Indian Counter Terror Operations Pictures & Discussions

[aditya g]

I am getting 404/error .......

Many of these UCGV are junking as they lack service ..

 

[republic_roi97]

I am getting 404/error .......

Why ?? ,..........................

 

[aditya g]

Nagrota. Looks like RLs used to take out the jehadis.

 

[aditya g]

Nagrota ................

 

[Mikesingh]

Nagrota ................

That's the officers living quarters in the cantonement. No one keeps any weapons with them in their homes and are not armed. There are scores of such living quarters at Nagrota where officers and their families stay being a 'peace' station as well as jawans and their families. Their children go to the Kendriya Vidyalya/Army Schools out there.

Guarding every inch of the vast area is impossible. Even the main highway goes through the cantonment. Fencing the entire area is impracticable and cannot be made 100% foolproof.

The terrorists' tactics are to go for such soft targets. The only way to prevent such attacks is good intel.

 

[indiatester]

That's the officers living quarters in the cantonement. No one keeps any weapons with them in their homes and are not armed. There are scores of such living quarters at Nagrota where officers and their families stay being a 'peace' station as well as jawans and their families. Their children go to the Kendriya Vidyalya/Army Schools out there.

Guarding every inch of the vast area is impossible. Even the main highway goes through the cantonment. Fencing the entire area is impracticable and cannot be made 100% foolproof.

The terrorists' tactics are to go for such soft targets. The only way to prevent such attacks is good intel.

The reports suggested that they started with the sentry post and then gained access to the area.
While these are not as well protected as other installations, I think in border areas, they must be considered as possible targets and defended accordingly.

 

[Yodha]

Serving army officers must be allowed to carry at least sidearms in Quartets, cantonments. May be even when they are not on active duty. They will come in hand. A through check must be done about the officers before handing out weapons to them. Some trigger happy persons may cause outrage if things go south.

The 'Indi'genization is down to the core.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

================

Now that we have green light, Army should not lose its focus from cross border raids, This kind of attacks are always part of a bigger plan ..

BSF and CRPF must take over CT ops from most urban complexes ..

 

[rkhanna]

No matter how much we all agree and say that no Cant Area can be 100% Secure 100% of the time its is clear that a number of mistakes (specially with heightened tensions, intell Warnings) are being repeated. No CO/Base commander is loosing his head over this and we are sweeping all analysis of these attacks under the Rug of "Retaliation and Jingoism". -

Ajay Shukla's for Once in my life is finding me in agreement with him - The Military needs to take a DEEP audtit at its current professional standards. If nothing is wrong then fine, But it simply cant be brushed aside.

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2016/11/string-of-tactical-debacles-concerns.html?m=1

This is anathema for an army that frowns on a “kill ratio” poorer than four-to-six militants killed for the loss of each soldier. This success rate was maintained even during the most violent years in J&K.

In 1999, 270 soldiers were killed while 1082 militants were eliminated (1 : 4 ratio);

in 2000, it was 311 killed against 1,520 militants dead (1 : 4.9) ;

in 2001, a total of 408 army men laid down their lives while killing 2020 militants (1 : 4.9);

in 2002, 362 soldiers died while the army gunned down 1707 militants (1 : 4.75);

and in 2003, the price paid for eliminating 1,494 militants was 258 soldiers dead (1 : 5.7).

In the last three years, with militancy on the ebb and the army operating more lightly, the ratio was two-to-four militants killed for each dead soldier.

In 2013, 32 soldiers died, while killing 67 militants (1 : 2 ratio);

in 2014, it was 31 soldiers dead, while gunning down 110 militants (1 : 3.5);

and last year, 28 soldiers laid down their lives while killing 108 militants (1 : 3.

.

With army casualties on par with militant casualties this year, there is pressure to establish what has gone wrong. Even more worrying than casualty numbers is the jihadis’ success in Pathankot, Uri and Nagrota at breaching what should have been tightly guarded perimeters, and gaining access to the lightly guarded interiors of military establishments and camps. A brigade commander notes: “We were fortunate that the jihadis could do serious damage only in Uri”.

A fidayeen squad, which must attack from the open against sandbagged and protected sentry posts on the perimeters of army camps, should suffer heavy casualties while forcing an entry. That the militants entered unharmed in Pathankot, Uri and Nagrota speaks of poor siting of sentry posts and careless sentries.

Even more worrisome is the tactical sloppiness on the Line of Control (LoC) that allowed the bodies of several soldiers to be mutilated by militants or Pakistani soldiers . When soldiers leave their posts for patrolling or laying ambushes, they are at least a section, i.e. ten men. While adversaries can sneak across the LoC and ambush such a patrol, even cause casualties with an initial burst of fire, trained soldiers start fighting back immediately, according to basic infantry drills.

“Only in one situation can a patrol justifiably allow its dead or injured soldiers to fall into enemy hands --- and that is when every single member of that patrol is dead or badly wounded. Good soldiers do not leave comrades behind”, says a retired general.

In a healthy army, alarm bells would have rung long ago, with basic tactical standards being demanded and subordinate commanders disciplined. Instead, tactical booboos keep getting repeated.

In a vibrant military, the next level of oversight comes from its veterans who, in military culture, are custodians of tradition and professional standards. Unfortunately, veterans gloss over declining professional standards, focusing instead on demands for better pensions, salaries and status --- important issues, but secondary to professional proficiency.

On television, on Tuesday, senior officers downplayed the Nagrota fiasco. One general argued: “I think it is an admission on the part of Pakistan that the surgical strikes [of November 29] were successful.” Said another, on the question of lax perimeter security: “No matter how highly secure you are, [with militants] who are determined to kill and prepared to die, there is no hundred per cent defence against it… These attacks cannot be stopped at the target end, they can only be stopped at the source end.”

In fact, the truth is quite the opposite. India can do little to stop jihadis at the “source end”, i.e. Pakistan. Where the military can stop them is at the “target end” --- through better perimeter security, tactical drills and higher standards of accountability.

The final level of oversight --- the political leadership --- is the quickest to abdicate responsibility. Bharatiya Janata Party spokesperson, BVL Narasimha Rao, declared on television after the Nagrota attack: “I do believe that after a series of such attacks, we ought to do everything possible to secure ourselves; at least secure our military establishments. But this is not a political [responsibility]… It’s the army themselves… I think they are in a position to take any decision that they need to; they don’t require any government’s intervention in this.”

The government’s disinclination to get involved is remarkable, with tactical debacles like Uri having strategic effects, and creating an imperative for escalation that impacts India-Pakistan relations. At Uri, incompetent management of a camp’s perimeter defence forced the government to order “surgical strikes”. This had the potential for dangerous escalation, while ultimately doing little to deter Pakistani adventurism.

Ultimately, when the Indian Army enters full crisis mode, there is no doubting its ability and resilience. Kargil was an example when, in 1999, tactical and intelligence laxity were set aside and the situation recovered, albeit bloodily. In Pathankot, Uri and Nagrota, examples of individual competence partially retrieved situations that could have played out more damagingly. Yet, the army cannot afford to gift success to militants again. There remains the possibility that a windfall jihadi “success” --- such as the destruction of Pathankot’s fighter aircraft; mass casualties in Uri, or wives and children taken hostage in Nagrota --- could allow a four-man fidayeen team to take India and Pakistan to war.

 

[aditya g]

.....

BSF and CRPF must take over CT ops from most urban complexes ..

BSF is a border guarding force and they should focus on that. They have enough on their hands with pak army facing them in garb of rangers.

CRPF unfortunately may not have that quality. They are going to get slaughtered by these jehadis who get military training.

IMHO army will have to deal with this in J&K at least.

 

[Bahamut]

@Kunal Biswas What about allowing secondary or conceal carry weapons like pistol to allowed to carry by army personal at all time in peace cantonment to prevent such attack ?

 

[Kunal Biswas]

BSF have its own CT training center also involved in CT ops at J&k with CRPF so does in Maoist corridor, They are well trained and equipped to deal with terrorists, CRPF`s Cobra are specialized in CT ops, If deployed they not only can take care of the task but will also see expansion in their forces.

BSF is a border guarding force and they should focus on that. They have enough on their hands with pak army facing them in garb of rangers.

CRPF unfortunately may not have that quality. They are going to get slaughtered by these jehadis who get military training.

IMHO army will have to deal with this in J&K at least.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

It must not be allowed, Their are various reason for it ..

Best is to redesign cantonment, one can learn from past ..

@Kunal Biswas What about allowing secondary or conceal carry weapons like pistol to allowed to carry by army personal at all time in peace cantonment to prevent such attack ?

 

[Bahamut]

It must not be allowed, Their are various reason for it ..

Best is to redesign cantonment, one can learn from past ..

Can you tell about the reason and what are the redesign and can it be done for inner city like Delhi ,Mumbai,Srinagar were the lack of free land ?

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Indian Army is perhaps the largest land owners in this country, Every major cantonment is like a mini city and their is no problem with land..

Its how its being utilized is important, I will give you an example, Fort William at Kolkata ..

what are the redesign and can it be done for inner city like Delhi ,Mumbai,Srinagar were the lack of free land ?

 

[su35]

No matter how much we all agree and say that no Cant Area can be 100% Secure 100% of the time its is clear that a number of mistakes (specially with heightened tensions, intell Warnings) are being repeated. No CO/Base commander is loosing his head over this and we are sweeping all analysis of these attacks under the Rug of "Retaliation and Jingoism". -

Ajay Shukla's for Once in my life is finding me in agreement with him - The Military needs to take a DEEP audtit at its current professional standards. If nothing is wrong then fine, But it simply cant be brushed aside.

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2016/11/string-of-tactical-debacles-concerns.html?m=1

This is anathema for an army that frowns on a “kill ratio” poorer than four-to-six militants killed for the loss of each soldier. This success rate was maintained even during the most violent years in J&K.

In 1999, 270 soldiers were killed while 1082 militants were eliminated (1 : 4 ratio);

in 2000, it was 311 killed against 1,520 militants dead (1 : 4.9) ;

in 2001, a total of 408 army men laid down their lives while killing 2020 militants (1 : 4.9);

in 2002, 362 soldiers died while the army gunned down 1707 militants (1 : 4.75);

and in 2003, the price paid for eliminating 1,494 militants was 258 soldiers dead (1 : 5.7).

In the last three years, with militancy on the ebb and the army operating more lightly, the ratio was two-to-four militants killed for each dead soldier.

In 2013, 32 soldiers died, while killing 67 militants (1 : 2 ratio);

in 2014, it was 31 soldiers dead, while gunning down 110 militants (1 : 3.5);

and last year, 28 soldiers laid down their lives while killing 108 militants (1 : 3.

.

With army casualties on par with militant casualties this year, there is pressure to establish what has gone wrong. Even more worrying than casualty numbers is the jihadis’ success in Pathankot, Uri and Nagrota at breaching what should have been tightly guarded perimeters, and gaining access to the lightly guarded interiors of military establishments and camps. A brigade commander notes: “We were fortunate that the jihadis could do serious damage only in Uri”.

A fidayeen squad, which must attack from the open against sandbagged and protected sentry posts on the perimeters of army camps, should suffer heavy casualties while forcing an entry. That the militants entered unharmed in Pathankot, Uri and Nagrota speaks of poor siting of sentry posts and careless sentries.

Even more worrisome is the tactical sloppiness on the Line of Control (LoC) that allowed the bodies of several soldiers to be mutilated by militants or Pakistani soldiers . When soldiers leave their posts for patrolling or laying ambushes, they are at least a section, i.e. ten men. While adversaries can sneak across the LoC and ambush such a patrol, even cause casualties with an initial burst of fire, trained soldiers start fighting back immediately, according to basic infantry drills.

“Only in one situation can a patrol justifiably allow its dead or injured soldiers to fall into enemy hands --- and that is when every single member of that patrol is dead or badly wounded. Good soldiers do not leave comrades behind”, says a retired general.

In a healthy army, alarm bells would have rung long ago, with basic tactical standards being demanded and subordinate commanders disciplined. Instead, tactical booboos keep getting repeated.

In a vibrant military, the next level of oversight comes from its veterans who, in military culture, are custodians of tradition and professional standards. Unfortunately, veterans gloss over declining professional standards, focusing instead on demands for better pensions, salaries and status --- important issues, but secondary to professional proficiency.

On television, on Tuesday, senior officers downplayed the Nagrota fiasco. One general argued: “I think it is an admission on the part of Pakistan that the surgical strikes [of November 29] were successful.” Said another, on the question of lax perimeter security: “No matter how highly secure you are, [with militants] who are determined to kill and prepared to die, there is no hundred per cent defence against it… These attacks cannot be stopped at the target end, they can only be stopped at the source end.”

In fact, the truth is quite the opposite. India can do little to stop jihadis at the “source end”, i.e. Pakistan. Where the military can stop them is at the “target end” --- through better perimeter security, tactical drills and higher standards of accountability.

The final level of oversight --- the political leadership --- is the quickest to abdicate responsibility. Bharatiya Janata Party spokesperson, BVL Narasimha Rao, declared on television after the Nagrota attack: “I do believe that after a series of such attacks, we ought to do everything possible to secure ourselves; at least secure our military establishments. But this is not a political [responsibility]… It’s the army themselves… I think they are in a position to take any decision that they need to; they don’t require any government’s intervention in this.”

The government’s disinclination to get involved is remarkable, with tactical debacles like Uri having strategic effects, and creating an imperative for escalation that impacts India-Pakistan relations. At Uri, incompetent management of a camp’s perimeter defence forced the government to order “surgical strikes”. This had the potential for dangerous escalation, while ultimately doing little to deter Pakistani adventurism.

Ultimately, when the Indian Army enters full crisis mode, there is no doubting its ability and resilience. Kargil was an example when, in 1999, tactical and intelligence laxity were set aside and the situation recovered, albeit bloodily. In Pathankot, Uri and Nagrota, examples of individual competence partially retrieved situations that could have played out more damagingly. Yet, the army cannot afford to gift success to militants again. There remains the possibility that a windfall jihadi “success” --- such as the destruction of Pathankot’s fighter aircraft; mass casualties in Uri, or wives and children taken hostage in Nagrota --- could allow a four-man fidayeen team to take India and Pakistan to war.

The article does not provide any solution it just use common word like kigh perimeter security and advance techs. The article contradict itself when it accept that these suicide squad are designed kill and die they are not regular soldiers rather brainwashed. How much advance or tighten we do to our perimeter they will be able to find loopholes. Anti virus are developed on Viruses not the vice versa.
This also proves why soldier kill/dead ratio figures are bad.
In both Uri and recent attacks terrorist are seen with army uniform so it is very difficult to identify them.
Even we develop databases to identify quickly that can be hacked. So there no such feasible solution to deal with identifying terrorist.
Intel from these are have to be verified multiple times as many of those are fakes. These assault can be stopped with quick reflexes and holding down the their 1st wave of UBGL strike

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Locals Narrate How Militants Attack on Army Camp in Nagrota


Published on Nov 28, 2016
Jammu and Kashmir: Locals narrate how militant attack on army camp in Nagrota. According to the security forces three to four terrorists have infiltrated into Jammu and Kashmir and tried to enter in base camp of army.

===============

Your post as well as the article make little sense ..

The article does not provide any solution it just use common word like kigh perimeter security and advance techs. The article contradict itself when it accept that these suicide squad are designed kill and die they are not regular soldiers rather brainwashed. How much advance or tighten we do to our perimeter they will be able to find loopholes. Anti virus are developed on Viruses not the vice versa.
This also proves why soldier kill/dead ratio figures are bad.
In both Uri and recent attacks terrorist are seen with army uniform so it is very difficult to identify them.
Even we develop databases to identify quickly that can be hacked. So there no such feasible solution to deal with identifying terrorist.Intel from these are have to be verified multiple times as many of those are fakes. These assault can be stopped with quick reflexes and holding down the their 1st wave of UBGL strike

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Jammu & Kashmir: Army Chief Dalbir Singh Visits Nagrota Attack Site to Assess the Situation


Published on Nov 30, 2016
Jammu & Kashmir: Army Chief Dalbir Singh visits Nagrota attack site to assess the situation.
Three to four terrorists hurled grenades and tried to enter into army camp. Three terrorists have been killed in this attack while combing operation is underway to find any other terrorist.

 

[su35]

Locals Narrate How Militants Attack on Army Camp in Nagrota


Published on Nov 28, 2016
Jammu and Kashmir: Locals narrate how militant attack on army camp in Nagrota. According to the security forces three to four terrorists have infiltrated into Jammu and Kashmir and tried to enter in base camp of army.

===============

Your post as well as the article make little sense ..

why whats your opinion ? please make me little enlighten

 

[aditya g]

We need to upgrade DSCs .... Perhaps convert them into TA battalions.