Indian Army’s Myanmar Operation: The Good, The Bad, The Ugly

[shekhar]

Seculars are getting uncomfortable! I wish Pakistan increases it defense spending and goes down like former USSR.

Seculars are getting uncomfortable! I wish Pakistan increases it defense spending and goes down like former USSR.

Even chinses are on such stage where thy have to decide whether thy hve to be consumer's or export economy..if china go with export economy....there economy will be collased & which is happening right now...so economy collaspe....inc in def.budget....i wish china with pakistan must be doomed as happned with ussr

 

[jackprince]

The congoon chamcha Tam Baddakkan or something got splattered by Rahul in NewsX. The tom guy insiniuated that PM doesn't want a strong mountain strike corps raised because of China tour influence even though UPA had allocated funds for it, and Rahul asked is the allocation of fund was same as allocation of fund of OROP?!!!!

 

[OneGrimPilgrim]

The congoon chamcha Tam Baddakkan or something got splattered by Rahul in NewsX. The tom guy insiniuated that PM doesn't want a strong mountain strike corps raised because of China tour influence even though UPA had allocated funds for it, and Rahul asked is the allocation of fund was same as allocation of fund of OROP?!!!!

could you pls post a link to it when it becomes available online?

this i think was the only channel that had given appropriate coverage to the Yemen rescue ops (though may be times now and some others may've had too, don't know)....i have a soft-corner for it.

 

[fyodor]

Firstpost has a penchant for highly opionated non objective articles. It has been the HQ for all kinds of self-hating posts about India.

 

[OneGrimPilgrim]

IIRC, FP had debuted with some nice and balanced articles, but over time, it turned slimy and is now outright PoS!

 

[Zebra]

Q: (Army's Myanmar strike) Blindly following the Doval doctrine can make India most dangerous place?

A: I don't think so.

 

[SamwiseTheBrave]

IIRC, FP had debuted with some nice and balanced articles, but over time, it turned slimy and is now outright PoS!

it has now become as slimy & "oily" as its puppet master who is controlling the editorial policy behind the scenes

 

[Blackwater]

Doval is the person we want. I have learned recently that he was in Syria getting log book of Isis

 

[Hari Sud]

I believe DFI community should stop reading opinion papers like the one by a Muslim Wajahat Qazi. I would suggest, stop reading FP completely.

Wajahat Qazi failed to give the same advice to Pakistan when they launched 26/11.

The pronouncements of UN Charter are unneccassry. These did not stop US from launching a raid in Pakistan to kill Osama Bin Laden.

 

[pmaitra]

Will Nagaland Ever Have Peace?
After six decades, a resolution to India’s insurgency remains elusive.

By Mukesh Rawat

Excerpts:

The Naga issue is the major threat to peace in India’s Northeast. Broadly speaking, the insurgent groups National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang (NSCN-K) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM), which claim to represent the Nagas, demand that a territory known as Nagalim (or Greater Nagaland) – which would include the present state of Nagaland along with roughly four districts of Manipur and parts of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh where Nagas live – be carved out to address the Naga issue. The proposed region of Nagalim would also include a not insignificant chunk of Myanmar, making this an international issue.

First, over the years during which the ceasefire agreements held, the insurgent groups in Nagaland increasingly lost the public support they once enjoyed. Violence has given way to comparative peace and locals are realizing (even if slowly) that their grievances will not be solved through the barrel of a gun. The younger generation no longer has the same sympathy towards the insurgent groups that their parents did. They have been witness to development. Many have been exposed to life in cities like Delhi, Bangalore, Pune, and Kolkata. They have seen the possibilities the big cities offer. They have seen their counterparts elsewhere in India prosper and so are now more inclined to seek to make a living by hard work rather than by taking up arms. The floating population has also exposed those back home to the prospects of the cities, and this to a great extent has redefined their understanding of development. The message is clear, at least among youth, that violence is now a failed strategy.

Second, there was a general apprehension within the Khaplang faction that New Delhi is systematically sidelining it from the Naga talks. There is considerable merit in this apprehension. In fact, when the ceasefire was first announced it was with NSCN-IM, and not with NSCN-K. It was only later, following violent protests in Manipur and other regions, that the ceasefire was extended to NSCN-K. Throughout the talks on the Naga issue New Delhi in one way or the other has considered the Muhiva faction NSCN-IM to be the “genuine” representative of the Nagas. This is largely because NSCN-K is seen to have its stronghold in the Naga-dominated areas of Myanmar rather than in India.

Further complicating the issues is the fact that NSCN-K has signed ceasefire agreements with the Myanmar government and that the Nagas have been accorded autonomous status in certain regions. Writing for theIndian Express Sanjib Batuah observed, “Increasingly, the Indian approach to the Naga conflict is at odds with developments across the border. The ceasefire between the government of India and the S.S. Khaplang-led faction of the NSCN has unraveled and there have been attacks on Indian soldiers by NSCN-K militants. But across the border, relations between Khaplang and the Myanmar government have been on the upswing. The group has signed a five-point agreement with the Thein Sein government. The terms include a ceasefire, the opening of a liaison office to facilitate talks and freedom of movement for unarmed cadres within Myanmar.”

 

[pmaitra]

India’s Myanmar Operation: A Signal of Intent
India’s recent cross-border strike into Myanmar leaves many questions, but it’s no model for Pakistan-based terror.

By Rohan Joshi

Then on June 9, a contingent of the Indian Army’s Special Forces crossed into Myanmar and killed several militants in an operation lasting over 14 hours. India’s Ministry of Defense and the office of Myanmar’s President Thein Sein confirmed that the army’s Special Forces had crossed into Myanmar to execute the operation.

Details of the actual operation, which some reports suggest was carried out by paramilitary and Army Special Forces, are limited. But by all available accounts, all aspects of the sensitive operation, from the diplomatic to the military were efficiently executed. India also benefited from assistance provided by the Myanmar government. The cross-border raid itself was facilitated by a 2010 India-Myanmar agreement on counter-terrorism.

However, India’s media and some of its politicians reacted to the operation with predictable bombast. Parallels between the Myanmar operation and the United States’ Operation Geronimo (that resulted in the killing of Osama bin Laden) were drawn when almost none exist. One news media house claimed that the Indian Army “did a Rambo on Naga militants,” whatever that means. Over-enthusiastic news reporters described “hot pursuits” and “precision strikes” when neither term accurately represents the operation.

One popular prime-time TV anchor who, as a matter of routine, invites commentators from Pakistan and proceeds to yell at them for the duration of the show, hounded his Pakistani guests by demanding, “Why are you so nervous?” And finally, Col. (r) Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore, now a junior minister in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, issued a barely-concealed warning to Pakistan that India “would choose the time and place” of targeting terrorist groups harbored by that country. Not only is such rhetoric unnecessary and in poor taste, it is also counter-productive and could hurt India’s ability to enlist the cooperation of Myanmar or other friendly neighbors like Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal in further counter-terrorism efforts.

So does this mean that India is without options when it comes to terrorism emanating from Pakistan? Not really. Public discourse in India appears to be quite unnecessarily tied down with notions of surgical strikes or Special Forces-led operations on terrorist training camps. In reality, the employment of surgical strikes, for example, represents one just one of many options, both overt and covert, at India’s disposal. Some of these capabilities are best left unstated. Ultimately, if the objective is to impose costs on an adversary in response to, let’s say, a terrorist attack on a major city, should it really matter as to how the state goes about prosecuting action?

The public mood in India too has changed decisively in favor of punitive action against terrorism. India’s political class and national security managers, quite rightly, feel the need to respond to such sentiment. In the context of this hardening of public sentiment and the ruling National Democratic Alliance’s electoral promises to take a tough line on terrorism, the cross-border operation in Myanmar serves as a signal of intent from the Indian government. Other countries, of course, are free to ignore or draw whatever conclusions they wish to from the operation.

So yes, Pakistan is not Myanmar. A Special Forces-led operation deep into Pakistan to take out terrorist targets may not be feasible. But it may also not be necessary.

 

[pmaitra]

One perspective:

Why the Modi government decided to deliberately leak information about the Myanmar strikes
A behind-the-scenes reconstruction of the daring Special Forces attacks on North Eastern rebel groups.
Saikat Datta

Excerpts:

At approximately 2.45 am on June 9, two teams from the 21 Para (Special Forces) quietly slipped into Myanmar on foot ‒ one team entering from Manipur and the other from Nagaland ‒ heading towards insurgent training camps of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) group.

Among the options that were examined was a surgical strike by the Indian Air Force, using precision guided missiles launched from the Indian side into Myanmar. However, the option was quickly dismissed since it could easily be construed as an act of war and could lead to heavy civilian casualties. The six key people involved in the planning agreed that the retaliation had to be manageable but deadly enough to establish New Delhi’s intent to hit back at the insurgents with precision on their turf.

After much deliberation, the five decision-makers sat down with army chief, Dalbir Singh Suhag, to finalise a plan to use the Indian military to conduct the retaliatory strike. Doval also contended that since the Indian Army had suffered casualties, it was their prerogative to strike back at the militants. Khanna agreed and deployed his intelligence assets to identify the NSCN (K) camps that would be targeted.

The success of the June 9 operation has demonstrated the need for India’s military to re-examine the use of its Special Forces. As the top security leadership grappled with options to retaliate against the insurgents, it fell on 21 Para (Special Forces) as the only unit to carry out such a delicate operation. A failure would mean international embarrassment, a major diplomatic fallout and embolden the insurgents to hit targets in India with impunity. At the very least, this could prove disastrous for the men who had been inserted covertly into Myanmar to carry out the operation.

In the early hours of June 9, a team from 21 Para (Special Forces) led by a veteran Manipuri officer entered Myanmar on foot from Manipur. Another team was launched simultaneously into Myanmar from Nagaland, to target a NSCN (K) camp in Aungzeya. The team led by the Manipuri officer headed for a PLA camp in the south, closer to the town of Kalaymyo. This was not the first time India’s Special Forces had slipped across an international border to hit strategic targets. In 1995, a team from 1 Para (Special Forces) was sent into Bangladesh to hit insurgent camps operating out of Sylhet district. Since 2000, retaliatory strikes have been regularly conducted across the Line of Control by Indian Special Forces to dissuade the Pakistani military from sending in militants into the Kashmir Valley.

The other team found a sleepy but populated insurgent PLA camp that had been sending insurgents into Manipur for years. “The PLA was not behind the earlier attack on the Dogra battalion, but the intention was to ensure that a message goes out to all the insurgent groups,” according to a senior intelligence official familiar with the raid. By morning, as dawn broke, the Special Forces team had set out for the Indian border when several Dhruv helicopters from the Indian army’s aviation regiment took off to bring the troops back home.

Doval argued, said officials familiar with the decision, that unless the intent and the reach was not publicised, India would never be able to establish deterrence.

Behind the scenes, Indian diplomats and intelligence officials posted in Yangon had already discussed the new strategy with their Myanmar counterparts.

Another perspective:

Needless rhetoric has undermined India's success in Myanmar
Hindustan Times

Excerpts:

The sort of chest-thumping indulged in by certain ministers undermines the government’s policy of zero tolerance on terror. It also puts the country involved, in this case Myanmar, in a difficult situation domestically. No government would like to be seen as complicit in foreign forces entering its territory for any reason, howsoever justified it may be. In this case, no sooner had the operation been conducted successfully, even junior ministers made remarks to the effect that a message had been sent out to the country’s rivals, leading to Pakistan reacting with its characteristic belligerence.

The army, which has borne the brunt of militancy in the northeast and coordinated the operation, has rightly maintained a discreet silence. By suggesting that more operations could be carried out, the militants are forewarned and could well shift their operations to safer locations in neighbouring countries.

 

[Hari Sud]

There was everything good, there was nothing bad as you could not let terrorists get away after killing 18 Dogra regiment soldiers, not in a combat but returning home soldiers in an ambush.

I will love to see the ugly part after the deadly Indian Commandos retaliation. I will like to see dead terrorists lined up on ground for a photo shoot.

Stop following the First Post website. It is collection of misfit journalists who were unable to find jobs in regular media outlets have collected here. Now they can be manipulated with ease with negative information and money.

 

[rockey 71]

12:00 AM, June 17, 2015 / LAST MODIFIED: 12:00 AM, June 17, 2015

Anti-terror Raids Inside Myanmar

Indian intellectuals criticise govt's 'jingoist sentiments'

Pti, New Delhi



A group of eminent intellectuals in India have expressed deep concern over the "thoughtless articulation of jingoist sentiments" by high-level representatives of the government and BJP in the wake of the Army operation in Myanmar and urged it to disassociate itself from them.



They also asked the goverment to take advantage of the first opporunity available for resuming dialogue with Pakistan.



The statement did not refer to any minister but was apparently referring to remarks of minister of state Rajyavardhan Rathore suggesting that Indian could carry out surgical strikes across the border in Pakistan after the Myanmar strike against north east insurgents.



"We are profoundly disturbed by the thoughtless articulation of jingoist sentiments by high-level representatives of the government, prominent spokespersons of the ruling party and strategic thinkers and experts associated with the think tanks close to policy makers, following the Indian army's seemingly successful operation against the militants in the north east along the Indo-Myanmar border.



"We are deeply concerned about its dangerous implications for peace and security in South Asia and for relations with our neighbours, particularly Pakistan," said the statement by the group including journalist diplomats, jurists and journalists.



They said this ran counter to the policy of peace and amity with the neighbours spelt out time and again by the leaders since independence.



The signatories included Kuldip Nayar, Muchkund Dubey, Justice Rajindar Sachar, Mrinal Pande, Manoranjan Mohanty, Zoya Hasan, Johan Dayal, N D Pancholi, Mohammad Salim Engineer, Seema Mustafa, Jawed Naqvi and Sumit Chakravartty.





http://www.thedailys...entiments-98311

 

[OneGrimPilgrim]

12:00 AM, June 17, 2015 / LAST MODIFIED: 12:00 AM, June 17, 2015

Anti-terror Raids Inside Myanmar

Indian intellectuals criticise govt's 'jingoist sentiments'

Pti, New Delhi



A group of eminent intellectuals in India have expressed deep concern over the "thoughtless articulation of jingoist sentiments" by high-level representatives of the government and BJP in the wake of the Army operation in Myanmar and urged it to disassociate itself from them.



They also asked the goverment to take advantage of the first opporunity available for resuming dialogue with Pakistan.



The statement did not refer to any minister but was apparently referring to remarks of minister of state Rajyavardhan Rathore suggesting that Indian could carry out surgical strikes across the border in Pakistan after the Myanmar strike against north east insurgents.



"We are profoundly disturbed by the thoughtless articulation of jingoist sentiments by high-level representatives of the government, prominent spokespersons of the ruling party and strategic thinkers and experts associated with the think tanks close to policy makers, following the Indian army's seemingly successful operation against the militants in the north east along the Indo-Myanmar border.



"We are deeply concerned about its dangerous implications for peace and security in South Asia and for relations with our neighbours, particularly Pakistan," said the statement by the group including journalist diplomats, jurists and journalists.



They said this ran counter to the policy of peace and amity with the neighbours spelt out time and again by the leaders since independence.



The signatories included Kuldip Nayar, Muchkund Dubey, Justice Rajindar Sachar, Mrinal Pande, Manoranjan Mohanty, Zoya Hasan, Johan Dayal, N D Pancholi, Mohammad Salim Engineer, Seema Mustafa, Jawed Naqvi and Sumit Chakravartty.





http://www.thedailys...entiments-98311

same secular parindey under one shed here too, crapping all over the place!

also, firstly, these bazzturds are again raking up and mazztur'baiting' to a non-issue! and secondly, and more importantly, what the DAMN f*cking f*ck is wrong if a nation felt proud for avenging the murder of its soldiers and civilians by professional mercenaries?!!!!!!!! these sensitive progeny of jaichand and mir zafar want to have 'good relations' at all costs with psychopaths who want to destroy you at all costs! what the f*ck are these traitors talking about? i sincerely hope that next time its either them or their near-dear ones that fall prey to the bombs and bullets of the terrorists! then we'll talk!

i severely despise this crappy import of democracy just for the reason that we (have to) nurture such aasteen ke saanp too under the glorious freedom-for-all shite!

 

[rockey 71]

http://mybangla24.com/the_daily_star_online_newspaper.php

12:00 AM, June 19, 2015 / LAST MODIFIED: 12:00 AM, June 19, 2015
Triumphalism over Myanmar Raid
Perils of covert operations


The debate over the Indian Army's Special Forces raid against National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) insurgents on Myanmarese territory has produced two main reactions.

The first, from Narendra Modi's diehard supporters, trumpets the operation's “great” success. The second defends covert operations, but believes that publicising them is self-defeating.

The first view's proponents support publicising the operation's details—against military rules—because India must send a signal not just to Khaplang, but to the “entire neighbourhood”. India's national security approach has changed under its “56-inch-chest” leader, who recently insulted Sheikh Hasina for combatting terrorism “despite” being a woman.

This puerile argument comprehensively misunderstands history—today's India was not one nation for a thousand years—and geopolitics. Confident, prudent nation-states don't violate their neighbours' borders; they know that healthy relations with them are key to their own security.

After the Khaplang faction killed 18 Indian troops on June 4 in Manipur, India could have conducted joint operations against it with the Myanmar army, with which it has good relations.

India entered into ceasefire agreements with both the Isak-Swu-Thuingaleng-Muivah (IM) and Khaplang factions of the NSCN respectively in 1997 and 2001. It had ample opportunity to renew the ceasefire with Khaplang which ended in March.

Alternatively, it could have roped in Naga civil society groups to persuade Khaplang to explore peace. Nagaland Chief Minister Zeliang says such groups have credibility.

Indian intelligence agencies did neither. They failed to keep the Manipur and Nagaland governments in the loop, and ignored the emerging coalition between Khaplang and other small North-eastern militants.

In its hastily-conceived retaliation, India attacked proximate rebel-bases for “political” reasons—not because they harboured many insurgents. Contradictory claims were made about the number killed: 20, even 100; but only seven bodies were recovered, says The Indian Express.

India could have negotiated joint anti-militant operations with the Myanmarese army, as it has done in Bhutan and Bangladesh.

The reason why India didn't even try is the Modi government's jingoism and its domination by super-hawks like National Security Adviser AK Doval, who prefer cloak-and-dagger methods.

Doval, a former intelligence man, is a firm believer in coercion, not diplomacy, to resolve all conflicts. He believes India-Pakistan peaceful co-existence is virtually impossible.

Both countries are nuclear-armed and so close that a nuclear exchange would lead to large-scale devastation and irreversible regional climatic change. As Kargil showed, conventional war rhetoric can lead to nuclear sabre-rattling, with horrifying consequences.

The second reaction recommends discretion: let covert operations speak for themselves. Yet, it fails to understand that protracted conflicts aren't decided by covert operations, but need strategic foresight and astute diplomacy. So it holds that a modern state must practice deception, skulduggery and lawlessness in exceptional circumstances.

Implicit here are three assumptions: first, covert operations successfully neutralise insurgents or terrorists; second, it's legitimate to use extreme/inhuman methods in special circumstances; third, democracies can return to normal political-social negotiation once a crisis has passed.

All three assumptions are questionable. In the 1950s, India collaborated with the CIA to instigate the so-called Tibetan Khampa Rebellion against China. The CIA abandoned it after sacrificing thousands of Tibetans. India earned China's hostility, revealed in 1962.

India joined a dangerous CIA-sponsored covert operation in 1965 to place espionage equipment energised by a plutonium power-pack on Nanda Devi to monitor Chinese nuclear activities. An avalanche prevented its placement. It has remained untraceable, raising fears of radioactive contamination of glaciers and the Ganga.

In 1987, India air-dropped “humanitarian” aid in northern Sri Lanka, and imposed the India-Sri Lanka accord on Colombo. India's “peace-keeping” operation cost it 1,200 soldiers—more than in all other wars—and led to Rajeev Gandhi's assassination.

Secondly, it's difficult to draw the line between lethal military attacks, and torture, hostage-taking, fake encounters, etc. They are all rationalised in the name of necessity to “deter” further attacks, or choosing “the lesser evil”. They form a slippery ethical slope, which permits increasingly brutal acts; ultimately, all limits collapse.

If torturing one person saves a hundred lives, wouldn't that be justified? This argument may seem attractive, but it's dangerously wrong. It violates the right to life and often produces false results which might lead to yet more violence.

By violating human rights, a democratic state undermines its claim to legality; it loses popular legitimacy. That's why “fake” encounters add to the cesspool of grievances that feed extremism.

In Mizoram, the Indian state created Malaya-Vietnam-style “strategic hamlets” by forcibly grouping villages. In Nagaland, Manipur and Assam, it waged war on its own people. This fuelled militancy.

The more ruthlessly the militancy was repressed, the greater were the civilian casualties. Hundreds of civilians were dehumanised through torture and forced labour in Manipur's “successful” Operation Loktak in 1999.

Finally, the state doesn't know when to stop. The draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act was introduced in 1958 as a “temporary” measure. It continues to operate in Kashmir and most North-Eastern states, barring Tripura.

The Myanmar raid forms part of the same vile pattern. This must end. For real long-term peace, India must talk to its alienated citizens without coercion.


The writer is an eminent Indian columnist.

 

[OneGrimPilgrim]

http://mybangla24.com/the_daily_star_online_newspaper.php

12:00 AM, June 19, 2015 / LAST MODIFIED: 12:00 AM, June 19, 2015
Triumphalism over Myanmar Raid
Perils of covert operations


The debate over the Indian Army's Special Forces raid against National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) insurgents on Myanmarese territory has produced two main reactions.

The first, from Narendra Modi's diehard supporters, trumpets the operation's “great” success. The second defends covert operations, but believes that publicising them is self-defeating.

The first view's proponents support publicising the operation's details—against military rules—because India must send a signal not just to Khaplang, but to the “entire neighbourhood”. India's national security approach has changed under its “56-inch-chest” leader, who recently insulted Sheikh Hasina for combatting terrorism “despite” being a woman.

This puerile argument comprehensively misunderstands history—today's India was not one nation for a thousand years—and geopolitics. Confident, prudent nation-states don't violate their neighbours' borders; they know that healthy relations with them are key to their own security.

After the Khaplang faction killed 18 Indian troops on June 4 in Manipur, India could have conducted joint operations against it with the Myanmar army, with which it has good relations.

India entered into ceasefire agreements with both the Isak-Swu-Thuingaleng-Muivah (IM) and Khaplang factions of the NSCN respectively in 1997 and 2001. It had ample opportunity to renew the ceasefire with Khaplang which ended in March.

Alternatively, it could have roped in Naga civil society groups to persuade Khaplang to explore peace. Nagaland Chief Minister Zeliang says such groups have credibility.

Indian intelligence agencies did neither. They failed to keep the Manipur and Nagaland governments in the loop, and ignored the emerging coalition between Khaplang and other small North-eastern militants.

In its hastily-conceived retaliation, India attacked proximate rebel-bases for “political” reasons—not because they harboured many insurgents. Contradictory claims were made about the number killed: 20, even 100; but only seven bodies were recovered, says The Indian Express.

India could have negotiated joint anti-militant operations with the Myanmarese army, as it has done in Bhutan and Bangladesh.

The reason why India didn't even try is the Modi government's jingoism and its domination by super-hawks like National Security Adviser AK Doval, who prefer cloak-and-dagger methods.

Doval, a former intelligence man, is a firm believer in coercion, not diplomacy, to resolve all conflicts. He believes India-Pakistan peaceful co-existence is virtually impossible.

Both countries are nuclear-armed and so close that a nuclear exchange would lead to large-scale devastation and irreversible regional climatic change. As Kargil showed, conventional war rhetoric can lead to nuclear sabre-rattling, with horrifying consequences.

The second reaction recommends discretion: let covert operations speak for themselves. Yet, it fails to understand that protracted conflicts aren't decided by covert operations, but need strategic foresight and astute diplomacy. So it holds that a modern state must practice deception, skulduggery and lawlessness in exceptional circumstances.

Implicit here are three assumptions: first, covert operations successfully neutralise insurgents or terrorists; second, it's legitimate to use extreme/inhuman methods in special circumstances; third, democracies can return to normal political-social negotiation once a crisis has passed.

All three assumptions are questionable. In the 1950s, India collaborated with the CIA to instigate the so-called Tibetan Khampa Rebellion against China. The CIA abandoned it after sacrificing thousands of Tibetans. India earned China's hostility, revealed in 1962.

India joined a dangerous CIA-sponsored covert operation in 1965 to place espionage equipment energised by a plutonium power-pack on Nanda Devi to monitor Chinese nuclear activities. An avalanche prevented its placement. It has remained untraceable, raising fears of radioactive contamination of glaciers and the Ganga.

In 1987, India air-dropped “humanitarian” aid in northern Sri Lanka, and imposed the India-Sri Lanka accord on Colombo. India's “peace-keeping” operation cost it 1,200 soldiers—more than in all other wars—and led to Rajeev Gandhi's assassination.

Secondly, it's difficult to draw the line between lethal military attacks, and torture, hostage-taking, fake encounters, etc. They are all rationalised in the name of necessity to “deter” further attacks, or choosing “the lesser evil”. They form a slippery ethical slope, which permits increasingly brutal acts; ultimately, all limits collapse.

If torturing one person saves a hundred lives, wouldn't that be justified? This argument may seem attractive, but it's dangerously wrong. It violates the right to life and often produces false results which might lead to yet more violence.

By violating human rights, a democratic state undermines its claim to legality; it loses popular legitimacy. That's why “fake” encounters add to the cesspool of grievances that feed extremism.

In Mizoram, the Indian state created Malaya-Vietnam-style “strategic hamlets” by forcibly grouping villages. In Nagaland, Manipur and Assam, it waged war on its own people. This fuelled militancy.

The more ruthlessly the militancy was repressed, the greater were the civilian casualties. Hundreds of civilians were dehumanised through torture and forced labour in Manipur's “successful” Operation Loktak in 1999.

Finally, the state doesn't know when to stop. The draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act was introduced in 1958 as a “temporary” measure. It continues to operate in Kashmir and most North-Eastern states, barring Tripura.

The Myanmar raid forms part of the same vile pattern. This must end. For real long-term peace, India must talk to its alienated citizens without coercion.


The writer is an eminent Indian columnist.

The writer is an eminent Indian columnist.
- couldn't have been otherwise! typical generic rudaali with all the usual spices of human rights, encounters, state-makes-terrorists, jingoistic govt., etc. thrown in the stew! all hail democracy! when china lambasts India's democracy i can't blame it. seems chinese fare much better than the ever moaning Indian 'intellectual' class.

 

[rockey 71]

The writer is an eminent Indian columnist.
- couldn't have been otherwise! typical generic rudaali with all the usual spices of human rights, encounters, state-makes-terrorists, jingoistic govt., etc. thrown in the stew! all hail democracy! when china lambasts India's democracy i can't blame it. seems chinese fare much better than the ever moaning Indian 'intellectual' class.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Praful_Bidwai

 

[OneGrimPilgrim]

his 'fame' precedes him

 

[Hari Sud]

These guys are too afraid of the adversary.

All these guys are reflecting Congress views, Who did nothing after 26/11 and allowed Pakistan to celebrate.

Display of Indian capability was essential and its knowledge by the enemy is sufficient to dissuade any future terror operation.