Pakistan decries help for India nuclear arms plans

[LETHALFORCE]

http://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFLDE70O24V20110125?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0

* Slams US plan for India to join export control regimes * Pakistan envoy warns that would destabilise South Asia

By Stephanie Nebehay

GENEVA, Jan 25 (Reuters) - Pakistan warned major powers on Tuesday against granting rival India membership of four key multilateral export control regimes that allow trade in nuclear and other materials, as proposed by the United States.

The plan, announced during U.S. President Barack Obama's visit to India last November, would further destabilise the volatile nuclear-armed South Asian region, said Zamir Akram, Pakistan's ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva.

This reinforced Pakistan's opposition, announced a year ago, to global negotiations to ban future production of nuclear bomb-making material, he said.

"These developments will amount to a paradigm shift in strategic terms," Akram said in a speech to the opening session of the U.N.-sponsored Conference on Disarmament.

"The message that such steps transmit is that the major powers can change the rules of the game if it is in their interest to do so," he added.

Pakistan is the only one of 65 member states holding up consensus to launch the fissile talks, arguing that existing stocks of plutonium and enriched uranium should be included to counter its neighbour's advantage.

The United States clinched a civilian nuclear deal with India in 2008, ending its nuclear isolation and granting it access to nuclear fuel and technology while allowing it to continue its nuclear weapons programme.

The Obama administration has announced backing for Indian membership of four regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australian Group, which aims to reduce the spread of chemical and biological weapons, and the Wassenaar Arrangement, a multinational effort to control the transfer of conventional arms and dual-use technology.

"Apart from undermining the validity and sanctity of the international non-proliferation regime, these measures shall further destabilise security in South Asia," Akram said.

The 46-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group tries to ensure that nuclear exports are not diverted for military purposes.

But Pakistan's envoy said that membership would enable India to improve its nuclear weapons and delivery capability.

"As a consequence, Pakistan will be forced to ensure the credibility of its (nuclear) deterrence," Akram added.

The United States said on Monday it was easing curbs on exports of high-tech goods to India in recognition of the two countries' stronger economic and security ties.

Pakistan, tainted by revelations that disgraced top scientist A.Q. Khan had run a nuclear smuggling ring that helped Iran, North Korea and Libya, has turned to ally China for help.

But Akram made no reference to China's offer to build two new nuclear powered reactors for Pakistan at its Chashma complex -- which have raised global concern about nuclear proliferation.

To import nuclear goods, all nations except the five officially recognised atomic weapons states must usually place nuclear sites under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog, NSG rules say.

When the United States sealed its nuclear supply accord with India in 2008, it won a waiver from such NSG rules.

India and Pakistan -- which have fought three wars -- have both refused to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that bars nuclear trade with states that have developed weapons. Both have built modest nuclear arsenals with India believed to hold about 100 warheads and Pakistan 70 to 80, according to the Washington-based Arms Control Association (Editing by Fredrik Dahl in Vienna and Jonathan Lynn;

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.dnaindia.com/world/repor...arns-against-nuclear-support-to-india_1499199

Pakistan blocks Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, warns against nuclear support to India

Protesting against the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver to India, Pakistan today blocked negotiations on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), describing the move as "discriminatory" that will help New Delhi stockpile bomb-making nuclear materials.

Speaking at the the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Pakistan's ambassador Zamir Akram said the "discriminatory waiver" provided by the NSG will help India to stockpile bomb-making nuclear (fissile) materials.

The NSG waiver, Akram said, will further accentuate the asymmetry in fissile materials stockpiles in the region, to the detriment of Pakistan's security interests.

For the last two years, Pakistan nearly blocked any progress in the FMCT negotiations.

It maintained that selective and discriminatory action of certain states in violation of their own national and international commitments, in pursuit of profit has tilted the nuclear balance in favour of India.

Without naming the United States, Pakistan's envoy said, "One of the major powers has gone a step further by announcing its intention in November 2010 to support our neighbour's full membership in the four multilateral control regimes - the NSG, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement."

"Clearly this irresponsible undertaking raises several issues," said Akram, pointing how major nuclear powers have undermined the nuclear-Non Proliferation Agreement to accommodate India.

Akram had told reporters last week that Islamabad will not accept the nuclear Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in its current form as it would enable India to increase its nuclear warheads at a rate of 40 per year following the waiver granted to New Delhi by the United States and other western countries.

Over the last 10 years, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is nearly paralysed as it is unable to negotiate any major nuclear arms treaty.

Pakistan has blocked negotiations on arriving at a verifiable FMCT on the ground that it would not address the issue of current bomb- making nuclear stocks possessed by India and other countries.

"Our opposition to the FMCT is due to the asymmetry in the current proposal," ambassador Akram told reporters, suggesting that it would enable India to divert its current stock of nuclear fissile material towards military use.

"This asymmetry is further worsened following the civilian nuclear agreement signed by India, the United States, and IAEA, as it would enable India to increase the number of warheads to 40 per year in which civilian nuclear fuel could be used for military purposes as India did in the past from the Tarapore reactor," he told reporters.

US President Barak Obama's recent visit to India has added a new dimension to FMCT as India will now be allowed to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) and other international arrangements, Akram said.

"It is ironic that the Nuclear Suppliers Group was created after India's first nuclear test in 1974," said ambassador Akram, suggesting that India would now be facilitated to become a member in these special arrangements without having to join the NPT (non-nuclear proliferation treaty).

When asked whether Pakistan is "tainted" by its AQ Khan who was allegedly responsible for illegal transfer of nuclear material to Libya and Iran and whether it would not be admitted to these arrangements despite being close to Washington, ambassador Akram said "we are tainted because we are seen close to China."

He said Pakistan is continuing to build two small reactors with the technical assistance from China and will also pursue "credible deterrence" policy that will not "match India missile to missile or war head to war head."

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110124_9167.php

Fissile Material Cutoff Plan Seen Harming Pakistan

A fissile material cutoff treaty as currently proposed would harm Pakistan's strategic security by allowing rival India to retain a larger stockpile of nuclear-weapon material, former Pakistani Foreign Minister Inamul Haq said on Saturday (see GSN, Sept. 27, 2010).

In addition to prohibiting further production of weapon-usable material, the plan should require bomb fuel reductions that would be made first by holders of the largest stockpiles, the Business Recorder quoted him as saying. The material could be converted into fuel suitable only for civilian use, he said.

The United States might try using financial means to coerce Pakistan to abandon nuclear-weapon material production, he added.

"The fragile economy might be a factor in influencing political leadership, policy and decision-makers in Pakistan to succumb to the pressure from Washington to endorse FMCT, which will [be] a discriminatory move," said the former official, who acted as Pakistan's top diplomat in late 2007 and early 2008. "In fact, one objective of the current U.S. nonproliferation policy is to cap and eventually reverse the nuclear weapons program of Pakistan."

"The FMCT, although considered to be a nondiscriminatory disarmament measure, global in its reach and universal in its application, is so only in intent. In real terms, it does not change the status quo nor does it in any way reduce the gap between the haves and the have-nots," he added.

The international Conference on Disarmament in 2009 broke a deadlock that had lasted for more than 10 years, agreeing to a work plan that would address four issues: nuclear disarmament, a fissile material cutoff pact, the prohibition of space-based weapons, and an agreement by nuclear-armed states not to use their strategic weapons against nations that do not possess such armaments. Pakistan initially endorsed the plan, but later withdrew its consent and demanded further consideration of the program. Decisions at the conference are made by consensus (see GSN, June 7, 2010).

Pakistan could consider endorsement of a fissile material pact if the international community judged its nuclear program by the same standard it has applied to India, defense analyst Shireen Mazari said. The multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008 lifted decades-old restrictions placed on civilian nuclear trade with India because the South Asian nation, which is not a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty member and does not permit international audits of its complete atomic complex (see GSN, Sept. 8, 2008).

"We will not be compromising on our deterrence in future," Mazari said, adding Washington might pressure Islamabad within the U.N. General Assembly on its nuclear stance (Aqeel/Ahmad, Business Recorder, Jan. 23).

 

[Yusuf]

too bad for pakistan.They can try considering terrorism, concentrate on its economy than kashmir.join mainstream world order and then hope to be rehabbed.

 

[Iamanidiot]

Yusuf you are saying India is willing to go for FMCT so that it can stick a probe against Pakistan's proliferation ?

 

[Yusuf]

Yusuf you are saying India is willing to go for FMCT so that it can stick a probe against Pakistan's proliferation ?

We have good stockpiles of fissile material. I dont think india should have a problem with FMCT.But pak will have as it is in fast track mode to make as many bombs as possible till they go back to eating grass.

 

[pmaitra]

India can do to Pakistan what USA did to USSR. Keep up the tempo of massive military expenditure, and Pakistan, will have no other option but to try to keep pace. This will keep eroding their economy that is already in shatters. If India can force Pakistan to maintain its defense expenditure above 10% of Pakistan's GDP for several years in a row, Pakistan, by itself, will implode.

See, we don't have to fire a single shot yet can get Pakistan disintegrated.

 

[arya]

India can do to Pakistan what USA did to USSR. Keep up the tempo of massive military expenditure, and Pakistan, will have no other option but to try to keep pace. This will keep eroding their economy that is already in shatters. If India can force Pakistan to maintain its defense expenditure above 10% of Pakistan's GDP for several years in a row, Pakistan, by itself, will implode.

See, we don't have to fire a single shot yet can get Pakistan disintegrated.

you are half right what about china india equation

your formula fails in that condition

 

[Yusuf]

India can do to Pakistan what USA did to USSR. Keep up the tempo of massive military expenditure, and Pakistan, will have no other option but to try to keep pace. This will keep eroding their economy that is already in shatters. If India can force Pakistan to maintain its defense expenditure above 10% of Pakistan's GDP for several years in a row, Pakistan, by itself, will implode.

See, we don't have to fire a single shot yet can get Pakistan disintegrated.

US,USSR thing does not apply here. Pakistan will be sustained by China. Pak also manages to find itself in a middle of being and "indispensable" ally in wars which helps it get money and as well as free weapons. We would be better off with them signing FMCT and then monitored and enforced properly. India has enough fissile material. Pakistan does not.

 

[nrj]

Whats wrong in the same motive over again?
"Stop supporting India in Nuke groups or we'll screw you in af-pak" ?

Question is how long unkil plans to keep this dirty poontang?

 

[Tshering22]

When asked whether Pakistan is "tainted" by its AQ Khan who was allegedly responsible for illegal transfer of nuclear material to Libya and Iran and whether it would not be admitted to these arrangements despite being close to Washington, ambassador Akram said "we are tainted because we are seen close to China."

What a irresponsible and self-victimizing comment! The report asked him about the allegations on AQ Khan and the only lame excuse the ambassador gives is closeness to China!? Where is the connection? Is this not pure immaturity of being a cry-baby? I hope world's mature leaders notice this in a sane manner.

India can do to Pakistan what USA did to USSR. Keep up the tempo of massive military expenditure, and Pakistan, will have no other option but to try to keep pace. This will keep eroding their economy that is already in shatters. If India can force Pakistan to maintain its defense expenditure above 10% of Pakistan's GDP for several years in a row, Pakistan, by itself, will implode.

As Yusuf said, we can't apply that theory. Pakistan's 90% weapons are either aid from US and NATO countries or on soft loan from China. The much harped F-16 "payment" these Pakistanis made that got sanctioned in the 90s, was also by the economic assistance package and the re-directing of 80s Afghan war money into Pakistani reserves. Only 10% of small arms and other similar stuff is "purchased" or made. Till CCP rules China and keeps aggressive stand against us, Pakistan will continue to be sustained even if it has to live in China's master and owner shadow but will get free weapons and owing to their fundamentalist paranoia, Pakistan will continue to keep their economy a hostage to China while getting and using their weapons as a puppet state. They did this in 70s with USA and now they are doing it with China. Their hatred of everything us will make them go to any suicidal extent to counter us. A country where Zaid Hamid isconsidered hero, one should expect this.

Whats wrong in the same motive over again?
"Stop supporting India in Nuke groups or we'll screw you in af-pak" ?

That's the only chip they got to bargain and that too partially. NRJ just for you; check this out:

RUNNING OUT OF BARGAINING CHIPS




Its a fine series of discussion being held by Sherry Rehman and some Riaz dude about how these people are living in a deluded world and how they must correct themselves. It has absolutely nothing negative about us but rather a smart and open analysis. The lady is pretty smart in general when talking and now she is the target of mullahs after this series and that Taseer dude's assassination.

 

[Yusuf]

The following is an old report but still valid as far as stokpile is concerned. note that in the year 2000, india had enough fissile material that it can take out from its civil plants to make over 1000 bombs. this is not any random assessment but by David Albright considered to be a premier expert in this field. take a look at the two tables.india has gone way far in its fissile material production. so has pakistan but still nowhere near india which went after ramping up nuke program after the 98 tests.

Estimating the size of India and Pakistan's inventory of separated weapon-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) has become more difficult following their nuclear tests in May 1998. Both countries treat these numbers as highly classified, partly because such estimates provide a direct indication of the number of nuclear weapons they may possess. The purpose of this annual report is to summarize estimates of their stocks of fissile material. This report is an update of a report covering the period up to the end of 1998.1

In the case of Pakistan, what can be surmised is that it has resumed full-scale production of HEU, following a declared moratorium on such production since 1991. Abdul Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's uranium enrichment program, announced soon after the Pakistani tests that his country had never stopped making HEU. Although his comment has been greeted skeptically, it indicates that Pakistan may have resumed making weapon-grade uranium well before its tests in May 1998.

Exactly how long before the tests Pakistan resumed making weapon-grade uranium is not too important in these calculations. During its moratorium, Pakistan produced low enriched uranium (LEU), which can be up-graded to weapon-grade uranium relatively rapidly. Given the length of the moratorium, this stock of LEU was relatively large and would have enabled a rapid increase in Pakistan's stock of weapon-grade uranium.

In addition, in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the Khushab reactor had started operating.2 This reactor, estimated to produce about 50 megawatts of power, could make enough plutonium for a few nuclear weapons per year.

Although no reports have emerged publicly about the performance of the Khushab reactor, CBS News reported on March 16, 2000 that U.S. intelligence had found evidence that Pakistan is reprocessing irradiated, or "spent," fuel from the Khushab reactor and recovering separated plutonium.3

The CBS report says that the United States had detected significant krypton 85 emissions from a small reprocessing plant at Rawalpindi, located near Islamabad.4 The "New Labs" reprocessing plant, next to the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech), has been finished for over a decade. Nuclear Fuel reported that New Labs has been upgraded and expanded during the 1990s to handle all the irradiated fuel from the Khushab reactor.5

With regard to India, information suggests that it is trying to increase the size of its stock of weapon-grade plutonium and perhaps HEU. India may be considering using its civil power reactors to increase its stock of weapon-grade plutonium. In addition, the debate about whether one of the Indian tests used reactor-grade plutonium is unresolved, leaving unanswered whether India considers its civil unsafeguarded power reactors and their large associated plutonium stock, at least potentially, to be part of its nuclear weapons program.

Faced with a swirling mixture of solid and ambiguous information, a more sophisticated analytical approach has been used to estimate India's stock of weapon-grade plutonium and Pakistan's stock of weapon-grade uranium and weapon-grade plutonium. This new approach specifically aims to capture the varying and conflicting information about key parameters affecting estimates of the size of the inventories. Rather than decide on a best estimate of a specific parameter, such as lifetime reactor operating capacity, a distribution of possible values is derived. In this way, various choices can be assigned a probability of being true.

U.S. officials, for example, have recommended strongly that India's Cirus and Dhruva plutonium production reactors have a lifetime capacity factor of about 40 percent. Indian officials have stated that the average capacity factor is significantly greater, as large as 60 percent. In this estimate, the most likely choice is selected as 40 percent with values up to 60 percent having a diminished probability of occurring. On the other end, a lifetime capacity factor less than 30 percent is viewed as highly unlikely. In the case of Pakistan's total enrichment capacity at the Kahuta and the newer Gadwal facilities, a wide range of possible values is given equal probability of occurring.

Using Crystal BallTM software, distributions representing key parameters in the calculations are sampled using a "Monte Carlo" approach to derive a distribution of results. This method varies from previous approaches used by the author, where central or best estimates are derived, and an uncertainty is attached by making a judgement about the overall data and information.6 Although judgements are still necessary in any uncertainty analysis, they can be applied more credibly in this more sophisticated method.

India's inventory is derived by estimating total production of weapon-grade plutonium in the Cirus, Dhruva, and power reactors and by subtracting drawdowns from nuclear testing, processing losses, and civil uses of the weapon-grade plutonium. The median value, which is the value midway between the smallest and largest value, is about 310 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium at the end of 1999.7 The range in the values can be understood by considering the set of all values, which in this case vary between 180 kilograms and 480 kilograms. Because values in the tails of the range carry a very low probability of being true, often only the values that fall between the 10th and 90th percentile are considered, which in this case are 250 kilograms and 375 kilograms, respectively. To be more certain that the actual value lies in the range, the 5th and 95th percentiles can be selected, which are 240 kilograms and 395 kilograms, respectively. One way to interpret the results is that, in the latter case, there is 90 percent certainty that the true value lies between 240 and 395 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium, where the median value is about 310 kilograms (see table 1).




The amount of plutonium needed for a nuclear weapon is represented by a triangular distribution that varies from 3 to 7 kilograms with the most likely value at 4.5 kilograms. The number of nuclear weapons India may have made from its stock of weapon-grade plutonium is listed in table 1, where the median is 65 weapons and the 5th and 95th percentiles are 45 and 95 weapons, respectively. However, recent media accounts have cast doubt on estimates that assume India has used all its available weapon-grade plutonium in nuclear weapons. NBC reported, based on an unclassified U.S. Defense Department document dated November 23, 1999, that India probably has only a handful of nuclear bombs-interpreted by NBC as about five weapons-and India is conducting research into missile warhead design.8 Other published estimates, some dating to the mid-1990s, are that India has about 30 nuclear weapons. Regardless of the actual number, most analysts believe that India is rapidly expanding the number of its nuclear weapons.

India operates a small enrichment plant that can, in theory, make HEU, although the amount produced so far is unknown. In any case, this amount is believed to be relatively small and is ignored here.

Pakistan's inventory of weapon-grade uranium is derived by estimating several factors, including total enrichment capacity, the feedstock into the enrichment plant, and the amount of LEU produced in Pakistan during the 1990s. Drawdowns, mainly resulting from the 1998 nuclear tests, are then subtracted.

An important factor in this calculation is that, in 1998 and 1999, LEU, widely reported to have been produced during the HEU moratorium from 1991 to 1998, was up-graded in the enrichment plants to weapon-grade uranium. This significantly increases Pakistan's inventory of weapon-grade uranium. However, this rate of growth in the inventory cannot be sustained, because Pakistan would have likely run out of LEU in 1999. Table 1 (above) shows the results for weapon- grade uranium. The median value is 690 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium, and the 5th and 95th percentiles are 585 and 800 kilograms, respectively.

As mentioned above, Pakistan has started a reactor that can make weapon-grade plutonium. The amount of weapon-grade plutonium that has been produced and separated through the end of 1999 cannot be estimated precisely, although it is likely enough for a single nuclear explosive. Assuming that the reactor did not operate well during this period and that losses during separation were relatively large, the median estimate is 5.5 kilograms, and the 5th and 95th percentiles are 1.7 and 13 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium, respectively.

As above, the amount of material needed for a nuclear weapon is represented by triangular distributions. In the case of weapon-grade plutonium, the same distribution is used as for India. The distribution for the amount of weapon-grade uranium per weapon varies from 12 to 25 kilograms with the most likely value at 18 kilograms. The number of nuclear weapons Pakistan may have made from its stock of weapon-grade uranium and plutonium is listed in table 1, where the median value is 39 weapons and the 5th and 95th percentiles are 30 and 52 weapons, respectively. Unlike the case of India, recent media reports have stated that Pakistan is believed to have turned most of its nuclear explosive material into nuclear weapons.9




Estimates can also be made of the amount of reactor-grade plutonium in India and Pakistan. These estimates, which are taken from ISIS's Plutonium Watch, are in table 2.Their uncertainty is judged to be about 20 percent. Although almost all of this civil plutonium is in spent fuel, and thus not suitable for use in nuclear weapons, a nuclear weapons equivalent is calculated to facilitate comparisons. Each weapon-equivalent is taken at 8 kilograms of plutonium.
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/stocks1000.html

So i dont think its going to be necessarily bad for india to sign FMCT, but it sure is going to be a problem for pak to do so. particularly because its bomb making is based on uranium and not plutonium. Pakistan is now seeking to develop plutonium based weapons,but then that raises another question,how did pakistan manage to perfect plutonium design without testing? did proliferation of this design take place again while pak was made the "indispensible ally" in the WoT?

 

[LETHALFORCE]

why does USA keep falling for this blackmail?? India has already chose the nuclear reactors that fall on the military side so signing FMCT will not make a difference in how much fissile material is produced. The unmonitored military reactors are hands off.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

We will strengthen n-arsenal, says Pak, slams US for India nuclear deal

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/W...s-Pak--slams-US-for-India-nuclear-deal/742561

Strongly protesting the US decision to facilitate India's entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Pakistan has threatened to take "requisite steps" to strengthen its credible deterrence.

This decision, Pakistan told the Conference of Disarmament (CD) on Tuesday, was taken last month by its apex body on strategic affairs, the National Command Authority (NCA).

In a clear indication of its intent, Pakistan's Permanent Representative at the CD in Geneva Zamir Akram told the Conference on its opening day that the "accumulative impact" of this decision would be to "destabilize the security environment in South Asia" which would "retard progress" on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament measures.

"Membership of the NSG will enable our neighbour to further expand upon its nuclear cooperation agreements and enhance its nuclear weapons and delivery capability. As a consequence, Pakistan will be forced to take measures to ensure the credibility of its deterrence."

The Pakistan delegation also circulated the decision of its NCA on December 14, 2010, which had met a month after US President Barack Obama's visit to India to review the implications of these developments on Pakistan's national security. The NCA text stated:

"The NCA expressed concern over policies and trends of selectivity, exceptionalism and discrimination relating to strategic control regimes... Revisionism based on strategic, political or commercial considerations accentuates asymmetries and would perpetuate instability, especially in South Asia. The NCA categorically reiterated that Pakistan will never accept discriminatory treatment and that it rejects any effort to undermine its strategic deterrence. Pakistan will not be a party to any approach that is prejudicial to its legitimate national security interests."

Spelling this out more clearly in his statement, Akram said the US decision has taken Pakistan further away from agreeing to a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty. "It is obvious from what I have stated that Pakistan's opposition to negotiations on a FMCT has further strengthened as a result of these developments," he said.

Coming down hard on the US, Akram said it was "unfortunate" that it had decided to go beyond the one-time waiver from the NSG for the nuclear deal and agree to "support our neighbour's full membership" in the four multilateral export control regimes, the NSG, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

Pakistan also raised questions on changing the membership criteria for India alone as it is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. "In other words, to create yet another set of discriminatory criteria, tailormade to suit only one country, as was done when providing the same country with the NSG waiver for nuclear cooperation."

According to Akram, the US has already conveyed its intent on this to the NSG Consultative Group meeting in Vienna last November. "Two of them (NSG members) have already indicated their concurrence, no doubt with an eye on profits to be made from their own nuclear cooperation agreements with the recipient country."

It may be noted that China has been pushing for sale of two additional nuclear reactors to Pakistan, which has been objected to by the US. While Beijing took everyone by surprise when it chose to first inform the IAEA Board on its intended sale and not the NSG, the US has already told the NSG that it's opposed to the deal.

Already incensed over those developments and constant watch on its own arsenal, an angry Pakistan told the CD: "We must ask ourselves whether the NSG can afford to flout its own rules by opening up its membership to a country whose nuclear tests in 1974 were the basis for the creation of NSG. If it does so, the NSG will have no credibility left in the context of the international non-proliferation regime."

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://ibnlive.in.com/generalnewsfe...ther-to-address-wmd-proliferation/549565.html

India and US working together to address WMD proliferation


Lalit K Jha Washington, Jan 26 (PTI) India and the US are working together to address serious issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; which is now moving forward in right earnest following the visit of the US President Barack Obama to India in November. India and the US signed a memorandum of understanding that allows the two countries to cooperate on global nuclear security issues under the auspices of Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership, which India announced at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. "Specifically, we agreed to give priority to discussion of best practices on the security of nuclear material and facilities, development of international nuclear security training curricula and programs, and joint outreach on nuclear security issues to our nuclear industries," Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, Robert Blake, said in his address before the Syracuse University in New York. The United States sought to ramp up high technology trade and collaboration through two critical steps, he said. The US agreed to support India's full membership in the four multilateral export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement) and the US pledged to remove India's space and defense entities from the Commerce Department's Entity List as India aligns its export controls with global standards. "The Department of Commerce published a Federal Register notice yesterday to fulfill that commitment," Blake said, adding that these actions will open important new opportunities for US companies and governments on cooperating in the defense and space areas. "We also completed the government pieces of the civil-nuclear deal, opening the way for US companies to supply billions of dollars worth of civil nuclear reactors for India's growing energy market", he said.