That is half truth and incomplete reporting ....
http://www.saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Our_Products/Audit_Report/Government_Wise/union_audit/recent_reports/union_compliance/2014/Defence/Report_4/Chap_6.pdf
Towed Array Sonar plays an important role in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) operations and is the sonar for warships to locate very silent submarines capable of launching high speed torpedoes. The Passive Towed Array Sonar (PTAS) technology was developed by NPOL, Kochi through a Technology Demonstration project in the nineties. Earlier, PTAS could meet the requirement of detection of a submarine at long range due to low
frequency operations of the sonar and reduced self-noise effect of operating platform. However, new submarines had become quieter due to incorporation of stealth technology and passive detection. Therefore, Navy projected the requirement of an Active cum Passive towed array sonar system for fitment on its frontline warships. Subsequently, based on an NSQR formulated in August 1997, NPOL took up development of “Active” cum Passive Towed Array Sonar” (Project NAGAN, NPL-206), a user driven Mission Mode Project sanctioned by the Government in June 1998 at an estimated cost of `30 crore and PDC of June 2002. the technology for Indian Navy, resulting in commissioning of its four frontline warships without Sonar capability between January 2001 and April 2004. In their Action Taken Note, Ministry had indicated (June 2009) that as a remedial measure, Decision Aid for Technology (DATE) analysis would be undertaken in all future mission mode staff projects to project realistic time frame and funds before obtaining sanction.
........ further examination revealed (October 2012) that the project underwent three further revisions of PDC (March 2008, March 2009 and finally till December 2011) as also cost revision upto `64.14 crore from the originally sanctioned amount of `30 crore. NPOL attributed the time and cost overrun to delays in commissioning of chilled air circulator system, power supplies and intercoms by Navy, non-conduct of trials due to monsoon/rough sea, refit of trial ship, shift in the basis of user acceptance6 leading to unanticipated purchase of two sets of wet end system; inaccurate estimates on the requirement of spares and lack of understanding of the engineering complexities of the project.
The system which was refurbished (April 2012) after carrying out the re-engineering works was termed as “Re-engineered NAGAN”. DRDO stated (May 2012) that NAGAN RE was undertaken for the upgradation of NAGAN as per the NSQRs and the initial trials in April 2012 with user participation had shown encouraging results. Extensive evaluations of NAGAN RE capability would be continued, wherein, DRDO was expected to
demonstrate the total capability of NAGAN. However, Navy viewed (March 2009) that NAGAN was far from meeting its primary requirements of even detecting a dived submarine and that the performance of NAGAN was even inferior to the medium frequency HUMSA sonar.
The delay in the project coupled with the non-achievement of the parameters of even detecting a dived submarine, compelled the Navy to consider the project as unsuccessful in February 2010 after incurring `48.51 crore, and eventually reduced the status of the project from MM to TD. As a result, a new NSQR was framed in November 2010 enhancing the performance requirements and in April 2012, a fresh MM project ‘Advanced Light Towed Array Sonar’ (ALTAS) (NPL-232) was sanctioned by Ministry of Defence at an estimated cost of `114.42 crore with PDC of April 2016.
NPOL, however, did not agree (September 2012) with the Navy’s views on the project as unsuccessful. DRDO stated that Project ALTAS had enhanced performance parameters incorporated in NSQR to meet present and futuristic requirement of the Navy and that Project NAGAN would continue as a TD project facilitating inputs to the design and testing of project ALTAS.
Thus, a project conceived in 1998 with a definite requirement projected by Navy could not be completed conclusively by the DRDO even after time overrun of nine and half years and cost overrun of `34.15 crore. NPOL cited (September 2012) the outdated QRs of 1998 as one of the reasons for non-acceptance of the developed system by the Navy. In addition, Navy opined (November 2012) that rapid advancements in technologies available worldwide made the system obsolete.
Due to continuous delays in completion of sonar NAGAN, Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) in 2008 approved procurement of ATAS (Advanced) for Delhi and Talwar class ships. Thus, due to prolonged delays and non-fructification of sonar NAGAN, project ALTAS had to be sanctioned at a cost of `114.42 crore, besides resorting to import.
Our scrutiny (October 2012) also brought out differences in perception between the DRDO and Navy regarding the project; while DRDO held that User Acceptance Trials (UAT) were conclusive and the system was ready for User Evaluation Trials (UET), Navy did not agree with this on the ground that certain key technologies/capabilities were yet to be proved. The audit scrutiny revealed that while DRDO claimed success, Navy opined (April 2009) that NAGAN was based on obsolete technology, did not show enhanced passive detection and was not comparable even with the 1980s’ technology. Navy further opined that that NPOL did not represent a realistic situation regarding the project at various fora such as Steering Committee, Apex Committee Meetings and Chief of Naval Staff/Vice Chief of Naval Staff reviews.
