amoy
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Saudi Arabia's Look-East Diplomacy: Ten Years On
Since January 2015, the new Saudi government led by King Salman bin Abdulaziz has continued to practice the kingdom's traditional foreign policy strategy, which Gerd Nonneman once referred to as "managed multi-dependence" (MMD). MMD is the strategy of seeking diverse diplomatic relations with major powers in order to increase a state's level of autonomy vis-à-vis the hegemon (the United States).1 In June, Deputy Crown Prince/Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman, a son of the king, visited Moscow to sign multiple bilateral cooperation agreements on subjects ranging from oil and the military to nuclear power and space exploration.2 In the same month, Mohammed also paid a visit to Paris to strengthen Saudi-French defense ties.3
Today, the kingdom's major diplomatic partners exist not only in the West, but in the East as well. In February and March 2014, Salman (then-crown prince and defense minister) visited Japan, India and China.4 The combined wealth of these three countries amounts to $17.04 trillion (2014), almost on a par with that of the United States ($17.41 trillion).5 These three countries also absorb 39 percent of total Saudi oil exports (2013), almost double the figure for the United States (19 percent).6
Saudi Arabia's Look-East diplomacy came to the fore during the time of the previous king, Abdullah (2005—15). In January 2006, Abdullah chose Beijing and New Delhi as his first two destinations outside the Middle East region after his accession to the throne the previous summer.7 Since then, Saudi Arabia's growing ties with Asian states have been the subject of extensive scholarly inquiry.8 As the prediction that this will be an "Asian century" sounds increasingly plausible, Saudi Arabia's "pivot to Asia" should not be considered surprising.9 While Saudi-Asian relations were still seen as a novelty at the time of Abdullah's Asian tour a decade ago, they are a norm today.
It is widely believed that Saudi-Asian relations have evolved mainly in the domain of low politics (economic affairs) rather than high security, although the distinction derives from a minimalist interpretation of the notion of security. In Saudi Arabia, where regime security is as integral to its decision making as state security, economic affairs should also be considered indispensably intertwined with its politics.10 Indeed, as this article will show, the export of oil, the development of renewable energy, and economic diversification are all closely related to the security of the Al Saud. The pursuit of the latter two goals by Saudi policy makers has significantly accelerated in the past decade. They realize that the country's oil-centered economy is unsustainable and that Saudi Arabia needs to adapt to changing socioeconomic circumstances, in light of the persistence of violent Islamism and the eruption of the Arab Spring. These dynamics have driven the development of Saudi-Asian relations in the fields of renewable energy and economic diversification. Furthermore, within Saudi-Asian relations there have been some signs of growing bilateral defense ties. These may be only marginal today, but they appear to be forward-looking.
Just as energy security is integral to the national security of oil-importing states, for Saudi Arabia safeguarding demand for its oil ("demand security") is integral to its national and, more specifically, regime security.11 With 89 percent of its state revenues coming from the oil sector (2013), the maintenance of reciprocal and interdependent relationships with major oil-importing states has been one of the most important objectives of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy.
In the previous century, major markets for Saudi oil existed in the West. However, the West-East balance in Saudi Arabia's oil exports tipped toward the latter in the early 2000s due to European states' successful diversification of their sources of oil imports in the final quarter of the previous century — away from the Gulf to other regions such as the North Sea, the former Soviet Union and North Africa — and the simultaneous increase in the demand for oil in the growing Asian economies.12 In 2013, 68 percent of 7.7 million barrels per day (bpd) of Saudi Arabia's oil exports were destined for Asia; Europe's share had declined to only 10 percent.13
Although in 2013, the United States remained the largest importer of Saudi oil at 1.5 million bpd (19 percent of the total), four major Asian economies combined imported 4.0 million bpd (51 percent): Japan, 1.2 million bpd (15 percent); China, 1.1 million bpd (14 percent); South Korea, 0.9 million bpd (11 percent); and India, 0.8 million bpd (10 percent). China and India will drive the growth in global demand for oil in the coming years. Their demand growth is expected to continue at least until sometime around 2040, according to the International Energy Agency.14 As increasing shale production will make the United States more self-reliant, China and India are likely to become the largest and second-largest importers of Saudi oil in the coming years.
Since January 2015, the new Saudi government led by King Salman bin Abdulaziz has continued to practice the kingdom's traditional foreign policy strategy, which Gerd Nonneman once referred to as "managed multi-dependence" (MMD). MMD is the strategy of seeking diverse diplomatic relations with major powers in order to increase a state's level of autonomy vis-à-vis the hegemon (the United States).1 In June, Deputy Crown Prince/Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman, a son of the king, visited Moscow to sign multiple bilateral cooperation agreements on subjects ranging from oil and the military to nuclear power and space exploration.2 In the same month, Mohammed also paid a visit to Paris to strengthen Saudi-French defense ties.3
Today, the kingdom's major diplomatic partners exist not only in the West, but in the East as well. In February and March 2014, Salman (then-crown prince and defense minister) visited Japan, India and China.4 The combined wealth of these three countries amounts to $17.04 trillion (2014), almost on a par with that of the United States ($17.41 trillion).5 These three countries also absorb 39 percent of total Saudi oil exports (2013), almost double the figure for the United States (19 percent).6
Saudi Arabia's Look-East diplomacy came to the fore during the time of the previous king, Abdullah (2005—15). In January 2006, Abdullah chose Beijing and New Delhi as his first two destinations outside the Middle East region after his accession to the throne the previous summer.7 Since then, Saudi Arabia's growing ties with Asian states have been the subject of extensive scholarly inquiry.8 As the prediction that this will be an "Asian century" sounds increasingly plausible, Saudi Arabia's "pivot to Asia" should not be considered surprising.9 While Saudi-Asian relations were still seen as a novelty at the time of Abdullah's Asian tour a decade ago, they are a norm today.
It is widely believed that Saudi-Asian relations have evolved mainly in the domain of low politics (economic affairs) rather than high security, although the distinction derives from a minimalist interpretation of the notion of security. In Saudi Arabia, where regime security is as integral to its decision making as state security, economic affairs should also be considered indispensably intertwined with its politics.10 Indeed, as this article will show, the export of oil, the development of renewable energy, and economic diversification are all closely related to the security of the Al Saud. The pursuit of the latter two goals by Saudi policy makers has significantly accelerated in the past decade. They realize that the country's oil-centered economy is unsustainable and that Saudi Arabia needs to adapt to changing socioeconomic circumstances, in light of the persistence of violent Islamism and the eruption of the Arab Spring. These dynamics have driven the development of Saudi-Asian relations in the fields of renewable energy and economic diversification. Furthermore, within Saudi-Asian relations there have been some signs of growing bilateral defense ties. These may be only marginal today, but they appear to be forward-looking.
Just as energy security is integral to the national security of oil-importing states, for Saudi Arabia safeguarding demand for its oil ("demand security") is integral to its national and, more specifically, regime security.11 With 89 percent of its state revenues coming from the oil sector (2013), the maintenance of reciprocal and interdependent relationships with major oil-importing states has been one of the most important objectives of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy.
In the previous century, major markets for Saudi oil existed in the West. However, the West-East balance in Saudi Arabia's oil exports tipped toward the latter in the early 2000s due to European states' successful diversification of their sources of oil imports in the final quarter of the previous century — away from the Gulf to other regions such as the North Sea, the former Soviet Union and North Africa — and the simultaneous increase in the demand for oil in the growing Asian economies.12 In 2013, 68 percent of 7.7 million barrels per day (bpd) of Saudi Arabia's oil exports were destined for Asia; Europe's share had declined to only 10 percent.13
Although in 2013, the United States remained the largest importer of Saudi oil at 1.5 million bpd (19 percent of the total), four major Asian economies combined imported 4.0 million bpd (51 percent): Japan, 1.2 million bpd (15 percent); China, 1.1 million bpd (14 percent); South Korea, 0.9 million bpd (11 percent); and India, 0.8 million bpd (10 percent). China and India will drive the growth in global demand for oil in the coming years. Their demand growth is expected to continue at least until sometime around 2040, according to the International Energy Agency.14 As increasing shale production will make the United States more self-reliant, China and India are likely to become the largest and second-largest importers of Saudi oil in the coming years.
