http://www.hindu.com/2009/05/02/stories/2009050255150900.htm
Raising profile as a maritime power in East Asia
P. S. Suryanarayana
Looking beyond India’s sea-faring soft power along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, what is the meaning of New Delhi’s ongoing naval exercise with the U.S. and Japan?
Chinese leaders have held a grand international fleet review to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of their rapidly-modernising navy. India and the United States were among the participants in the recent celebration at Qingdao. Conspicuous, too, was the American acknowledgment of China’s growing potential as a naval power.
Coincidentally, but also significantly, the U.S. Navy began in late-April a sophisticated exercise with India and Japan off Okinawa, not far from China. In fact, the
ongoing trilateral exercise, set to conclude by May 3, punctuates India’s efforts to raise its profile as a maritime power for peace and stability.
The Indian Navy, four of whose ships have been deployed on a goodwill mission in East Asia since early April, is no stranger to the region. In the wake of December 2004 tsunami, the Indian Navy was co-opted by the U.S. for a humanitarian core-group of just four navies. The other two in that core-group were Japan and Australia.
Two new aspects of India’s maritime actions, both evident on the eve of the ongoing trilateral exercise, are relevant to East Asia. These are naval power projection and, at another level, maritime soft power.
Four Indian ships — two destroyers, a supply vessel, and a missile corvette — paid goodwill port calls in East Asia before the trilateral exercise. All four warships first visited Singapore and participated in an annual naval exercise with the City-State. Several other countries, too, figured on the Indian Navy’s compass in the time horizon between this exercise and the India-U.S.-Japan game.
During that period, the two destroyers visited Vietnam and also China for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s celebration at Qingdao. In a parallel move, the supply ship and the missile corvette visited the Philippines. Thereafter, the supply vessel made its way to South Korea, while the missile corvette went to Malaysia on a goodwill call before the trilateral event. These goodwill calls brought into focus India’s latest wave of defence diplomacy in East Asia — a form of benign power projection.
India’s maritime soft power, different from such a benign show, was on display at a meeting in Malaysia prior to the trilateral game. Held under the aegis of the International Maritime Organisation, the event shone the spotlight on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The themes, discussed by the relevant Aid to Navigation Fund, were safety of shipping and the protection of marine environment along these two straits.
The littoral states — Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia — held talks with a number of “major user states” and other stakeholders. India participated in its dual status as a major user-state and a “funnel state.” As Indonesia’s maritime neighbour, India has a huge sub-domain that acts as a “funnel” into the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
New Delhi talked about ways to associate itself with the littoral states over two projects. One is designed to help study the recovery of wreckages along the two straits. India has agreed to provide customised training in the know-how, as different from the actual act, of removing wreckages. An estimated 11 ship wrecks are found in this maritime sub-region. Another project, which India and a few others will fund, relates to the survey for and also the setting up of devices to measure tides, currents, and winds.
New Delhi is taking part in these projects
“without any preconditions.” Emphasising this, India’s High Commissioner to Malaysia, Ashok K. Kantha, says “we respect the lead role of the littoral states.” Both India and China will be partners in the project relating to tides, currents, and winds. However, this does not translate into an India-China venture as such. India, Mr. Kantha says, “is participating in these regional initiatives, in partnership with the three littoral states and also Japan, China, and international organisations.” Japan has so far remained the biggest contributor.
Is India, too, beginning to engage Southeast Asia more constructively than before? India’s High Commissioner to Singapore, S. Jaishankar, says that Southeast Asia, with “deep regionalisation,” ranks next only to Europe in this domain. So viewed, New Delhi’s constructive activism in Southeast Asia can be seen as “the regional face of India’s Look-East Policy,” Dr. Jaishankar points out.
India’s new show of maritime soft power is also in line with Malaysia’s thinking as a key player on matters relating to the Malacca Strait. When global concerns rose in regard to this strait, the then Malaysian Foreign Minister Hamid Albar outlined the role of non-littoral user-states. He told this correspondent that India, as an emerging global player, could help fund projects for navigational safety and environmental protection. India is now doing exactly this.
Looking beyond sea-faring soft power, what is the political or strategic meaning of India’s ongoing naval exercise with the U.S. and Japan? Northeast Asian diplomats have told this journalist that the event is really “important” in the current international situation.
Aside of the “tactical” and operational coordination among the three navies, the exercise, second of its kind, widens the scope of India-U.S. engagement.
The trilateral game conforms to U.S. President Barack Obama’s current policy of continuity in East Asia as evident in his first 100 days in office. So, is there a China factor driving the U.S.-Japan-India entente? The Japanese view is that the exercise is driven only by the shared desire of the three to “enhance their friendly ties.” Of coincidental political importance, indeed, is the visit to China this week by Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso at the time of this trilateral exercise. His talks with Chinese President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao centred on “global issues of mutual interest and concern.” Privy to the outcome of these talks, Japanese official Kazuo Kodama cited the emphasis laid on Japan-China coordination to solve the economic crisis. Also addressed were Japan’s new ideas on climate change issues and North Korea’s latest “threat” to conduct a second test of a nuclear-weapon.
The U.S.-Japan-India equation may yet be influenced by Mr. Obama’s longer-term world view as it emerges. It is not clear whether he will opt for a concert of open economies, as variously advocated by experts on Asia like William Overholt and others. Such a concert will certainly include China, according to Western experts. A competing “vision” is that of a concert of open democracies. And, the attitude of India, China, and Japan to these ideas will also matter to him.
For now, Mr. Obama is acutely conscious of the importance of Japan and China to the global efforts at ending the economic crisis. Beijing’s continuing relevance to a resolution of the North Korean nuclear and missile issues is also not lost on him. As an aside, the big-power “unity” in the face of North Korea’s latest “satellite launch” averted a possible international crisis.
Such a crisis could have even cast a shadow over the U.S.-India-Japan naval exercise.
