The Rise of China : Strategic Implications.

Discussion in 'China' started by pyromaniac, Mar 1, 2009.

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What does china fear most militarily and socially as a threat to its security and stability?

  1. Japan turning assertive

    7.6%
  2. An indian global power

    33.0%
  3. The United States in its backyard.

    55.8%
  4. the russian military machine ramping up

    3.6%
  1. cw2005

    cw2005 Regular Member

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    My company has been trying to recruit a civil engineer from China stationed in West Africa for two years with only two application received in three months. The requirement is U Grad plus two years experience, speaking Chinese and basic daily English. We are now instead trying to recruit from Malaysia and Indonisia. The job market in China for certain trade is very tight.
     
  2. Tolaha

    Tolaha Senior Member Senior Member

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    I have not voted for the poll. CCP is a paranoid lot, and probably thinks every nation in this world is a threat to its existense! Hell, it even thinks that the Chinese people are a threat to its existence!! :pound:

    Other than Pakistan, ofcourse! :namaste:
     
    SADAKHUSH and LurkerBaba like this.
  3. ace009

    ace009 Freakin' Fighter fan Elite Member

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    Actually I think China thinks that USA is threat number one (history and USA military power), followed by Japan (history again), South Korea (because of NK), Russia (because of long border and Russia's growing militarism) and finally India (economic and naval threat, still not big enough to threaten the CCP).
     
  4. nitesh

    nitesh Mob Control Manager Stars and Ambassadors

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  5. Bhadra

    Bhadra Defence Professionals Defence Professionals Senior Member

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  6. Ray

    Ray The Chairman Defence Professionals Moderator

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    China is raising her strategic oil reserves from 30 days to 100 days and that will give her a greater sustenance to wage war!
     
  7. Ray

    Ray The Chairman Defence Professionals Moderator

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    Read the above with the one here and one thereafter

     
  8. Ray

    Ray The Chairman Defence Professionals Moderator

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    As per military analysis China has the capability to deploy and sustain 34 divisions over a month along the Line of Actual Control.

    China can do so by mustering troops from the Chegdu and Lanzou Military Region without having to carry out stocking or dumping in advance.

    China has a distinct advantage over India when viewed against India's 09 Divisions along the Northern borders.

    As a major upgrade, China is doing/done the following in Tibet and Xinjiang:

    1. Connection with all major counties in Tibet with border roads completed. Road network increased from 51,000 kms in 2008 to 58,000 kms in 2010. Plan to increase black topped roads by another 70,000 kms is on the anvil.

    2. Extension of Qinghai - Tibet Railway from Golmund to Lhasa and thereon to Shiagatse (close to Sikkim). Rail connectivity is planned to link Katmandu in Nepal, Myanmar, Bhutan , Pakistan and Central Asian Republics.

    3. Eleven new rails lines are on the anvil for Tibet and Xinjiang for rapid deployment of the PLA.

    4. 18 air bases in Tibet and Xinjiang have the capability to put India under the range of Sukhoi 27.

    The infrastructure development along with building of logistic hubs at a rapid pace is worth note since it is far in excess of the requirement for the local population. It is a known fact that the PLA has built tunnels for storage of military hardware.

    The fact that Pakistan is China's all weather friend and supplies military hardware to include J 17 is of serious concern to India. It maybe recalled that China has 1000 troops in POK to upgrade the Karakorum Highway and fast pace the link to Gwadar, Karachi and Bin Qassim. This will give 'strategic depth' ( at term not quite what it means in the military sense, but more in the political realm) as also permit China to control the Persian Gulf.

    China's Dong Fang Electric Supply Corporation and the Pakistan Railways have signed the feasibility study contract on a Havelian - Khunjerab Pass rail link.
     
  9. Patriot

    Patriot Senior Member Senior Member

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    Yes, China Could Have a Global Navy


    [​IMG]

    The idea that Chinese strategists are too limited in their thinking to have a world-straddling navy is misplaced, argues James Holmes.

    My colleague Prof. Bernard ‘Bud’ Cole doubts China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) can transform itself into a global force by mid-century, realizing founding father Adm. Liu Huaqing’s vision of a navy that commands an expanding belt of offshore waters before taking its place alongside the U.S. Navy as a world-straddling fleet. Writing in the Naval Institute Proceedings, Cole—a veteran U.S. Navy surface warfare officer and author of The Great Wall at Sea—deems Chinese maritime strategy “antithetical to historic naval strategic thinking, whether formulated by Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Julian Stafford Corbett, or any other maritime strategist of note.”

    I’m not so sure. Importing ideas from abroad is never straightforward, but Chinese strategists read the classic works attentively—more so than their contemporaries in the West. They have fused concepts drawn from the greats of sea power with China’s land-warfare traditions. Chinese maritime strategy is an alloy between East and West, land and sea power. To me it’s almost beside the point whether the PLA Navy grows into a global force. Beijing sees pressing interests at stake in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. So does Washington, judging from its current maritime strategy, which vows to stage “credible combat power” in these two oceans for the foreseeable future. These are the theatres that matter—for both nations.

    An Intellectual Shortfall?


    As Bud sees it, an intellectual deficit fetters China’s maritime ambitions. It takes two closely related forms. First and foremost, China, a continental power steeped in land warfare, thinks in terms of “defending fixed and limited areas at sea.” As Cole tells it, Liu urged the PLA Navy to construct forces “capable of exerting sea control out to the First Island Chain, defined by a line drawn from the Kurile Islands, through Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, then through the Philippines to the Indonesian archipelago.” He envisioned consummating this first phase of naval development by 2000—a benchmark the navy conspicuously failed to meet.

    “By 2020,” continues Cole, the PLA Navy should be able to “exert sea control out to the Second Island Chain, defined by a line drawn from the Kuriles, through Japan and the Bonin Islands, then through the [Mariana] Islands, Palau, and the Indonesian archipelago,” enclosing much of the Western Pacific and the South China Sea within a zone of Chinese maritime supremacy. The fleet would commence global operations by 2050.

    Cole points out that Liu made a career move unthinkable in the U.S. armed forces, ascending the army ranks before assuming command of the navy in the 1980s. According to Cole, the first two phases in the PLA Navy chief’s strategic design “reflect a traditional continentalist view: armies operate in and across solid geography, cued to lines of defense, advance and withdrawal, and logistics lines…There are no lines at sea, however, which calls into question both the maritime applicability of his theory [and] the ultimate goal of his eloquent plan for modernizing the Chinese navy” (my emphasis).

    Second, Cole faults the PLA Navy for overreliance on “anti-access” and “area-denial” weaponry to shut adversary forces—chiefly the U.S. Navy—out of East Asian waters during a Taiwan contingency or some other clash along China’s nautical periphery. He suggests this constitutes a static, passive approach inimical to global navies. Under Beijing’s anti-access strategy, diesel submarines, anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), stealthy catamarans, and other short-range or shore-based weapons erect a dense, “layered” defense against forces that venture into China’s geographic environs. By pummeling forces steaming westward across the Pacific, PLA defenders could ratchet up the costs of intervention so high that a U.S. president would hesitate long enough for Beijing to accomplish its goals. Better yet, Washington might desist from a rescue effort altogether.

    Bud interprets anti-access as proof that “current Chinese naval strategic thinking remains based on defending limited areas at sea…and that the [PLA Navy] is intending to draw lines at sea.” This intellectually barren approach deprives the Chinese fleet of the “core value of naval forces: mobility and flexibility.” This adds up to a damning indictment of China’s navy, and of Chinese thinkers’ strategic fluency. Furthermore, the implications for fellow Asian powers are sweeping. If Liu’s geographically minded program appears predestined to fail, dulling Chinese minds in the process, the United States and its allies have less to worry about than many analysts think. They can take a relatively laid-back approach to China’s maritime rise.

    But, as ESPN sportscaster Lee Corso likes to say, “Not so fast, my friend!” There’s more texture to sea-power theory, and more to Chinese strategic thought about the sea, than Cole allows. Beijing can never escape the exigencies of land defense, but it isn’t captive to the nation’s continental past and traditions. Mahan beguiles Chinese strategists in part because he too applied concepts from land warfare to the sea. He had to; the field of maritime history remained a backwater when he got his start in the late 1800s. He was fond of quoting Napoleon’s maxim that “war is a business of positions.” And he called Baron Antoine Henri Jomini, a continental thinker of considerable renown—a commentator with an intensely geospatial view of combat that emphasized topography, positions, and lines—“my best military friend.” Mahan ratifies, complements, and shapes China’s approach to strategy.

    Let’s take Cole’s geographic argument first. It’s true in a narrow sense that there are no lines on the high seas. The open sea resembles a featureless plain for mariners plying the oceans far from land—which is why mathematicians such as myself typically enjoy navigation. Seafarers use nautical charts to plot courses from place to place, paying scant heed to underwater topography. They use “maneuvering boards” based on polar co-ordinates and vector mechanics to manage the relative movement of ships within formations. Where else can you put classroom learning to everyday use?

    Mahan recognized all of this. Not for nothing did he ascribe the strategic value of the Hawaiian archipelago to its lonely position amid an empty maritime plain. Hawaii represented the only convenient stopping place for ships bound from North America to Asia or the reverse. Sea-power theorists like Mahan and Corbett also observe that the oft-used term “sea lanes” is a misnomer on the high seas. For instance, shipping commonly follows a “great circle” path from seaport to seaport, if possible. Such a course traces the shortest distance between two points on the globe, thereby saving on fuel, steaming time, and wear-and-tear on crews and machinery. But there’s no geographic reason skippers can’t plot more roundabout courses between the same origins and destinations if they accept the extra costs. Mahan and Corbett both point out that all one fleet can know for sure about another is its point of origin. If commanders can learn their adversary’s destination, so much the better. Their other option is to loiter near “focal points” or “chokepoints”—think straits like Malacca or Gibraltar that provide access from one body of water to another—in hopes of picking up the trail.

    But this all breaks down when a fleet closes in on land—as it ultimately must to make a difference. Corbett depicts maritime strategy as the art of using seagoing forces in concert with armies to influence events ashore. Since wars are fought on land, that’s where navies must make their presence felt. Mahan pays less attention to “joint” use of land and sea forces, locking his gaze squarely on sea combat. On the other hand, he pays far more attention to geography than do Corbett, Wolfgang Wegener, and other sea-power theorists.

    That’s because—contra Cole—Mahan designed his maritime strategy with the goal of empowering the United States to command the confined waters of the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. Lines on the map abound in such enclosed “Mediterranean” seas, as well as other coastal zones. Indeed, Mahan got his start appraising the strategic features of the Gulf and Caribbean—the “fixed and limited” sea areas the United States had to dominate to keep European navies from establishing bases menacing the approaches to a Central American canal, America’s “gateway” to the Pacific Ocean. And riverine warfare represented a decisive part of the Union victory in the American Civil War. The Confederates “admitted their enemies to their hearts” by surrendering command of the Mississippi River and other inland waterways.

    The United States’ sea-power “evangelist,” then, repeatedly accentuates the strategic worth of shorelines, lines of islands, and other strategic barriers—much as Chinese strategists ponder how to cope with Asia’s offshore island chains. Geographic analysis came first for him. “In considering any theater of actual or possible war,” he wrote in Naval Strategy precisely a century ago, “the first and most essential thing is to determine what position, or chain of positions, by their natural and inherent advantages affect control of the greatest part” of that theater (my emphasis).

    And like Chinese maritime strategists today, Mahan drew explicitly on traditions of land combat to fashion a theory of warfare at sea. “The same processes” used to analyze the value of land positions “are suitable to the study of a maritime strategic field.” He was enamored of the writings of Archduke Charles of Austria, who depicted the stretch of the Danube River between Ulm and Regensburg as “the controlling military feature” of Germany despite the passage of two thousand years and dramatic changes in technology and tactics. Posts along the river controlled the movement of armies—just as navies based on seacoasts or islands could control the movement of fleets. Proclaimed Mahan, “geography underlies strategy.”

    Here’s what Mahan had to say about the Gulf and Caribbean. Together these expanses constituted “a kind of inland sea, or Mediterranean” whose boundary lines are traced by the Florida peninsula, Cuba, Haiti, and the Lesser Antilles, or Windward Islands, on the one side’ and by the land masses of North, Central, and South America on the other. He estimated the value of passages that provided access to these bodies of water. “The military importance of such passages or defiles depends not only upon their geographic position” but also upon their width, their length, any underwater topography or hydrographic conditions that complicated transit through them, and the availability of nearby alternatives should they be closed to shipping. The “entire sweep from Haiti to Trinidad” was “traversable at so many points as to be practically a continuous stretch of water,” but a fleet approaching from the Atlantic would have to make a long voyage to pass through this permeable barrier.

    Far better to cross into “America’s Mediterranean,” as Nicholas Spykman later dubbed it, through one of the northern entryways. Jamaica, to the north and west, was ideally situated to guard “a frontier line of over nine hundred miles” against invasion from the broad Atlantic. The island “flanks all lines of communication.” It held the key to the Caribbean, although nearby Cuba—overshadowing Jamaica with its strategic position, natural resources, and defensibility—possessed “the grip that can wrest it away.” Cuba and Santo Domingo formed an 1,100-mile land barrier between the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. It was “broken in this stretch in only one place, by the Windward Passage,” which was just over fifty miles wide. If a strong fleet held the Windward Passage, it could compel an enemy fleet to make a substantial detour, wasting its fuel and supplies and hindering naval detachments from combining for battle.

    Chinese thinking about island chains and other offshore topography, then, is entirely consistent with what the most geographically attuned classical maritime strategist had to say about the topic. What Mahan doesn’t say about lines of strategic positions is as important as what he does say. He didn’t counsel “perimeter defense”, or dispersing forces thinly along a vast frontier to deny an enemy freedom of movement. This was folly. Even the strongest navy had to target finite resources on controlling important passages and moving nimbly to meet adversary fleets. Nor did he see lines on the map as impenetrable barriers. He understood that a thinking, reacting opponent possessed of a mobile, flexible fleet would always have options.

    Nor did Mahan regard defensive perimeters as passive defenses. They were staging points from which to constrain and assault enemy navies. The United States had wrested island bases—including strategically located Guantanamo Bay—from Spain in 1898. A modest-sized U.S. Navy—he espoused a fleet of twenty armored battleships with an entourage of lesser craft—could make itself supreme in this crucial inland sea provided it possessed adequate forward bases, and provided its commanders grasped the strategic dynamics imposed by islands, seaports, and maritime passages. “Herein—that is, in the present possession of a continuous line of posts—lies the permanent advantage of the United States, in the West Indies, as compared to European states, which must always have the long exposed transatlantic stretch to cover’ before entering the Gulf or Caribbean.” (my emphasis).

    …And Liu Wasn’t Inflexible About Them


    If Chinese strategists err by thinking in linear terms about semi-enclosed waters, then, they are in good company. Nor did Liu Huaqing, known in the West as China’s Mahan, think in terms of fixed, passive defenses. In his 2004 memoir, Liu recalled giving a lecture that “stressed the Navy’s operational principle and summarized it as ‘active defense and offshore battles.’” How, and where, should this principle be put into effect? He concedes that a very realistic question was how to unify the understanding of the concept of “offshore.”

    As he tells it, the PLA Navy never equated China’s defense perimeter strictly to island chains. “In the past,” he writes, “the Navy had described the seas within 200 nautical miles of our coast as ‘offshore.’” A “unified understanding of the concept” that complied with political guidance from paramount leader Deng Xiaoping encompassed “the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea, the seas around the Nasha Islands and Taiwan and inside and outside the Okinawa island chain, as well as the northern part of the Pacific” (my emphasis). For “a relatively long time to come, the main areas for the Navy’s operations would be the First Island Chain and its outside seas as well as the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea” (my emphasis).

    Operating zones for the PLA Navy would include “not only the sea areas under China’s jurisdiction as defined by the [UN] Convention on the Law of the Sea, but also the South China Sea islands, which are China’s inherent territories.” Indeed, there’s a striking analogy between U.S. strategy in the Gulf and Caribbean during the age of Mahan and contemporary Chinese strategy in the South China Sea, another Mediterranean sea. “With the continuous growth of our economic strength, the elevation of our science and technology level, and the further boosting of our naval force,” continued the admiral, “our sea-war areas would gradually expand to the northern Pacific and the ‘Second Island Chain.’” Again, the second island chain wasn’t a rigid defense perimeter in Adm. Liu’s vision. “In applying tactics to ‘active defense’ operations, we would act on the guiding principle that we advance if the enemy advances. That is, if the enemy attacked our coastal areas, we would attack the enemy’s rear.” The strategic defensive presented PLA commanders certain operational opportunities.

    Active defense was—well, active. Liu recounts addressing a June 1984 forum. He was gratified that the navy had embraced “a unified guiding ideology for its combat operations. It had made clear the combat principle of ‘active defense, offshore battles’ and the combat forms of ‘positional warfare for firm coastal defense, mobile sea warfare, and sabotage guerrilla sea warfare.’” At a gathering to learn the lessons of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, “I particularly stressed the need to adhere to the strategic principle of active defense…Put another way, our strategy was defensive in general…Of course, our defense wasn’t passive defense, but was active defense. Defense, in itself, should be a combination of defense and attack, I stressed.” Now as during Liu’s tenure, operational and tactical offence within the strategic defensive is a mainstay of Chinese maritime strategy.

    The PLA Navy Is No Passive Force


    And finally, it’s far from clear that geographic thinking shackles Chinese maritime strategy. Mahan paid tribute to the capacity of land-based or short-range weaponry to deny passage through narrow seas. Such waterways “bear an analogy to bridges over a river.” Wide passages “must be held by an active force instead of by permanent works; for they cannot be closed by fortifications.” The navy, that is, must put to sea to fight for control of broad waterways. But if, for example, “the Windward Channel between Cuba and Haiti were two miles wide…it could be made impregnable by forts and torpedoes against all ordinary attack or passage.” Given the rudimentary weapons technology of Mahan’s day, when effective gunnery range was only a few miles, “natural water bridges of such a character” were few and far between. The Bosporus and the Dardanelles, allowing transit between the Mediterranean and Black seas, were a “conspicuous example of such, and in the hands of a strong nation could not be forced.”

    And indeed, scant years later, during World War I, Britain’s Royal Navy tried to force the straits—and suffered an epic defeat at Turkish hands. In this age of land-based anti-ship missiles and tactical aircraft—weapons with range, precision guidance, and hitting power that dwarf the guns of a century ago—far more nautical passages fall within reach of shore-based weaponry. In one sense this helps China. As Mahan observed, narrow seas with difficult hydrographics “correspond precisely to difficult country ashore.” Such districts, he declared, “favor a kind of guerrilla sea warfare.” That’s exactly what access denial—Liu’s offshore active defense—connotes. But in another sense it works against China. Strategic competitors like Japan control passages through which Chinese shipping must pass to reach the Western Pacific and other crucial expanses. They possess anti-ship hardware of their own. Maritime Asia, it seems, is becoming an arena for back-and-forth struggle for strategic advantage. How China, the United States, and other protagonists will fare is anyone’s guess.

    Astute PLA Navy commanders backed by shore-based missiles and combat aircraft could give a superior adversary like the U.S. Navy fits. If Beijing can hold U.S. forces off with its “flotilla” of diesel submarines, fast patrol boats, and anti-ship missiles, it can liberate the surface fleet to operate freely under the protective shield provided by access denial. ASBM coverage will extend hundreds of miles seaward if that “bird” lives up to its billing—perhaps even out to the second island chain. A map in the Pentagon’s annual reports on Chinese military power shows the ASBM “threat envelope” covering most of the Western Pacific, the entire South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, the Bay of Bengal, and parts of the Arabian Sea. That opens up vast maneuvering room for the Chinese fleet, allowing naval commanders to operate with the mobility and flexibility Bud Cole rightly extols, not to mention the confidence that comes with ready fire support from PLA rocketeers based on home soil. A defensive fleet can be a venturesome fleet.

    Yogi Berra joked that “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.” Prof. Cole could be correct. Continental thinking could stunt the PLA Navy’s intellectual growth, preventing it from maturing into an oceangoing peer of the U.S. Navy and allied sea services. But even if so, China’s navy could well manage what America’s navy did a century ago. Strategists will study China’s geographic surroundings, fit a strategy to those surroundings, and design a fleet capable of vying for supremacy there. Will the PLA Navy become a global navy? Who knows? But Beijing’s and Washington’s strategic gazes will remain fixed on the same expanses—the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean—for the foreseeable future. China’s navy promises to pose stubborn strategic problems for the U.S. Navy, even if it confines its endeavors to maritime Asia.


    James Holmes is an associate professor of strategy at the US Naval War College and co-author of Red Star over the Pacific, an Atlantic MonthlyBest Book of 2010. The views voiced here are his alone.
     
  10. HeinzGud

    HeinzGud Senior Member Senior Member

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    to do that US had to to take money from China!
     
  11. cir

    cir Senior Member Senior Member

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    You must have India in mind when writing these words.

    India is THE country that makes an issue out of China building a toilet along the Sino-India border, let alone paving a dirt road with concrete, all to make life easier for people living in the remote border region.

    China, on the other hand, couldn't care the least if India stations a few squadrons of the junk known as Su-30MKIs or raise several mountain divisions just to freeze to death in the Hymalaya winter.

    Talking about who is being paranoid. :rofl:
     
  12. Bhadra

    Bhadra Defence Professionals Defence Professionals Senior Member

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    That is Chinese point if view and that is not the absolute truth. The absolute truth is China makes a massive road linking tow regions and then claims that territory to be theirs. Chinese make a toilet on border to assert their claim rather than provide facilities to people. At the same time Chinese break Indian made toilet there. It is this partial view which prevents reconciliation and mutual adjustment. This attitude has thrown Tibetans into exile. This same attitude will bring a crushing war on China.
     
  13. ice berg

    ice berg Senior Member Senior Member

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    There is no absolutt truth there. None of use is there. What we are hearing may not be the truth. That goes for both sides. Let us end all the talk about Indian toilets or Chinese toilets. Seriously, think about how stupid this is...
     
  14. Bhadra

    Bhadra Defence Professionals Defence Professionals Senior Member

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    Unfortunately, it is very difficult to erase past. Only statesmanship of a very high order can take India and China of its past so that future is free of conflict. The onus of this lies on China and Chinese people.

    India has tried this with Pakistan as India surrendered all the victories to Pakistan and gave it all advantages. I am sure they will realise it one day. So will all our neighbours except the Chinese.
     
  15. Ray

    Ray The Chairman Defence Professionals Moderator

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    China's infrastructure spurt is basically for military purposes.

    China historically has been an imperialist nation and it is continuing what it has been doing historically.
     
  16. Bhadra

    Bhadra Defence Professionals Defence Professionals Senior Member

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    India In China’s New Assertiveness – Analysis


    Written by: SAAG
    February 23, 2012




    By Bhaskar Roy

    The international community took note of China exercising veto over the UN Security Council resolution on Syria recently, which called on President Bashar Al-Assad to step down. The veto came in the face of incessant killing of protestors by the Syrian security forces, something which not only disturbed western sensibilities but also outraged the Arab world. This raised the question whether China feels it has arrived on its own, playing by its own rules and challenging existing global rules. Some Chinese commentaries on the subject suggest this indeed is the case.

    These commentaries allege that China has decided to stand up to the west ganging up for regime change in smaller countries, which may gather enough momentum to sabotage China’s own socialist system.
    The Chinese authorities are abundantly clear that the US is cobbling together a chain of countries which include Japan, India, Australia and now the Philippines to encircle and contain China. They perceive that the US has been encouraging India to provoke issues with China. This means that India, otherwise, would not be strong enough or bold enough to challenge China. Examples include India’s position on the Brahmaputra water issue, the border issue, forays into South East Asia which China considers its backyard, and other such developments, which they see as challenging China.

    There is a political tussle within China on projecting its power and profile. Many actors feel that the time has come to gradually discard late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s 1991-92 strategy of maintaining a low profile while building strength. Concurrently, there is the old Chinese military strategy of striking at the weakest link in an adversarial chain while buying peace and stable relations with the strongest of them.

    The above strategy is clearly reflected in China confronting weak neighbours on the one hand, and building relations with the US on the other. During his recent visit to the US, Vice President Xi Jinping was rather circumspect in countering sharp talks from President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden. Xi is slated to take over the Party leadership in October this year and as President in March next year. Obama is likely to win the US presidential elections at the end of the year. Xi would not like to start his leadership of China for ten years on the wrong footing with the US.

    Another development needs consideration. While the Communist Party remains in full control of internal and foreign policies, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has made serious inroads into foreign policy. The PLA has at least four important foreign policy think tanks which the party and the government cannot ignore. Retrieval of territories claimed by China is a major responsibility of the PLA.

    Currently, India sits in the centre of this Chinese strategic planning. Beijing has cautioned and warned India on several issues and views India’s “Look East” policy as trying to encroach on China’s sphere of influence and create, as they say, ‘trouble’ for China. It was therefore not surprising, that pressure on India would be intensified by Beijing.

    An article titled “China, India should strengthen mutual trust”, carried by the Liberation Daily (Jeifang Ribao) of February 14, republished the same day in the People’s Daily Online (English) appears to corroborate what is discussed above.

    The importance of the article lies in the media that carried it. Liberation Daily is published under the Shanghai Party Committee. The People’s Daily is the Party’s mouthpiece which gives out the views of the Party. The English version is meant for quick dissemination abroad. Even otherwise, the Liberation daily is known to signal important developments that are to come.

    The article made the following points. First, it was made very clear that although the 15 meetings at Special Representative (SR) level led to some positive results, “some contradictions and issues that still exist between China and India are still severely disturbing the normal development of the China-India relations”.

    The first point listed was the China-India border issue, and India was made the main culprit. It blamed some Indians who still insist that border dispute should be based on the Mc Mahon Line left by British colonialists; the dispute only concerns the 90 thousand sq kms in the eastern sector, and not the 30 thousand sq kms in the western sector, claiming that this territory historically belonged to China.

    Further, India’s multi-party system was blamed for their different views on the boundary issue, emphasising the superiority of the Chinese system. It was also conveyed that India cannot expect any territorial concessions from China, something China did while resolving border disputes with other countries. India was also charged with not accepting the China proposed principle of “mutual understanding and mutual accommodation” on resolving the border issue.

    The commentary, which appears to be an official statement but keeps the window of deniability open, appears to be turning the parameters of the talks on its head. The western sector was always on the discussion table. China has no hard historical evidence to suggest the 30 thousand sq kms, known as Aksai Chin belonged to China. In the eastern sector (90 thousand sq kms) there is a Chinese claim no doubt, but simply claiming territory does not make it theirs.

    China is actually trying to get out of the 2005 agreement on the parameters of negotiation where both sides accepted that no settled population will be exchanged. Beijing is trying to come out of this because their claim on Tawang gets nullified.

    Since India agreed, in deference to Chinese sensibilities, not to mention “Mc Mahon Line’ by name, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was agreed to be approximately along this line. Hence, why raise these issues unless there is some other plan boiling in Beijing? Both sides have a very good idea where the LAC lies.

    The commentary also brings in trade issues. It said that the Nathu La land port (Sikkim-Tibet) had great opportunities but did not work out because “someone” in India thought it will threaten India’s security. That “someone” may be Indian security agencies. But the fact is that this port did not yield the promise it had held out.

    India was also accused of trade protectionism including on export of iron ore to China and anti-dumping measures.

    Interestingly, the People’s Daily added the Tibet issue, insinuating India’s stated position on it differed from actions on the ground. It was alleged that

    New Delhi’s ambiguous position towards the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans encourage them to provoke Tibetan disturbances inside China. The rest of the article was banal including trying to deny Sino-Pak cooperation to curb India, an issue on which evidence abounds in tons!

    A litany of charges against India have been laid by China’s official media. It may be too early to say if it is a threat to be acted upon soon, but the line is certainly hard and the perception is that India may have to be taught a lesson again.

    At the same time, a military punitive action is not expected. If China does so, it would prove to be the world’s largest liar, hiding evil intentions behind masks of “harmony” and “peace”. But these
    are non-combative ways. This can be expected. China’s assertiveness is clearly reflected in their policy towards India.

    http://www.eurasiareview.com/230220...ign=Feed:+eurasiareview/VsnE+(Eurasia+Review)
     
  17. Virendra

    Virendra Moderator Moderator

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    Something I found while browsing about Henderson Brooks report over Indo-China war 1962.

    China’s India Aggression - German Historians Discover Logic Behind Communist Military Strategy
    by: Subroto Roy
    China’s India Aggression « Independent Indian: Work & Life of Dr Subroto Roy


    Excerpts :

    Regards,
    Virendra
     
  18. blank_quest

    blank_quest Senior Member Senior Member

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    Last edited: Aug 28, 2012
    LurkerBaba likes this.
  19. huaxia rox

    huaxia rox Senior Member Senior Member

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    a couple of errors in the eassy.....

    1 only indians think tibet should serve as a buffer between india and china.....chinese never think so i guess tibetans dont even know indians think tibet that way......

    2 the 1st time tibet was under the control of china was in qing dynasty.........1950s can be seen as the 2nd time....

    3 there had been wars between china and india before 1962 in history....for example the war between Kushan Empire and han dynasty in which some 70,000 indian troops were completely defeated by general ban chao and geng gong......
     
  20. GromHellscream

    GromHellscream Regular Member

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    Wang Xuance in Tang Dynasty, iirc.
     

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