Indian Ballistic Missile Defense System

Parthy

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Shaurya missile test launch - Extended footage

 
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Parthy

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India's Multifunction Missile for Credible Deterrent

Shourya and Sagarika is a new common missile that can be launched from multiple platforms, i.e. ground, submarine and mobile launcher. The naval version is called Sagarika, while the land based version is called Shourya1. The Indian doctrine of Minimum Credible Nuclear Deterrence envisages "No First Use" (NFU) policy and a triad of nuclear counterstrike capability. The land based Agni-2 missile range is limited to about 3,300 km, and the longer range Agni-3 will enter service soon.

Shourya and its relative sizesThe sea leg of the triad based on blue water naval assets dispersed across the world's oceans is most survivable and thus a critical part of the triad. The ability to reach all corners of a potential challenger requires a range of 5,000 to 8,000 km. DRDO is developing sub-surface launched long range Agni-3SL with heavy MIRV payload and ABM countermeasures.

Indian nuclear powered ATV due for sea trial in 2009 will reportedly carry 12 launch tubes2 of 2.4m diameter. Launch tubes can be flexibly configured to either carry a two meter diameter Agni-3SL or three wooden rounds3 of 0.74m diameter K15-Sagarika missile. Shourya and Sagarika fills the short to medium range gap that is below Agni-3's minimum range.

At operational level these missiles provide for range of warheads necessary for graduated nuclear escalation as enunciated by Indian staff and military warfare collages.4



This multifunction missile made in large quantities would fulfill India's immediate requirements. The missile optimally matches latest types of strategic weapons tested at Pokhran-II in 1998. The missile will most likely takeover the strategic weapons role of Prithvi and Agni-1 missiles, and make them unambiguously dedicated for conventional roles thus stabilizing nuclear deterrence. Shourya and its counterpart Sagarika has been tested six times5 till date. The missile is expected to enter service in 2010. Sagarika will be deployed on submarines and very likely on 'Sukanya' class naval vessels too.

Description

Shourya is a compact, slender, two-stage, solid fuel missile designed as a wooden round. The missile development was initiated as project K15 and was first flight tested6 on 27 October 2004 in the guise of solid fueled Prithvi-III.7 It is stored, deployed and launched in a fiberglass composite canister, which is easy to handle mobile and can be flexibly deployed on different types of surface and sub-surface platforms. Shourya and Sagarika share a common design. The missile is sealed and can be launched from a moving submarine at 50 meter depth.



The 6.2 tonne Shourya is 10 meters long, and has two solid fuel stages of 0.74 meters diameter. The first stage booster is about two meters long and the second about six meters long. The missile supports a range of unitary warhead configurations, weighing 180 to 1,000 kg. High missile accuracy and ability to fly in a highly depressed trajectory well within atmosphere indicates that it is a weapon for choice to interdict Command & Control (C&C) and preemptive tactics.

The sixth test flight on November 12th, 2008 was a depressed trajectory flight (at Mach 6 and 50 km altitude) with continuous rolling to dissipate heat over a larger surface demonstrated the mastery of difficult aspects of rocketry involving sustained hypersonic flight.

The wooden round design sealed in a fiber glass canister with the aero fins folded inside in a clean & controlled environment makes it maintenance free and tamper proof. The missile is launched by a hot gas generator developing 15-200 bar pressure using high burn rate HTBP based composite propellant. The thick dark gas cloud greatly reduces the thermal signature of the missile.

Once out of the launch tube, the first stage booster motor ignites, taking the missile to five km altitude, when, the main second stage motor takes over. The booster debris reaches a maximum altitude of six km, well below the horizon of radars beyond 330 km. The clean and small diameter missile presents a tiny RCS (radar cross-section).



second stage air fins provide necessary in-flight trajectory control. The main motor is typically expended at 33 km altitude well within the atmosphere; however the air fins remain effective beyond post boost phase. The air fins also allow the missile to fly in a depressed trajectory as well as a cruise and glide in sustained hypersonic regime at 50 km altitude. The payload separation can be done much later after using aerodynamics for trajectory modification during ascent or descent. The missile is resistant to ABM defense.8



Shourya Re-entry Vehicle (RV) supports a wide range of weapons, with total payload mass ranging from 180 to 1,000 kg. The missile range is a function of payload mass (see graph below).

Re-entry vehicle optionsThe November 2008 test unveiled the new generation RV that is designed and optimized for newer boosted fission and thermonuclear weapon (including those awaiting confirmatory test). The sharp nose high 'âeta' (Ballistic coefficient9) RV design employs 16 cm diameter blunt nose and half angle of 12° that is mounted on a payload adapter to interface with the 0.74m diameter mission control module atop the upper stage. The high 'âeta' RV in combination with an all carbon composite body enables higher re-entry speed even with a light weight payload.10



* Mk-4: For light weight 17Kt Fusion Boosted Fission (FBF) warhead11. Mass12: ~180 Kg13.
* Mk-5: For 50Kt FBF or 200Kt Thermo Nuclear (TN) warhead14. Mass: ~340 Kg
* Mk-6: For 150Kt FBF warhead15. Mass: ~550 Kg.

comparative destruction areaThe all carbon composite re-entry heat shields with multi-directional ablative carbon-carbon re-entry nose tip make it very light and tough.16 This very light RV mass enables scalable payload and range tradeoff especially for lightweight warhead.



Propulsion

The Shourya has two solid fueled stages of 0.74m diameter. This diameter is compatible with a recently tested Indian sub-surface launch system that has a 2.4 meter diameter launch tube17.

Second stage motorFirst Stage: The first stage solid fuel booster is approximately two meter long and weighs about 1,300 kg including 1,000 kg high density fuel. The booster lifts the missile to an altitude of five km so that the second stage can operate more efficiently at low atmospheric pressure. It uses hot gas reaction control for initial control of yaw, pitch and roll before the air fins unfold and missile gains sufficient velocity for aerodynamic control surfaces.



Second Stage: This six meter long stage weighs about 3.6 tonne and generates 16 tonne thrust. Case-bonded HTPB-based composite propellant with low burn rate is ignited by a small pyrogen ignition motor.

Parameters of Shourya MissileThe case is made of 250 grade maraging steel to maximize fuel mass fraction that is critical for scalable payload versus range flexibility. Its nozzle is made of composite material with metallic backup and carbon phenolic liners. The interstage coupling uses a soft-stage separation mechanism and retro rockets for reliable and safe stage separation.

Navigation & Accuracy

Shourya largely carries the proven avionics set of Agni-3. However, for more extensive aerodynamic maneuvering, it is augmented by new sensors and flight control system. Shourya will also benefit form Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS)23 expected to be ready by 2012, to ensure guaranteed national access to precision navigation. These systems enable high accuracy required for precision strike.



Missile range and payload mass are inversely related. It is interesting to note that press reports the Shourya's range for 1,000 kg and 500 kg payload. The former corresponding to 1980 vintage 200Kt FBF warhead and the latter corresponding to 150Kt FBF that is yet to be field validated.

Range vs RV payloadThe official reporting obfuscates the missile's much higher range corresponding to field tested 17Kt FBF warhead that is the mainstay of Indian deterrence.



Conclusion

Shourya class of missile is truly a multi-service missile that has desirable attributes of small size, mobility, stealth, rich set of warhead options, robustness and cost that could make it the most mass produced Indian missile. It complements the long range Agni class missiles to provide the Indian military commanders the global range necessary to secure Indian interests.
 
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Rahul Singh

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India set to launch Agni-II Prime



The Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) scientists, engineers and system specialists have begun the last-minute preparations for the launch of the much-awaited Agni-II Prime missile from Wheeler Island.

The missile's maiden test is now expected on Friday, December 10 from the Interim Test Range. The launch, which was originally scheduled for today (December 9), had to be postponed by one day due to inclement weather and continuous rain that hit the Orissa coast, due to depression.

Sources confirm that the flight readiness review (FRR) meeting was held on December 8 and the crucial Range Integration Checks (RIC) are being held on December 9. "If the weather holds back, then we are sure for a launch tomorrow. The Met department says that it will be overcast for the next 24 hours with the possibility of slight drizzle. Though Agni-II Prime is an all-weather missile, we are keen to test it for the first time under normal circumstances so that we get every minute data during the launch accurately," an official said.

While this piece is being pushed to the blogspace, the missile is already shifted to the launch pad with the launch managers engrossed in a series of internal and external checks.
 
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Rahul Singh

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My observation:
1.The new Agni-2 Prime has no movable control surface.
2. Re-entry vehicle is radically different. It is longer have no control surface.
3. Agni-II prime looks shorter and lighter than basic Agni-II.

Basic Agni-II
 
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sayareakd

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Rahul where is the missile thread has gone this one is missile defence system we should discuss this A2+ missile which appears to be hybrid of A2 and A3
 

Rahul Singh

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Yes Says i am also not seeing Missile Test Notification thread hence posted here.

Yes this A-2 prime is different, look at the re-entry vehicle, it is longer and features no control surface. I also wonder if it is at all a re-entry vehicle only or entire second stage has been converted into re-entry vehicle. BTW Saya where is the grill separating stages? A wild guess, they have converted this missile into an endo-spheric balletic missile with powered payload delivery vehicle.
 

gogbot

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Agni-II Prime


The First Section seems to be the same as on the A3. No Control surfaces Just a Booster.

But the Second Phase ?
I Share everyone's curiosity with the RV. I looks completely different from what we have seen in the Agni series so far.
this is what i found on wiki
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agni-II#Manoeuvring_Re-Entry_Vehicle:_Agni_RV-Mk.2
Not sure how much of it is true. No links were cited.

I also like that they have removed the grill. It will shorten the missile and make it easier to transport in one piece.

What ever it is i am not more excited about the A5
 

RPK

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India tests nuclear capable Agni-II plus missile




Bhubaneswar: India on Friday conducted a test of its nuclear capable surface- to-surface Agni II plus missile - a modified version of the Agni II strategic missile - from a defence base in Orissa, defence sources said.

The missile, which has the capability to hit targets 2,500 to 3,000 km away, was tested from a facility off the Orissa coast in the presence of senior defence officials, sources said.



It was tested from Wheeler Island in the district of Bhadrak, about 200 km from here, sources said. Agni II plus is an intermediary between the Agni-II and the Agni-III missiles.

India tests nuclear capable Agni-II plus missile
 

RPK

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Upgraded Agni II test-fired unsuccessfully


The maiden test launch of Agni-II Plus, a nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missile with a strike range of 2,500 km to 3,000 km, ended in a massive failure after the missile dropped off ito the sea a few seconds after it was launched from Wheeler Island off coastal waters of Orissa on Bay of Bengal at 10 am.

The Agni-II Plus, a modified version of Agni-II, is an intermediary between Agni-II and Agni-III. It has two stages and both are powered by solid propellants.

DRDO sources said soon after the missile took off, it dropped into the sea. "We are still investigating how it happened," said a source. Today's failure comes in the wake of a similar failure of Prithvi-II missile on September 24 that dropped off just a few seconds after the launch. The failure comes 10 days after the successful flight of surface-to-surface missile Agni-1 on Nov 25.

DRDO was hoping that today's testfiring would add teeth to India's nuclear deterrence. The Agni-II plus or A-2, manufactured by DRDO's Advanced System Laboratory (ASL) in Hyderabad, had a higher range, higher performance with respect to the thrust and weight ratio than Agni-II missile. The new missile would perform more better at various levels in terms of accuracy, strength and distance covered in comparison to Agni-II.

Agni II Plus can carry extra fuel and will have a new motor in its re-entry vehicle for better manoeuvrability, a flex nozzle in the second stage to avoid anti-ballistic missile defences and an improved navigation system.


Upgraded Agni II test-fired unsuccessfully
 

Rahul Singh

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u]DRDO to test advanced defence interceptor next week[/u]

Fri Dec 17 2010, 00:51 hrs

Undeterred by the December 11 failure of Agni-II prime ballistic missile test flight —— the missile fell into the sea a few seconds after launch —— the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is planning to test the advanced Air Defence Interceptor on December 22 and 24. Two earlier tests of the interceptor ended in failure.

The test on Wheeler Island off Orissa coast will see an interceptor missile destroy an incoming 'hostile' missile mid-flight over the Bay of Bengal. This test, sources said, is meant to observe the "operational effectiveness of the indigenously developed high-speed interceptor missile".

A modified Prithvi missile, to be launched from the Chandipur Integrated Test Range, will "mimic" a hostile ballistic missile, the sources said.

The DRDO will also flight-test the indigenously developed micro-light drone Lakshya at the Chandipur Test Range on December 20. Lakshya is a sub-sonic, re-usable drone meant for aerial reconnaissance of battlefield and target acquisition. Lakshya has seen nearly 200 launches so far. It was last successfully tested in November 2009.
 

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India's Ballistic Missile Defense Options

By Nathan Cohn

Despite steady efforts toward developing ballistic missile defenses (BMD), the purpose of India's emerging capabilities remains obscure. Given the glacial pace of Indian strategic decision-making, New Delhi may not have decided what purpose BMD is to serve and where to deploy it. Even so, Pakistan's military-planners have likely begun to consider potential responses. These decisions and their ramifications will be influenced by assumptions about the scope and mission of future Indian missile defenses.

India began BMD flight tests in 2006. Some Indian officials have claimed that initial tests have been exceptionally successful. In reality, claims of BMD effectiveness are questionable at this early stage of development. The history of U.S. BMD programs suggests that India will need to overcome significant technical challenges before claims of effectiveness are plausible. Moreover, India's defense research establishment has experienced difficulties in developing other major weapons systems and the challenges of BMD development are daunting.

Assuming the government of India succeeds in developing BMD or purchases such capabilities elsewhere, New Delhi could deploy the system to accomplish several potential missions. Opportunity and financial costs associated with BMD deployments, as well as an assessment of which assets are most essential to protect, would certainly factor into India's decisions. Thus far, India has not elaborated publicly on the purposes and architecture of its missile defenses. How might India choose to deploy BMD, and how might Pakistan respond?

One plausible deployment is a defense of India's leadership and the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) around New Delhi. The mission would be to protect the Indian leadership from the threat of a decapitating nuclear attack – or to dissuade Pakistan's military leadership from believing such an attack could succeed. There are other ways for the government of India to protect its leadership, such as by dispersal to bunkers away from the capital. But New Delhi could decide to adopt multiple approaches to protecting the continuity of its government, including BMD. If the protection of India's NCA by means of BMD is a fixed requirement, then Pakistan's prospective counters are immaterial to New Delhi.

A second option is a thin and perhaps symbolic defense of India's two most iconic cities, New Delhi, the seat of the government, and Mumbai, the commercial capital and the location of significant nuclear infrastructure. Symbolic defenses could fulfill domestic political imperatives and accede to the urgings of India's strategic enclave, without committing vast resources necessary to achieve harder objectives. Limited defenses of New Delhi and Mumbai would still place India in a select category of states, including the United States, Russia, Israel, and Japan, that have some kind of BMD deployments.

A third option is for BMD to accompany Indian troops in carrying out "Cold Start," a limited war doctrine designed to retaliate against mass casualty attacks on Indian soil linked to Pakistan's military and intelligence services. In this scenario, Indian leaders might presume that BMD deployments could be of assistance in calling Pakistan's nuclear threats as a bluff. If escalation occurs across the nuclear threshold, New Delhi would have to rely on their missile defenses working effectively the very first time they were required on the battlefield. Depending on the size of the theater of war and the number and kind of missiles challenging Indian missile defenses, this might be a heroic assumption.

Other Indian BMD deployment options are harder to envision and even less feasible. A nation-wide defense of Indian population centers from breakdowns in Pakistani command and control or from terrorists in possession of ballistic missiles would be financially prohibitive: there are simply too many large cities to protect. Protecting India's nuclear-capable assets and infrastructure, which are widely dispersed, is also too hard and too expensive. Relying on mobility to ensure the survivability of India's arsenal is a better bet than relying on missile defenses.

The development of missile defenses has predictably stoked Islamabad's concern that India is attempting to neutralize Pakistan's nuclear deterrent, which Pakistan considers essential to deter a conventional war with India. New Delhi's interest in BMD has heightened Pakistan's security concerns, providing Pakistan yet another rationale for increasing its nuclear weapon requirements. However, Pakistan may already be the world's fastest growing nuclear power. There are many drivers of Pakistan's on-going nuclear expansion, such as conventional military asymmetries, Cold Start, and the U.S.-India nuclear deal. These factors make it difficult to argue that Pakistan's nuclear expansion would proceed at a more modest pace in the absence of BMD.

Nonetheless, Indian ballistic missile defenses are likely to marginally increase Pakistani military concerns that it will be unable to hold defended targets at risk, generating further improvements in Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, especially with regard to penetration aids. Other potential counters to prospective Indian missile defenses, including cruise missiles, are already being pursued.

If decapitation is a fixed targeting strategy for Pakistan, BMD deployments around New Delhi may be especially likely to increase Pakistan's qualitative or quantitative nuclear requirements. Similarly, any Indian effort which appears designed to back up Cold Start and to negate Pakistani threats to use nuclear weapons would be of great concern to Pakistan's military establishment, even though they are likely to express confidence in being able to defeat missile defenses.

The world's most dangerous strategic competition is occurring in Southern Asia, where China, India, and Pakistan are expanding their nuclear arsenals and ballistic missiles, competing for influence in the Indian Ocean and Afghanistan, and modernizing their conventional forces. Escalation control is not easy on the subcontinent, and Indian deployment of Indian BMD will make it more challenging. But the threat of escalation begins with a mass casualty attack on Indian soil. India's Cold Start strategy increases the risk of full-scale conventional war and uncontrolled escalation in the aftermath of such an attack. If Pakistani authorities wish to avoid triggering Cold Start as well as concerns over prospective Indian missile defenses, they would be well advised to work harder at preventing acts of terrorism on Indian soil.

http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2010/12/indias-ballistic-missile-defense.html
 

utubekhiladi

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India began BMD flight tests in 2006. Some Indian officials have claimed that initial tests have been exceptionally successful. In reality, claims of BMD effectiveness are questionable at this early stage of development. The history of U.S. BMD programs suggests that India will need to overcome significant technical challenges before claims of effectiveness are plausible. Moreover, India's defense research establishment has experienced difficulties in developing other major weapons systems and the challenges of BMD development are daunting.
Mr/Ms Nathan Cohn, you cannot just wake up in the morning, have a cup of coffee and go around criticizing our BMD program. why claims of BMD effectiveness are questionable at this early stage of development? we don't care what the history of USA BMD programs suggests about our technology. if we can create history by discovering evidence of water on moon and can create world record by launching 10 satellites in a single mission using a single launch vehicle., i am sure we are capable of putting any missile defenses in place.

you must read this.
http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=34262


PAD was tested in November 2006, followed by AAD in December 2007. With the test of the PAD missile, India became the fourth country to have successfully developed an Anti-ballistic missile system, after United States, Russia and Israel. On March 6, 2009, India again successfully tested its missile defense shield, during which an incoming "enemy" missile was intercepted at an altitude of 75 km.


How might India choose to deploy BMD, and how might Pakistan respond?
Mr/Ms Nathan Cohn, I think the question should be other way around. we have some kind of missile defenses in place such as BMD, PAD and AAD. where would pakistan hide if we choose to use our nukes against them? pakistan dont have any missile defenses even for namesake. so Mr/Ms Nathan Cohn i think you should be worrying more about Pakistan than to worry about us.

These factors make it difficult to argue that Pakistan's nuclear expansion would proceed at a more modest pace in the absence of BMD.
Mr/Ms Nathan Cohn now that is a good point.
 
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