Army may scrap FMBT and focus on Arjun

[ersakthivel]

@ersakthivel, let's say you have asked one question, and they have not responded, so what? How can I or you force them to respond? Participation is voluntary, and the best you can do is ask them, and if your question goes unanswered, well, what can you do? I cannot force anyone to answer your question. Why not just let it go?

Ofcourse dragging this on is childish,
I only thought that they will answer, but now it is becoming evident they have no intention of doing it.

I will have to stop questioning them, because persisting with these questions to people who are not going to answer will make me look silly.

I do wish I should not have made the remark on homeland security,but repeated provocation gets one heated some times,

ANyway I will put them in my ignore list and stop arguing with them.

 

[ersakthivel]

And in what way that is connected whit Arjun armour LOS?
Important are only turret diamensions, armour backplates, and one propper mesurment based on draw, relan mesurmant etc. Rest is quite simple -even if we shoud take into account some photo perspective.
Eacht else is not relevant to count Arjun LOS. This whole post about "crew hatch" is dum as **** becouse it haven sense in corletaion to the main problem - Arjun LOS.

Okay since you have no intention of giving an answer to my questions ,STOP posting about armor thickness of ARJUN without answering these questions,

Who is a dumb--- is known pretty much to every one here, WE don't need your person's certifying authority for that.

Thanks

End of debate.

 

[pmaitra]

ANyway I will put them in my ignore list and stop arguing with them.

As I had said earlier, if you can focus on the content of the post, you are more than welcome to debate. We are a forum, so we have to debate. All I ask is to stop name-calling. I said the same thing to @Damian. Now, if you, or he, cannot debate without name-calling, I think it is best you two keep each other in your ignore lists.

Thank you for your cooperation.

 

[Payeng]

pmaitra you show have let the show go on

the posts were interesting to follow on

and now it stopped

 

[Austin]

Hopefully our FMBT would have Blow Out panels for all places where ammo is stored , This is a nice video of M1 Abrams Blow Out panels in action

M1A1 & M1A2 tank blow out panels on ammunition stowage - YouTube

 

[militarysta]

Okay since you have no intention of giving an answer to my questions ,STOP posting about armor thickness of ARJUN without answering these questions,

Of course I will not stop posting about armour thickness in Arjun, becouse your completly stupid and not conected whit armour LOS thema quetions have nothing common whit my own estimatous based on:
a) overal turret width
b) gun mantled mask width

If You are interestd I have Arjun draw from Kampfanzer heute und morgen. in 1:72 scale. They are very accurate draws (I check on Leopard-2A4, A5, A6 draws, and T-xx draws). And Arjun mesurmant made on this draw give:
turret width - 280-284cm
gun mantled mask whole width less then ~136cm

So in fact correct Arjun armour estimatosu is this:

Variant No.4 -
Values given by STGN - turret ~2,84m width:
frontal turret armour: 820mm LOS
armour block behind main sight: 400mm LOS*
turret sides at 30.: 460mm LOS
thin turret sides after boxes at 90: ~50mm thick
gun mantled mask 400mm LOS


*in case armour block behind main sight there is a option that here is 450-500mm los if periscope is inside armour cavity. IMHO avaible photos do not settle this clearly enought.





And whole Arjun program shoud be compare with Altay program and South Korea K1 program, and Al Chalid program. All those countries try to bulid their own first tank, whit some foregin support.

 

[DivineHeretic]

With due respect to the experts of tank design here, it might be worth considering the employment tactics to be employed by the IA and the tasks designated to the FMBT post 2025, when this tank should make its appearance to the IA armored divisions.
There is ample evidence to suggest that armored warfare is going through its most profound shift since the introduction of tanks in WW1. Even in India the concept of armor and its employment is being seriously revisited in the wake of the GW2 which practically shut the doors on tank vs tank battles, with air power taking over the tank buster role.
Shift in India's understanding of armored warfare is already showing changes on the ground. The decision to induct over 150 LCH and 70 odd rudras alongwith 22 Apaches signals that IA no longer believes in the validity of tank vs tank battles. This does not mean that the demise of tanks is imminent or that the IA will simply discard its tanks in favour of gunships. But it does mean that it would prefer that anti tank action be taken by the attack helis and/or strike aircraft, thus reducing the massive casualties that occur to both sides in tank battles.
So the question that arises is what does the IA expect from its tank. Sure the tank of future i.e. FMBT must still be capable of taking down an enemy tank should it come infront of it, and be able to protect itself from hostile armor and AT teams. But what else will be the role of the FMBT? Will it be relegated to supporting the infantry/IFV assault units? Will it still retain the role of the spearhead of the IA IBGs?

 

[Shirman]

With due respect to the experts of tank design here, it might be worth considering the employment tactics to be employed by the IA and the tasks designated to the FMBT post 2025, when this tank should make its appearance to the IA armored divisions.
There is ample evidence to suggest that armored warfare is going through its most profound shift since the introduction of tanks in WW1. Even in India the concept of armor and its employment is being seriously revisited in the wake of the GW2 which practically shut the doors on tank vs tank battles, with air power taking over the tank buster role.
Shift in India's understanding of armored warfare is already showing changes on the ground. The decision to induct over 150 LCH and 70 odd rudras alongwith 22 Apaches signals that IA no longer believes in the validity of tank vs tank battles. This does not mean that the demise of tanks is imminent or that the IA will simply discard its tanks in favour of gunships. But it does mean that it would prefer that anti tank action be taken by the attack helis and/or strike aircraft, thus reducing the massive casualties that occur to both sides in tank battles.
So the question that arises is what does the IA expect from its tank. Sure the tank of future i.e. FMBT must still be capable of taking down an enemy tank should it come infront of it, and be able to protect itself from hostile armor and AT teams. But what else will be the role of the FMBT? Will it be relegated to supporting the infantry/IFV assault units? Will it still retain the role of the spearhead of the IA IBGs?[/

Agree with u bro on this front. But i guess they will opt for easily deploy-able, cost effective modular design n under 50 tonnes as their cheif parameters....

With Arjun mk2 goin above 65 tonnes 67.5 tonnes perhaps to be precise (and FMBT to be developed from it)... Its difficult for me to even imagine its outcomes......

 

[Damian]

With due respect to the experts of tank design here, it might be worth considering the employment tactics to be employed by the IA and the tasks designated to the FMBT post 2025, when this tank should make its appearance to the IA armored divisions.
There is ample evidence to suggest that armored warfare is going through its most profound shift since the introduction of tanks in WW1. Even in India the concept of armor and its employment is being seriously revisited in the wake of the GW2 which practically shut the doors on tank vs tank battles, with air power taking over the tank buster role.
Shift in India's understanding of armored warfare is already showing changes on the ground. The decision to induct over 150 LCH and 70 odd rudras alongwith 22 Apaches signals that IA no longer believes in the validity of tank vs tank battles. This does not mean that the demise of tanks is imminent or that the IA will simply discard its tanks in favour of gunships. But it does mean that it would prefer that anti tank action be taken by the attack helis and/or strike aircraft, thus reducing the massive casualties that occur to both sides in tank battles.
So the question that arises is what does the IA expect from its tank. Sure the tank of future i.e. FMBT must still be capable of taking down an enemy tank should it come infront of it, and be able to protect itself from hostile armor and AT teams. But what else will be the role of the FMBT? Will it be relegated to supporting the infantry/IFV assault units? Will it still retain the role of the spearhead of the IA IBGs?

Conclusion in the gratest armies all over the world is that efficency of air assets against ground troops, even poorly equiped is low.

This is why contrary to this silly misbelief, such countries like USA, Russia, Germany, Israel, are shifting from lightweight, lightly armored vehicles in to better protected and more weight balanced vehicles.

What does it means, well it does not means end of heavy armor-mechanized forces, but their evolution. The wheeled platforms are evolving from lightweight and lightly armored in to mediumweight and medium armored, sam goes for tracked APC's and IFV's, while MBT's for the nearest future will also still be relatively heavy, approx 60 tons or more, but this is mainly due to inefficent design with manned turrets. When unmanned turrets will be widespreading then the MBT will again have a better balance between weight, dimensions and protection.

It is actually easier to achieve such balance in case of MBT, because MBT have much smaller internal volume than APC or IFV, in the end however, some new design solutions might also give such better balance for APC's and IFV's as MBT's will achieve in future.

Another question is of course evolution of armor protection. Nanotechnology is obvious way to further evolve, with greater strenght and also better flexibility, in theory it would be possible to achieve high protection levels with less thickness nececary for armor array.

So I would not be such enthusiastic with air forces, because in the end ground combat vehicles might end as much more advanced in terms of materials from which they are made, and in the end both air and sea platforms might be benefiting from the solutions made for ground vehicles.

 

[DivineHeretic]

Conclusion in the gratest armies all over the world is that efficency of air assets against ground troops, even poorly equiped is low.

This is why contrary to this silly misbelief, such countries like USA, Russia, Germany, Israel, are shifting from lightweight, lightly armored vehicles in to better protected and more weight balanced vehicles.

What does it means, well it does not means end of heavy armor-mechanized forces, but their evolution. The wheeled platforms are evolving from lightweight and lightly armored in to mediumweight and medium armored, sam goes for tracked APC's and IFV's, while MBT's for the nearest future will also still be relatively heavy, approx 60 tons or more, but this is mainly due to inefficent design with manned turrets. When unmanned turrets will be widespreading then the MBT will again have a better balance between weight, dimensions and protection.

It is actually easier to achieve such balance in case of MBT, because MBT have much smaller internal volume than APC or IFV, in the end however, some new design solutions might also give such better balance for APC's and IFV's as MBT's will achieve in future.

Another question is of course evolution of armor protection. Nanotechnology is obvious way to further evolve, with greater strenght and also better flexibility, in theory it would be possible to achieve high protection levels with less thickness nececary for armor array.

So I would not be such enthusiastic with air forces, because in the end ground combat vehicles might end as much more advanced in terms of materials from which they are made, and in the end both air and sea platforms might be benefiting from the solutions made for ground vehicles.

I dont remember declaring the end of heavy armored vehicles or for that matter the lightly armored vehicles being the future of armor. It is true that the US led coalition forces after initial bitter experience with lightly armored vehicles in Iraq and Afg shifted to more medium weight better protected platforms with the Russians followimg suit after the Georgian campign. But in both the situations the airforce and the attack helis had crippled the opposing sides' armor capability to a few scattered disorganised units taking on the organised and substancial armored formations of the NATO and the Russian army.

The air component had already done its bid and cleared out majority of the hostile armor in both the situations, allowing for a relatively easier thrust by the armored columns. Now imagine the carnage and casualties on the side of the NATO in iraq if they hadnt used the air component to break the back of the enemy. Tank battles are inherently expensive in terms of casualties, which we will not be acceptable to us. The efficiency of the air power against ground troops may be low, but we wont be doing economics on the battlefield,and anyway it will be much more inefficient not to mention expensive in all the criucial parameters to be caught in a tank vs tank war.

A CBU 97-102 is far more easier and cheaper, not to mention faster way to take down a traditional armored regiment than to meet it with your own armor. Granted the tank cannot be replaced on the battlefield in terms of presence and staying power, but its anti armor role will diminish with time as more and more countries delegate this to the air component of battle.

 

[Damian]

But in both the situations the airforce and the attack helis had crippled the opposing sides' armor capability to a few scattered disorganised units taking on the organised and substancial armored formations of the NATO and the Russian army.

This is a dangerous myth. Better read some of the AAR's from 2003, when if not the tanks, infantry units would be destroyed by Iraqi forces.

Air forces are greatly inefficent in dealing with armoured fighting vehicles.

US Army also learned that attack helicopters are very vurnable even to small arms fire.

The air component had already done its bid and cleared out majority of the hostile armor in both the situations, allowing for a relatively easier thrust by the armored columns. Now imagine the carnage and casualties on the side of the NATO in iraq if they hadnt used the air component to break the back of the enemy. Tank battles are inherently expensive in terms of casualties, which we will not be acceptable to us. The efficiency of the air power against ground troops may be low, but we wont be doing economics on the battlefield,and anyway it will be much more inefficient not to mention expensive in all the criucial parameters to be caught in a tank vs tank war.

A CBU 97-102 is far more easier and cheaper, not to mention faster way to take down a traditional armored regiment than to meet it with your own armor. Granted the tank cannot be replaced on the battlefield in terms of presence and staying power, but its anti armor role will diminish with time as more and more countries delegate this to the air component of battle.

History proves that this is complete BS.

If air forces would be so potent, then there would be no huge tank battles like battle for 73 eastings, battle for medina ridge in 1991, or relatively big engagements in 2003. I had somewhere a one number of one of military magazines from my country where such battle is described I will try to find it.

----------------------------------------

Example, during night between 23rd and 24th March 2003, 1-227 Attack Helicopters Battalion had a mission to attack Medina Division of the Iraqi Army, to attack were sent 30 AH-64's, during attack helicopters were reppeled by AAA assets of Iraqi Army, mostly made from 12,7mm, 14,5mm and other small ot medium calliber AAA weapons. From 30 helicopters to base returned only 29, one not returned, needed to land in field, others were so badly damaged that during 24 hours only 2 were repaired, while repairs of the rest continued for the whole month. None of their tasks were accomplished.

More to come.

 

[Damian]

Even better example.

In night between 2nd and 3rd April, B Company from 3-7 Battalion had been faced with Iraqi armor force made from approx 50 tanks (mostly T-72's) and 50 APC's (mostly Chinese made Type 63's) from 10th Armored Brigade.

4 M1 tanks attached to 3-7 Battalion were able to stop them, Iraqis were attacked by air forces and artillery but their effectiveness was low. Iraqi armored column tried to flank 3-7 Battalion, but they were faced by C company of 3-69 tank battalion. Americans nearly depleted all of their ammunition load in tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, but nearly completely wiped out Iraqi forces.

This is a battle in the region of An Najaf and An Nasiryah.

Source is Polish Military Magazine "Poligon" number 6 2010.

 

[DivineHeretic]

This is a dangerous myth. Better read some of the AAR's from 2003, when if not the tanks, infantry units would be destroyed by Iraqi forces.

Air forces are greatly inefficent in dealing with armoured fighting vehicles.

US Army also learned that attack helicopters are very vurnable even to small arms fire.



History proves that this is complete BS.

If air forces would be so potent, then there would be no huge tank battles like battle for 73 eastings, battle for medina ridge in 1991, or relatively big engagements in 2003. I had somewhere a one number of one of military magazines from my country where such battle is described I will try to find it.

----------------------------------------

Example, during night between 23rd and 24th March 2003, 1-227 Attack Helicopters Battalion had a mission to attack Medina Division of the Iraqi Army, to attack were sent 30 AH-64's, during attack helicopters were reppeled by AAA assets of Iraqi Army, mostly made from 12,7mm, 14,5mm and other small ot medium calliber AAA weapons. From 30 helicopters to base returned only 29, one not returned, needed to land in field, others were so badly damaged that during 24 hours only 2 were repaired, while repairs of the rest continued for the whole month. None of their tasks were accomplished.

More to come.

Well we have our own piece of history which does relate more to the subcontinental conditions. In 1971 war vs pak, on our western frontier a company of infantry had with the support of airforce fighters and without any armored support, had turned an entire armored regiment to scrap metal. So my earlier arguements aren't the works of a fanboy, I have history to back myself, just as you do. If you want you can read up on battle for Longewala.

I agree that throwing infantry without armor support in open plains is a suicidal arrangement, even if you have massive air support, but the bulk of the tank kills in the future will be done by air platforms, not tanks. This does not mean that large scale tank battles will not occur, they very well could, but they will be the exception rather than the norm. Yes the air component is vulnerable to small arms fire, but the same arguement can be applied to tanks as well, particularly with infantry getying AT systems like Spike LOS with range over 25km, and for every technological evolution arguement you make, the aircraft will also undergo evolution, and they do tend to go through evolution and revolution faster than the terrestial platforms.

You dont need the air component to go and clean up every single armored vehicle the enemy has put on the ground, but to break the warfighting capability of the opponent. You donot need to destroy every single vehicle of an armored division, but to take out the vital assets of the division, alongwith a fair number of fighting vehicles, to effectively stop the armored division, which can be better and faster done by air component than to have a tank v tank engagement risking more men and equipment, in a prolonged engagement.

 

[Damian]

Air assetts are useless waste of money if used to attack tanks or other armored vehicles.

This is conclusion from many conflicts.

Instead of investing a lot in to air forces I would put more money in to ground forces, especially modernization of armored vehicles.

I seen a reliable conclusions from USA about the effecitveness of air forces. It become obvious that flyboys were liers, when it comes to their effectiveness reports. So I am disgusted with these people and their work, not to mention that contrary to ground forces and especially AFV's crews, flyboys and artillery are causing much more corrateral damage, kill much more innocent people, and effectiveness of their support for troops is many times just not efficent enough compared to effect of even a single tank.

Militarysta have more recent and reliable sources, you should ask him for these publications.

 

[ersakthivel]

Air assetts are useless waste of money if used to attack tanks or other armored vehicles.

This is conclusion from many conflicts.

Instead of investing a lot in to air forces I would put more money in to ground forces, especially modernization of armored vehicles.

I seen a reliable conclusions from USA about the effecitveness of air forces. It become obvious that flyboys were liers, when it comes to their effectiveness reports. So I am disgusted with these people and their work, not to mention that contrary to ground forces and especially AFV's crews, flyboys and artillery are causing much more corrateral damage, kill much more innocent people, and effectiveness of their support for troops is many times just not efficent enough compared to effect of even a single tank.

Militarysta have more recent and reliable sources, you should ask him for these publications.

have you read any book on battle for Longewala. ?

 

[Damian]

have you read any book on battle for Longewala. ?

No, but I read articles from military press and some books about 1991 ODS, 2003 OIF, 2006 Lebanon and 1990's Balkan Wars. This is far more of experience, and air forces show their inefficency rather than claimed efficency, even when they were using guided weapons.

In the recent Russia-Georgia war, both Russiand and Georgian air assets didn't had any spectacular achievements, in fact their use was irrelevant.

The same was during WWII, for example for many years, death of Michael Wittman had been claimed to be because hist tank was hit by a rocket from allied aircraft, the more recent studies reveals different conclusion, that Wittmans Tiger had been hit by allied tank (Sherman VC Firefly).

 

[Shirman]

No, but I read articles from military press and some books about 1991 ODS, 2003 OIF, 2006 Lebanon and 1990's Balkan Wars. This is far more of experience, and air forces show their inefficency rather than claimed efficency, even when they were using guided weapons.

In the recent Russia-Georgia war, both Russiand and Georgian air assets didn't had any spectacular achievements, in fact their use was irrelevant.

The same was during WWII, for example for many years, death of Michael Wittman had been claimed to be because hist tank was hit by a rocket from allied aircraft, the more recent studies reveals different conclusion, that Wittmans Tiger had been hit by allied tank (Sherman VC Firefly).

May because of the fact u Polish had given them " Grom '' manpads and Ukrainians had given them Buk-m1 missiles :thumb:........
But even i was shocked why did Russians did't deployed that much amount of CAS aircrafts apart from mi-25/35 and Su-25s
Much of the tank busting was done by T-72 series and Anti-tank units............

 

[ersakthivel]

No, but I read articles from military press and some books about 1991 ODS, 2003 OIF, 2006 Lebanon and 1990's Balkan Wars. This is far more of experience, and air forces show their inefficency rather than claimed efficency, even when they were using guided weapons.

In the recent Russia-Georgia war, both Russiand and Georgian air assets didn't had any spectacular achievements, in fact their use was irrelevant.

The same was during WWII, for example for many years, death of Michael Wittman had been claimed to be because hist tank was hit by a rocket from allied aircraft, the more recent studies reveals different conclusion, that Wittmans Tiger had been hit by allied tank (Sherman VC Firefly).

So you think the recent induction of APACHE's with top attack anti tank missile is a waste of resource by Indian army?

History will forever stop at World war two data?

then what is the use of Tanks firing missiles through their main guns ,if top attack anti tank missiles fired from APACHE are useless.

 

[Damian]

May because of the fact u Polish had given them " Grom '' manpads and Ukrainians had given them Buk-m1 missiles

Both are not super weapons, Georgian air forces also didn't had anyvsignificant successes.

So you think the recent induction of APACHE's with top attack anti tank missile is a waste of resource by Indian army?

No, AH-64's that India buys are new AH-64E Guardian Apache, which have some nice features. The problem is that use them as a anti tank platforms only is wasting their potential. It is better to use AH-64E's with Mi-24's to attack infrastructure like command centers, communications centers, radar stations, eventually use them in COIN operations.

But using attack helicopters in a conventional warfare to attack armoured formations, might end with loosing this expensive machines due to AAA assets of the enemy. Attack helicopters survivability was a point of a lot of discussion in NATO, and both training and real warfare operations proove these concerns.

I can give you example from Poland when during training session with Americans, our obsolete air defences made effective ambush on AH-64's, we had allmost non casualties, and Americans lost all helicopters.

 

[militarysta]

I can give you example from Poland when during training session with Americans, our obsolete air defences made effective ambush on AH-64's, we had allmost non casualties, and Americans lost all helicopters.

I can write more about that.

It was in two yers VICTOR STRIKE 2001 and 2002 in polish "poligon" in Drawsko Pomorskie city.

In 2001 it was:
"our force"
- batery PATRIOT sam
- 8x polish Sa-8B GECKO

"enemy"
- 2x AH-64 regiments
- MLRS + BM-21 battery
- ECM

During both years there was using MILES system (whit ASET IV) so there was wery simle to notice how whas hit by what (MLRS, Hellfire, Sa-8B). The aim of that was trening for US forces how to overcome air defense by using MLRS battery, and destroy polish radar and combat command center. Time was 12 days for both trening (20001 an 2002).
And what?
In 2001 US lost both Ah-64 regiments from only polish Sa-8B fire. PATRIOT shot down only 2 Ah-64, rest was "destroyed" by our Gecko.
From MLRS and Grad battery only one (1) Sa-8B was destroed. No radar was used on Sa-8B. During day and noight fight there was no case when Ah-64 + MLRS batery was able to do their task. No one target was destroyed by Ah-64 - due to imposible achive 10km range to the target.
The key whas proper using terrein and shot-and-run tactick.
In 2002 USa Army want's second ture, but this time they need to do smth whit very low morale in Us Ah-64 regiment (after 2001 ) so they forced some limit's for Sa-8B Osa - (for example - max fire range for Sa-8P only 2.5km, twice shorter time contreaction for MLRS battery, etc ) .
And what? And LOL -againt Sa-8P win, but those time whit bigger loses (about 40% of the Sa-8B), but still Ah-64 regiment was almoust evaporeted after polish fire
And there was used old Sa-8b Gecko, nod deeply moderniseted polish Sa-8P (Sting-P).