MUST READ by former ambassador Stobdan
Ceding Aksai Chin not an option for India
The Chinese may be making a smart move to let India, in the first step, forego its claim over 38,000 sq km (Aksai-Chin), thereby de-linking Ladakh or J&K sector from the overall boundary dispute.
By P Stobdan
CHINA'S "urgency" to "redouble" efforts to push for the boundary settlement is quite perplexing. It explains the motive behind the recent 19 km intrusion in Depsang. Why did China play such a trick? Nothing is clear whether Premier Li Keqiang, during his visit, will push for a boundary settlement only in the Ladakh sector or will he seek to resolve the entire boundary dispute?
The five tents that comprised the Chinese incursion across the LAC in Ladakh.
India may believe this would be limited to exchanging maps, clarifying the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and verifying troop positions. But this is not what the Chinese may have in their minds. They may push for a formal settlement along the LAC in Ladakh, where they have nothing to lose. And, to India's disappointment, it may not involve swapping India's claims over Aksai Chin for China's claims over Arunachal Pradesh, which many in India consider a pragmatic thing to accept.
The Chinese may be making a smart move to let India, in the first step, forego its claim over 38,000 sq km (Aksai-Chin), thereby de-link Ladakh or J&K sector from the overall boundary dispute. But, should that happen, India, by implication, will have to give up not only Aksai Chin, but also cede its notional claim over the 5,047 sq km (Skyasgam valley) and the Menser Enclave (five villages) near the Mansarowar lake.
Chinese checkers
The "urgency" also explains China's motivations linked to its domestic security agenda. Some of the Chinese border negotiation tactics displayed against three Central Asian states should be instructive.
Fearing its sensitive Xinjiang region becoming an object of external power play, Beijing since 1991 has applied all instruments of its power to quell the Uyghur unrest and simultaneously resolved borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The Chinese scheme blended 'incentives with coercion' — a varied mix of diplomacy, political support, economic allurement and military aid. The strategy was implemented within the crafty policy framework of domestic economic growth and peaceful periphery. The strategy finally worked in China's favour — acquiring heft and influence.
China gave concession to counterparts without actually losing an inch of territory. Beijing settled for a third of territories it claimed from Kazakhstan. Yet the Kazakhs had to admit they had gained. In addition to what it had lost, the Kazakh President had to denounce Uyghur separatism and curb anti-China activities. In a similar pattern, Kyrgyzstan had to cede 1,20,000 hectares in a dubious exchange for Chinese assistance. Tajikistan being the last was made to surrender 1,100 square miles in 2010. Here, China claimed some 28,000 sq km, but settled for 3.5 percent of it. The Tajiks had to cede land and yet made to feel the victor.
In essence, China ultimately gained a bit of land, nixed the Uyghur issue, and pushed its economic agenda by making Xinjiang a pivotal link to the Eurasian markets. The success gave birth to a self-serving SCO, lauded as an exemplary multilateral cooperation mechanism, essentially meant to blunt any US-led Asian alliance in Eurasia.
But, its growing trade ties with Asian neighbors haven't stopped China's increasing appetite for territorial expansion. Land and demographic encouragement continues in Russia's Far East. Weaker states are induced to let out agriculture and forest land to Chinese farmers. The borders and rivers are still being altered to meet China's new interests. A view popular now is that the early surrender to China was a mistake, which is bouncing back with huge implications. China's tactics are fuelling mounting tensions and resentments across Asia.
Internal agenda
What lessons do they hold for India? How is the boundary issue with India linked to China's internal agenda? The above Chinese strategy should provide enough clues about what China wants from India.
Firstly, China's new move can't be unrelated to China's internal agenda, possibly with a future trajectory in Tibet. In essence, Beijing's idea is to ward off threat at the periphery to achieve internal stability. Beijing, though, doubts India would ever play the Tibet card. But, it does suspect the US-Japan-India coalescing to encircle and subvert China internally. Therefore, a stronger assertion may be a euphemism for deterring India plus others harming China's core interests. Of course, China retains the option to offset the three by fronting Iran, North Korea and Pakistan.
We don't know whether any big-ticket deals are slated for Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's visit, but he is likely to convey three essential points: (a) intends to settle the boundary dispute on its terms, (b) intends to solve the Tibet problem internally; wants no Indian interference in the post-Dalai developments, and (c) to point out that a US-led Asia pivot process should not be encouraged.
Secondly, on the boundary issue, China still maintains Arunachal is 'South Tibet' and Tibet is incomplete without Arunachal. Remember, the Chinese are masters of the art of denial and deception. Once India falls for Chinese magnanimous position over Aksai Chin, Beijing will then shift the focus to Arunachal. where it hopes to gain from India. They would emphatically convey that India is occupying 90,000 sq km of Chinese territory, but Tawang is non-negotiable in a final settlement of the border issue. Such a 'minimal demand' had been aired by Beijing at an unofficial level through Chinese academics. This 'minimum demand' tactic was also applied with Central Asian states.
China's recent overt and overbearing postures are not only not reassuring but also disturbing. India should tread carefully on China policy. In any case, ceding Aksai Chin would fundamentally alter the status of J&K. By implication, India would have to forget about PoK as well. Is there a clear Indian strategy?
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2013/20130519/pers.htm#3