Renminbi's mysterious rise: trade finance or interest arbitrage?
May 29, 2012 2:09 pm by Robert Cookson
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Renminbi’s mysterious rise: trade finance or interest arbitrage? | beyondbrics
Something funky is going on with the renminbi.
Swift, the global payments network – essentially an all-seeing eye over the global banking system – has released some intriguing new data about the international use of the Chinese currency.
While the renminbi accounts for just 0.34 per cent of all international payments, this year it has accounted for 4 per cent of global issuance of letters of credit (LCs), instruments used to finance trade.
Or to put it another way, the renminbi is one of the least-used currencies in the world when it comes to all payments, in sixteenth position, but it is now the third-biggest currency for LCs, after the dollar and the euro (see chart.) This is all the more remarkable because international transactions in renminbi only became possible three years ago.
Source: Swift
What's going on? In its press release on the data, Swift didn't suggest why such a large proportion of renminbi trade involved letters of credit.
But beyondbrics can take a stab at an explanation. Our best guess is that Chinese companies are using renminbi-denominated LCs as a clever way to arbitrage the onshore and offshore financial markets.
Remember, Beijing retains extensive controls on the movement of capital between the Chinese mainland and the rest of the world. Trade is one of the few permitted routes for the renminbi in and out of the country.
Letters of credit, therefore, open up all sorts of possibilities for savvy companies. Traditionally, companies use LCs to provide iron-clad guarantees to their international trading partners that they will be paid on time. Issued by banks, LCs ensure that payment will be made for goods once they are delivered at a specified date in the future.
But as the FT reported in November, Chinese companies can also use LCs to pierce the country's capital controls and borrow more cheaply offshore.
One of the main types of arbitrage works as follows. A Chinese company places renminbi on deposit with a mainland bank, earning an interest rate of about 3.5 per cent. The company then obtains a long-dated, renminbi-denominated letter of credit from the bank, ostensibly to pay for a shipment of goods from its own subsidiary in Hong Kong.
In turn, the Hong Kong subsidiary takes the letter of credit to a local bank and uses it as collateral to obtain a US dollar loan at a lower interest rate than those available on the mainland. In many cases, the company would also use a currency derivative to eliminate the foreign exchange risk. The end result: the company has captured the difference between onshore and offshore interest rates, less banker's fees.
From the looks of the Swift data, this kind of activity is occurring on a big scale. As shown in the chart below, most of the LCs are between mainland China and Hong Kong. Note also that almost all the LCs are going in one direction: out of China.
Source: Swift
For more evidence of the remarkable boom in renminbi letters of credit, we must turn to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. HKMA data show that Hong Kong banks' claims on banks in mainland China – a statistic that includes letters of credit – reached HK$1.53tn ($196bn) as of August, having jumped sixfold from just HK$252bn when the renminbi trade settlement scheme started in June 2009 (see chart.) These data are important, as they suggest that Hong Kong banks have indeed been lending against letters of credit from the mainland.
Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority
Why should we care about all this? For a start, it suggests that Hong Kong banks have a large exposure to mainland banks sitting on their balance sheets and that discounting LCs has been a big driver of revenues in recent years.
But there is a broader point too. If international trade in the renminbi is largely driven by financial arbitrage, as the extraordinary use of letters of credit implies, then Beijing's plan to internationalise the renminbi is not exactly going according to plan.