also has 122mm MBRL where the french are rumored to have increased the range and they are in contract with the chinese to buy A-100's both which can also be used as possible delivery platforms

Pakistan Aircraft Special Weapons Delivery Systems

http://forum.pakistanidefence.com/lofiversion/index.php/t82449.html

The main question would be how does India respond?? 2 options absorb the attack and take the loss (as they have thruout history) or respond with larger nukes and escalate to possibly all out nuclear war?

 

[Yusuf]

LF, the reasons you have listed a couple of posts eariler is as per Pak nuke doctrine. What has now become the "threshold of Pakistan" to launch nukes. And that will mean use of strategic nukes tipped on their ballistic missiles not tactical nukes.

Russia does have 5000 tac nukes because they inherited them from the Soviet Union. They also maintain them probably because they are threatened by a large and probably conventionally superior NATO force and tac nukes are a deterrent for them. And also since it has a large strategic arsenel as well, they don't have to worry about their strategic assets coming under fire.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

LF, the reasons you have listed a couple of posts eariler is as per Pak nuke doctrine. What has now become the "threshold of Pakistan" to launch nukes. And that will mean use of strategic nukes tipped on their ballistic missiles not tactical nukes.

Yusuf we would not know which would be used first? Also once they acquire this ability a cruise missile like BABUR maybe more than just a cruise missile? It will add a new complexity to the nuclear arms race in south asia. I agree with the author that some kind of agreements or treaty by both governments needs to be reached so there is no mistakes by either side.