Someone somewhere decided to copy my post onto another forum. (Why, I have no idea). Nevertheless, certain rebuttals were put foreword, which I'd like to counter. (Primarily because I have nothing else to do right now...
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The IA currently has 13 corps, with the goal of inducting the mountain Strike Corps by 2017-19. Thats 14 corps in 2019, unless the Apaches enters service and retire by 2019. So for all practical purposes, the IA has to prepare its inductions keeping in mind the 14 corps.
The idea is then put foreward that the Attack Helis are for the Strike Corps only. It does indeed appear to be the case here, but then it would mean the inductions are being carried out contrary to combat doctrines.
The Army no longer classifies the Non-Strike Corps as Holding Corps. The reason is that unlike earlier, when these corps were tasked with holding the enemy, the current Pivot Corps have a clearly defined offensive responsibility. They are expected to prepare the theatre for the Strike Corps.
Then there comes the IBGs, 8 in all. The usage of the Apache by the US clearly shows that these gunships are typically used at the head of the offensive, which in the case of the IA would be the IBGs. It must be noted here that in the absence of the mass and firepower of the Strike Corps, the IBGs are reliant exclusively on CAS for slicing into enemy territory.
Would it make any sense to have IBGs tasked with initial offensive and not provide them the Apaches while the Strike Corps holds them? The case can be made for LCH here, but if the LCH is capable of leading and controlling the offensive, what is the need for the Apache? Surely if any force needs the networked fighting capability, the lead formations would be first in queue.
Of course though the case can be made for the non requirement of theCorps responsible for mountaineous regions,.