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Why India does not have CAS crafts?
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pmaitra
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If I may, I will add a few things.
We should look at specific machines and decide what is suited for what.
Sukhoi-25 is a rugged and versatile machine. It is not maintenance intensive, and can run on virtually anything on earth - petrol, kerosene, diesel.
Mil-24/35 is not a gunship. It is a combo by functionality - it combines and performs the roles of a troop transporter and a CAS or FAS craft. It is also a combo in flight characteristics - it is not a pure rotary wing craft; it is a mixture of rotary and fixed wing craft, because, the wings on the two sides not only carry weapons, but also give lift to the helicopter.
Regarding operations in mountains, Mil-24/35 is not the best, and it would work better in lower altitude, but can fly much higher than tree-tops level. Mil-17 can be attached with 57 mm MBRL pods, and has operated in the heights of Kargil area.
When it comes to MANPADS, I think good usage of flares should be enough to deflect them. While mountains might provide more cover, most of helo losses tend to be in the mountains. In the Soviet-Mujahideen War, many were attacked not only with MANPADS but DShK machine guns perched on top of cliffs.
The advantage of a rotary wing craft over a fixed wing craft is simple, it can land and take off from any clearing. On the other hand, a fixed wing craft is more stable, faster, payload-capable, and efficient.
I think both have their own advantages, and disadvantages, and hence, many armies try to have both of these types of crafts.
Also, this post below is a very well written post:
p2prada
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I agree with the versatility of dedicated CAS aircraft, but we may not be able to afford one, especially in the numbers required.
That's why we will have to use our multirole aircraft to handle CAS also. Meaning, why buy a single role aircraft when we can instead use our funds to purchase better aircraft and use it for CAS which is merely one of the many roles it can perform.
If air superiority is maintained, then we will be able to use more aircraft for strike duties.
t_co
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If you have air superiority over huge chunks of the battlefield, why not use the aircraft for interdiction sorties on deep targets? Blinding and paralyzing your enemy on an operational level matters much more than putting on a light show for some beleaguered company of infantry caught in an unfavorable situation. Hell, if I was the commander, I would even prioritize striking enemy artillery and fuel supplies above CAS missions. CAS causes the most visible effects, but not necessarily the most efficient ones.
In order of precedence, these are the targets air planners generally go for:
1) Any battlefield target identified as a high priority by corps or theater command (e.g. the point of initial breakthrough; flank security for advancing friendlies; whittling down the flanks of an enemy breakthrough)
2) C4ISR nodes (radars, command bunkers, communications relays)
3) Transportation bottlenecks (especially destructible bridges, but also port facilities, highways, railroads, etc)
4) Fire support assets (artillery and missile launchers - especially nuclear-capable missile launchers)
5) Fueling stations or resupply depots
6) Large concentrations of enemy troops in staging areas (battalions packed together into cramped jump-off points or lined up along a road - these will happen in a fluid, mechanized war, no matter how much tactical commanders try to spread out - they simply won't have the time to until they get close to the front lines)
7) Clumps of enemy troops about to overwhelm friendlies
8) "Penny packets" of enemy troops; mopping up operations
Only 7 and 8 fall into the buckets of traditional CAS - fighters diving on infantry/armored companies with short-range weapons. #1 fits more with the role of a massive wave of first strikes with anti-infrastructure or anti-structure weapons, likely done before air superiority is achieved - which demands a survivable launch platform and standoff weapons system, not $150mm fighters risking themselves to impress some jawans on the ground.
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p2prada
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Hence why CAS aircraft are not a priority. Instead buy aircraft which can conduct DPS missions which are capable of CAS when the need arises. That's what we are doing.
So what's your point? Do you want us to buy CAS aircraft for penny-pinching fireworks or not use MRCA for CAS at all?
t_co
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I apologize if my last post came off as unduly harsh. I was saying that the IAF shouldn't worry itself with CAS considerations when selecting their MRCA - instead, they should think more rationally about what missions they will need their next generation of fighter aircraft to accomplish.
Warfare is increasingly not about defeating your opponent's ability to fight back, or even to move around - it's defeating his ability to comprehend the battlefield, decide on the battlefield, and communicate on the battlefield.
Basically, I'm advocating for culling CAS from the IAF's mission profile altogether, and transferring it to the IAAW.
pmaitra
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A multi-role aircraft is most likely going to be with the IAF, and not IAAW. If it is with IAF, it will only add to the bureaucratic burden. Having a dedicated CAS aircraft for IAAW would improve operational alacrity. Can India afford dedicated CAS aircraft for IAAW? With the money India has been spending lately, I don't see why not.
TrueSpirit
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That's a touchy bone of contention between IAF & IA, since Kargil. Turf battles are already on. I believe the eventual decision was that IA would have its IAAW performing routine CAS roles & would own all necessary assets to achieve the same (no clarity about fixed wing platforms, though). But given the over-reliance of IA to train its pilots & support staff with IAF, the desired amount of autonomy that IA leadership wanted has not been achieved yet.
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Turbo-prop have some advantages over Jets..
1. Fuel Economy aka lesser operational costs, Also lesser maintenance cost Also lesser unit price.
2. Ability of Short landing and take off from rugged or no run way just plain fields..
3. More or less Similar Payload specs ( LGB, Rocket pods, Guns, A2A & A2G guided missiles combos ) with jets..
4. More loitering time compare to Jet over battlefield..
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/military-aviation/14807-air-power-cheap.html
1. Fuel Economy aka lesser operational costs, Also lesser maintenance cost Also lesser unit price.
2. Ability of Short landing and take off from rugged or no run way just plain fields..
3. More or less Similar Payload specs ( LGB, Rocket pods, Guns, A2A & A2G guided missiles combos ) with jets..
4. More loitering time compare to Jet over battlefield..
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/military-aviation/14807-air-power-cheap.html
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Thanks everyone for your responses. I have a few more questions.
How does the vulnerability of attack helicopters to MANPADS and other SAMs compare with that of fixed-wing CAS aircraft. I would think that attack helicopters are more vulnerable, but if I recall, an IAF MiG-21 was downed by a Pakistani MANPADS during Kargil. Also, is it right to assume that attack helicopters are more vulnerable to enemy fighters than fixed-wing CAS aircraft?
Unless I'm mistaken, most militaries include attack helicopters under Army Aviation, while fixed-wing CAS aircraft are included under the Air Force. I believe this setup exists in India also. I assume that logic behind this is to facilitate easy deployment of air power in support of ground forces. Given this, is an army commander more likely to rely on attack helicopters than fixed-wing CAS, since they are more readily available/deployable and cooperation with the Air Force not needed?
What is an example of a situation where an army commander would ask for fixed-wing aircraft to provide CAS rather than attack helicopters, when the latter are more readily accessible to the army commander? In the Indian context specifically, what are the roles of the attack helicopters and fixed-wing CAS in India's military doctrine (assuming Cold Start exists and is actually the general planned strategy of the Indian Armed Forces)? When making shallow incursions into Pakistani territory as dictated by Cold Start, how and when would the two types of CAS be used?
How does the vulnerability of attack helicopters to MANPADS and other SAMs compare with that of fixed-wing CAS aircraft. I would think that attack helicopters are more vulnerable, but if I recall, an IAF MiG-21 was downed by a Pakistani MANPADS during Kargil. Also, is it right to assume that attack helicopters are more vulnerable to enemy fighters than fixed-wing CAS aircraft?
Unless I'm mistaken, most militaries include attack helicopters under Army Aviation, while fixed-wing CAS aircraft are included under the Air Force. I believe this setup exists in India also. I assume that logic behind this is to facilitate easy deployment of air power in support of ground forces. Given this, is an army commander more likely to rely on attack helicopters than fixed-wing CAS, since they are more readily available/deployable and cooperation with the Air Force not needed?
What is an example of a situation where an army commander would ask for fixed-wing aircraft to provide CAS rather than attack helicopters, when the latter are more readily accessible to the army commander? In the Indian context specifically, what are the roles of the attack helicopters and fixed-wing CAS in India's military doctrine (assuming Cold Start exists and is actually the general planned strategy of the Indian Armed Forces)? When making shallow incursions into Pakistani territory as dictated by Cold Start, how and when would the two types of CAS be used?
pmaitra
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Most SAMs and MANPADS are IR guided, i.e. they are heat seeking missiles. They can be defeated by:
- Quick maneuverability of the craft.
- Heat signature. (smaller the better)
- Exhaust supressors.
- Flares that are manually operated.
- Flares that are automatically deployed by launch seekers.
- Chaff or decoys, which AFAIK are only deployed by planes, but I don't see why a helicopter cannot deploy it. (might not be relevant in CAS scenario)
Helicopters, even if hit, can auto-rotate if the blades are intact after impact, even if the engine is taken out. Fixed wing aircraft will have more chance of survival. A very fast craft would be safer, for in CAS, the speed of a fixed wing aircraft and helicopter would be much lower, and probably won't make a big difference. I would say a fixed-wing aircraft has a slight edge when it comes to pilot survival, but when it comes to being hit, neither has an advantage.
Helicopter have this wonderful advantage of being able to land in many places and also evacuate casualties or insert troops. It can also insert troops, and provide cover prior to and after troop insertion. Fixed wing aircraft will need at least some stretch of flat land, field, or a road, to take off from, and land onto. They do have a longer loiter capability, but they cannot operate from anywhere. So, what you are saying is correct - helicopters are more readily deployable.
In the Indian context, how the roles have been defined is something I would let others comment on.
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The Helicopter's Grim Future in Modern Combat
By Ralph Omholt
Despite our rapid defeat of the Iraqi army last spring, one clear lesson that has emerged from both the combat and occupation phases of the war is that the entire concept of helicopter operations in battle is undermined by their extreme vulnerability to ground fire.
Unlike our experience in the jungles and wooded mountains of Vietnam, the helicopter is a prime and easy target in desert and urban warfare environments such as we have seen in Somalia, and are still seeing in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The combat record of the helicopter in Vietnam was different from subsequent battlefields. That was true by virtue of the limitations of the Viet Cong-NVA firing accuracy, the limitations of their weaponry - including quantity - and the visual limitations of the jungle or forests which served to protect the helicopters flying overhead.
It was also true that the UH-1 Huey was a simple and tough helicopter, easily repaired. The application of the helicopter was uniquely successful in a unique environment. And, their relatively low cost ensured that quantity was rarely a factor.
The harsh reality is that today the helicopter is a terrible choice of troop transport or firepower against any competent or well-equipped force - of any size.
Whether in Mogadishu 10 years ago or Iraq today, the helicopter equation has changed for the worse. Typically, the adversary's ground arms are more available. And whether by luck or skill, the effectiveness of enemy ordnance is far greater than that experienced in Vietnam.
While the details remain unclear eight months after the fact, the only major battle in the Iraq war centered on U.S. attack helicopters ended in mission failure. The raid involved 40 AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopters that attacked Iraqi Republican Guard units south of Baghdad on March 24. One was shot down (the two crewmen taken prisoner) and 30 returned to base having sustained severe damage. The Washington Post subsequently reported:
"In attacking a formation of about 40 Apache Longbows on Monday, the Iraqis staged a classic helicopter ambush first perfected by the North Vietnamese in the 1960s. As the lethal, tank-killing aircraft approached on a mission to destroy the Medina Division's dispersed armor, troops dispersed throughout a palm-lined residential area and opened fire with antiaircraft guns, rocket-propelled grenades and a wall of fire from rifles and other small arms. ... "The Iraqi fire was so intense that the Apaches had to break off their mission and return to base."
The results of that failed mission strongly suggest that the modern helicopter is a battlefield liability, versus such close air support aircraft as the A-10.
The Iraqis in 2003 seemed to have adapted a lesson from the Afghani resistance that fought the Soviets more than 20 years ago and was repeated over Mogadishu in 1993: The art of downing a helicopter is a well-known methodology - lure and destroy.
Of particular concern to the helicopter pilot today is the time-tested Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG). They are cheap and effective weapons. "Close" counts with RPGs, given their 4.2-second time-fuse and associated 900-meter burst-range (lacking physical contact), ensures that a volley of RPG firings will be effective against the frailty of a helicopter's main or tail rotor.
Second, the electronic frailty of the modern helicopter leaves an exposed Achilles heel. Packed with "black box" components, wire bundles and sensors, the modern helicopter is at a terrible disadvantage against a machine gun or even an ordinary rifleman's bullet. Beyond the combat scene, the maintenance factor for modern UH-60 or AH-64 helicopters is also a major challenge, compared with the Huey or CH-47 Chinook from the Vietnam era. Given the limited numbers of helicopters, ground time is the greatest expense and also a liability.
A third element of weakness involves the matter of budgetary limits on basic airmanship and training flights. Time and again, the events surrounding the helicopter accidents and combat losses show a distinct pattern of inadequate training in basic flying skills, judgment and tactics. Whether a high-altitude accident or a midair collision, certain truths stand out. There should be no doubt that part of this problem stems from unrealistic expectations by mission planners.
The modern helicopter pilot finds more demand on his/her data management skills than airmanship. The dollar expense of "blade time" additionally detracts from the skill of the pilots, through non-currency and total experience in actual flight.
Unfortunately, in a combat zone, the smart pilot must deviate from the "standardization" of the infamous "classroom solution," even as it pertains to safety. Landing into the wind is suicide if an enemy gunner is awaiting just that arrival. Since there are multiple forms of combat scenarios, a simple set of tactics is impossible to devise.
Still, there are a number of tactics that can help protect helicopters from enemy ground forces:
Alter any takeoff and landing directions from known or predictable helipads.
Never fly a predictable or constant schedule, route, course, altitude, "race-track" or other any other identifiable or easily predictable flight path. That includes constant hovering positions, including "nap-of-the-earth" flight.
Never follow a predictable altitude or route, including rivers, canyons, streets or roads, for any length of time.
Evade any population centers, such as a town or village.
If these rules must be compromised, arrange for effective fighter cover and rescue capability.
In multi-ship missions, allow at least 500 meters between aircraft, so as to allow all aircraft room to maneuver without risking collision or restriction of defensive gunnery. That includes the basic airmanship of always turning, so as to view a clear spot, whether climbing, descending or staying level.
Vary any insertion or extraction tactics as well as those of support aircraft and their stand-off defensive coverage.
Be aware that helicopters have no significant surprise element, given their speed and noise. Thus, pilots must be aware that going into an unprepared LZ is extremely dangerous. This is especially true if the LZ presents itself as a predictable insertion point, particularly if a "pathfinder" is not used. One landmine can destroy a helicopter and its mission.
Be certain during night operations that a minimum of light from the ground - as simple as a trash-fire barrel - will illuminate the rotor blades, marking the helicopter as an easy target.
Never fly a mission without overwhelming firepower in immediate reserve, whether artillery or air cover. That includes rescue capability.
In light of the above helicopter limitations, the U.S. military is proceeding to repeat the current crisis by fielding the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. Many news reports over the past five years have cited the aircraft as unsafe in any environment. The FAA won't certify its use for civilians, yet the Marine Corps and Air Force Special Operations Command are preparing to entrust the fate of America's finest combat troops to an aircraft that begs of disaster.
A schedule of design changes and flight tests have supposedly ironed out some of the MV-22's problems. However, critics who study the flight history of the Osprey cannot shake a deep suspicion that its basic flight parameters will prove fatal on the modern battlefield. Just one identified limit, the Osprey's maximum descent rate, is so slow as to leave it a sitting duck for any amount of rifle fire alone.
Beyond the risk of life, the MV-22 also comes with an increasingly exorbitant starting price tag - $68 million apiece - independent of such factors as combat maintenance and repair. Worse, its marginal suitability compromises any mission effectiveness.
The final issue regarding helicopters on the battlefield comes down to an unpleasant premise. The United States may not always be conducting war with a third-world country. It is clear that any competent army armed with sophisticated anti-aircraft weaponry or aviation assets, will quickly drive our fleet of attack and reconnaissance helicopters from the sky, rendering them to a marginal role as a vehicle used for air evacuation and mop-up operations.
It remains to be seen whether senior U.S. military leaders have the awareness and moral courage to recognize how endangered military helicopters have become.
The Helicopter's Grim Future in Modern Combat
*************************
A thought provoking article.
Take it for what its worth.
By Ralph Omholt
Despite our rapid defeat of the Iraqi army last spring, one clear lesson that has emerged from both the combat and occupation phases of the war is that the entire concept of helicopter operations in battle is undermined by their extreme vulnerability to ground fire.
Unlike our experience in the jungles and wooded mountains of Vietnam, the helicopter is a prime and easy target in desert and urban warfare environments such as we have seen in Somalia, and are still seeing in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The combat record of the helicopter in Vietnam was different from subsequent battlefields. That was true by virtue of the limitations of the Viet Cong-NVA firing accuracy, the limitations of their weaponry - including quantity - and the visual limitations of the jungle or forests which served to protect the helicopters flying overhead.
It was also true that the UH-1 Huey was a simple and tough helicopter, easily repaired. The application of the helicopter was uniquely successful in a unique environment. And, their relatively low cost ensured that quantity was rarely a factor.
The harsh reality is that today the helicopter is a terrible choice of troop transport or firepower against any competent or well-equipped force - of any size.
Whether in Mogadishu 10 years ago or Iraq today, the helicopter equation has changed for the worse. Typically, the adversary's ground arms are more available. And whether by luck or skill, the effectiveness of enemy ordnance is far greater than that experienced in Vietnam.
While the details remain unclear eight months after the fact, the only major battle in the Iraq war centered on U.S. attack helicopters ended in mission failure. The raid involved 40 AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopters that attacked Iraqi Republican Guard units south of Baghdad on March 24. One was shot down (the two crewmen taken prisoner) and 30 returned to base having sustained severe damage. The Washington Post subsequently reported:
"In attacking a formation of about 40 Apache Longbows on Monday, the Iraqis staged a classic helicopter ambush first perfected by the North Vietnamese in the 1960s. As the lethal, tank-killing aircraft approached on a mission to destroy the Medina Division's dispersed armor, troops dispersed throughout a palm-lined residential area and opened fire with antiaircraft guns, rocket-propelled grenades and a wall of fire from rifles and other small arms. ... "The Iraqi fire was so intense that the Apaches had to break off their mission and return to base."
The results of that failed mission strongly suggest that the modern helicopter is a battlefield liability, versus such close air support aircraft as the A-10.
The Iraqis in 2003 seemed to have adapted a lesson from the Afghani resistance that fought the Soviets more than 20 years ago and was repeated over Mogadishu in 1993: The art of downing a helicopter is a well-known methodology - lure and destroy.
Of particular concern to the helicopter pilot today is the time-tested Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG). They are cheap and effective weapons. "Close" counts with RPGs, given their 4.2-second time-fuse and associated 900-meter burst-range (lacking physical contact), ensures that a volley of RPG firings will be effective against the frailty of a helicopter's main or tail rotor.
Second, the electronic frailty of the modern helicopter leaves an exposed Achilles heel. Packed with "black box" components, wire bundles and sensors, the modern helicopter is at a terrible disadvantage against a machine gun or even an ordinary rifleman's bullet. Beyond the combat scene, the maintenance factor for modern UH-60 or AH-64 helicopters is also a major challenge, compared with the Huey or CH-47 Chinook from the Vietnam era. Given the limited numbers of helicopters, ground time is the greatest expense and also a liability.
A third element of weakness involves the matter of budgetary limits on basic airmanship and training flights. Time and again, the events surrounding the helicopter accidents and combat losses show a distinct pattern of inadequate training in basic flying skills, judgment and tactics. Whether a high-altitude accident or a midair collision, certain truths stand out. There should be no doubt that part of this problem stems from unrealistic expectations by mission planners.
The modern helicopter pilot finds more demand on his/her data management skills than airmanship. The dollar expense of "blade time" additionally detracts from the skill of the pilots, through non-currency and total experience in actual flight.
Unfortunately, in a combat zone, the smart pilot must deviate from the "standardization" of the infamous "classroom solution," even as it pertains to safety. Landing into the wind is suicide if an enemy gunner is awaiting just that arrival. Since there are multiple forms of combat scenarios, a simple set of tactics is impossible to devise.
Still, there are a number of tactics that can help protect helicopters from enemy ground forces:
Alter any takeoff and landing directions from known or predictable helipads.
Never fly a predictable or constant schedule, route, course, altitude, "race-track" or other any other identifiable or easily predictable flight path. That includes constant hovering positions, including "nap-of-the-earth" flight.
Never follow a predictable altitude or route, including rivers, canyons, streets or roads, for any length of time.
Evade any population centers, such as a town or village.
If these rules must be compromised, arrange for effective fighter cover and rescue capability.
In multi-ship missions, allow at least 500 meters between aircraft, so as to allow all aircraft room to maneuver without risking collision or restriction of defensive gunnery. That includes the basic airmanship of always turning, so as to view a clear spot, whether climbing, descending or staying level.
Vary any insertion or extraction tactics as well as those of support aircraft and their stand-off defensive coverage.
Be aware that helicopters have no significant surprise element, given their speed and noise. Thus, pilots must be aware that going into an unprepared LZ is extremely dangerous. This is especially true if the LZ presents itself as a predictable insertion point, particularly if a "pathfinder" is not used. One landmine can destroy a helicopter and its mission.
Be certain during night operations that a minimum of light from the ground - as simple as a trash-fire barrel - will illuminate the rotor blades, marking the helicopter as an easy target.
Never fly a mission without overwhelming firepower in immediate reserve, whether artillery or air cover. That includes rescue capability.
In light of the above helicopter limitations, the U.S. military is proceeding to repeat the current crisis by fielding the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. Many news reports over the past five years have cited the aircraft as unsafe in any environment. The FAA won't certify its use for civilians, yet the Marine Corps and Air Force Special Operations Command are preparing to entrust the fate of America's finest combat troops to an aircraft that begs of disaster.
A schedule of design changes and flight tests have supposedly ironed out some of the MV-22's problems. However, critics who study the flight history of the Osprey cannot shake a deep suspicion that its basic flight parameters will prove fatal on the modern battlefield. Just one identified limit, the Osprey's maximum descent rate, is so slow as to leave it a sitting duck for any amount of rifle fire alone.
Beyond the risk of life, the MV-22 also comes with an increasingly exorbitant starting price tag - $68 million apiece - independent of such factors as combat maintenance and repair. Worse, its marginal suitability compromises any mission effectiveness.
The final issue regarding helicopters on the battlefield comes down to an unpleasant premise. The United States may not always be conducting war with a third-world country. It is clear that any competent army armed with sophisticated anti-aircraft weaponry or aviation assets, will quickly drive our fleet of attack and reconnaissance helicopters from the sky, rendering them to a marginal role as a vehicle used for air evacuation and mop-up operations.
It remains to be seen whether senior U.S. military leaders have the awareness and moral courage to recognize how endangered military helicopters have become.
The Helicopter's Grim Future in Modern Combat
*************************
A thought provoking article.
Take it for what its worth.
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Those who are keen to understand Attack Helicopter Ops here is the link
Attack Helicopter Operations
FM 1-112
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/1-112.pdf
Attack Helicopter Operations
FM 1-112
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/1-112.pdf
I see the utility of any CAS platform especially the helos very very less, unless you have the absolute air superiority. until that time comes(for India wrt to immediate neighbors) when we are actually able to deploy a dominant air force in numbers across the border, having a separate CAS role platform(fighters) is all useless....That's why we go for MRCA+ helos. Not that we can't ever be dominant but coupled with our political system, its just a dream for now.
On another note: with respect to Helicopters, IMO, we need to take a different route. Usually helos can be manufactured quite cheap(if done in scale), so if we get/develop a drone version of DHRUV or even LUH or even the watered down version of LCH which can be manufactured in say about 10-15million $ and atleast in 1000s numbers, now that can be useful. Also Instead of having 500 CAS prop planes, I would prefer 200 LCA or 250 hawks in IAF.
On another note: with respect to Helicopters, IMO, we need to take a different route. Usually helos can be manufactured quite cheap(if done in scale), so if we get/develop a drone version of DHRUV or even LUH or even the watered down version of LCH which can be manufactured in say about 10-15million $ and atleast in 1000s numbers, now that can be useful. Also Instead of having 500 CAS prop planes, I would prefer 200 LCA or 250 hawks in IAF.
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pmaitra
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@Ray Sir,
Regarding the downing of the BlackHawks, one important aspect was the disabling of their radar guidance system by the rebels. The rebels achieved this by burning tires at several points on the streets thus engulfing the sky with thick black carbon filled smoke, which effectively neutralized the radar equipment, along with radar guided munitions. This made the helicopters less lethal, while they drifted into areas susceptible to ambush from tall buildings.
Regarding the downing of the BlackHawks, one important aspect was the disabling of their radar guidance system by the rebels. The rebels achieved this by burning tires at several points on the streets thus engulfing the sky with thick black carbon filled smoke, which effectively neutralized the radar equipment, along with radar guided munitions. This made the helicopters less lethal, while they drifted into areas susceptible to ambush from tall buildings.
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Just imagine that!
A primitive way to checkmate a sophisticated machine!
So, what is important is the environment of operations.
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@civfanatic @pmaitra
In Kargil, the MANPADs were being fired from the mountain peaks. Later with adoption of Laser Targeting Pods, we were able to decimate Pakistani bunkers from afar, and beyond the range of MANPADs.
So the valuable lesson we learnt from Kargil was, classic CAS crafts (low flying, low speed) are vulnerable to MANPADs, AA fire and definitely SAMs.
With todays smart bombs, PGMs we can lob them from crafts beyond the range of MANPADs and SAMs.
In Kargil, the MANPADs were being fired from the mountain peaks. Later with adoption of Laser Targeting Pods, we were able to decimate Pakistani bunkers from afar, and beyond the range of MANPADs.
So the valuable lesson we learnt from Kargil was, classic CAS crafts (low flying, low speed) are vulnerable to MANPADs, AA fire and definitely SAMs.
With todays smart bombs, PGMs we can lob them from crafts beyond the range of MANPADs and SAMs.
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