Pakistani initiated this, India must cease it.

[..Azad]

Pakistani initiated this, India must cease it.


On this day in 1971 pakistan suffered its biggest abasement till date, I said ‘till date’ cause going by whats befalling Pakistan now than its second abasement is close at hand, which can well dwarf its ‘71 humiliation. But it was not 1971 where Pakistan lost the plot, diminishing of Pakistani state lies with its avaricious army and its aggressive meddling in Pakistani political space soon after Indo-China 62 war, tho its army always have had ambitious designs after partition. A defeat in 62 and failure of International community to rush toward an non-allied India, emboldened Pakistan to settle all scores with its religious belligerent.

Soon after 62 war, in December, India and Pakistan signed a joint statement to resolve all its issues with peaceful manner. Both Z. Bhutto and J.Nehru came up with a draft which reads words that can be music to any discomfited nation. Intelligibly Zulfikar Bhutto wanted India, Pakistan to get into an acceptable accord. India more importantly reciprocated with an historical ‘’No War Pact” with Pakistan in assurance to UN.

‘No way” – was the locution literally used by an cold war blinded super power and an avaricious Pakistani army. Both with there pursuit went into cahoots to fix a common concern – India, a non-allied chesty for one and an religious foeman for another. The first casualty was Pakistani democracy.

In 1964 pakistani premier in UN denounced Indian offer of ‘’ No war pact’’. The exact quotes from his speech was:-

For the important considerations, Pakistan cannot accept India's offer of a "No War Pact". India is an aggressor state and we cannot have a "No War Pact" with an aggressor state. India must first settle the Kashmir problem on anhonourable and an equitable basis. Once that is done according to the dictates of justice and equity, we shall be willing to have not one "No War Pact" with India but as many as India might desire. But to that condition India would not agree. The purpose of India in making the present offer of a "No War Pact" is a deceptive one.

The reason cited was second world war Ribbontrop-Molotov pact, a non–aggression treaty between Nazi’s and soviet’s, which Hitler tactically went into to keep soviets at distance till he finishes with western front. Pakistan collimate same theory to refuse to go in with peace with India, with understandably no remorse from western alignment. Moreover a doctrine of analogy was also uttered with reference to Algerian independence struggle vis-à-vis Kashmir
dispute. The first sign of what was stored for India by Americans and its newly found stooges inside Pakistan

Bhutto cleverly than drag Soviet Union, India’s only protagonist after 62 crisis, into the ominous contrive. Playing to US gallery, the idea was to deny India Soviet assistance.Perhaps a wishful thought, as Pakistan itself was going by American behest.

The quotes form the speech were:-

The Soviet Union, a great country, must be congratulated for orbiting men, women and animals in outer space, but it must also keep its feet on the ground. We would like to ask if its partisan policy on Kashmir, which in some respects, is more Indian than India's own, is in the highest interest of world peace and security? If India in its present position is to
become the recipient of military assistance both from the United States and from the Soviet Union, is there not some basic and innate contradiction in it

Same yr in one of his speech he said:-

If a bloody conflict does break out, it will have far-reaching repercussions. Pakistan on its part has always exercised the greatest restraint and shall continue to do so. But there comes a time when the patience of a people is exhausted. I remember that when the struggle for the achievement of Pakistan was being waged, it was said that it should be a now or never struggle. The problem of Kashmir has now become so urgent, so critical in its consequences, that it should be thought of in the same way. Kashmir must be liberated if Pakistan is to have its full meaning.

The event followed was not very arduous to understand. In 1965 Operation Gibraltar was launched.


Though India mauled Pakistan but at a heavy price, this American-pakistani ditch dug for India was responded in 1971. Pakistan shown its real valuate and Americans told that they can go scratching Pakistani poonani but all they will get is a Indian banana. A miffed America came up with most amusing answer that it is because of its might, mainland Pakistan was saved. No ifs and buts, no Mukti Bahini, no this no that, India must not enshroud itself in all this stupid alibis. Yes we clobber them with right time and India must celebrate this day as to remind world that the word “Avenge” still figures in its resolve.

This message must go clamorously to the handlers and germinators of Dawood’s and Kasab’s.

The war in 1971 was not only with the Pakistani armed forces but with the very idea of Pakistan. An ongoing struggle to defeat the surmise of a ‘muslim pakistan’. On 16 december 1971 at exact 16 hour 31 mts general Niazi not only surrendered its shameless troops but also ceded Jinnah’s idea of Pakistan. India first step to reject a mortifying Pakistan. India must put this surrendering accord on Jinnah grave, in futurity.

Its now on India’s polity and its proud ppls to stand tall and make Indian politicians to stop kowtowing to American aspirations on Pakistan and stop treating Indian muslims as fifth estate, unlike Indian national congress did with muslim league.


Jai Shri Ram
Jai Hind

 

[..Azad]

Call Pakistan's Bluff

An op-ed by retired major general G.D Bakshi in today's TOI editorial page. Its saying what i have been exhorting here and what is now being muted in the highest close quarters.

Call Pakistan's Bluff

There are renewed intelligence inputs about the possibility of India being the target of further terrorist attacks. The fencing of India's land borders has had a major and palpable impact on the Pakistani ISI's methodology for exporting terror and destabilising this country. Fencing had helped curtail terrorism in Punjab and the same access denial solution has worked well in J&K. With the extension of the fence to Rajasthan, the degree of difficulty in infiltrating personnel, arms and ammunition into India has increased exponentially.

This clearly has prompted the ISI to revamp its terror offensive strategy against India. This tactical shift was effected in 2007 and its consequences became painfully visible in 2008, through a series of high profile and mass casualty strikes in Jaipur, Ahmedabad, New Delhi, Guwahati and Mumbai. The Mumbai mayhem unleashed an unprecedented wave of public anger and indignation at the embarrassing failure of the Indian state to protect the lives of its citizens.

The ISI's strategy is fairly explicit in hindsight. It has two clear strands. The reduced porosity of land borders impelled the ISI to place heavy reliance on the local Tanzeems with localised narratives. These were trained not in PoK or Pakistan but in various jungle locations within India. The emphasis was on greater deniability, which would enable the Pakistani establishment to distance itself from these actions. Salient characteristics of these Indian Mujahideen-initiated strikes were using locally available explosive materials like ammonium nitrate, hydrogen peroxide and slurry etc. The deliberate design was to spread the terror war from J&K to the rest of India.

Local Tanzeems, however, could be easily penetrated and tracked down by the Indian police and intelligence agencies. Most of the IM operatives were swiftly rounded up after the terror strikes. This seems to have compelled the ISI to exploit the sea flank to launch meticulously planned sea-borne assaults using highly motivated and well-trained west Punjabi operatives of the Lashkar-e-Taiba.

One year down the line we are again deluged with intelligence warnings of another strike. What then are our response options? One would have thought that with so much on its plate, the Pakistani establishment would not be keen to open other fronts. India would be equally happy to let Pakistan focus its energies on draining the terrorist swamp it has created. What then could be the Pakistani motivations for a resumption of its terrorist assault on India?

The military-ISI duo that calls the shots in Pakistan appears to be under severe pressure due to the ongoing global offensive against terrorism. Twenty-eight per cent of its rank and file are ethnic Pathans who are seriously affected by the ongoing operations in Swat and Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Is Pakistan seeking an eastern diversion that can repair the fast deepening Punjabi-Pashtun faultline and enable it to call off the global offensive? Whatever be the motivations, a renewed Pakistani terrorist assault in India translates into mass casualties.

ISI's asymmetric assault against India started in 1983. For almost three decades India has surrendered the strategic and tactical initiative to Pakistan. We have waged a purely defensive battle on our own territory. Such a reactive and passive stance was understandable in the era of the 1990s when we were trying to revive and liberalise our failing economy. But that stance is unsustainable beyond a point. It calls into question the Indian state's will to safeguard its vital national interests and the life of its citizens.

How do we transit to a proactive phase to deter further Indian casualties? First, the state needs to send out a clear communication that such terrorist attacks and resulting Indian casualties are no longer acceptable. Second, we must rapidly deploy dominant war fighting capabilities that can deter Pakistan's asymmetric adventurism. India must also hasten its defence acquisition process. Finally, we must remember that the primary flaw of Operation Parakram was it's all-or-nothing mission. India needs to evolve and enunciate a declaratory doctrine for limited wars against a nuclear backdrop. This must aim at raising costs for Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorism.

The initial response to Pakistan-sponsored terror attacks could be air power and naval power or special forces centric. These should be just, focused, precise and proportionate responses that serve as warning shots and place the onus of further escalation squarely on Pakistan.

It is time India called Pakistan's nuclear bluff. Kargil clearly highlighted that there is no one-step nuclear escalation ladder in South Asia. The weight of deterrence in Pakistani military thinking is premised on its perceived parity in conventional military force with that of India's. This must be addressed on an urgent basis. Frankly it would be far better for India to deter such an attack than deal with its consequences. Deterrence, however, mandates a clear communication of resolve to respond. It is here that well-intentioned declarations of peaceful intent and abhorrence for war from our leadership could unfortunately have the opposite effect of inviting more such attacks.

Indian army is now buying 50 yr old 130 mm M-46 field gun from Russian surplus stocks lying in there storage warehouses. Its an old gun but very light and highly maneuvering in open battle field.

But why? Its not an deterring item from Pakistanis. Is India up to something? hmm.....