Bhadra,
The problem is that we are far behind in making weapons & ammo.
In actual R&D, the projectile is designed first as per the task it has to accomplish, thereafter the weapon is designed around it.
DRDO, does it the other way around - they first copy a gun system, then try to reverse engr a type of ammo. The concept is ok if the basics are correct, but an organisation that has not done R&D in basic rifle ballistics cannot be expected to make heavy calibre ammo.
In this case, the ammo & gun came together. The Indian 125mm FSAPDS was developed from the 105mm round developed for the Vijayanta. Besides which one has to start someplace. If you look at IMI, it started pretty much the same way, reverse engineering US/western/eastern bloc designs, buying out US tech and finally becoming a decent innovator itself. There is not a single company out there which has a flawless past.
DRDO has very little accountability and it is a simiple sarkari employment entity like BEML and survives on giving the armed forces substandard stuff.
First, if we look at it case to case, the problems with some products overshadow the success it has been able to achieve with others.
DRDO products in several cases are as good as or even better than imported items. It just depends on the generation of the product in service (whether it is the first of its type) and who made it - whether it was by BEL etc or TATA or somebody like OFB.
Logic suggests - and I know this for a fact having been aware of several technology attempts by leading technology vendors - that the first product - especially when developed to challenging specs, may not meet all the customer is looking for. But as long as the base design is ok, and a long term product roadmap is drawn - a MK2 or a MK3 or a MK4 can is often developed that ends up becoming the best in class or equivalent to the market leader. Its the way things are, iterative development usually outscores disruptive development. India;s problem is that it is starting from such a low industrial base, only changing in the past couple of decades, that most of its attempts are invariably disruptive. Products have to be at the MK3 level, without any MK1 having existed because no such program was launched earlier. That makes the job, much, much harder. Without getting into too many details, even the world's best companies launch products which even in their second, third iteration find the going tough. Look through the balance sheet and check out the percentage of R&D as a percentage of sales. The key is how many of those end up actually converting into winning products. New product introduction, especially when not built on a previous generation success, is inherently fraught with risks. A rough thumbrule was 70% fail. Product development costs in the meantime keep ballooning. Whether at the subsystem level or at the integrator level, ultimately the costs have to be passed on.
Second, coming to accountability, if you see the structure that exists, plus the scrutiny- DRDO is highly accountable, but clearly lacks something basic, which is authority. The Arjun is for example a "DRDO" tank, but a closer look reveals, the DRDO is only the owner till design and development, the producer is the OFB which is a parallel organization and directly reports to the RM. Basically, the DRDO has very limited say in the manufacture of its product and negotiating power as well. For instance, how large MNCs keep their system integrators/ contract manufacture on their toes is via competition. If an EMS/CM makes a mistake and continues to treat say the Japanese "brand owner" shabbily, the latter can walk to the other firm. Here clearly, that is not the case. For certain systems, the designated "partner" is predecided and the program owner (or the brand owner as in business) does not have power over the final deliverable beyond a point. This is a problematic state of affairs, whether it be with the Arjun/OFB or LCA/HAL etc. What this means is a potential conflict of interest can also occur. What does OFB care if the Arjun fails? One way or the other, they will manufacture a tank, like the T-90.
Similarly, in all the successful programs - like with the Navy /AF - a key success factor has been a partner who does its part of the job on time and with effort, like BEL with radars or so forth.
This is a structural problem which can only be solved by the MOD and one which is not going away. The project owners should have the power to decide on the partner upfront and also change them, if found unsuitable.
Third, and this is another severe issue, is the lack of structure within the Armed forces themselves - especially the AF and Army, to deal with complex system of systems projects, long gestation by their very nature. The Army and AF are staffed and enabled for procurement, not development. Currently, limited forecasting is done, trials are done, procurement suggested. However, what is required is an entire parallel weapons evaluation and development directorate, with services involvement (ideally, joint with all three) which handles programs end to end, and hence can also decide on proper GSQRs with its needs in mind (as versus looking at Janes, or cobbling together specs from responses to RFI/RFP as is still being done). Take a look at the two successful arms complexes in France and Israel. Latter is militarized state and we cannot adopt it. France follows the above approach. They have their own Army evaluation, PM and test group which acts across the entire development cycle for the product. What this also does is give the services ownership - which is a big deal for success. Across firms, most complex projects, bids etc invariably have an identified project sponsor. This is similar. The Navy for instance talks about
its Delhi class not XYZ yards ship. This will require the creation of another career path in the services as well. Right now, service officers are deputed to DRDO/DPSUs etc - while they often do a yeoman job - they face lack of understanding from some peers who don't understand how tough it is to develop a product, even hostility etc if they push for the product (all this is solved if the product is "owned" by the services themselves - which means greater transparency and decision making powers on how it is to be developed). Furthermore, their career is in flux. They have to return to parent organization - to progress otherwise they risk stagnating. This is very bad for the program which needs leadership continuity. VKS mentioned this fact in a recent interview along with the GSQR issue, these are clear learnings from programs like the Arjun.
Basically, solve these three problems - open competition (open up the sector to private giants for each and every competition and they can bid for who is the partner for DRDO for the specified "make" project), restructuring/divestment of the most problematic DPSU (OFB comes to mind, its problems are legion), a weapons directorate (beyond the current acquisition house it is) - joint in nature and which works with R&D to "own" the projects and see them through end to end. Do these three things, and there will be a sea change in the program perceptions and customer confidence. Right now the Armed forces- industry interface works on an ad hoc, project to project, chief to chief basis - this has to change. Irrespective of who comes, who goes, programs have to succeed and give the armed forces what they need, when they need. Ultimately this can only be done locally, whether it be the yahoodis or the roos, everyone is out to use our money for their industry. Thats unsustainable.