Oops, I meant Commissioned Officers by CO. Do you think 10:1 ratio of JCO:Officer is good? It is said that JCOs are closer to the ranks as he rose from them, which is much more effective than Officers engaging in Human Resource Management.
There are many issues regarding the JOCs.
One of the biggest problems that Officers do not let the JCOs have a free hand except for very basic administrative work. Again, it is the problem of micromanagement and the question of the blame finally lying on the officer;s shoulder.
I have found that if you make the JOC responsible for a task and haul him over the coals if he messes it up and you get the bolloking from the CO (Commanding Officer), it will happen once and maybe twice, but then he (the JCO) knows that he is responsible for what task he is assigned. Things get into shape and you have an easier command.
Interestingly, three of my JCOs who were sent to me as useless chaps, there was hectic lobbying for them from all concerned to make them Subedar Major (the highest rank for the trooper). And they made it! One of them (and Mahars are very docile and not cocky chaps) whose actual name was Uttam Borde, but I used to call him Billy Borde started using that name as if it were given by his parents. He even introduced himself to the Commander as 'Billy Borde and the Commander got confused since his name tag reas "Uttam Borde". The CO then when into a Ram Katha as to how and why he was nicknamed by me as 'Billy' and how Billy liked to be called so.
In fa, Billy started thinking he was no less than any officer. Once during an exercise, when we were acting as the 'enemy', during the Debriefing the attacking officer on Billy's Platoon was narrating how his attack went and how an Officer got up in his dressing down and told him to 'bugger off'. We all hide our smirk for we all knew if could be none other than Billy Borde. I hauled him over coals that on an exercise, even if you were the CO, you could not wear a dressing gown or tell an officer to 'bugger off'. He loved using English terms and picked up all the wrong phrases I used to use so that the troops did not understand and could not thus take umbrage.
So, give them responsibility and elevate their ego and they are as good as any other commander.
As far as Young Oficers are concerned, in any good unit, he has to go through the Ummedwar, Naik to Havildar, Have to JCO cadres before he actually takes command of his platoon. He is normally given his due as an officer, but without hurting sensitivities, is actually made an 'understudy' of the JCO Platoon Commander, who gives him all due respect and keep guiding and teaching him. Sub Shankar Ubale was the JCO who taught me about tactics,.administration and man management. I remain grateful to him till today.
The Company Commanders keep a sharp eye and teaches the youngster the documentation etc. We had to fill DO IIs, paybook IAB 64 with our own hands and if there was a lapse and the OR did not get their due in pay and allowances because of wrong bookkeeping the Company Commander did not spare you.
The initial years are the formative years and if well learnt, then it holds you in good stead.
We even had to stay and live like troopers till we passed our Ummedwar. Actually, it was a way to teach you the problems and living and training conditions that a jawan endures, so that when you actually commanded them, you did not command them as if you were destined by God to be a Ruler and all your serfs! It also built great bonds between the troops and you!
But then each unit has its own ethos.
:shocked: No Medic? Isn't there supposed to be 1 combat trained medic for each platoon? Else who will apply tourniquets? Who will stem blood loss by applying Hemostatic Dressing? Who will set dislocations on the field? Who will give morphine shots to those in trauma/shock?
Why do you think that there are so many casualties in the war?
We have First Field Dressing and Shell Dressing that we carry and we are evacuated by our own chaps. after the attack. That is why the 5.56 was invented so that troops who should be defending have to peel off to evacuate those wounded and thus reducing the bayonet strength at the captured objective end.
Then there are the 'fighting porters' which the unit musters up within its administrative staff like clerks and tradesmen and even drivers, who also help lugging up the F echelon stores and also evacuate casualties to the Regimental Aid Post.
Cutting back of Pioneers are still understandable in today's day and age, but AT Coys? Who takes such decisions which are so contrary to common sense?
Not at all.
Who provides the manpower to construct the ALGs?
Who will augment the engineer manpower?
Who will help lift loads needed urgently. If they are not there, then those who are upfront and holding the fort so to say will have to shed manpower from their posts/ positions and thereby reducing the fighting strength i.e. the combat ratio thought essential at that position given the threat analysis.
In an active combat with an active AD environment, it is not feasible for helicopters to operate.
And then, in the mountains and high altitude, helicopters can land at all places to deliver warlike stores!
Mules and AT Coys are most essential. Even the US Army has realised it in Afghanistan, inspite of all technology and air platforms at their command.
Fighting a high-tech war with a low-tech mule
US Marines and soldiers are training to fight in Afghanistan, where mules and donkeys can haul supplies and weapons to places where Humvees and helicopters can't easily go.
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2009/0504/p22s01-usmi.html
The Virtues of Stubbornness: Mules at War
In 1957, the U.S. Army sold off its last 136 mules as an anachronism, unsuitable for the nuclear age. But in the 1980s, when Afghan Mujahedeen took on the occupying Soviet Army, there was an urgent need for pack animals. When Egypt got a CIA contract to provide 2,500 mules at $1,300 each, Pakistan raised objections about equine disease risks, and the Egyptians provided each animal with an ID card and a vaccination certificate! The Pakistanis became so cranky they wouldn't let CIA transports leave mule manure in-country, and made cargo planes carry it back to Europe. A decade later, mules were a key component in the U.S.-led effort in Afghanistan, where they were used by the famous Special Forces "Horse Soldiers," in Fall 2001. Mules continue to be a critical logistics/transport resource today.
http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/the-virtues-of-stubbornness-mules-at-war/
It does seem that Manpower, specially among the ranks, is perceived by GoI/MoD to be the most overabundant and expendable resource.
Can't blame the Govt alone.
They are clever tykes and ticks.
The give out lollipops to those in uniform who Head these studies which Rob Peter to Pay Paul.
It happens in every organisation of the Govt of India. Cost Saving and you get a lollipop!
, a new ethos emerged that was totally antithetical to the ethos pre 1962. This new ethos degraded the value system and all that aura, sheen and genuine self pride that they have to be an example to society eroded and the military, true to Nehruvian philosophy, became egalitarian and plebeian.
