Introduction
Kingdom of Hungary and Croatia had provided a continuous defense of Western Europe against Ottoman expansion from Battle of Nicopolis in 1396. until Battle of Mohacs in 1526. During this time, external assistance was received only infrequently. With Franco-Burgundian military incompetence causing a disaster at Nicopolis, and Western Europe busy with its own matters, Hungary was alone with its vassals in fighting against the Ottoman threat. This had multiple causes. First, European powers were busy fighting each other. England and France were fighting a Hundred Years War, while Germany was disunited and incapable of proper action. Italy was much like Germany, and Italian maritime city-states of Venice and Genoa were as likely to assist Ottomans as they were to fight against them. Any action against Ottomans required settling disparate interests and arranging for peace; but such a peace was diplomatically almost impossible to achieve. Neither frequent messages of peace nor Ottoman conquests could induce Western princes to abandon their wars. Second, West Europeans were too frightened by Turks to go against them. Images of Ottoman cruelty – both real, exaggerated and imagined – coupled with ther (real) military capability and efficiency invited images of disaster, and turned away in fear those who otherwise might have gone against them. As was their usual response to problems arising in Eastern and Central Europe, Western Europe adopted “head in the sand” management policy. Third reason for lack of response was simply that Hungarians were too successful in containing the Turkish threat. While Turkish raids did penetrate into Slovenia, especially during the latter part of the period discussed here, Hungary was the primary target of the raids, and it was – for the most part – able to defend itself well. Hungarian army adapted many Ottoman methods, providing a flexible and capable force matched only by Ottoman army itself. In fact, as will be seen from the following, Hungarian army was largely on the offensive during first part of the period discussed here, entering Ottoman territory and fighting battles there. In 1442., Ottomans were forced to surrender Vidin and Wallachia to Hungary. Even when Ottomans won at Varna in 1442. and Kosovo in 1448., they were unable to capitalize on these victories, at least against Hungary itself – but Constantinople, Serbia and Albania all fell to them in following years. Hungary itself remained strong until its nobility gutted its military capability post 1490., leading to fall of Belgrade in 1521. and defeat at Mohacs in 1526. In 1529., Suleiman beseiged Vienna.
History and battles
John Hunyadi
John (Janos) Hunyadi was born in 1387., as the oldest son of a Hungarized Romanian Wallach Woyk Morosin. Woyk and his two brothers bought a city of Hunyad, receiving surname Hunyadi after the city. John Hunyadi came to court of king Sigismund as a boy while preparing for knighthood. From 1420., John Hunyadi fights against Hussites in Czech lands. After campaign against Ottomans near Smederevo in 1437., king Albrecht I gave John Hunyadi banship over Severin, the most exposted area of Hungary. During civil war of 1440. John Hunyadi supported Wladislaus III. Jagellon (hrv. Vladislav I. Varnenčik) alongside Nikola Iločki, likely due to Polish king’s promise of help in defense against Ottomans. In the same year (1440.), Ivan Talovac, commander of Knights of St.John in Croatia, defeated Ottoman assault against Belgrade.
Belgrade 1441.
Ottomans did not give up, however, and came back the next year. John Hunyadi attempted to push back Ottoman forces which were active south of Belgrade, but was forced to retreat in face of unexpectedly large numbers. He was forced into battle after his retreat to Transylvania got cut off by Bey of Semendria. John Hunyadi in this battle abandoned traditional battle order where knights were in the front, opting instead to place heavy infantry in the center, with crossbowmen and light infantry at its flanks. At flanks of infantry were placed heavy cavalry with mounted crossbowmen in support, and light cavalry archers were placed as skirmishers in front of heavy cavalry. Reserve composed of heavy cavalry was placed behind infantry. Battle was decided by the decisive charge of heavy cavalry reserve.
Alba Iulia & Sibiu 1442.
Mezid-beg, beglerbeg of Rumelia, entered Transylvania in early March of 1442. with an army of 16 000 – 20 000 men, besieging Sibiu – a Saxon-populated town in Carpathians. Hunyadi found himself in a bind – having dismissed his veterans after liberating Serbia, he could not recall them in time. Instead, he declared a general mobilization (exercitus generalis – all males capable of bearing arms) with a mobilization point in Alba Iulia. Mesid-beg sent a detachment of his army, which broke Hunyadi’s army with a charge, upon which Hunyadi retreated to Alba Iulia. Few days later however Hunyadi’s own army arrived at Alba Iulia, along with Szekels and Saxons under Anton Trautenberg, and Wallachian army under Vlad Drakul.
Two armies met each other somewhere near Sibiu on 22. April 1442. Both had infantry in the center, but Ottomans had second line of infantry behind the first row. Ottoman cavalry was deployed at wings and also as a central reserve. Hunyadi deployed infantry in a single line, with wagons reinforcing the flanks. At the flanks, beyond the wagons, was cavalry, with additional cavalry in reserve. Christian troops were the ones to attack, and in combat one of commanders of infantry in Hunyadi’s center was killed, causing some degree of disorder. Turks used this for a general assault, but one of wings of Ottoman army was destroyed by counterattack by Christian heavy cavalry and battlewagons. Some Christian detachments may also have penetrated into rear of Ottoman army. Ottomans then routed, and during the pursuit Wallachians captured and executed Mezidbeg and Mezidbeg’s son.
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