India and its Hybrid War

Discussion in 'Strategic Forces' started by JAISWAL, Feb 3, 2012.


    JAISWAL Senior Member Senior Member

    Mar 13, 2010
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    India and its Hybrid War |
    India and its Hybrid War

    Going by the definition of Hybrid Warfare, what
    we witnessed in 1971 was the preparation,
    provocation and successful execution of a first
    rate Hybrid War.The 40th anniversary of the
    Bangladesh Liberation War passed by in the
    middle of December. As ever it was an occasion
    to reminisce independent India’s greatest military
    success. Most of the writing and recollecting,
    therefore, remained confined to the positive
    aspects of the campaign.
    What we heard was the purely conventional
    story as has been repeatedly told — from Mrs
    Indira Gandhi’s directive to General Sam
    Maneckshaw and his legendary refusal to initiate
    hostilities prematurely, to how the Pakistani Army
    persisted with digging itself into a hole that it
    found surrounded by the Indian Army on
    December 16, 1971. Various individual acts of
    brilliance and bravery were also recounted. Since
    times are changing, the sailing of the US Navy’s
    Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal found lesser
    space than in previous years. But that is par for
    the course.
    Some of the more discerning comments were
    about how India managed a superb manoeuvre
    campaign. Instead of attacking conventionally,
    which it did initially, the Army bypassed dug-in
    Pakistani troops to get to the centre of gravity,
    Dhaka. Army-Air Force synergy came into play at
    this stage, and some suitably praised it, for it was
    exemplary. The mobility of the Indian military
    mind stood out in stark contrast to the Pakistani
    Army’s reactive and confused state of thinking.
    But that was only to be expected since the
    perpetrator of atrocities and the harbinger of
    freedom carry with them contrasting manuals of
    perceptions. The preconceived assessment of
    India’s actions had already been made by the
    sheer scale of the Pakistani Army’s brutality. It
    was a cake walk in the battle of global opinion
    polls. In the euphoria of analysis it is not
    surprising that two aspects of the Bangladesh
    Liberation War get short shrift.
    It was, for starters, a just war in the global
    perception stakes. Not since World War II was it
    possible to define good and bad in terms as
    clearly as it was in the weeks and months
    running up to December 1971. The villain and the
    vanquisher had been determined long before the
    first shot was fired. This was as much on
    account of Pakistan’s villainy as it was on India
    playing the perception management game.
    Which then leads on to the second aspect of the
    war that has gotten short shrift thus far. It still
    remains an unanswered query, but which begs
    asking. Did India do everything in its abilities to
    ensure hostilities happened? Was Indian policy
    designed to trigger a war, or was it really a
    sleeping neighbour roused to goodness by the
    scale of cruelty heaped on East Pakistan? Did
    Pakistan simply walk into a mate prepared by the
    brilliance of India’s manoeuvres on the global
    chess board?
    Asking questions in this direction does not take
    away from Pakistan’s perfidy toward its own
    people, and it doesn’t take away the goodness
    from India’s actions. India as the initiator of
    conflict does not become the villain. What it does
    is to lead us to the crux of the second aspect of
    the war that has gotten short shrift. Did India in
    1971 predate the 21st century global fixation with
    Hybrid Warfare? Going simply by the prevailing
    definitions of Hybrid Warfare, it is possible to
    credit India with the preparation, provocation and
    successful execution of a first rate Hybrid War.
    Military analysts around the democratic world
    have been poring over writing, training, conflicts,
    skirmishes, and evolving ideologies to arrive at a
    greater understanding of the nature of Hybrid
    Warfare. It is regarded as the greatest threat to
    the global order of things. The genesis of this
    fascination lies in a Beijing pamphlet credited to
    two officers of the People’s Liberation Army and
    mischievously titled ‘Unrestricted Warfare’. It
    created a storm when published in the late-1990s.
    The concept of Hybrid Warfare was thus born,
    and in the last decade it has moved from concept
    papers in high brow military journals, to seminar
    rooms, to possible field training manuals. India
    recently conducted its first brain storming session
    on Hybrid Warfare in a closed-door seminar at
    the prestigious Army War College in Mhow. The
    attendees included serving and retired officers,
    military and civilian. Organised and hosted by the
    Army War College, the seminar represents India’s
    first attempt at understanding this phenomenon.
    Little wonder that the initiative was taken by the
    Army War College, doyen of military thought and
    teaching in India.
    The widely accepted definition of Hybrid Warfare
    is credited to its most avid analyst, retired United
    States Marine Corps officer Frank Hoffman.
    Writing inConflict in the 21st century: The Rise of
    Hybrid Wars, published by the Potomac Institute
    of Policy Studies, Hoffman states, “Hybrid threats
    incorporate a full range of different modes of
    warfare, including conventional capabilities,
    irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts,
    including indiscriminate violence and coercion,
    and criminal disorder.
    Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both state and
    a variety of non-state actors. These multi-modal
    activities can be conducted by separate units, or
    even by the same unit, but are generally
    operationally and tactically directed and
    coordinated within the main battlespace to
    achieve synergistic effects in the physical and
    psychological dimensions of conflict. The effects
    can be gained at all levels of war.”
    The global benchmark of a hybrid campaign is
    currently regarded to be that of the Lebanese
    Hizbullah in 2006 when it succeeded in halting
    and overturning Israel’s incursion into south
    Lebanon. Panelists and participants at the Army
    War College seminar did allude to a Hizbullah
    scenario in the future, but there was mention too
    of India in 1971. In fact one of the participants
    brought out points from Kautilya that could easily
    be taken as preparations for a Hybrid War.
    Going by the myriad of actions and activities that
    constitute Hybrid Warfare, there is no doubt
    aspects of it did exist in the mind and thinking of
    Kautilya. Just as there is no doubt that what India
    conducted in 1971 was not merely a war in the
    conventional sense of the word, but a hybrid
    campaign that covered almost all aspects as
    highlighted by Hoffman. India prepared for the
    campaign physically as well.
    But lessons from the conduct of the Pakistani
    Army are equally important. They serve to
    highlight the mind as the centre of gravity, in
    every aspect of warfare. As the Commandant of
    Army War College, Lt Gen Anil Chait, said, “The
    Army that rejects seminal thinkers, deprives itself
    of innovative ideas and intellectual self renewal. It
    will ultimately become a defeated Army,
    vanquished in the wake of foes who adapt more
    wisely and quickly, to the ever-evolving art and
    science of war.”
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    JAISWAL Senior Member Senior Member

    Mar 13, 2010
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    Are We Ready for Hybrid Wars? | Small Wars Journal
    The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
    has just released a new monograph that presents an
    alternative view of the character of warfare in the
    21st Century. This new model argues that future conflicts will blur the distinction between war and peace, combatants and noncombatants.
    Rather than distinct modes of war, we will face
    "Hybrid Wars" that are a combination of
    traditional warfare mixed with terrorism and insurgency.

    Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars , by Research Fellow Frank Hoffman, summarizes the background and
    analysis of the changing character of warfare in
    our time. Examining the debate over the past
    decade about the evolution of modern warfare in
    the post Cold-war world, several thinkers have
    claimed that we were in the midst of a
    "Revolution in Warfare." Hoffman takes this
    discussion to a new and much more mature level
    by recognizing that we are entering a time when
    multiple types of warfare will be used
    simultaneously by flexible and sophisticated
    adversaries. These adversaries understand that
    successful conflict takes on a variety of forms that
    are designed to fit one's goals at that particular
    time—identified as "Hybrid Wars" in Conflict in the
    21st Century.
    Hoffman notes that it is too simplistic to merely
    classify conflict as "Big and Conventional" versus
    "Small or Irregular." Today's enemies, and
    tomorrow's, will employ combinations of
    warfare types.
    Non-state actors may mostly employ irregular
    forms of warfare, but will clearly support,
    encourage, and participate in conventional conflict
    if it serves their ends. Similarly, nation-states may
    well engage in irregular conflict in addition to
    conventional types of warfare to achieve their
    goals. The monograph lays out some of the
    implications of the concept. Clearly the United
    States must be prepared for the full spectrum of
    conflict from all fronts and realize that preparing
    our forces for only selected types of conflict will
    be a recipe for defeat.
    This concept builds upon and is contrasted with
    alternatives including "New Wars," "Wars
    Amongst the People," Fourth Generation Warfare,
    and Unrestricted Warfare. It absorbs useful
    elements from many of these concepts, and
    incorporates the best of foreign analysts as well.
    Potomac Institute Chairman and CEO, Michael S.
    Swetnam remarked that "Frank Hoffman's work
    on Hybrid Wars is a masterpiece of enlightened
    thinking on conflict in our time. It should be
    required reading for all students and practitioners
    of modern warfare."
    Hoffman is an accomplished defense analyst who
    is highly sought after for his insights on historical
    analyses of the past and on the character of
    future conflict. He lectures frequently here and
    abroad on long-range security issues. His areas
    of expertise include military history, national
    strategy, homeland security, strategic planning,
    defense economics and civil-military relations.
    The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies is an
    independent, not-for-profit public policy research
    center that identifies key science, technology and
    national security issues, and aggressively follows
    through with focused research and policy advice.
    From this research and subsequent public
    discussions, the Institute has a track record for
    developing meaningful policy options and
    assisting their implementation at the intersection
    of both business and government.

    JAISWAL Senior Member Senior Member

    Mar 13, 2010
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    What is Hybrid warfare??
    Ans: -
    Hybrid warfare is a military
    strategy that blends conventional
    warfare, irregular warfare and
    cyberwarfare.[1] In addition,
    hybrid warfare is used to
    describe attacks by nuclear,
    biological and chemical weapons,
    improvised explosive devices and
    information warfare.[2] This
    approach to conflicts, is a
    potent, complex variation of
    warfare.[3] Hybrid warfare can
    be used to describe the flexible
    and complex dynamics of the
    battlespace requiring a highly
    adaptable and resilient response.

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