THE WAITING GAME
Gwynne Dyer
The most important thing in Taiwanese politics is always left unsaid. When I interviewed Ma Ying-jeou in 2008, just before he won the presidency for the first time, he was happy to talk about the details of his plans for better relations with the People's Republic of China: direct flights, more trade, and the like. But ask him about the long-term future, and all you got was platitudes. Ma has just been re-elected for a second term as president. "In the next four years, ties with China will be more harmonious and there will be more mutual trust and the chance of conflict is slimmer." But it still does not address the question of where all this harmony is taking Taiwan.
Ma's victory this time was smaller than the one in 2008: then he had a lead of 17 percentage points; now he's down to six. But that's probably due mostly to the country's slow economic growth and the widening income gap between rich and poor. There is no evidence to suggest that he lost votes because he was getting too close to China. So here's the question: if Ma, like almost everybody else in Taiwan, has no desire to live under communist rule, then why is there support for closer ties with a giant neighbour that refuses to recognize the legitimacy of Taiwan's government? Beijing even threatens to attack Taiwan if it ever declares independence from China. What can the Taiwanese be thinking?
This is where it all goes silent, except for the platitudes. But with a little thought you can figure out the logic behind the position of Ma and his supporters. They know that Beijing could do terrible damage to Taiwan if it attacked, but they also know that it won't actually do that unless Taiwan formally declares independence. Beijing is willing to live with the present ambiguous relationship for a long time to come, if necessary.
Money talks
Meanwhile, Taiwan has to make a living, and it has been losing market share to China's cheaper exports for two decades now. The favoured solution is to invest in mainland industries and subsidize Taiwan's much higher living standards with the profits. Mainland Chinese investment in Taiwan's hi-tech sector would not hurt, either. Time for better relations with the mainland, then — but what about the future?
The thinking goes like this. We can cozy up to China now because it serves the interests of a great many people on both sides, and it doesn't really endanger our de facto independence. Taiwan is not disarming, and China still can't move an army across the 180-km Strait of Taiwan; its navy isn't strong enough. As for the long run, it will take care of itself, because the communist regime in Beijing will not last forever.
Ideology is dead in the People's Republic. The regime insists that it gives the people "socialism with Chinese characteristics," but in fact it gives them "unbridled capitalism with Chinese characteristics" — including a plague of corruption that mainly benefits communist party members.
China is a capitalist country, and it has not been granted some special exemption from the business cycle. Every once in a while, in capitalist economies, a major recession comes along. This is hard enough to manage in a democracy. It is potentially lethal for a dictatorial regime whose only remaining credibility is its reputation as an economic miracle-maker. So Taiwan's best strategy is just to wait. Make deals on trade and investment, keep talking to Beijing to reduce the risk that some hothead will launch missiles at Taiwan, but don't get into talks about reunification with a communist-ruled China.
The wheel will turn, and eventually there will be a different, democratic China that Taiwan can safely rejoin. Meanwhile keep the mainland regime sweet, and make some money.
The Waiting Game
