Darth Malgus
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The Battle Of Walong, Oct 21st – Nov 17th, 1962
In 1962, Nehru’s Panch Sheel and his protege’ Krishna Menon’s handling of the Defense portfolio, resulted in the worst ever drubbing of the Indian Army. There were a number of places where the Indian Army did bring credit to itself and Walong was one such.
This is the story of that battle. Sadly even some 48 years after the event, the Henderson Brooks Inquiry Report into the debacle has not seen the light of day. Possibly for fear of compounding our difficulties with the Chinese.
The Macro Background
India gained Independence in 1947 and China became a Peoples Republic in 1949. While India propagated the Five Principles of Non Alignment, the Chinese invaded Tibet in 1949 itself and ten years thereafter the Dalai Lama fled to India. The British had maintained Tibetan integrity and had a garrison in Lhasa.
More dangerously China, for better connectivity to its Western region, built a road through the Aksai Chin plateau, thereby annexing thousands of square miles of Ladakh. Ninety percent of the territory taken by China was Indian and ten percent was under Pakistani control. All this while India slept and hence the fait accomli.
When India woke up, Nehru justified the lapse by terming the Aksai Chin, “a desolate, barren region where not a blade of grass grows”. The pragmatic Chinese Premier Zhou en Lai, while endorsing Nehru’s Panch Sheel, always maintained that there was NO Border dispute – because China had taken what it needed.
However to counter the Indian charge in Ladakh, the Chinese claimed that the whole of Arunachal Pradesh was Tibetan and hence Chinese. It said it did not recognize the Macmohan Line or any other border in the East.
An example of Chinese forwardness. In the Walong Sector in 1958, a Chinese patrol of some 40 soldiers was found camping some 20 miles South of Walong. When accosted, the responce was that they had lost their way! How that could be done in that narrow valley, stretches the imagination.
The sordid, indeed pitiful, details leading to the commencement of the War have been covered in, among others, Brig Dalvi’s Himalayan Blunder. So let it be said here that the India Chinese Conflict of 1962 began when India tried to dislodge the Chinese from the Thagla Ridge – several hundred miles to the West of Walong.
It all began on 20 Oct 62 when instigated by the Indian theatrics, the fully prepared and thorough Chinese launched their Mountain Blitzkrieg. That made the Indian Army, not recoil but flee back helter skelter. Having made their point the Chinese added insult to injury by unilaterally declaring a cease fire and pulling back to the prewar positions.
The Opposing Armies
Mao ze Dong’s People’s Liberation Army had ejected the American supported Chiang kai Shek’s Nationalists to Taiwan. Thereafter it had fought to a stand still the UN Forces (read US and UK) in the Korean War.
Bill Slim had two Chinese Divisions under him in Burma in 1942. He makes two observations about them in his Defeat into Victory. While praising the Chinese as a soldier, he says their formations needed no administrative support what so ever. They simply lived off the land. He says whole railway stations would disappear complete with rail lines and rolling stock, should they be in the vicinity. The other point he makes is that ‘tme‘ meant nothing what so ever to them. If they had been ordered to attack on a particular day, they would attack after a day or more – whenever.
The Indian Army had an ethos and reputation for valor which went back several centuries. However, after Independence, the idealistic Nehru and the Congress thought that the Defense Forces were a waste of national wealth and better reduced and employed for gainful development work like construction.
The first officer to be bestowed the prestigious Param Vashist Seva Medal was Gen BM Kaul, a distant kin of Nehru. The citation read – ” For successfully completing the project ‘Amar’ which entailed the construction of 1,450 quarters for troops in Ambala. This was the first project of its kind and was completed through hot weather and the monsoons in the face of numerous problems. Lt.-Gen. Kaul overcame these difficulties by dint of hard work and initiative of the highest order. He displayed organising ability, drive, and resourcefulness. It was by his determination, leadership and personal example that the task was completed by due date.” Pretty Pathetic Indeed.
Gen KS Thimaya (who together with Field Marshals Kipper Carriapa and Sam Manekshaw ranks among the Armies three greatest Chiefs) , was so humiliated by Krishna Menon, then Defence Minister, that he tendered his resignation. It took all of Nehru’s guile and charm to dissuade the vastly popular and principled man of honor, from going through with it. The event broke the great man’s heart and vastly diminished his stature.
Thereafter the pliable Thapar did a fill in time till Nehru could bring in Gen BM Kaul who was a Service Corps officer with Nehru’s Kashmiri background. Above all he was least a leader who could inspire and lead troops into battle.
Terrain Overview
Walong is the largest small town in the remotest North Eastern Corner of India. It lies in a narrow valley, on the banks of the North-South running Lohit River, which is called Telu by the locals and is the Eastern most tributary of the Brahmaputra River.
Walong has a small airfield but only the smaller type aircraft can use it. It is some 20 miles South of the International Border with Tibet in the North.
It was then reached by a 150 mile long foot track running on the West Bank of the Lohit River (mind you, not mule track), from Teju – the District HQ of Lohit Division. Teju served as the road head after several river crossings by boat and ferries from mainland Assam.
From the IB, some 20 miles North of Walong, the main communication is along the track on the West Bank of the Lohit River. A small post, Kibithu lies couple miles South of the IB.
On the Tibet side there was a class 9 road, meaning fit for buses and large trucks, which ended a mere 2 miles short of the International Border. So much for the logistic differential.
Terrain – Broad Overview of the Battle Area.
Terrain on the East Bank of the Lohit River is not really relevant to the battle. East of Walong and the Lohit River is a large impassable mountain massif. It ends in the South where the Sati Nullah flows from the East into the Lohit River at Walong. There is a small track coming from the North up to Walong on the East Bank of the Lohit River.
Large patrols can reach Walong along the Sati Nullah but they would need to cross two perenially snow bound over 3k meter passes (the Jachep and Chhu Passes) from the Tibet and Burma side to reach the origin of this Nullah. This approach is only fit for small special forces groups.
South of the Sati Nullah is another mountain massif, which is scantily used by even the locals and has only game tracks on it.
On the Western side of the Lohit River and parallel to it, runs a North South Mountain Water Shed or spine. This has numerous massive spurs separated by nullahs flowing down to the Lohit River on the East and a smaller River on its West. This spine is over 3k meters height.
Terrain Pertinent to the Battle.
On this North South Watershed running West and parallel to the Lohit Valley in the area of Walong, there is one massive spur leading West from the Water Shed for a couple miles.
From that point it breaks into three spurs and hence this point is named Tri Jn.
For easier understanding, imagine a downward turned Left Hand, with the Ring Finger, Middle Finger and Index Finger all sloping down from Tri Jn towards the West Bank of the Lohit River.
These three fingers correspond to the North Eastern Spur, Center Spur and the South Eastern Spur. The Middle Finger or Center Spur ends above Walong. The Ring Finger or North East Spur makes out flanking of defencss on the Middle Finger or Center Spur possible. The Index Finger or the South East Spur makes it possible to cut off the Walong garrison by getting behind it.
The North Eastern Spur ends a mile or two North of Walong. The Center Spur directly overlooks Walong. The South Eastern Spur, ends some 5 miles South of Walong.
The Center Spur, together with Tri Jn was the main area of this Battle.
The Center Spur’s end forms an impregnable defense position for about a platoon. This area is called ‘Ladders. Machine guns from here make direct forward movement impossible from the North.
The Center Spur is massive having smaller spurs going down North Eastward and South Eastward. These have good defense positions and all of them together make the entire spur fit for a brigade and more to deploy.
Some defense positions can also be occupied East of the Lohit River, both North and South of the Sati Nullah.
Height differential between Tri Jn and Lohit River is over 10,000 ft and the distance is about ten miles – a hard two day march from the Valley, for troops carrying loads.
Indian Deployment at Walong
Till 1959, the IB at Walong was sentineled by the Assam Rifles, which come under the Home Ministry. The first army unit to be deployed was 2 Rajput which was replaced by 6 Kumaon in Apr ’62 with the main unit at Walong.
However in first week Sep, the unit was moved forward to Kibithu which is a couple miles from the IB and a company deployed ahead and slightly to its NE on MacMohan Ridge.
Walong was ordered to be reinforced by 4 Sikh but as the staff at the HQ (and perhaps the Air Force too), was unfamiliar with the area, only two companies were air landed at Walong, while the HQ and the two other companies were air landed at Along – since their was confusion in the names of Walong and Along over the radio.
The Sikhs were deployed at Ladders and surrounding localities.
The Chinese initially began operations with a Regiment, which corresponds to the Indian brigade. They built this up and by war’s end there was a whole division plus involved in the final battle.
The Battle Phase I – Oct 21 to Oct 25 – The Opening Rounds
On Night Oct 20/21, the PLA cleared the Kumaoni Company from MacMohan Ridge and before they could attack the remainder of 6 Kumaon at Kibithu, the unit was ordered back to man the defenses at Walong, without so much as a shot being fired.
Within two days, the remainder of 4 Sikh along with two companies of 2/8 Gurkhas were flown in and the command of the Garrison taken over by CO 4 Sikh from CO 6 Kumaon.
The cock a hoop and swaggering Chinese, showing scant respect for the Indian Army, put in two strong day light attacks on Oct 24 and 25. The Chinese had been confidentally advancing Southward along the single track from the North on the West Bank of the Lohit River. The Sikhs and Gurkhas had field days as they caught the attacking Chinese, with their machine guns enfilade (along their main axis) as they came forward with restricted space for deployment or out flanking movements.
The Chinese took a big hit as they fled back and out of range. To their credit, let it be said that under cover of the smoke from fires they had lit, the Chinese came back and honorably carried away their dead. A fair estimate of casualties – all Chinese, would conservatibly be between a hundred and two hundred.
The Battle Phase 2 – Oct 26 to Nov 3 -The Lull Period.
Indian Activity in the lull period.
The Corps Commander was Gen BM Kaul (the would be future Chief), but as he was away to Delhi, the officiating Corps Commander, Gen Harbaksh of the Sikhs, visited Walong on Oct 27. This self styled super professional (whose personal orders resulted in the whole of 4 Sikh along with their CO, being made POW in ’65) ruled that 6 Kumaon, 4 Sikh and two companies of 2/8 Gurkhas were adequate to hold Walong.Hence under Gen Harbaksh’s orders, back went the two companies of 2/8 Gurkhas alongwith the newly arrived two companies of 3/3 Gurkhas, which had just reached Walong after a gruelling 150 miles march by foot from Tezu.
General Harbaksh had also brought along Brig Hartley MC of the Sikhs to take over the Walong Garrison from CO 4 Sikh.
However Gen BM Kaul returned from Delhi and visited Walong on Oct 29. He directed Brig NC Rawlley, who had Major AK Handoo as BM of his 5 Brigade, to take over on Oct 31.
Gen Kaul also ordered the raising of 2nd Mountain Division. Brig Rawlley ordered the poor 3/3 Gurkha companies to once again turn around and come back to Walong. He also requested for three more battalions to hold a brigade defended area at Hayuliang, which is some 75 miles to the rear of Walong and half way to Tezu.
Walong now became the scene of feverish activity what with the fly in of the remainder of 3/3 Gurkhas, some artillery and engineers and administrative units. The 2/8 Gurkhas were flown out.
At that time food supplies for three days, arillery and mortar ammunition barely adequate to repulse one attack and small arms ammunition for facing two attacks, was all that was held.
Chinese Activity in the lull period
Having got a bloody nose in their initial attacks, what were the Chinese doing during this period? They were busy preparing for an out flanking attack by moving up the North Eastern Spur or Ring Finger – but not without the Sikh machine guns on Center Spur or Middle Finger, harrying and harrasing them as they moved up westward, trying to outflank them on Center Spur.
The Chinese in these ten days managed to establish themselves on two heights on the extreme West of Center Spur and about a mile or so east of Tri Jn. These positions were named Green and Yellow Pimple by the Brigade.
The Chinese had managed to deployed about a company plus on each and these were continuously being built up. The Chinese were also stocking these positions with mortar and other ammunition as also supplies.
Chinese patrols were also spotted on the East Bank track of the Lohit River, forward of Walong. Chinese activity certainly indicated that they were preparing to launch a major attack. Their preparation was sure and deliberate.
Phase 3 – Nov 3 to Nov 13 – Jockeying for Position
From Nov 3 onwards Sikh and Assam Rifle patrols were fired upon from Green Pimple. However the venturesome Sikhs had established themselves in an area they named Patrol Base so that they could more effectively interfere with the movement of the Chinese going up North Eastern Spur and towards the two Pimples they had occupied.
From Nov 6, a company under the valiant Lieut Bikram Singh of 6 Kumaon and a course mate, launched repeated probes and attacks on Green Pimple from the South – but with little success. The Chinese proved to be strongly entrenched and young Bikram was killed leading one attack. The company established itself on an area they named West Ridge, in order to keep Green Pimple under observation.
On Nov 11, Kumaoni patrols reported to brigade that Tri Jn was not held. The Corps Commander, Gen Kaul, who was visiting, approved a plan for 6 Kumaon to attack Yellow Pimple from Tri Jn, complete with artillery and mortar support. Tri Jn was secured on Nov 12 by a strong patrol of 6 Kumaon. This would of course have warned the Chinese – if warning was necessary.
At last light Nov 11, 6 Kumaon had a company on the East of Lohit River. As such this company had to cross the river to the West Bank and then climb some 10,000 ft with equipment and ammunition along with the rest of the battalion for launchng the attack. It took 6 Kumaon the better part of two days, Nov 12 and 13 to establish it self at Tri Jn.
It had to carry man pack all supplies and ammunition, including mortars and machine gun ammunition, needed for the battalion attack.
By late evening on Nov 13, 6 Kumaon had estabished it self on Tri Jn. It received orders from the brigade to attack Yellow and Green Pimples the very next day ie Nov 14.
The Battle Part 4 – Nov 14 to N0v 17 – Indian Attack and the Chinese Riposte .
The Commanding Officer represented that the unit had just reached Tri Jn and no preparations for an attack including reconnaisance of enemy positions had been carried out by company and platoon commanders.
He strongly recommended that his unit be given at least one day for proper preparation before he could launch the attack. The CO was told that Nov 14 was Nehru’s birthday and Gen Kaul wanted to give a ‘victory’ gift to Nehru on his birthday.
When the CO persisted and said that he could give no guarantee of success, he was told he could either attack or be removed from command.
With such a background and without the company and platoon commanders ever having seen their objectives, the unit launched an attack with two companies at first light on Nov 14.
Due to inadequate preparation, there was no artillery or mortar supporting fire which fell on the objective. Still the attack made some progress but under strong small arms and machine gun fire, it ground to a halt some fifty yards short of the objective.
Though the attacking force was reinforced by two platoons, it could make no further progress. The troops were ordered to dig down where they were and defend themselves.
The attack along a narrow ridge with little space for proper deployment and without any covering fire had been easy to halt.
At 2230 hrs that night, the Chinese counter attacked and the Kumaonis were forced back onto Tri Jn.
Out of the over 200 men that had gone into the attack, only 90 returned.
The Chinese launched their first attack on 15 Nov at 4-30 am. The defenders repulsed this attack with heavy losses on the enemy.
The second attack was launched after last light on the same day and was also repulsed as during that period, Tri Jn had been reinforced by a company of 4 Dogra, which had reached after having broken through the Chinese blocking positions.
The Third Attack was launched at 7-30 am on Nov 16. It was preceded by very heavy and accurate on target 120mm mortar fire. After some very heavy and bitter fighting, Tri Jn was captured by the Chinese by 10oo hrs Nov 16.
Simultaneous attacks had also been launched by the Chinese along the entire front. They employed infiltration tactics between company defense localities with telling effect.
The Chinese extracted full revenge on the Sikh positions which had interfered with their build up on Green and Yellow Pimples as also the defences on Ladders which had caused them so much grief at the start of the battle. The Ladders position held fast and was only abandoned on Nov 17 though the Corps Commander, who was present, had ordered withdrawal from Walong at 1100 hrs Nov 16.
In a separate operation on the same day, a strong Chinese column raced down the South Eastern Spur or Index Finger and reached the track, some 5 miles South of Walong. This effectively bottled up and cut of the Indian Garrison.
Some artillery and other personnel, Jim Suri, another friend, among them, saved themselves from going into the POW bag by moving on game tracks on the East Bank of the Lohit River, to eventually reach Hayuliang.
Lieut YR Palta of the Sikhs, another course mate, was killed in the Chinese attack on the Sikh position guarding the East Bank of the Lohit River, North of Walong.
Casualties
Out of a total Indian garrisson strength of 2191, the killed were 17%,wounded 13% and 16% were taken POW – making a total casualty figure of 46% – which is pretty awesome.
The gallantry awards were one Maha Vir Chakra and nine Vir Chakras.
As for the Chinese, the three large grave yards at Bathithwang, Tithong and Chikhong, are ample testimony to their war dead.
In the final analysis, the units at Walong, even in defeat, upheld the name and honor of the Indian Army and made the nation proud.
Some Observations.
The Brigade Commander as well as the brigade major were Guardsmen who both became Army Commanders. Navin C Rawlley and Ashok K Handoo were men of substance and commanded professional respect.
Yet, it is pathetic to read how much they, along with the then Army, were out of touch with professional reality.
Their orders said that the Walong Battle was to be fought in three phases.
Phase 1- the Chinese attack was to be repulsed. Phase 2 – the brigade was to advance to the IB. Phase 3 – the brigade was to march into Tibet!!!
Alas, this was the state of professionalism that existed in those days – the Army was out of professional depth and not in touch with reality.
Future Generations, should take an oath akin to the Israelis, who before commissioning vow that their ancient Mazda forttess shall never fall.
Postscript
Sadly, some 21 years later in 1983, the Indian Army was proposing to fight its main battle well back at Hayuliang, upto where a class 9 road had then been built.
At Walong, the dispositions for a brigade defensive battle, were the same as they had been in 1962!!!
Even prior toGeneral K Sunderji’s Forward Posture of 1985, the Corps Comdr Gen KB Mehta, another Guardsman, developed, for his promotion or award, a brand new brigade defended sector at Chagwanti. This lies in disuse and decay!
How ever a class 9 road was extended from Hayuliang to Walong. And now a twice a week bus connects that forward town.
In 1962, Nehru’s Panch Sheel and his protege’ Krishna Menon’s handling of the Defense portfolio, resulted in the worst ever drubbing of the Indian Army. There were a number of places where the Indian Army did bring credit to itself and Walong was one such.
This is the story of that battle. Sadly even some 48 years after the event, the Henderson Brooks Inquiry Report into the debacle has not seen the light of day. Possibly for fear of compounding our difficulties with the Chinese.
The Macro Background
India gained Independence in 1947 and China became a Peoples Republic in 1949. While India propagated the Five Principles of Non Alignment, the Chinese invaded Tibet in 1949 itself and ten years thereafter the Dalai Lama fled to India. The British had maintained Tibetan integrity and had a garrison in Lhasa.
More dangerously China, for better connectivity to its Western region, built a road through the Aksai Chin plateau, thereby annexing thousands of square miles of Ladakh. Ninety percent of the territory taken by China was Indian and ten percent was under Pakistani control. All this while India slept and hence the fait accomli.
When India woke up, Nehru justified the lapse by terming the Aksai Chin, “a desolate, barren region where not a blade of grass grows”. The pragmatic Chinese Premier Zhou en Lai, while endorsing Nehru’s Panch Sheel, always maintained that there was NO Border dispute – because China had taken what it needed.
However to counter the Indian charge in Ladakh, the Chinese claimed that the whole of Arunachal Pradesh was Tibetan and hence Chinese. It said it did not recognize the Macmohan Line or any other border in the East.
An example of Chinese forwardness. In the Walong Sector in 1958, a Chinese patrol of some 40 soldiers was found camping some 20 miles South of Walong. When accosted, the responce was that they had lost their way! How that could be done in that narrow valley, stretches the imagination.
The sordid, indeed pitiful, details leading to the commencement of the War have been covered in, among others, Brig Dalvi’s Himalayan Blunder. So let it be said here that the India Chinese Conflict of 1962 began when India tried to dislodge the Chinese from the Thagla Ridge – several hundred miles to the West of Walong.
It all began on 20 Oct 62 when instigated by the Indian theatrics, the fully prepared and thorough Chinese launched their Mountain Blitzkrieg. That made the Indian Army, not recoil but flee back helter skelter. Having made their point the Chinese added insult to injury by unilaterally declaring a cease fire and pulling back to the prewar positions.
The Opposing Armies
Mao ze Dong’s People’s Liberation Army had ejected the American supported Chiang kai Shek’s Nationalists to Taiwan. Thereafter it had fought to a stand still the UN Forces (read US and UK) in the Korean War.
Bill Slim had two Chinese Divisions under him in Burma in 1942. He makes two observations about them in his Defeat into Victory. While praising the Chinese as a soldier, he says their formations needed no administrative support what so ever. They simply lived off the land. He says whole railway stations would disappear complete with rail lines and rolling stock, should they be in the vicinity. The other point he makes is that ‘tme‘ meant nothing what so ever to them. If they had been ordered to attack on a particular day, they would attack after a day or more – whenever.
The Indian Army had an ethos and reputation for valor which went back several centuries. However, after Independence, the idealistic Nehru and the Congress thought that the Defense Forces were a waste of national wealth and better reduced and employed for gainful development work like construction.
The first officer to be bestowed the prestigious Param Vashist Seva Medal was Gen BM Kaul, a distant kin of Nehru. The citation read – ” For successfully completing the project ‘Amar’ which entailed the construction of 1,450 quarters for troops in Ambala. This was the first project of its kind and was completed through hot weather and the monsoons in the face of numerous problems. Lt.-Gen. Kaul overcame these difficulties by dint of hard work and initiative of the highest order. He displayed organising ability, drive, and resourcefulness. It was by his determination, leadership and personal example that the task was completed by due date.” Pretty Pathetic Indeed.
Gen KS Thimaya (who together with Field Marshals Kipper Carriapa and Sam Manekshaw ranks among the Armies three greatest Chiefs) , was so humiliated by Krishna Menon, then Defence Minister, that he tendered his resignation. It took all of Nehru’s guile and charm to dissuade the vastly popular and principled man of honor, from going through with it. The event broke the great man’s heart and vastly diminished his stature.
Thereafter the pliable Thapar did a fill in time till Nehru could bring in Gen BM Kaul who was a Service Corps officer with Nehru’s Kashmiri background. Above all he was least a leader who could inspire and lead troops into battle.
Terrain Overview
Walong is the largest small town in the remotest North Eastern Corner of India. It lies in a narrow valley, on the banks of the North-South running Lohit River, which is called Telu by the locals and is the Eastern most tributary of the Brahmaputra River.
Walong has a small airfield but only the smaller type aircraft can use it. It is some 20 miles South of the International Border with Tibet in the North.
It was then reached by a 150 mile long foot track running on the West Bank of the Lohit River (mind you, not mule track), from Teju – the District HQ of Lohit Division. Teju served as the road head after several river crossings by boat and ferries from mainland Assam.
From the IB, some 20 miles North of Walong, the main communication is along the track on the West Bank of the Lohit River. A small post, Kibithu lies couple miles South of the IB.
On the Tibet side there was a class 9 road, meaning fit for buses and large trucks, which ended a mere 2 miles short of the International Border. So much for the logistic differential.
Terrain – Broad Overview of the Battle Area.
Terrain on the East Bank of the Lohit River is not really relevant to the battle. East of Walong and the Lohit River is a large impassable mountain massif. It ends in the South where the Sati Nullah flows from the East into the Lohit River at Walong. There is a small track coming from the North up to Walong on the East Bank of the Lohit River.
Large patrols can reach Walong along the Sati Nullah but they would need to cross two perenially snow bound over 3k meter passes (the Jachep and Chhu Passes) from the Tibet and Burma side to reach the origin of this Nullah. This approach is only fit for small special forces groups.
South of the Sati Nullah is another mountain massif, which is scantily used by even the locals and has only game tracks on it.
On the Western side of the Lohit River and parallel to it, runs a North South Mountain Water Shed or spine. This has numerous massive spurs separated by nullahs flowing down to the Lohit River on the East and a smaller River on its West. This spine is over 3k meters height.
Terrain Pertinent to the Battle.
On this North South Watershed running West and parallel to the Lohit Valley in the area of Walong, there is one massive spur leading West from the Water Shed for a couple miles.
From that point it breaks into three spurs and hence this point is named Tri Jn.
For easier understanding, imagine a downward turned Left Hand, with the Ring Finger, Middle Finger and Index Finger all sloping down from Tri Jn towards the West Bank of the Lohit River.
These three fingers correspond to the North Eastern Spur, Center Spur and the South Eastern Spur. The Middle Finger or Center Spur ends above Walong. The Ring Finger or North East Spur makes out flanking of defencss on the Middle Finger or Center Spur possible. The Index Finger or the South East Spur makes it possible to cut off the Walong garrison by getting behind it.
The North Eastern Spur ends a mile or two North of Walong. The Center Spur directly overlooks Walong. The South Eastern Spur, ends some 5 miles South of Walong.
The Center Spur, together with Tri Jn was the main area of this Battle.
The Center Spur’s end forms an impregnable defense position for about a platoon. This area is called ‘Ladders. Machine guns from here make direct forward movement impossible from the North.
The Center Spur is massive having smaller spurs going down North Eastward and South Eastward. These have good defense positions and all of them together make the entire spur fit for a brigade and more to deploy.
Some defense positions can also be occupied East of the Lohit River, both North and South of the Sati Nullah.
Height differential between Tri Jn and Lohit River is over 10,000 ft and the distance is about ten miles – a hard two day march from the Valley, for troops carrying loads.
Indian Deployment at Walong
Till 1959, the IB at Walong was sentineled by the Assam Rifles, which come under the Home Ministry. The first army unit to be deployed was 2 Rajput which was replaced by 6 Kumaon in Apr ’62 with the main unit at Walong.
However in first week Sep, the unit was moved forward to Kibithu which is a couple miles from the IB and a company deployed ahead and slightly to its NE on MacMohan Ridge.
Walong was ordered to be reinforced by 4 Sikh but as the staff at the HQ (and perhaps the Air Force too), was unfamiliar with the area, only two companies were air landed at Walong, while the HQ and the two other companies were air landed at Along – since their was confusion in the names of Walong and Along over the radio.
The Sikhs were deployed at Ladders and surrounding localities.
The Chinese initially began operations with a Regiment, which corresponds to the Indian brigade. They built this up and by war’s end there was a whole division plus involved in the final battle.
The Battle Phase I – Oct 21 to Oct 25 – The Opening Rounds
On Night Oct 20/21, the PLA cleared the Kumaoni Company from MacMohan Ridge and before they could attack the remainder of 6 Kumaon at Kibithu, the unit was ordered back to man the defenses at Walong, without so much as a shot being fired.
Within two days, the remainder of 4 Sikh along with two companies of 2/8 Gurkhas were flown in and the command of the Garrison taken over by CO 4 Sikh from CO 6 Kumaon.
The cock a hoop and swaggering Chinese, showing scant respect for the Indian Army, put in two strong day light attacks on Oct 24 and 25. The Chinese had been confidentally advancing Southward along the single track from the North on the West Bank of the Lohit River. The Sikhs and Gurkhas had field days as they caught the attacking Chinese, with their machine guns enfilade (along their main axis) as they came forward with restricted space for deployment or out flanking movements.
The Chinese took a big hit as they fled back and out of range. To their credit, let it be said that under cover of the smoke from fires they had lit, the Chinese came back and honorably carried away their dead. A fair estimate of casualties – all Chinese, would conservatibly be between a hundred and two hundred.
The Battle Phase 2 – Oct 26 to Nov 3 -The Lull Period.
Indian Activity in the lull period.
The Corps Commander was Gen BM Kaul (the would be future Chief), but as he was away to Delhi, the officiating Corps Commander, Gen Harbaksh of the Sikhs, visited Walong on Oct 27. This self styled super professional (whose personal orders resulted in the whole of 4 Sikh along with their CO, being made POW in ’65) ruled that 6 Kumaon, 4 Sikh and two companies of 2/8 Gurkhas were adequate to hold Walong.Hence under Gen Harbaksh’s orders, back went the two companies of 2/8 Gurkhas alongwith the newly arrived two companies of 3/3 Gurkhas, which had just reached Walong after a gruelling 150 miles march by foot from Tezu.
General Harbaksh had also brought along Brig Hartley MC of the Sikhs to take over the Walong Garrison from CO 4 Sikh.
However Gen BM Kaul returned from Delhi and visited Walong on Oct 29. He directed Brig NC Rawlley, who had Major AK Handoo as BM of his 5 Brigade, to take over on Oct 31.
Gen Kaul also ordered the raising of 2nd Mountain Division. Brig Rawlley ordered the poor 3/3 Gurkha companies to once again turn around and come back to Walong. He also requested for three more battalions to hold a brigade defended area at Hayuliang, which is some 75 miles to the rear of Walong and half way to Tezu.
Walong now became the scene of feverish activity what with the fly in of the remainder of 3/3 Gurkhas, some artillery and engineers and administrative units. The 2/8 Gurkhas were flown out.
At that time food supplies for three days, arillery and mortar ammunition barely adequate to repulse one attack and small arms ammunition for facing two attacks, was all that was held.
Chinese Activity in the lull period
Having got a bloody nose in their initial attacks, what were the Chinese doing during this period? They were busy preparing for an out flanking attack by moving up the North Eastern Spur or Ring Finger – but not without the Sikh machine guns on Center Spur or Middle Finger, harrying and harrasing them as they moved up westward, trying to outflank them on Center Spur.
The Chinese in these ten days managed to establish themselves on two heights on the extreme West of Center Spur and about a mile or so east of Tri Jn. These positions were named Green and Yellow Pimple by the Brigade.
The Chinese had managed to deployed about a company plus on each and these were continuously being built up. The Chinese were also stocking these positions with mortar and other ammunition as also supplies.
Chinese patrols were also spotted on the East Bank track of the Lohit River, forward of Walong. Chinese activity certainly indicated that they were preparing to launch a major attack. Their preparation was sure and deliberate.
Phase 3 – Nov 3 to Nov 13 – Jockeying for Position
From Nov 3 onwards Sikh and Assam Rifle patrols were fired upon from Green Pimple. However the venturesome Sikhs had established themselves in an area they named Patrol Base so that they could more effectively interfere with the movement of the Chinese going up North Eastern Spur and towards the two Pimples they had occupied.
From Nov 6, a company under the valiant Lieut Bikram Singh of 6 Kumaon and a course mate, launched repeated probes and attacks on Green Pimple from the South – but with little success. The Chinese proved to be strongly entrenched and young Bikram was killed leading one attack. The company established itself on an area they named West Ridge, in order to keep Green Pimple under observation.
On Nov 11, Kumaoni patrols reported to brigade that Tri Jn was not held. The Corps Commander, Gen Kaul, who was visiting, approved a plan for 6 Kumaon to attack Yellow Pimple from Tri Jn, complete with artillery and mortar support. Tri Jn was secured on Nov 12 by a strong patrol of 6 Kumaon. This would of course have warned the Chinese – if warning was necessary.
At last light Nov 11, 6 Kumaon had a company on the East of Lohit River. As such this company had to cross the river to the West Bank and then climb some 10,000 ft with equipment and ammunition along with the rest of the battalion for launchng the attack. It took 6 Kumaon the better part of two days, Nov 12 and 13 to establish it self at Tri Jn.
It had to carry man pack all supplies and ammunition, including mortars and machine gun ammunition, needed for the battalion attack.
By late evening on Nov 13, 6 Kumaon had estabished it self on Tri Jn. It received orders from the brigade to attack Yellow and Green Pimples the very next day ie Nov 14.
The Battle Part 4 – Nov 14 to N0v 17 – Indian Attack and the Chinese Riposte .
The Commanding Officer represented that the unit had just reached Tri Jn and no preparations for an attack including reconnaisance of enemy positions had been carried out by company and platoon commanders.
He strongly recommended that his unit be given at least one day for proper preparation before he could launch the attack. The CO was told that Nov 14 was Nehru’s birthday and Gen Kaul wanted to give a ‘victory’ gift to Nehru on his birthday.
When the CO persisted and said that he could give no guarantee of success, he was told he could either attack or be removed from command.
With such a background and without the company and platoon commanders ever having seen their objectives, the unit launched an attack with two companies at first light on Nov 14.
Due to inadequate preparation, there was no artillery or mortar supporting fire which fell on the objective. Still the attack made some progress but under strong small arms and machine gun fire, it ground to a halt some fifty yards short of the objective.
Though the attacking force was reinforced by two platoons, it could make no further progress. The troops were ordered to dig down where they were and defend themselves.
The attack along a narrow ridge with little space for proper deployment and without any covering fire had been easy to halt.
At 2230 hrs that night, the Chinese counter attacked and the Kumaonis were forced back onto Tri Jn.
Out of the over 200 men that had gone into the attack, only 90 returned.
The Chinese launched their first attack on 15 Nov at 4-30 am. The defenders repulsed this attack with heavy losses on the enemy.
The second attack was launched after last light on the same day and was also repulsed as during that period, Tri Jn had been reinforced by a company of 4 Dogra, which had reached after having broken through the Chinese blocking positions.
The Third Attack was launched at 7-30 am on Nov 16. It was preceded by very heavy and accurate on target 120mm mortar fire. After some very heavy and bitter fighting, Tri Jn was captured by the Chinese by 10oo hrs Nov 16.
Simultaneous attacks had also been launched by the Chinese along the entire front. They employed infiltration tactics between company defense localities with telling effect.
The Chinese extracted full revenge on the Sikh positions which had interfered with their build up on Green and Yellow Pimples as also the defences on Ladders which had caused them so much grief at the start of the battle. The Ladders position held fast and was only abandoned on Nov 17 though the Corps Commander, who was present, had ordered withdrawal from Walong at 1100 hrs Nov 16.
In a separate operation on the same day, a strong Chinese column raced down the South Eastern Spur or Index Finger and reached the track, some 5 miles South of Walong. This effectively bottled up and cut of the Indian Garrison.
Some artillery and other personnel, Jim Suri, another friend, among them, saved themselves from going into the POW bag by moving on game tracks on the East Bank of the Lohit River, to eventually reach Hayuliang.
Lieut YR Palta of the Sikhs, another course mate, was killed in the Chinese attack on the Sikh position guarding the East Bank of the Lohit River, North of Walong.
Casualties
Out of a total Indian garrisson strength of 2191, the killed were 17%,wounded 13% and 16% were taken POW – making a total casualty figure of 46% – which is pretty awesome.
The gallantry awards were one Maha Vir Chakra and nine Vir Chakras.
As for the Chinese, the three large grave yards at Bathithwang, Tithong and Chikhong, are ample testimony to their war dead.
In the final analysis, the units at Walong, even in defeat, upheld the name and honor of the Indian Army and made the nation proud.
Some Observations.
The Brigade Commander as well as the brigade major were Guardsmen who both became Army Commanders. Navin C Rawlley and Ashok K Handoo were men of substance and commanded professional respect.
Yet, it is pathetic to read how much they, along with the then Army, were out of touch with professional reality.
Their orders said that the Walong Battle was to be fought in three phases.
Phase 1- the Chinese attack was to be repulsed. Phase 2 – the brigade was to advance to the IB. Phase 3 – the brigade was to march into Tibet!!!
Alas, this was the state of professionalism that existed in those days – the Army was out of professional depth and not in touch with reality.
Future Generations, should take an oath akin to the Israelis, who before commissioning vow that their ancient Mazda forttess shall never fall.
Postscript
Sadly, some 21 years later in 1983, the Indian Army was proposing to fight its main battle well back at Hayuliang, upto where a class 9 road had then been built.
At Walong, the dispositions for a brigade defensive battle, were the same as they had been in 1962!!!
Even prior toGeneral K Sunderji’s Forward Posture of 1985, the Corps Comdr Gen KB Mehta, another Guardsman, developed, for his promotion or award, a brand new brigade defended sector at Chagwanti. This lies in disuse and decay!
How ever a class 9 road was extended from Hayuliang to Walong. And now a twice a week bus connects that forward town.
