US, China woo India for control over Asia-Pacific
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thakur_ritesh
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NEW DELHI: With the Asia-Pacific region emerging as the theatre of escalating US-China rivalry, India on Wednesday found itself in a rare and enviable situation: of being wooed by the competing giants.
Visiting US defence secretary Leon Panetta said India would be "a linchpin" in America's unfolding new defence strategy that revolves around "re-balancing" its forces "towards" Asia-Pacific, while Chinese vice premier Li Keqiang told foreign minister SM Krishna that Sino-Indian ties would be the most important bilateral relationship in the 21st Century.
Li's remark to Krishna, on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Beijing, is significant not just because he is slated to take over as China's premier from Wen Jiabao after the transition process starting July this year is over. But also since it virtually echoed US President Barack Obama's statement earlier to Indian Parliament terming the ties between the two democracies as the "defining partnership of 21st century".
Panetta said, "America is at a turning point. After a decade of war, we are developing the new defence strategy. In particular, we will expand our military partnerships and our presence in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and South Asia. Defence cooperation with India is a linchpin in this strategy."
China, which after the over 5,000-km Agni-V missile's test had sniggered at India for harbouring super-power ambitions, seems to have switched to a conciliatory tone and, suddenly, respectful of New Delhi's strategic autonomy.
The tactic found expression in the People's Daily which gushingly proclaimed that India with an independent foreign policy could not be manipulated, even as it slammed the new US strategy that includes progressively shifting 60% of the formidable American naval combat fleet to Asia-Pacific.
Recognizing Asia-Pacific's emergence as the new economic hub, the US has decided to focus on the region as part of what they call the pivot towards Asia. The new strategic posture has been welcomed by the countries in the region which have been at the receiving end of the muscle flexing by China that claims the entire South China Sea as its exclusive domain.
Caught in between?
The unfolding rivalry creates problems for India. It is uneasy about China's aggrandizement and wants unhindered access to and through the South China Sea. Yet, it does not want to be seen as being part of any American grand design to contain China, already miffed with the new strategy being enunciated by the US.
India wants to further step up its defence cooperation with the US on a bilateral basis but clearly does not want additional naval forces in an already-militarized IOR and surrounding regions.
Defence minister AK Antony indirectly conveyed to Panetta that the US needed to recalibrate or rethink the policy. He emphasized there was a "need to strengthen the multilateral security architecture" in the Asia Pacific and that it must "move at a pace comfortable to all countries concerned".
Antony, however, did say India fully supported "unhindered freedom of navigation in international waters for all", given its own bitter experience of being needled by China in the contentious South China Sea.
But in another indication of India not being supportive of US actively jumping into the fray in South China Sea, where China is jostling with countries like the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore on territorial claims, Antony said it was "desirable" that the "parties concerned themselves should settle contentious matters in accordance with international laws".
Panetta, after earlier ruffling the prickly Chinese feathers, on Wednesday also struck a conciliatory note. Delivering a lecture, he said that even as India and the US "deepen" their bilateral defence partnership, the two would also seek to strengthen their ties with China.
"We recognise China has a critical role to play in advancing security and prosperity in this region. The US welcomes the rise of a strong, prosperous and a successful China that plays a greater role in global affairs - and respects and enforces the international norms that have governed this region for six decades," he said.
India was pleased with the outcome of the Krishna-Li meeting, making the Indian foreign minister one of the first leaders to have any substantial interaction with next generation of Chinese leaders.
Xi Jinping, who has been anointed successor to President Hu Jintao, was scheduled to visit India last year but it never materialized. Many described it as a missed opportunity for India in engaging the leader who would be president.
But on Wednesday, India had reason to be happy. "Repeatedly emphasizing how important ties were between the two countries, Li told the foreign minister that he looked upon the ties between the two nations as the most significant bilateral relationship of the 21st century," said an official.
Krishna, who will also meet Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi on Thursday, had on his way to Beijing said there were no contentious issues between the two countries apart from the border dispute.
Visiting US defence secretary Leon Panetta said India would be "a linchpin" in America's unfolding new defence strategy that revolves around "re-balancing" its forces "towards" Asia-Pacific, while Chinese vice premier Li Keqiang told foreign minister SM Krishna that Sino-Indian ties would be the most important bilateral relationship in the 21st Century.
Li's remark to Krishna, on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Beijing, is significant not just because he is slated to take over as China's premier from Wen Jiabao after the transition process starting July this year is over. But also since it virtually echoed US President Barack Obama's statement earlier to Indian Parliament terming the ties between the two democracies as the "defining partnership of 21st century".
Panetta said, "America is at a turning point. After a decade of war, we are developing the new defence strategy. In particular, we will expand our military partnerships and our presence in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and South Asia. Defence cooperation with India is a linchpin in this strategy."
China, which after the over 5,000-km Agni-V missile's test had sniggered at India for harbouring super-power ambitions, seems to have switched to a conciliatory tone and, suddenly, respectful of New Delhi's strategic autonomy.
The tactic found expression in the People's Daily which gushingly proclaimed that India with an independent foreign policy could not be manipulated, even as it slammed the new US strategy that includes progressively shifting 60% of the formidable American naval combat fleet to Asia-Pacific.
Recognizing Asia-Pacific's emergence as the new economic hub, the US has decided to focus on the region as part of what they call the pivot towards Asia. The new strategic posture has been welcomed by the countries in the region which have been at the receiving end of the muscle flexing by China that claims the entire South China Sea as its exclusive domain.
Caught in between?
The unfolding rivalry creates problems for India. It is uneasy about China's aggrandizement and wants unhindered access to and through the South China Sea. Yet, it does not want to be seen as being part of any American grand design to contain China, already miffed with the new strategy being enunciated by the US.
India wants to further step up its defence cooperation with the US on a bilateral basis but clearly does not want additional naval forces in an already-militarized IOR and surrounding regions.
Defence minister AK Antony indirectly conveyed to Panetta that the US needed to recalibrate or rethink the policy. He emphasized there was a "need to strengthen the multilateral security architecture" in the Asia Pacific and that it must "move at a pace comfortable to all countries concerned".
Antony, however, did say India fully supported "unhindered freedom of navigation in international waters for all", given its own bitter experience of being needled by China in the contentious South China Sea.
But in another indication of India not being supportive of US actively jumping into the fray in South China Sea, where China is jostling with countries like the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore on territorial claims, Antony said it was "desirable" that the "parties concerned themselves should settle contentious matters in accordance with international laws".
Panetta, after earlier ruffling the prickly Chinese feathers, on Wednesday also struck a conciliatory note. Delivering a lecture, he said that even as India and the US "deepen" their bilateral defence partnership, the two would also seek to strengthen their ties with China.
"We recognise China has a critical role to play in advancing security and prosperity in this region. The US welcomes the rise of a strong, prosperous and a successful China that plays a greater role in global affairs - and respects and enforces the international norms that have governed this region for six decades," he said.
India was pleased with the outcome of the Krishna-Li meeting, making the Indian foreign minister one of the first leaders to have any substantial interaction with next generation of Chinese leaders.
Xi Jinping, who has been anointed successor to President Hu Jintao, was scheduled to visit India last year but it never materialized. Many described it as a missed opportunity for India in engaging the leader who would be president.
But on Wednesday, India had reason to be happy. "Repeatedly emphasizing how important ties were between the two countries, Li told the foreign minister that he looked upon the ties between the two nations as the most significant bilateral relationship of the 21st century," said an official.
Krishna, who will also meet Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi on Thursday, had on his way to Beijing said there were no contentious issues between the two countries apart from the border dispute.
thakur_ritesh
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China has a habit of huffing and puffing, and when nothing gives in, try to sweet talk. A trait we are getting all too familiar with.
Anyways, it remains in our larger interest that we keep engaging with the four (let's not forget Russia and EU here) and don't completely side with any. The era of aligning with one against the other is long over for us, we remain in a position of maximizing our benefits by engaging with all than play someone else's bigger games, though we can always pretend to further their interests to extract the max, but that should be the limit of what we should be ready to deliver on and no further.
On China specific, one would like to see the trade issue to be sorted out, and if the Chinese are not a willing partner, make them fall in line by taking unilateral decisions and message be passed on crisp and clear, its they who forced it on us.
There ought to be certain things that UPA II needs to be complimented for, foreign policy being one such. Though not related to the article, but with the message, before MMS hangs up his shoes, I long to see him make a visit to both Israel and Iran, that for me would be the best parting shot of the premier on the Indian diplomacy in the region.
Anyways, it remains in our larger interest that we keep engaging with the four (let's not forget Russia and EU here) and don't completely side with any. The era of aligning with one against the other is long over for us, we remain in a position of maximizing our benefits by engaging with all than play someone else's bigger games, though we can always pretend to further their interests to extract the max, but that should be the limit of what we should be ready to deliver on and no further.
On China specific, one would like to see the trade issue to be sorted out, and if the Chinese are not a willing partner, make them fall in line by taking unilateral decisions and message be passed on crisp and clear, its they who forced it on us.
There ought to be certain things that UPA II needs to be complimented for, foreign policy being one such. Though not related to the article, but with the message, before MMS hangs up his shoes, I long to see him make a visit to both Israel and Iran, that for me would be the best parting shot of the premier on the Indian diplomacy in the region.
no smoking
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Li Keqiang, next premier
Is the chap on the right, Chinese?
If so, which region is he from?
He was a Han born in Anhui province.
By the way, is our friend Satish007 an actor? Tears for what? What Asia-Pacific control? Talking to a premier or vice permier in China only means they are talking about money!
This article explains why good relations with the US is necessary to be seen seriously by China as I have suggested earlier
The Hindu : Opinion / Lead : Still seriously unmatched
India is taken more seriously now in China than before, but is still not seen as an equal
External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna's visit to China is emphasising the prospects for India-China cooperation, in the aura of good feeling that high-level visits usually generate. A well-connected academic, Wang Dehua, in an interview about the visit, refers to India and China as "a rising and an emerging power." He concludes that "India's interests lie in wider economic and cultural cooperation with China. This is China's opportunity to break up the U.S. intention to contain China."
A recent visit to Beijing and Shanghai after a long absence gave us a more complicated picture of how the rise of India and China, so central to U.S. strategic thinking, looks from the east.
The India-China relationship is still asymmetrical. This theme ran through a dozen or so meetings with Chinese and some Indians who follow the relationship closely. One Chinese observer commented that neither country was top priority for the other. The disparity in their trade relations tells the story: China is India's largest partner for merchandise trade; India is China's 10th partner.
Respect and condescension
Despite this imbalance, Chinese thinkers, and apparently the Chinese government, take India far more seriously than they once did. Several observers commented that China had recently upgraded the rank of its ambassador in Delhi to the Vice-Minister level. India now ranks among China's largest economic partners, even if it is not at the top of that list. Reflecting on India's foreign policy, one Chinese veteran of India-China ties commented that its best feature was its independence. Another made an impassioned plea for China to "seize the moment" to work closely with India and together reshape the working of global institutions, an enterprise for which he clearly believed that India's participation was important. At least one observer spoke with real warmth about Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, whom he said the Chinese leadership admired for his realistic approach to India's economy and for his "kindness."
But with this increased respect for India came more than a whiff of condescension. Several observers used phrases like "China is the big brother." All argued that India's ambitions for a greater global role were "understandable," in light of its improved economic performance, but in the end unrealistic. They felt India was not yet ready for a major global role. Almost all argued that China's Comprehensive National Power (CNP) exceeded India's by a factor of three or four, and that the gap was widening. Chinese commentators often cite this metric, which combines economic strength and military power and, in some versions, measures of cultural or other "soft" power. One observer argued that India's missile programme was 10 years behind China's.
Reaction from the U.S.
A particularly dismissive attitude was reserved for India's practice of equating itself with China — both its quest for an international status that matched China's and its reference to India and China as a matched pair, whether as the "two rising powers" or in other ways. One Indian observer commented that Chinese India-watchers were conscious that a few decades ago, Chinese and Indian per capita incomes were the same, whereas today, China's exceeds India's by a factor of between three and four. The Indian practice of bracketing the two countries, he felt, struck Chinese observers as "a B-plus student presenting himself as the equal of a straight-A student."
This slightly jaundiced view dovetailed with a widespread comment that India routinely tried to negotiate outcomes beyond what its national power could justify. Some people referred to India's "arrogance," or to the "unilateralism" or "self-righteousness" of Indian foreign policy. Commenting more specifically on India's negotiating style, the most common word was "tough." Those we spoke to had considerable respect for India's diplomats, both for their diplomatic talents and for their linguistic skills and knowledge of China. They felt that the need to do business in English put China at a disadvantage.
For two visitors from the United States, perhaps the most arresting observation concerned the balance among bilateral, regional and global issues in the relationship. For the U.S., bilateral ties are the biggest success story, and this matches India's priorities. For China, on the other hand, the easiest arena for India-China collaboration is global, both their interactions at the United Nations and on such issues as climate change. Bilateral issues are much more difficult, and regional cooperation almost non-existent.
Bilateral, regional issues
In India-China bilateral relations, the oldest issue, and the one that still has pride of place, is the border. We found no one who expected this issue to be resolved within his professional lifetime; the best that could be hoped for was to manage it. We were given a succession of presentations on 1960s-era opportunities for solving the border that had been squandered by India's "excessive" ambitions. Solutions that might have worked in the 1960s, we heard repeatedly, were no longer possible in light of the two nations' power gap. On the growing list of other bilateral issues, notably trade, energy and water, Chinese observers often cited India's "toughness" in defending its interests.
The dialogue on regional issues is even more difficult, and is highly selective. The most obvious problem area is Pakistan, which China does not discuss with India. Chinese scholars either deflected our questions about the reported Chinese role in Gilgit and Baltistan, or dismissed the reports of a Chinese military role as misinterpretations of "workers who had military-like uniforms." Nuclear questions are another no-no — whether or not they involve Pakistan. China is unwilling to enter into any discussion or multilateral forum that involves an implication of equal nuclear status between China and India.
Discussions on East Asia are also difficult. One observer noted that India treated China as an outsider in South Asia and the Indian Ocean; China did the same to India in East Asia. It was clear that China's India-watchers had noted India's "look East" policy but did not particularly welcome it. They predictably dismissed India's fears of Chinese military bases on the Indian Ocean rim. The South China Sea was a major preoccupation, and our Chinese interlocutors pointedly dismissed any notion that India (or indeed the U.S.) had legitimate interests there.
On global issues, the people we spoke with felt that India's and China's interests were much closer, and they had little difficulty agreeing on broad principles to guide their desired outcome in multilateral discussions. As a result, negotiations were much easier — although we heard from both Chinese and Indian observers that once one got into details, reaching agreement was harder. Both countries started from the premise that they needed to defend the rights of "large developing countries," a phrase the Chinese seemed to prefer to "rising powers." India often finds it easier to make common cause with China in forums like the United Nations Security Council. But one retired diplomat conceded that China had made good use of ambiguous but positive-sounding statements on such issues as India's quest for a permanent seat on the Security Council and its Nuclear Suppliers' Group waiver. They succeeded in sending visitors away with a warm feeling, without actually undertaking any real commitment on China's part.
Little about Delhi-Washington
We heard little about China's attitude toward India's relations with the United States, and were asked surprisingly few questions about this. China's apparent misgivings about Delhi-Washington ties, however, surfaced in one retired diplomat's comment that the U.S. was reinforcing India's unrealistic ambitions. The case he cited in particular was the statement by then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2005 that the U.S. wanted to help India "become a great power in the 21st Century."
It is noteworthy that Mr. Krishna's visit to Beijing coincided with U.S. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta's visit to Delhi, and preceded by a week his own trip to Washington for the Strategic Dialogue. The U.S. believes that India will be one of the powers that shape the next century, and that its contribution to Asian security and prosperity will be vital. The bilateral U.S.-India relationship is vibrant and growing, with some predictable speed bumps reflecting both India's internal challenges and the difficulty of meshing two stubborn bureaucratic systems and our different foreign policy traditions. India-U.S. consultations on East Asia have become a dynamic part of this relationship in the last two years, and other regional dialogues are getting started; global cooperation, on the other hand, has lagged. China has not yet accepted India's global role, and has kept India at arm's length when it comes to regional issues. Cooperation on multilateral global issues is valued both in Beijing and in Delhi, but does not seem to touch the core issues of India's role as a world power.
(Teresita and Howard Schaffer are former U.S. ambassadors, with long years of service in South Asia. They are co-founders of southasiahand.com. Howard Schaffer teaches at Georgetown University; Teresita Schaffer is a non-resident senior fellow at Brookings Institution.)
The Hindu : Opinion / Lead : Still seriously unmatched
India is taken more seriously now in China than before, but is still not seen as an equal
External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna's visit to China is emphasising the prospects for India-China cooperation, in the aura of good feeling that high-level visits usually generate. A well-connected academic, Wang Dehua, in an interview about the visit, refers to India and China as "a rising and an emerging power." He concludes that "India's interests lie in wider economic and cultural cooperation with China. This is China's opportunity to break up the U.S. intention to contain China."
A recent visit to Beijing and Shanghai after a long absence gave us a more complicated picture of how the rise of India and China, so central to U.S. strategic thinking, looks from the east.
The India-China relationship is still asymmetrical. This theme ran through a dozen or so meetings with Chinese and some Indians who follow the relationship closely. One Chinese observer commented that neither country was top priority for the other. The disparity in their trade relations tells the story: China is India's largest partner for merchandise trade; India is China's 10th partner.
Respect and condescension
Despite this imbalance, Chinese thinkers, and apparently the Chinese government, take India far more seriously than they once did. Several observers commented that China had recently upgraded the rank of its ambassador in Delhi to the Vice-Minister level. India now ranks among China's largest economic partners, even if it is not at the top of that list. Reflecting on India's foreign policy, one Chinese veteran of India-China ties commented that its best feature was its independence. Another made an impassioned plea for China to "seize the moment" to work closely with India and together reshape the working of global institutions, an enterprise for which he clearly believed that India's participation was important. At least one observer spoke with real warmth about Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, whom he said the Chinese leadership admired for his realistic approach to India's economy and for his "kindness."
But with this increased respect for India came more than a whiff of condescension. Several observers used phrases like "China is the big brother." All argued that India's ambitions for a greater global role were "understandable," in light of its improved economic performance, but in the end unrealistic. They felt India was not yet ready for a major global role. Almost all argued that China's Comprehensive National Power (CNP) exceeded India's by a factor of three or four, and that the gap was widening. Chinese commentators often cite this metric, which combines economic strength and military power and, in some versions, measures of cultural or other "soft" power. One observer argued that India's missile programme was 10 years behind China's.
Reaction from the U.S.
A particularly dismissive attitude was reserved for India's practice of equating itself with China — both its quest for an international status that matched China's and its reference to India and China as a matched pair, whether as the "two rising powers" or in other ways. One Indian observer commented that Chinese India-watchers were conscious that a few decades ago, Chinese and Indian per capita incomes were the same, whereas today, China's exceeds India's by a factor of between three and four. The Indian practice of bracketing the two countries, he felt, struck Chinese observers as "a B-plus student presenting himself as the equal of a straight-A student."
This slightly jaundiced view dovetailed with a widespread comment that India routinely tried to negotiate outcomes beyond what its national power could justify. Some people referred to India's "arrogance," or to the "unilateralism" or "self-righteousness" of Indian foreign policy. Commenting more specifically on India's negotiating style, the most common word was "tough." Those we spoke to had considerable respect for India's diplomats, both for their diplomatic talents and for their linguistic skills and knowledge of China. They felt that the need to do business in English put China at a disadvantage.
For two visitors from the United States, perhaps the most arresting observation concerned the balance among bilateral, regional and global issues in the relationship. For the U.S., bilateral ties are the biggest success story, and this matches India's priorities. For China, on the other hand, the easiest arena for India-China collaboration is global, both their interactions at the United Nations and on such issues as climate change. Bilateral issues are much more difficult, and regional cooperation almost non-existent.
Bilateral, regional issues
In India-China bilateral relations, the oldest issue, and the one that still has pride of place, is the border. We found no one who expected this issue to be resolved within his professional lifetime; the best that could be hoped for was to manage it. We were given a succession of presentations on 1960s-era opportunities for solving the border that had been squandered by India's "excessive" ambitions. Solutions that might have worked in the 1960s, we heard repeatedly, were no longer possible in light of the two nations' power gap. On the growing list of other bilateral issues, notably trade, energy and water, Chinese observers often cited India's "toughness" in defending its interests.
The dialogue on regional issues is even more difficult, and is highly selective. The most obvious problem area is Pakistan, which China does not discuss with India. Chinese scholars either deflected our questions about the reported Chinese role in Gilgit and Baltistan, or dismissed the reports of a Chinese military role as misinterpretations of "workers who had military-like uniforms." Nuclear questions are another no-no — whether or not they involve Pakistan. China is unwilling to enter into any discussion or multilateral forum that involves an implication of equal nuclear status between China and India.
Discussions on East Asia are also difficult. One observer noted that India treated China as an outsider in South Asia and the Indian Ocean; China did the same to India in East Asia. It was clear that China's India-watchers had noted India's "look East" policy but did not particularly welcome it. They predictably dismissed India's fears of Chinese military bases on the Indian Ocean rim. The South China Sea was a major preoccupation, and our Chinese interlocutors pointedly dismissed any notion that India (or indeed the U.S.) had legitimate interests there.
On global issues, the people we spoke with felt that India's and China's interests were much closer, and they had little difficulty agreeing on broad principles to guide their desired outcome in multilateral discussions. As a result, negotiations were much easier — although we heard from both Chinese and Indian observers that once one got into details, reaching agreement was harder. Both countries started from the premise that they needed to defend the rights of "large developing countries," a phrase the Chinese seemed to prefer to "rising powers." India often finds it easier to make common cause with China in forums like the United Nations Security Council. But one retired diplomat conceded that China had made good use of ambiguous but positive-sounding statements on such issues as India's quest for a permanent seat on the Security Council and its Nuclear Suppliers' Group waiver. They succeeded in sending visitors away with a warm feeling, without actually undertaking any real commitment on China's part.
Little about Delhi-Washington
We heard little about China's attitude toward India's relations with the United States, and were asked surprisingly few questions about this. China's apparent misgivings about Delhi-Washington ties, however, surfaced in one retired diplomat's comment that the U.S. was reinforcing India's unrealistic ambitions. The case he cited in particular was the statement by then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2005 that the U.S. wanted to help India "become a great power in the 21st Century."
It is noteworthy that Mr. Krishna's visit to Beijing coincided with U.S. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta's visit to Delhi, and preceded by a week his own trip to Washington for the Strategic Dialogue. The U.S. believes that India will be one of the powers that shape the next century, and that its contribution to Asian security and prosperity will be vital. The bilateral U.S.-India relationship is vibrant and growing, with some predictable speed bumps reflecting both India's internal challenges and the difficulty of meshing two stubborn bureaucratic systems and our different foreign policy traditions. India-U.S. consultations on East Asia have become a dynamic part of this relationship in the last two years, and other regional dialogues are getting started; global cooperation, on the other hand, has lagged. China has not yet accepted India's global role, and has kept India at arm's length when it comes to regional issues. Cooperation on multilateral global issues is valued both in Beijing and in Delhi, but does not seem to touch the core issues of India's role as a world power.
(Teresita and Howard Schaffer are former U.S. ambassadors, with long years of service in South Asia. They are co-founders of southasiahand.com. Howard Schaffer teaches at Georgetown University; Teresita Schaffer is a non-resident senior fellow at Brookings Institution.)
satish007
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thanks, no smoking, you kown me now.
, I hope India and China bhai bhai. Indian will not be interested in making money with China unless they think China is ok.
unlike India, China willing to make money with anyone.
so it may be a good start.
the fellow right side 57 years old now but China standard, yes, he is very young.
amoy
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Satish Bhai, We don't want any Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai. If u read posts on US, China woo India for control over Asia-Pacific u'd note India wants a role in Pacific. That sounds like taking our bowl of rice, needless to say "money". To my woe Li again massaged Indian ego. That would invite more misfortune like their adventures to Pacific hand in hand with Uncle. We'd better keep 'em King of INDIAN Ocean, but not here on South CHINA Sea.thanks, no smoking, you kown me now.
Indian will not be interested in making money with China unless they think China is ok.
unlike India, China willing to make money with anyone.
so it may be a good start.
the fellow right side 57 years old now but China standard, yes, he is very young.
