Sukhoi Su 30MKI

[Vinod DX9]

Big Breaking: #BrahMos testfird from Su-30 MKI over Balasore test firing range (Ajit Kumar Dubey)

 

[TPFscopes]

.

 

[V_Force]

GOOD NEWS -

 

[Hiranyaksha]

__________________________________________________________________________________

 

[Jagdish58]

Next strike on terror camp Su-30MKI - Brahmos combo

Wish Air launched Nirbhay is also developed soon

 

[Sameer Chaudhary]

why it is so special?. and as per the tweet, it creates world record, what is that record?

 

[Kalki_2018]

Wy wasn't it tested to full 450 Km range?

 

[Chinmoy]

why it is so special?. and as per the tweet, it creates world record, what is that record?

None of the frontline fighter in world till date was tested for or carried such a heavy missile.

 

[Chinmoy]

Wy wasn't it tested to full 450 Km range?

This is the first firing test. More would be there for varying range and targets.

 

[Bahamut]

good news

 

[Vinod DX9]

Better quality pics of today's test

 

[Prashant12]

Brahmos A Video



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[lcafanboy]

30000000000000000000000000000000000000

 

[sthf]

• Opinion

How 4 great Indians from 3 rival parties saved Sukhoi-30
SHEKHAR GUPTA 23 November, 2017

A Sukhoi Su-30MKI makes touchdown on the Lucknow-Agra Expressway | Photo by Subhankar Chakraborty/Hindustan Times via Getty Images
A Sukhoi-30 fired a Brahmos missile to national applause and defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman hailed it as a world record. An inside story of how the IAF’s Su-30 dream would have crashed before take-off but for the sagacity of Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Jaswant Singh and the most unlikely, Mulayam.

This is a story from the summer of 1996. Some of you might remember (and the rest can Google) how a little controversy had started to build in the last days of the Narasimha Rao government when, with the election campaign in full swing, the Sukhoi-30 deal was signed with the Russians and, The Indian Express broke the story. There were immediate protests from the BJP. Rao’s was after all a caretaker government with the Election Commission’s model code in force.

There were dark insinuations, as it is usual with all defence deals: was Rao in a hurry to collect hundreds of crores for his campaign?

Then, surprisingly, the BJP stepped back. Because the facts were absolutely to the contrary. Somebody did indeed want money from the Sukhoi deal, but it wasn’t Rao.

Two weeks before the first round of the 1996 elections, I got a call one morning from Jaswant Singh to talk about the Sukhoi story.

What did I think about the deal, he asked. Did I suspect there was a scam, like Bofors? I told him I had heard no such thing and that my friends in the IAF thought this was a great aircraft. He then asked me if I would see Mr Vajpayee (then leader of the opposition) to talk more about this.

The same afternoon, I got a call from Vajpayee’s home to see him at breakfast the next morning. Vajpayee was lovingly and generously buttering a crisp toast and feeding it in small pieces to his favourite Pomeranian, while exploring the possibility of a campaign-time bonanza of a scandal bigger than Bofors.

His question, briefly, was as follows. The lame-duck Congress government had sealed the deal in its last days in an unseemly hurry. It was also his ‘information’ that the government had paid an advance of around $350 million to the Russians without any final price settlement. Why such an unusual rush? Did the Congress want to collect a kickback in the last, cash-and-carry phase of its government?

He said he had heard that the Express knew more about this, or if not, could I have it looked at more closely? He said his apprehension was that “if it is a good plane, unsubstantiated talk of a scam should not scuttle the deal”. At the same time, knowing the ways of the Rao government, and circumstantial evidence in the case, you naturally suspected a kickback.

We checked out our usual sources and suspects and it did not seem that the decision, though hasty, was mala fide. The BJP too kept quiet, Rao’s Congress was defeated anyway, and Vajpayee’s coalition government was sworn in, although the first time it lasted only 13 days.

It was towards the last couple of days of that government that Jaswant Singh called me to chat on the sidelines of a public function. “That Sukhoi story,” he said, “is actually nothing.” Having been in government now, they had been able to look at the files and it was a clean deal and the haste, if any, was in a larger national interest, so it would be better to forget all about it. He wouldn’t tell me what that ‘larger’ national interest was.

The scene now shifts to the IAF mess on New Delhi’s Zakir Hussain Marg, a few months later, and we pick up the thread of that Sukhoi story again. Now H.D. Deve Gowda’s coalition was in power and Mulayam Singh Yadav was the defence minister. His ministry had organised a dinner for him to meet senior editors at the IAF’s showpiece mess in Delhi. Mulayam’s defence ministry had just finalised the full Sukhoi order. I stole a discreet moment to ask him if he had looked at the Sukhoi deal closely, because it was signed by Rao in such haste, there was a large, arbitrary advance involved, and because the top leaders of the BJP were at one stage suspicious about it.

“I know, I know, Jaswantji and Atalji had brought this up with me,” he said. Then he went on to describe in detail how, before the final, full deal was signed, he had actually invited Vajpayee and Jaswant to South Block to have a detailed presentation on the deal given to them. He said they had suggested changes in the deal documentation, including the provision of a sovereign guarantee from the Russian government that no kickbacks were paid and, should any be discovered any time in future, they would reimburse the amount to the Government of India.

Then, Mulayam said with a lot of delight: “They came to my office, we settled everything, but you people never found anything out.”

That conversation ended with Mulayam telling me triumphantly, and repeatedly, “Dekha, media phail ho gaya (see, the media failed to find out).”

We had failed, alright, to break a marvellous story, of how arch-rivals Mulayam and the BJP had actually exchanged notes on such a sensitive issue behind closed doors. Though late, it was still a great story, I thought, and so asked the redoubtable Ritu Sarin, the head of the Express investigative bureau, to find out more.

Sure enough, she landed up at Jaswant Singh’s office to check. At which point I once again got an invitation to Vajpayee’s house. This time, the point was simple. Could the Express avoid this story please? Because if it was published, it might hamper “our ability to communicate across party lines even on issues of such sensitivity and national interest”. These are days of bitter, ideological politics, but governing India is serious business, he said, or something to that effect.

Now, the mystery of what exactly that ‘larger’ national interest was that had led to such haste and a large advance payment in the last days of the Rao government. It seems that Boris Yeltsin had told Rao that he too was heading for elections, that the Sukhoi factory happened to be in his constituency, was too broke to pay salaries to its staff and if India could pay it that advance, salaries would be paid. It would work like magic in his election campaign.

That advance was, therefore, a political deal between the big boys, to be adjusted in the final pricing later. It was a conscious, diplomatic decision, cleared by Rao, and executed by none else than the then finance minister, Manmohan Singh.

Rao took an incredibly bold decision (given the Bofors background) which the BJP, locked in a bitter electoral battle with him, was suspicious of, but did not make an issue of, in the national interest.

When the BJP found the real reason (the Yeltsin request) they kept quiet — they in fact said Rao’s government had handled it masterfully. Then Mulayam Singh, whose entire politics is based on anti-BJPism, was large-hearted enough to open the files to its leaders and take their advice, again in the national interest.

In one story, therefore, you had the top leadership of all three major political groups — bitter enemies — involved. Yet they talked, shared confidences, and did the right thing by their nation. Now compare that with the lack of communication, even social graces, the general antagonism in our politics through this past month, and you know why that Sukhoi story is so relevant, and worthy of recall.

https://theprint.in/2017/11/23/how-four-great-indians-from-rival-parties-saved-sukhoi-30/

 

[sjmaverick]

Someone clarify, with this weight reduction of Brahmos and integration can Su 30MKI land back without dropping this missile...If i recollect the aircraft can take off with this 2.5 ton missile but cannot land safely with it still attached to its belly ? or this has been solved

 

[Chinmoy]

Someone clarify, with this weight reduction of Brahmos and integration can Su 30MKI land back without dropping this missile...If i recollect the aircraft can take off with this 2.5 ton missile but cannot land safely with it still attached to its belly ? or this has been solved

Weight reduction of BRAHMOS has been carried out to make it operable from MKI. The flight tests of it has been carried out to validate this. MKI could both take off and land with it.

 

[flying.modi]

BRAHMOS SUCCESSFULLY TEST FIRED FROM SUKHOI 30 MKI . AND ITS RANGE INCRESED FROM 200 TO 600 KM

 

[Steven Rogers]

Can anyone tell me where HAL makes IRST OLS30 FOR Su30mki it manufacturers, or is it imported like the radar.

Sent from my Aqua Ace II using Tapatalk

 

[WolfPack86]

As the Indian Air Force juggles between the idea of procuring single engine or twin engine fighter jets to replenish its depleted squadron strength, an expert tells Sputnik that the emphasis on single-engine fighter aircraft is a contrived and arbitrary approach to a pressing concern.

New Delhi (Sputnik) – The Indian Air Force (IAF) is at a pivotal crossroads. Despite its impressive capability advancements in recent years, it now faces declining squadron strength as the bulk of its current squadron is either already past their service deadline or is due to retire within the next decade.

Presently, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has 34 squadrons (18-20 fighter jets in a squadron), which include MiG-21, MiG-27, MiG-29, Jaguar, Mirage 2000, Su-30MKI, and Tejas LCA aircraft. The bulk of the combat aircraft belong to the MiG family and all of them are far beyond their official dates of service. The IAF desires the strength of some 42 combat squadrons by the 2027-32 period in order to meet the contingencies of a two-front war with China and Pakistan.

India has contracted three more Su-30MKI, two Dassault Rafale squadrons, and two squadrons of Tejas MK.1 fighters. This will add some seven squadrons to the IAF. However, six squadrons of MiG-21Bison and the two MiG-27UPG will be phased out by 2025. Furthermore, one Jaguar squadron is due to retire by 2027, which would mean an overall deficiency of 13 squadrons by 2027 when set against its desired strength.

The IAF has two options before it to replenish the depleting fleet. The first is the procurement of new single and twin-engine fighter jets. The other involves the procurement of four squadrons of the locally developed Tejas Mk.1A variant.

In order to fill the void to be generated from immediate retirements, the IAF is considering issuing a global tender for single engine fighter jets. Twin-engine jet would be acquired at a later stage when funds are available with the force, according to sources.

Vijainder K Thakur, IAF veteran known for his independent views tells Sputnik about the most appropriate options before the force.


Sputnik: The IAF has been pondering over various options to reach out to the required strength of 42 squadrons in the shortest possible time-frame. Despite considering off-the-shelf purchases along with Make-in-India, it is highly unlikely that fleet could be replenished in the next 15 years. How necessary is it for the IAF to have 42 squadrons?

Vijainder K Thakur: If equipped with 42 squadrons of front-line aircraft, the IAF would be a formidable force which would strongly deter any joint adventure by our two adversary neighbors. However, India clearly cannot afford to equip the IAF with 42 squadrons by introducing two very expensive new fighter types into service. If the IAF wants to reach the figure of 42 quickly it should order more Su-30MKIs or MiG-35s.

Sputnik: There has been a tug of war between those favoring single engine fighter jets and those in favor of twin-engine jets. What in your opinion should be the consideration?

Vijainder K Thakur: The requirement for a single engine fighter is contrived and arbitrary. Single engine or multi-engine was not a criterion during the MMRCA acquisition which was ultimately abandoned. Why has it become an important consideration now? The single-engine qualitative requirement was likely introduced purely to limit the choice to the F-16 and SAAB Gripen-E, not out of any operational necessity. The IAF should be focused on the payload, range and operating costs of its fighters, not whether it is single or twin engine.

Sputnik: In October, Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa categorically stated that the emphasis on single-engine fighter jets was a cost-cutting attempt whereas the Indian Air Force actually desired twin-engine jets.

Vijainder K Thakur: Single engine fighters are claimed to have lower operating costs. However, the evidence to support the claim is not convincing. According to Forbes, the operating cost-per-hour for a F-16C is $8,278 and for the F/A-18E is $10,507. The difference is marginal and if you factor in the F/A-18E's much greater weapon load and range, the 'single engine is cheaper' claim completely falls apart. On the other hand, many F-16s have crashed because their only engine failed, while many F/A-18s have returned to base safely after losing one engine. Twin engine fighters are unarguably safer to fly! Lesser crashes results in lowered operating costs!

Sputnik: Should the Indian Air Force order more upgraded Su30MKI and Su35 instead of going for the global tender on the single-engine fighter jet?

Vijainder K Thakur: The IAF has ordered 272 Su-30 aircraft, enough to equip around 23 — 24 squadrons. Considering that at one point in time the IAF was operating with around 30 squadrons of MiG-21 variants, there is scope to order additional upgraded Su-30MKI or Su-35s. The aircraft is currently under production at Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) Nasik division. Also, the Su-30MKI is a perfect fit for the IAF doctrine, which advocates use of fighter aircraft that can perform any role.

Sputnik: The why is the IAF not considering the purchase of additional Su30MKI?

Vijainder K Thakur: The IAF should be considering additional upgraded Su-30MKIs/Su-35 or MiG-35 to limit and optimize its inventory. The imperatives for not considering additional Su-30MKIs/Su-35/MiG-35 are likely geopolitical, not operational.

Sputnik: Is this because the Indian Air Force wants different types of fighter jets in its inventory?

Vijainder K Thakur: The USAF operates 4 fighter types: F-16, F-15, A-10, and F-22. It is in the process of replacing its A-10 and F-16 fighters with the F-35A. In other words, the USAF aims to reduce the types of fighters in its inventory from four to three. The US Navy, the second largest air force in the world, operates with a single fighter type — F/A-18. It is in the process of replacing the older F/A-18 variants with the F-35C. In other words, the USN inventory fighter types are set to increase from 1 to 2. The RuAF operates 4 fighter types — Su-27/30/35, MiG-29, MiG-31 and Su-25 (The Su-34 is a bomber). The IAF currently operates seven fighter types: MiG-21 variants, MiG-27 variants, MiG-29 variants, Jaguar, Mirage 2000, Su-30MKI, and Tejas LCA. It's set to introduce 8th type — Rafale! Clearly, there is a need for the IAF to reduce the types of fighters in its inventory, not the other way around!
http://www.defencenews.in/article.aspx?id=454927

 

[WolfPack86]

When will Super Sukhoi upgrade will be signed ?.