Qsaark the countries you mentioned specifically USA and Canada are the ones i will reply to
USA had nuclear trade with India starting in the 1950's under Eisenhower's atoms for peace program, later with the creation of the NPT there was no trade upto recently with the US-India nuclear deal. The canadian nuclear trade with India under CANDU also started in the 1950's until 1974 ; the Cirus canadian reactor is no longer operational. Lumping this in with Chinese NPT violations to Pakistan is not the same. The basic difference is China was violating the NPT while being a signatory and also possibly violating CTBT.
http://www.nci.org/i/ib12997.htm
Canada has also done nuclear trade with pakistan.India is currently negotiating a new nuclear treaty with Canada.
Canadian Nuclear Cooperation with India and Pakistan
CANADIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION
WITH INDIA & PAKISTAN
all research by David Martin
Nuclear Awareness Project
BACKGROUND
by David Martin
1. Canada suspended nuclear cooperation with India following the explosion of a bomb at the Pokhran site in May 1974. The bomb had used plutonium manufactured in a research reactor known as "CIRUS" given to India by Canada.
However, it was not until May 1976, after unsuccessful discussions to upgrade proliferation safeguards, that Canada formally ended its nuclear relationship with India.
After the 1974 Indian nuclear test, discussions on improved safeguards also took place with Pakistan. Again, negotiations were unsuccessful, and nuclear cooperation with Pakistan was terminated in December 1976.
2. Beginning in 1989, at the urging of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) Canada quietly re-started nuclear cooperation with India & Pakistan. This occurred through the CANDU Owners Group (COG), an alliance of AECL and utilities with CANDU reactors around the world.
The motto of the CANDU Owners Group -- an integral part of their corporate logo -- is "Strength Through Cooperation".
WHY CANADA SHOULD END
ALL NUCLEAR COOPERATION
WITH INDIA & PAKISTAN
3. Neither Indian nor Pakistan have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nor have they signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Neither does Canada have any Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCAs) with India or Pakistan. That should be reason enough to end all nuclear cooperation.
4. There is no clear separation in either India or Pakistan between the military and civilian nuclear programs. Aid for one is aid for the other.
5. AECL, COG and the Canadian government are defending nuclear cooperation and information exchange on the grounds that it promotes reactor safety in India and Pakistan.
In reality however, the issue would not have been unsafe operation. Without Canadian nuclear cooperation India would likely have had to shut down the two RAPS reactors (the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station).
Similarly Pakistan would almost certainly have had to shut down the KANUPP reactor (the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant). Its pressure tubes used the original CANDU alloy known as "Zircalloy" that was extremely prone to embrittlement.
In other words, refusal of nuclear cooperation by Canada would have been an extremely effective sanction, since it would have necessitated the shutdown of the RAPS and KANUPP reactors.
6. Canadian aid has gone far beyond just information exchange. The CANDU Owners Group (COG) orchestrated a major rehabilitation of the KANUPP reactor in Pakistan. This involved extended work from 1990 to the present by AECL and Ontario Hydro and other contractors.
7. Although the KANUPP and RAPS reactors ARE safeguarded (inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency), the COG Annual Report for 1995-96 confirms that AECL and Ontario Hydro technicians worked on the Narora and Kakrapar nuclear stations in India (NAPS and KAPS). These reactors are NOT safeguarded.
8. The fact that the KANUPP and RAPS reactors are safeguarded is NOT an acceptable defense for providing aid to them. In the case of India, knowledge gained from work on the RAPS reactors is clearly transferable to the other six operating CANDU "clones" and the four under construction.
9. The CIRUS "research" reactor, which Canada gave to India in 1956, was used to produce plutonium for India's first bomb exploded in 1974. CIRUS continues to operate, and it is NOT safeguarded. It is quite possible, even likely, that CIRUS provided at least some of the plutonium for the nuclear weapons exploded by India in 1998.
10. The tritium connection is also a very interesting way in which Canada has likely made a material contribution to the Pakistani and Indian military nuclear programs in recent years.
Tritium is a key nuclear explosive which is used in both "boosted" fission bombs and in the triggering of most thermonuclear (fusion) bombs.
The CANDU reactor produces large quantities of tritium, and Ontario Hydro and AECL have notable expertise in tritium handling and production. This information was likely made available to both India and Pakistan, and rationalized on the grounds of worker safety.
11. Ultimately, it is a matter of principle. How serious is Canada about walking the non- proliferation talk? Should Canada be aiding and abetting rogue nuclear states?
12. Freedom of information is also an issue. The government claims that the nuclear information provided to India and Pakistan is "public domain". Yet the government has refused a request by Nuclear Awareness Project to provide a list of information provided to India and Pakistan.
Moreover, if the information is in the public domain, why do India and Pakistan require Canadian cooperation? And why do India and Pakistan pay a fee to be members of the CANDU Owners Group?
SANCTIONS
13. The Prime Minister stated that all relations with India and Pakistan have been placed on hold. However, nuclear cooperation is clearly continuing. According to the statement of Lloyd Axworthy on May 28, the only actions taken against both India and Pakistan have included:
* recall of the Canadian High Commissioners from India and Pakistan (that is the name for Ambassadors in Commonwealth countries);
* discontinuation of all non-humanitarian aid;
* support for deferral of international financial institution funding for both countries (eg. World Bank funding);
* a ban on military exports; and
* deferral of visits by Indian and Pakistani officials to Canada.