Indian Cruise Missile Defence - News and Discussions

[arnabmit]

India: Defeating the Cruise Missile Threat | Flashpoints

October 26, 2013 : By Debalina Ghoshal

The country may need to look beyond a conventional defense, to deterrence by punishment.

As India considers its threat environment, it must consider not just ballistic missiles, but also cruise missiles, such as those that might potentially be launched from Pakistan or China. These latter are far more difficult to detect and intercept than are ballistic missiles.

A cruise missile has been defined as a "weapon which automatically flies an essentially horizontal cruise flight profile for most of the duration of its flight between launch and its terminal trajectory to impact." Land-attack cruise missiles further complicate the task of any defense system, since they can be terrain hugging and can also fly a circuitous trajectory.

In particular, Pakistan's Babur and Raad cruise missiles represent a threat to India. Meanwhile, China's cruise missile arsenal include the Seersucker, Silkworm, the ground launched DH-10 and the air-launched CJ-10, C-101 and HN series, to name a few. Some of China's missiles are nuclear capable.

As it considers these weapons, one of the key questions that confronts New Delhi is whether it should opt solely for a cruise missile defense or also adopt a "deterrence by punishment" posture with the help of its own cruise missile arsenal. While a cruise missile defense could possibly intercept a subsonic cruise missile, it may be difficult to intercept supersonic cruise missiles and it is virtually impossible to intercept hypersonic cruise missiles. Although at present neither Pakistan nor China possess a hypersonic cruise missile, that could very well change. China already has supersonic cruise missiles such as the C-101 and C-301. Pakistan has also acquired the new CM-400 AKG, a supersonic cruise missile claimed to be hard to intercept because of its velocity.

For its part, India is currently working on a ballistic missile defense. India's Defence Research and Development Organisation is developing a defense system with two layers, with Advanced Air Defence (AAD) as the first layer and the two-stage Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) as the second layer. However, neither PAD nor AAD would be able to intercept cruise missiles.

Using anti-air missiles of various ranges, it may still be possible to intercept supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles (although intercepting land-attack missiles remains a Herculean task). France, for instance, has been able to intercept supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles using its Principal Anti-Air Missile System. For it to replicate the feat, India would need an effective command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance system. Even with that, intercepting hypersonic cruise missiles would very likely remain unrealistic. Moreover, missiles with low radar signatures make the job of any air or missile defense system that much more difficult. Any surface-to-air missiles used would need to be highly sophisticated, with high-power large aperture radars, although even that might not be enough to intercept incoming threats. India could hope to defeat air-launched cruise missiles by destroying the aircraft that carry them. However, both Pakistan and China are developing stealth technology that could make it difficult for India to locate and destroy the aircraft before they fire.

All of which means that while defense by denial is an important approach, India ought also to consider another form of defense. Specifically, it must concentrate on its own hypersonic cruise missiles. To maximize deterrence, its cruise missile arsenal should also be nuclear capable. Deterrence by punishment is a useful option when defense in general may not be sufficiently robust to counter the threat, and nuclear-capable cruise missiles would be as effective in that respect as nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Indeed, the moment a missile becomes nuclear capable, it has value as deterrence.

In fact, next-generation cruise missiles for India and for other countries are likely not only to be faster, but will also be able to carry non-nuclear warheads that are equally cataclysmic, like directed energy weapons, such as electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons that could disable command, control and communication systems. A high-speed, sophisticated cruise missile carrying such a deadly warhead would surely give an adversary pause.

Already, India's BrahMos supersonic cruise missile is capable of evading any missile defense system in the world. There are also plans to develop a hypersonic version. Either version is likely to defeat any defense system it counters. The next step would be for the missiles to be nuclear capable, making them a deterrence against not only conventional cruise missile attacks, but also against nuclear strikes using cruise missiles or even ballistic missiles.

(Debalina Ghoshal is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies)

 

[W.G.Ewald]

Defeating Cruise Missiles

Since 1944 cruise missile defence has remained a persistent headache. As defensive systems have evolved, so has the cruise missile threat. Stealth techniques have complicated the issue, with the cancelled 1990s US AGM-137 TSSAM and its replacement, the current AGM-158 JASSM designed from the outset for true very low observable performance. As cruise missiles are easier to design for low radar signature than a full sized aircraft is, it is inevitable now that second generation EU, Russian and indigenous regional weapons will follow the US lead.

A key contributor to Soviet bankruptcy was the deployment of the AGM-86B on the B-52 and its contemporary, the BGM-109L GLCM. The Soviet response was to field large numbers of expensive MiG-31P Foxhounds, Su-27 Flankers, S-300P semi-mobile SAM batteries, S-300V mobile SAM batteries, and supporting assets. With hundreds of each of these systems deployed to counter a modest inventory of US cruise missiles, Soviet PVOS and V-PVO budgets bloated out of control during the 1980s. This remains the classical case study of the assymetric use of technology to effect massive strategic damage on an opposing economy.

With regional ALCM/SLCM proliferation, including weapons with hundreds of nautical miles of range, Australia is presented with similar geo-strategic / technological problems to those faced by the Soviets two decades ago, albeit not on that scale. Siberia and Australia's deep north share the common topographical problem of widely separated population centres, military bases and industrial facilities, and the dilemma of an enormous coastline to cover with a finite pool of assets. They also share the advantages of a sea-air gap to the north.

While Australia does not face at this time the threat of nuclear armed cruise missiles, the damage effect produced by even conventional cruise missiles against the gas/oil infrastructure would be similar in effect due to the combustible nature of the targets involved. With the Burrup Peninsula and Gorgon/Barrow LNG tank farms each storing when full energy equivalent to a 1 Megatonne TNT class weapon, the warhead issue is truly moot for these economic targets.

Defensive strategies for dealing with cruise missile threats fall broadly into two categories, the first being the denial or deterrence of launch and counterforce strategies, the second being the interception of launched weapons.

Deterrence strategies amount to threatening credible retaliation, regardless of weapons used. If Australia pursues current force structure plans then this approach will not be credible, given the limitations of the JSF supported by a small number of tankers. Retaliatory pinprick strikes maketh not for deterrence.

Counterforce strategies amount to pre-emptive destruction of the opponent's cruise missile capability before it can be deployed or launched. This approach requires similar capabilities to deterrence, but involves much more specific targeting. With a lightweight JSF-centric future strike force, this too is not a credible future option for Australia.

Denial of launch strategies amount to shooting the archer, not the arrow paraphrasing the 1980s US Maritime Strategy. This involves killing cruise missile carrying aircraft, sinking cruise missile armed ships/subs, or destroying ground mobile TELs before they have the opportunity to fire. This approach also requires a robust force structure, including good maritime and land strike capabilities, good air defence capabilities, and good ASW capabilities.

Interception of launched cruise missiles presents its own challenges, especially in terms of fighter persistence, speed, missile payload, radar performance, tanker and AEW&C numbers. However, in strategic terms it is often the only option left, especially during the period preceding an outbreak of full scale hostilities. As cruise missiles present an attractive first strike weapon to disrupt air defence infrastructure, their use is most likely in the opening round of a conflict.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

ibid.

 

[happy]

ibid.

Sir, does this hold true to any type of cruise missile? I mean, will a supersonic cruise missile take lesser time to target??

 

[W.G.Ewald]

Sir, does this hold true to any type of cruise missile? I mean, will a supersonic cruise missile take lesser time to target??

T=D/R, so yes. Greater rate, lesser time.

 

[SajeevJino]

In my views Gun turret systems is the Best option to defeat the Cruise Missile

Once the Radar Picked Up the missiles Path we can take it out Using our Turret systems Like Shilka now and Land based AK 630 CIWS in Future

Problems is they are Hungry systems they need Tons of Projects to defeat a single target

 

[cloud]

Land based guns are not a solution for cruise missiles. if you hold the gun at horizon you can aim hardly 2-3 kilometers properly as these missiles flies very low, due to curvature of earth, unless one to put a pairs of AK630 every kilometer on entire Indian border on High towers/high ground such as hills including with Radars. But then I would prefer a solution something like OTO melara 76mm DART round. For example in below video(starts at 2:45), which covers greater area with precision. AK630 would eat too much lead. Also I'm assuming Oto-melara DART types of round can be used against artillery shells and short range missiles(I doubt if any military has conducted such tests so far, but seems possible) with more development. Such a solution is feasible. for India one would need to cover approx 7-8000 kms for outer layer ring Assuming A pair of such gun at every 10kms you will need 1500 guns..Seems quite possible if a long term plan is devised. And also one would need 3-4 rings of such guns, as enemy will most likely to take out the outer ring post even if in single numbers, this will create the holes and so missiles should be picked up by another ring 30-40 kms behind it.
Oto Melara 76mm Strales Naval Gun System - YouTube

Similarly land based radar also have very less range to detect them, no matter even if use swordfish radar it won't pickup cruise missile 40-50 km away.. We should be prioritizing the long range land based radar to pickup BMs and high flying target and should invest considerably in Aerostat radar for low level detection(i. e. downward looking radar) and our own AWECS even though they don't have 360 degree coverage, but we need to scan only the other side of border mostly. 20-30 AEROSTAT radar can cover the whole border, except in adverse weather situation.