A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratley

[Ray]

A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratley Islands


To understand the complex nature of disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, a comprehensive integration of the legal and the political perspectives is required. The legal perspective allows us to determine whether arguments of the claimants are valid and whether they are actually supported by historical facts. This essay reviews and analyses the arguments of the claimants from the perspective of international law and argues for Viet Nam's position.

The Paracel Islands are disputed between Viet Nam, the People's Republic of China (hereafter referred to as "China"), and the Republic of China ("Taiwan"), all of which claim sovereignty over the whole archipelago.
The dispute over the Spratly Islands involves Viet Nam, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam ("Brunei"). While the first three claimants assert their sovereignty over the whole archipelago, the Philippines (since 1951) and Malaysia (since 1978) have claimed parts of the archipelago, and Brunei has only claimed a single feature (Louisa Reef, since 1984).

VIETNAM'S ARGUMENTS
The Paracel and Spratly Islands have been subject to the sovereignty of Viet Nam by reason of terra nullius (land not belonging to any sovereign State) effectively occupied by Viet Nam since the 16th century

According to international law, the discovery of a terra nullius itself does not sufficiently legitimize any legal status for the discovering State over that territory. To acquire sovereignty over the terra nullius, a State must effectively occupy that territory. There are two principles that govern this effective occupation. The first is the principle of actuality, which requires that the State actually possesses the terra nullius, considers it as part of the State's territory, and exercises State authority and administration over it for a reasonable period of time. In addition to the material (corpus) element, the actual possession also requires the intentional (animus) element of whether a State wishes to possess the terra nullius. The second is the principle of publicity, which requires that the possession by a State must be announced to, or acknowledged by, other sovereign States1. An individual or a company cannot acquire sovereignty over a territory.

To demonstrate its actual possession of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, Viet Nam asserts the following arguments:

-The States of Viet Nam knew of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, grouped them together, named them as "Đại Trường Sa" (Hán-Nôm: 大長沙; English: Grand Long Sand), "Hoàng Sa" (黃沙, Yellow Sand), or "Vạn Lý Trường Sa" (萬里長沙, Ten-Thousand-Mile Long Sand), and considered them as part of Viet Nam's territory.


- Throughout more than three hundred years, from the 16th to the 19th centuries, the States of Viet Nam had continuously exercised their sovereignty at least over the Paracel Islands by frequently sending the Flotillas of Hoàng Sa and Bắc Hải to the archipelago, which would stay there for several months every year for surveying and exploiting resources in a systematic manner. Personnel from these flotillas collected goods from wrecked ships, built temples, planted trees to symbolize the State's sovereignty, collected taxes, and provided assistance to foreign ships in danger. These activities of the Vietnamese States were totally free from any opposition or disputes from other countries, including China, and contained both the corpus and animus elements of an actual possession.

Viet Nam uses official documents from the 17th century to support these arguments. These include Đại Nam thá»±c lục tiền biên (1600–1775) (大南實錄前編, The Early Chapter of The Chronicles of Đại Nam [Đại Nam is an ancient name of Vietnam]), Toản tập Thiên Nam tứ chí lá»™ đồ thÆ° (1630–1653) (纂集天南四至路图書, The Collection of the South's Road Map), Phủ biên tạp lục (1776) (撫邊雜錄, Miscellany on the Pacification at the Frontier), Đại Nam thá»±c lục chính biên (1848) (大南實錄正編, The Main Chapter of The Chronicles of Đại Nam), Đại Nam nhất thống chí–the combinatorial record for geography and history of Đại Nam (1865–1882) (大南ー統誌, The Record of The Unified Đại Nam), Hoàng Việt dÆ° địa chí (1833) (皇越輿地誌, Geography of The Viet Empire), Việt sá»­ thông giám cÆ°Æ¡ng mục khảo lược (1876) (越史通鑑綱目考略, Outline of The Chronicles of The Viet History), official documents of the Nguyá»…n Dynasty on petitions and imperial decrees, and many maps and documents made by other countries at that time2.

Jaseniew Vladimir and Stephanow Evginii, in their 1982 book entitled "The Chinese Frontiers: From Traditional Expansionism to Present Hegemonism", listed the activities of the Vietnamese States in continuously exercising their sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and emphasized that "feudal States of Viet Nam had for long annexed archipelagos such as the Paracels and Spratlys into their State's territory"3.

France, after imposing its protectorate over Viet Nam, represented Viet Nam in exercising and maintaining Viet Nam's sovereignty over the archipelagos

In 1899, then Governor-General of Indochina Paul Doumer submitted a proposal to the Government of France to build a lighthouse in the Paracel Islands. Financial difficulty, however, prevented this plan from being realized.

On March 8, 1925, the Governor-General of Indochina affirmed that the Paracel Islands were part of French territory4. Surveillance and research trips thus had been organized in the Paracel Islands since 1925 and in the Spratly Islands since 19275.

In 1930, the French authorities in Indochina sent a mission group to set up a flag pole in the Spratly Islands. Since then until 1933, French naval units established a garrison on the main islands of the archipelago, including Spratly (Trường Sa) (April 13, 1930), Amboyna Cay (An Bang) (April 7, 1933), Itu Aba (Ba Bình) (April 10, 1933), the Two-Island Group including Southwest and Northeast Cays (Song Tử Tây, Song Tử Đông) (April 10, 1933), Loaita (Loai Ta) (April 11, 1933), and Thitu (Thị Tứ) (April 12, 1933), together with small islets/cays surrounding these islands. These occupation activities were proclaimed in the July 26, 1933 Official Gazette of the French Republic and the September 25, 1933 Official Gazette of Indochina, and did not meet any opposition from China, the Philippines, the Netherlands (which occupied Brunei at that time), or the United States of America. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland required explanation for these activities and was satisfied with the response from France6.

On December 2, 1933, Governor of Cochinchina (Nam Kỳ) J. Krautheimer incorporated the Spratly Islands into the Province of Bà Rịa.

On March 30, 1938, Emperor Bảo Đại issued his imperial edict to incorporate the Paracel Islands into the Province of Thừa Thiên. On June 15, 1938, the Governor-General of Indochina Jules Brévié issued a decree on establishing an administrative unit in the Paracel Islands. The French authorities then effectively occupied the whole archipelago with a permanent guard unit. In 1938, a sovereignty stele was erected with the inscription of the words "The French Republic – The Kingdom of An Nam – The Paracel Islands, 1816 – Pattle Island – 1938". A lighthouse, a meteorological station, and a radio station were also set up on Pattle Island5.

Japan occupied the Spratly Islands in 1939, re-named the archipelago as Shinnan Shoto (新南諸島, the New Southern Islands), and put it under the jurisdiction of Kaohsiung (Taiwan, which China had ceded to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895). France subsequently sent a diplomatic note to oppose Japan's military action and re-affirmed that the Spratly Islands were part of An Nam's territory7. There was no protest by China against either Japan's occupation of the Spratlys or France's assertion of sovereignty.
Immediately after Japan surrendered in 1945, the French authorities restored their presence in the Paracel and Spratly Islands. In June 1946, a subunit of the French armed forces landed to re-occupy the Paracel Islands. In October 1946, the French battleship Chevreud arrived in the Spratly Islands and installed a sovereignty stele on Itu Aba Island8. When the Republic of China sent its troops to occupy Itu Aba Island in late 1946, France also opposed the action and demanded China's withdrawal from the archipelago.
In summary, as the protecting power representing Viet Nam's interests, France maintained Viet Nam's sovereignty over the Paracel Islands without any interruption. In the Spratly Islands, France considered the archipelago as a terra nullius and conducted its effective occupation with the knowledge of other States without any opposition from China, the Philippines, the Netherlands (which occupied Brunei at that time), the United States of America or the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Viet Nam's sovereignty over the two archipelagos has been continuously exercised and maintained since France left Indochina

With the Hạ Long Bay Treaty of 1949, France transferred the sovereignty of Cochinchina, which included the Spratlys, to Viet Nam. On October 14, 1950 the government of France officially handed over the control of the Paracels to Viet Nam's Bảo Đại Administration.

On September 7, 1951, during the seventh session of the San Francisco Conference on the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Trần Văn Hữu of the State of Viet Nam officially affirmed Viet Nam's sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. His statement did not meet with any objection or reservation of opinion from any of the 51 States attending the Conference. The Soviet Union requested an amendment that envisaged the recognition by Japan of the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China over a series of territories including the Paracels and the Spratlys. This amendment was rejected by 46 of the countries present, only Poland and Czechoslovakia supported the Soviet request. Neither China nor Taiwan attended the Conference7.

After the partition of Viet Nam by the 1954 Geneva Accords, the administration of the Paracel and Spratly Islands was placed under the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN, South Viet Nam). Immediately after the last French troops' withdrawal on August 22, 1956, the Republic of Viet Nam promptly established its control over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and faced challenges from China, which disputed the archipelagos9.

The RVN, as a successor to the French authorities for legal titles, rights, and demands in the Paracel and Spratly Islands, had continuously exercised its administration, surveillance, exploitation, and defence over the two archipelagos through a series of actions such as erecting flag pole and sovereignty stele in the Spratly Islands (August 1956), incorporating the Paracel Islands into the Province of Quảng Nam (July 1961), affirming sovereignty over the two archipelagos by a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (July 15, 1971), incorporating the Spratly Islands to the Province of Phước Tuy (September 1973), granting license for guano collection, and detaining China's troops who were disguised as fishermen in an attempt to occupy the western group of the Paracel Islands (February 1959).

China's complete occupation of the Paracel Islands by military forces in January 1974 was strongly opposed by RVN, which took every opportunity to affirm its sovereignty, including sending letter to demand an intervention from the President of the United Nations General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, issuing statements to re-affirm sovereignty at the meeting in March 1974 of the Economic Commission for the Far East (precursor of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (July 1974), and proclaiming the White Paper on the Paracel and Spratly Islands (February 1975).

The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam is the successor of the two prior States and has had all legal titles over the Paracel and Spratly Islands since July 2, 1976

As part of its exercise of sovereignty, in December 1982 Viet Nam established Hoàng Sa District (huyện) under the Province of Quảng Nam–Đà Nẵng for the Paracel Islands, and Trường Sa District under the Province of Đồng Nai for the Spratly Islands. Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa Districts are currently under the jurisdiction of the City of Đà Nẵng and the Province of Khánh Hoà, respectively. Viet Nam has also maintained permanent troops in the Spratly Islands.

In addition, Vietnamese top officials have paid several visits and joined surveillance trips to affirm Viet Nam's sovereignty in the Spratly Islands. These include a series of visits in May 1988 by Minister of Defence Lê Đức Anh, Vice-Chairman of the State Council Nguyễn Quyết, and Chief of the Armed Forces' General Staff Đoàn Khuê. More recent visits of top officials include those by Member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Viet Nam (CPVN) Phạm Thế Duyệt (April 1998), and former Secretary-General of CPVN Lê Khả Phiêu (November 2011).

Although the Paracel Islands have been completely occupied by China's troops since 1974, Viet Nam maintains all its legal titles over the archipelago. The most recent assertion of sovereignty by Viet Nam is a statement by Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng in a televised testimony at the National Assembly on November 25, 2011 in which he said that Viet Nam has had sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands at least since the 17th century, and that Viet Nam seeks to resolve the sovereignty dispute through peaceful means according to international law.

CHINA AND TAIWAN'S ARGUMENTS

As China and Taiwan share the same arguments about the Paracel and Spratly Islands, they can be presented together as follows.

China was the first country to discover and occupy the Paracel and Spratly Islands as terra nullius
China asserted that it was the first country to find the archipelagos, and this discovery was made as early as the reign of Emperor WÇ”of the Hàn Dynasty (2nd century BCE)10. This argument, however, is not backed up by official historical documents. On this issue, Nguyá»…n Hồng Thao commented that "most of these documents are travel accounts, monographs, and navigation books demonstrating knowledge of ancient people about territories belonging to not only China but also other countries"9. Moreover, in these documents, the territories which China now claims to be the Paracels and Spratlys are named inconsistently, thus there are no convincing arguments that those territories are really the Paracels and Spratlys5.

Moreover, the aforementioned assertion from China contradicts the encyclopedia GÇ”jÄ«n TúshÅ«Jichéng(古今圖書集成, Complete Atlas on the Past and Present) completed by the Qing Dynasty in 1706. None of the maps in Zhífāng Diăn(職方典, Dictionary of Administrative Units) of this encyclopedia, including Zhífāng Zŏngbùtú(職方總部圖, General Map of the Administrative Units, Number 1), Guăngdōng Jiāngyùtú (廣東疆域圖, Territorial Map of Guăngdōng, Number 157), and QióngzhōufÇ” Jiāngyùtú(琼州府疆域圖, Territorial Map of Qiongzhou Prefecture, Numer 167), indicate any archipelagos farther to the south than Hainan Island. The islands depicted in Guăngdōng Tōngzhì (廣東通志, Annals of Guăngdōng), made during the reign of Emperor Jiājìng of the Ming Dynasty (1522–1567), also do not go beyond Qiongzhou (i.e. Hainan)11

.
The finding of ancient money and goods dated back to the Wáng Măng (王莽) Era (9–23 CE) is also used as archaeological evidence by China to support the early presence of its fishermen in the archipelagos. However, even if these pieces of evidence are valid, Chinese fishermen's early presence was merely private/individual activities and thus cannot constitute an effective occupation by a State as required by international law.]

China also claims sovereignty over the archipelagos by asserting the following events:

The Sòng Dynasty (960–1127) sent its military patrols to the Paracel Islands' area. This assertion is based on WÇ”jÄ«ng Zŏngyào (武经总要, Military General Records) with a prologue written by Emperor Rénzōng5. However, according to Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, this record merely indicates that there were geographical surveillance trips conducted by the Chinese that went as far as the Indian Ocean, and that China knew of the Paracel Islands. The document, however, does not demonstrate any possession.

- In the 13th century, emperors of the Yuán Dynasty ordered the astronomer GuōShŏujìng (郭守敬) to conduct astronomical observations in many areas, including the Paracel Islands. However, Guō's observations, performed both inside and outside of China, were only astronomical research activities and thus could not legitimize any sovereignty status over the territories from which the observations were made.

- Wu Sheng (吳升), Guangdong navy's rear-admiral, commanded a patrol to the Paracel Islands in 1710–1712. However, according to Monique Chemiller-Gendreau, this was in fact a patrol around Hainan Island and did not go as far as the Paracels.

- The local government of Guangdong opposed a German ship conducting research in the Spratly Islands in 1883. This opposition, however, was only a diplomatic action and did not have any legal status as China's sovereignty had not been established9.

Therefore, historical evidence used by China to support its claim is insufficient and weak according to international law. These pieces of evidence do not demonstrate any occupation, effective administration, or sovereignty12. As far as the effective occupation of the Paracel and Spratly Islands as terra nullius without protests from other States are concerned, Viet Nam's arguments are stronger than those of China13.

China's arguments regarding the period from early 20th century to 1945

It was not until the beginning of the 20th century that China showed any real efforts in occupying the Paracel Islands. In 1909, Admiral LǐZhǔn (李准) commanded a small-scale landing (over a period of 24 hours) in the Paracel Islands. His troops raised their flag and fired their guns to mark China's sovereignty5 (which raises the question of why LǐZhǔn's fleet acted as if this was the first time the islands were discovered despite China's claim to have possessed them long before?)
]
In 1921, the self-proclaimed Guăngzhou Military Government annexed the administration of the Paracel Islands to Yái (崖) District. This action did not meet any response as the Guăngzhou Military Government was not recognized by any countries in the world.
In 1937, Japan occupied the islands offshore of Indochina despite the opposition from the French authorities, renamed them to "Shinnan Shoto", and put them under the jurisdiction of Kaohsiung (Taiwan), which China had ceded to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895. Japan maintained its occupation in the South China Sea's archipelagos throughout World War II.

In summary, with a limited effort in early 20th century to demonstrate its sovereignty in the Paracel Islands, China neither actually and continuously occupied nor effectively established administration over the archipelago. At the same time, China had absolutely neither influence nor interest in the Spratly Islands and did not protest when Japan claimed and occupied them. In contrast, France was the only country to protest against Japan's occupation of the Spratlys. An irrefutable evidence of China not considering the Spratlys to be its territorry was China's diplomatic note to France in September 1932 claiming that the Paracels "form the southernmost part of Chinese territory"5.

China's arguments regarding the period after 1945

After Japan's surrender in 1945, it withdrew troops from mainland and all archipelagos of Indochina. France promptly restored its presence in the Paracel Islands in June 1946. In July 1947, the Republic of China sent its troops to Woody Island in the Paracels. In response, France opposed this illegal occupation and sent a military unit to the Paracel Islands to set up a garrison and built a meteorological station which would be in operation for the next 26 years until the People's Republic of China used military force to occupy the archipelago in 1974.

At the end of 1946, the Republic of China sent its troops to occupy Itu Aba Island in the Spratlys after France had erected a sovereignty stele. The Chinese Civil War's conclusion and the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in October 1949 forced the Republic of China's troops to leave Woody Island in the Paracels and Itu Aba Island in the Spratlys while the French garrisons were maintained.

In April 1956, French forces were withdrawn from Indochina. In the Paracels they were replaced by the Republic of Viet Nam's troops (i.e.,South Viet Nam's troops). At the same time, the People's Republic of China's troops secretly landed and occupied Amphitrite Group in the eastern part of the Paracel Islands5. On September 4, 1958, China issued a statement on its twelve-nautical-mile territorial waters, including around both the Paracel and Spratly Islands. On January 19, 1974, China used its military forces to occupy completely the Paracel Islands. Until then, the Spratly Islands "were completely out of China's influence, let alone China's intention to control them"7. In February 1988, China sent troops to some islands in the Spratlys, and a month later, seized six islands from Viet Nam5. All of these events make China a unique claimant in the Spratly Islands for its exclusive claim over the whole archipelago and its absolute lack of control in reality until 1987.

China then established its 33rd province including Hainan Island, the Paracels, and the Spratlys in April 1988, occupied one more small island in the Spratly Islands in May 19895, and seized Mischief Reef of the Philippines in February 1995.

China's main approach to seize control over the islands is to use military force, an approach which has been condemned by international law since early 20th century. The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted on October 24, 1970, also states explicitly that "The territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention of the provisions of the Charter. The territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal". The use of military force is therefore against international law and cannot legitimize any legal status for China in the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

China's use of statements by the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam

China maintains that Viet Nam recognized China's sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands during the Viet Nam War by statements of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (North Viet Nam) including

- A verbal expression by Deputy Foreign Minister Ung Văn Khiêm on June 15, 1956 to a standing member of the Embassy of China in Ha Noi that these archipelagos are part of China's territory in terms of history. However, China fails to provide the meeting's minutes that contains this expression by Deputy Foreign Minister Khiêm14. It should also be noted that, according to international law, deputy foreign ministers do not by default have the authority to represent a State in such matters.

- A diplomatic note by Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng on September 14, 1958 in which China's claim of twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea was said to be approved without any reservation of opinion regarding the Paracel and Spratly Islands.
Whether these statements have legal implications for the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam's sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands will require further studies in international law. However, the author would like to offer a perspective on these statements as below.

- On May 9, 1965, in response to the the escalation of the Viet Nam War and the establishment of tactical zones in the South China Sea by the United States, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam's newspaper Nhân Dân (The People) stated that the Paracel Islands were under the sovereignty of China. It should be noted that, according to international law, newspapers are not considered representatives of a State.

Whether these statements have legal implications for the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam's sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands will require further studies in international law. However, the author would like to offer a perspective on these statements as below.

During the Viet Nam War (1954–1975), there were two States co-existing in Viet Nam, namely, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) in the North, and the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN) in the South. The co-existence of these two States is agreed upon by many leading international laywers, such as James Crawford, Robert Jennings, Nguyá»…n Quốc Định, Jules Basdevant, Paul Reuter, Louis Henkin, and Grigory Tunkin14.

Acccording to the DRVN and RVN's understanding of the 1954 Geneva Accords, and to thede facto administration, the RVN was the successor State to the Vietnamese titles over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. As mentioned above, the RVN had continuously controlled, exercised administration, and affirmed sovereignty until China's occupation of the Paracel Islands by force in 1974, and until the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam's takeover of the Spratly Islands in 1975. The DRVN was a third party in the dispute between the RVN and China over the Paracels, and in that between the RVN, the Philippines and China over the Spratlys.

First, given that it was the RVN, and not the DRVN, which was the successor State to the Vietnamese titles over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, the DRVN did not have the duty to defend these titles. Therefore, its conduct cannot be interpreted as acquiescence to China or the Philippines' claims. Furthermore, as a third party, the DRVN was not in dispute or negotiation with any other State over these archipelagos. Therefore, no statement made by the DRVN can be said to have been made in the context of a dispute or negotiation over these archipelagos between it and China or the Philippines.

Second, the 1958 diplomatic note of the DRVN's Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng and other DRVN's statements on the issue did not affect RVN's titles over the archipelagos. Any legal obligation that might arise from the DRVN's statements could only apply to the DRVN, not to the RVN.

Third, let us consider whether the DRVN's statements gave rise to any binding obligations for itself? The statements made by DRVN on the issue are unilateral ones. According to international law, to determine whether a unilateral statement might give rise to binding obligations, three main conditions must be considered, namely,

1. the context in which the statement was made;

2. whether the unilateral statement is explicit, and whether the party making the statement explicitly expresses the intention that it wishes to be bound by its own statement; and

3. whether there has been detrimental reliance for the other party, i.e., damage or loss caused by that party's reliance on the unilateral statement.

In addition, judgements by the International Court of Justice require that the unilateral statements are made continuously over a prolonged period of time for it to give rise to binding obligations15.

It is not difficult to see that the DRVN's statements on the issue lack most of these prerequisite conditions, and therefore did not give rise to any binding obligations for the DRVN. Regarding the criterion of context, these statements were not made in the context of the DRVN and China contesting the Paracels and Spratlys with each other. Regarding the criterion of explicitness, the only authoritative statement from the DRVN – the diplomatic note by Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng, did not say anything explicit about the Paracels or Spratlys. Regarding the criterion of detrimental reliance, China has not taken any actions that could be said to be detrimental reliance on the DRVN's statements.

As the successor State to the DRVN and the RVN (and subsequently the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam) since 1976, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (SRVN) succeeded to both the sovereignty of the Paracel and Spratly Islands from the RVN and the unilateral, non-binding statements from the DRVN. Since the latter is non-binding, the SRVN is free to choose to uphold the former. The re-unified Vietnamese State, therefore, has full legal basis to assert its sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

Hundred Viet's (Bai Yue): A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratley Islands

 

[Ray]

Re: A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratle

THE PHILIPPINES' ARGUMENTS

The Philippines claims over about 60 islands, reefs, and submerged banks in the Spratly Islands16. The first assertion was made in 1947 by Tomás Cloma, a Philippine citizen, when he claimed to have discovered a group of islands and reefs 300 nautical miles to the west of Palawan Island.

On May 17, 1951, the President of the Philippines claimed that islands in the Spratlys should belong to the closest territory, which is the Philippines9. This claim was opposed by the other countries.

It was not until March 1956 that Tomás Cloma resumed his "work to discover" these islands. He sent a group of 40 sailors to land on many islands in the Spratlys to mark their possession. The flag of the Philippines was raised on some islands including Itu Aba17. On May 11, 1956, they proclaimed Kalayaan (Freedom-land) as the new official name of the islands and Tomás Cloma as the President of the Supreme Council of the State of Kalayaan7. This proclamation was opposed by all relevant countries10.

Tomás Cloma sent a letter dated May 15, 1956 to the Republic of the Philippines' Minister of Foreign Affairs to announce that he and his group had occupied a 64,976-square-mile area to the west of Palawan Island, that this area was outside of Philippine territorial waters and was not subject to the jurisdiction of any countries, and that this area had been found and effectively occupied as a terra nullius. He also included with the letter a map of his claimed area. Although the names of these islands were completely changed, Cloma's map indicates that the Kalayaan area includes most of islands in the Spratlys8.

The Philippines' Minister of Foreign Affairs subsequently declared in a press conference on May 19, 1956 that the islands in the Spratlys including Itu Aba and Spratly are subject to the Philippines' sovereignty as they are closest to the Philippines. This declaration met with objections from Sai Gon, Beijing, and Taiwan. When Taiwan showed its intention of deploying troops to the Spratly Islands, Manila promptly sent a notice to Taiwan and South Viet Nam and said that it had not officially claimed sovereignty over the area.

On July 6, 1956, Tomás Cloma sent a letter to the Philippines' government to ask that Kalayaan become a protectorate of the Philippines. In his response, the Philippines' Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that any island in the area that is not within the group of seven islands referred to as "the Spratly Islands" by international community can be considered as terra nullius, and thus can be freely exploited and inhabited by citizens of the Philippines or any other countries. To retaliate against Tomás Comas' activities, South Viet Nam sent a patrol ship to the Spratly Islands in August 1956.
The first clash between Taiwan's navy and Tomás Cloma's group occurred on October 1, 1956 in North Danger Shoal. Tomás Cloma's group ended up having all their weapons stripped while the Philippines' government did not intervene.

During 1970–1971, President Ferdinand Marcos ordered the Philippines' navy to occupy some islands in the Spratlys including Thitu, Nanshan, and South Rock. The Philippines also organized patrols in many small islands and reefs in the northeast of the archipelago7. After the Philippines attempted once more but failed to occupy Itu Aba Island in 1971, it continued to object to Taiwan's occupation of the island with three arguments, namely, (1) the Philippines' sovereignty over the islands based on Tomás Cloma's discovery of terra nullius, (2) de facto occupation without notice by China of many islands under the jurisdiction of the Allies, and (3) the Philippines archipelagic waters containing the Spratlys10. The Philippines also expanded its occupation to 1,000 troops and built an airport on Thitu Island. Tomás Cloma transferred the "sovereignty" of the islands to the Philippines' government in 1974. By that time, the Philippines had acquired control over four islands in the Spratlys.

In 1978, the Philippines deployed troops to seven islands in the Spratlys. The President of the Philippines then signed Decree 159612 on June 11, 1978 to annex these seven islands to the Philippines' territory. The decree also states that "these areas do not legally belong to any state or nation but, by reason of history, indispensable need, and effective occupation and control established in accordance with the international law, such areas must now deemed to belong and subject to the sovereignty of the Philippines", and that a 200-nautical-mile economic exclusive zone was set for these islands10.

In a press conference on September 14, 1979, the President of the Philippines stated clearly that his country would maintain its claim over the seven islands that it occupied but not all of the Spratly Islands. The Philippines' President also re-affirmed that these seven islands had never been occupied, known of, inhabited, or even marked in any maps before World War II, and they had thus been terra nullius until the Philippine's occupation.

On March 10, 2009, the President of the Philippines promulgated Republic Act 9522 to define the archipelagic baseline of the Philippines, in which most of the Spratly Islands was included in the Philippines' regime of islands. China quickly objected while Vietnam re-asserted its claims to the Spratlys but did not mention the Act specifically.

Arguments from the Philippines, in general, do not have a solid basis. The Philippines maintains that the islands it claimed were terra nullius. Even if we ignore those events in the Spratlys in previous centuries, the Spratly Islands were effectively occupied since 1930 by France (French troops had been on Thitu Island since April 1933) and transferred to Viet Nam without objection from any countries including the Philippines when France left Indochina. Also, the claim that these islands should belong to the Philippines on the basis of proximity is not supported by international law. Moreover, the Philippines' occupation and claim to the Spratly Islands have been opposed by relevant countries from the beginning. Therefore, the involvement of the Philippines in these islands cannot constitute an effective occupation without disputes as required by international law.

 

[Ray]

Re: A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratle

MALAYSIA'S ARGUMENTS

In 1978, Malaysia made its first claims for sovereignty over Amboyna Cay, Mariveles Reef, and Commodore Reef on the basis that these features lie on its continental shelf. The 1979 map of Malaysia depicted some islands in the Spratlys as Malaysia's territory.

Malaysia started its first military occupation in June 1983 by taking control of Swallow Reef, which is within its claimed area. In September 1983, Malaysia officially declared its intention to occupy James Shoal, Swallow Reef, Ardasier Reef, and Mariveles Reef, and asserted that these islands/reefs lie within Malaysia's "marine economic zone"7. In December 1986, Malaysia's troops occupied Mariveles and Ardasier Reefs. In June 1999, Malaysia expanded its occupation to a total of seven islands/reefs/shoals by taking control over Erica Reef and Investigator Shoal.

In general, Malaysia cites the international law's regulations of continental shelf to support its claim in the Spratly Islands. However, Article 76 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines clearly that: "The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises of the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental shelf does not extend up to that distance". This definition does not govern the above water islands/reefs/cays on the continental shelf and thus cannot provide legal ground for Malaysia's claims to any feature that is above high tide.

The legal question for a feature that Malaysia claims is whether it is above high tide or not. This question is critical because a State can only claim and acquire sovereignty over islands that are naturally above high tide. If a feature is submerged or is a low-tide elevation then neither Malaysia nor any other State can claim sovereignty over it18,19, and Malaysia can only claim certain restricted rights as prescribed by UNCLOS. And if this is the case, we shall have to resolve the question of whether that feature lies within Malaysia's exclusive economic zone or that of another State.

 

[Ray]

Re: A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratle

BRUNEI' ARGUMENTS

Brunei only claims Louisa Reef based on the argument that this reef is within its exclusive economic zone.

Article 56 of the 1982 UNCLOS, however, only acknowledges that a coastal State has (1) "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents, and winds", and (2) jurisdiction to establish and use artificial islands, installations and structures for marine scientific research, and protection and preservation of marine environment. The use of UNCLOS to claim sovereignty over islands within the exclusive economic zone is an aberrant interpretation of the Convention. Therefore, the argument from Brunei, similar to that of Malaysia, is unconvincing if applied to islands that are naturally above high tide.

The legal question in this case is whether Louisa Reef is an island naturally above high tide, or is it submerged or is a low-tide elevation. If Louisa Reef is submerged or is a low tide elevation then neither Brunei nor any other countries can claim sovereignty over it18,19, and Brunei can only claim certain restricted rights as prescribed by UNCLOS. And if this is the case, we shall have to resolve the question of whether Louisa Reef lies within Brunei's exclusive economic zone or that of Viet Nam or Malaysia.

 

[Ray]

Re: A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratle

Conclusion

In the light of international law, the above comparative analysis of perspectives from different claimants of the Paracel and Spratly Islands reveals that the most logical and best-supported arguments are those of Viet Nam. In reality, however, the prolonged and complicated nature of disputes in area, as well as the involved parties' intention, make dispute resolution through legal means a very difficult approach. Instead, an integration of legal, historical, political, and economic solutions is needed to resolve the issue. And any resolution for the South China Sea's dispute would require efforts and good will of the involved parties, particularly China, which has been objecting to any proposal made by Viet Nam to bring the Paracel and Spratly Islands' issue to the International Court of Justice.

Nevertheless, the legal perspective of the issue is still of vital importance.


Nguyễn Thái Linh
LL.M.(University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland)
DÆ°Æ¡ng Danh Huy
Translated by Nguyễn Trịnh Đôn
-------

 

[Ray]

Re: A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratle

Acknowledgement
The authors wish to thank Nguyễn Đức Hùng and Lê Vĩnh Trương for their comments and discussion.

Literature Cited
1. Wójciech Góralczyk, Stefan Sawicki (2007). Introduction to International Public Law (Prawo miedzynarodowe publiczne w zarysie). Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Prawnicze LexisNexis (in Polish).
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (1988).White Paper: The Archipelagos of Paracels, Spratlys and International Law (in Vietnamese and English).
3. Vladimir Jaseniew, Evginii Stephanow (1982). The Chinese Frontiers: From Traditional Expansionism to Present Hegemonism (Kитайские границы: от традиционного экспансионизмa к текущемy гегемонизмy). Moscow (in Russian).
4. Jean-Pierre Ferrier (1975). The Conflict of the Paracel Islands and the Problem of Sovereignty over the Uninhabited Islands (Le conflit des iles Paracels et le problème de la souveraineté sur les iles inhabitées). Annuaire francais de droit international. Vol. 21 (in French).
5. Monique Chemillier-Gendreau (1998). Sovereignty over the Archipelagos of Paracels and Spartlys (Chủ quyền trên hai quần đảo Hoàng Sa và Trường Sa) (in Vietnamese). Ha Noi. Translated from "La souveraineté sur les archipels Paracels et Spratleys" (in French). L'Harmattan, Paris.
6. Marcel Beauvois (November 27, 1971). The Archipelagos of Paracels and Spratlys (Les archipels Paracels et Spratley). Vietnam Press nr.7574 (in French).
7. Jan RowiÅ„ski (1990). South China Sea––Potential Dispute in Asia (Morze PoÅ‚udniowochiÅ„skie––region potencjalnego konfliktu w Azji). Warsaw (in Polish).
8. Marwyun Samuels (1982). Contest for the South China Sea, New York, 1982
9. Nguyá»…n Hồng Thao (2000). Viet Nam and the Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea". Institute of Economic Law of the Sea (Le Vietnam et ses différends maritimes dans la mer de Bien Dong [Mer de Chine méridionale]). Monaco (in French).
10. Lee G. Cordner (1994). The Spratly Island dispute and the Law of the Sea. Ocean Development and International Law, Washington D.C. Vol. 25.
11. Phạm Hoàng Quân (December 11, 2007). "Xisha" and "Nansha" in China's historical documents. Talawas: talawas | Phạm Hoàng Quân - Tây Sa và Nam Sa trong sá»­ liệu Trung Quốc Vietnamese).
12. Kuang-Minh Sun (1990/1991). Dawn in the South China Sea? A Relocation of the Spratly Islands in an Everlasting Legal Storm. South African Yearbook of International Law, University of South Africa. Vol. 16.
13. Lacoste Yves (1981). China's Sea or Southeast Asian Sea (Mer de Chine ou Mer de l'Asie du Sud-Est). Herodote, Paris (in French).
14. DÆ°Æ¡ng Danh Huy (November 9, 2011). Was there one or were there two States in North and South Viet Nam during the 1954–1975 War?(Trong chiến tranh 54–75, có má»™t hay hai quốc gia Việt Nam trên hai miền Bắc, Nam).Southeast Asian Sea Foundation: http://www.seasfoundation.org/artic...-75-co-mt-hay-hai-quc-gia-tren-hai-min-bc-nam (in Vietnamese)
15. Từ Đặng Minh Thu (July 2007). Sovereignty over the Two Archipelagos of Paracels and Spratlys (Chủ quyền trên hai quần đảo Hoàng są và Trường Sa).Thời Đại Mới (New Era) Magazine, Vol. 11 (in Vietnamese).
16. Michael Hindley, James Bridge (June 1994). South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands Dispute. The World Today, London, Vol. 50.
17. Quốc Tuấn (1975). Comments on China's arguments on the Paracels and Spratlys' issue (Nhận xét về các luận cứ của Trung Hoa liên quan tới vấn đề chủ quyền hai quần đảo Hoàng Sa và Trường Sa). Tập san Sử Địa (History and Geography Reviews). Vol. 29. Sai Gon (in Vietnamese)
18. International Court of Justice (2001). Judgement: Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/87/7029.pdf
19. International Court of Justice (2008). Judgement: Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore). http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14506.pdf

Source: East Sea Study

 

[Ray]

Re: A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratle

Hopefully the above will give some perspective of the issue that is unfolding in the South China Sea.

 

[Ray]

Re: A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratle

Why the East Sea became the South China Sea?

VietNamNet Bridge – The follow-up article by researcher Nguyen Dinh Dau explains why the East Sea, from the name Giao Chi (Jiaozhi) Sea in the 14th century, was mistakenly noted by Western people as the South China Sea.

In the article "From the East Sea to the U-shape Line", researcher Nguyen Dinh Dau clarified that in ancient maps of Chinese people; the East Sea was named Giao Chi Sea, Great East Sea or Southeastern Sea.

The world map (continents) as drawn by Henricus Matellus Germanus in 1498

From this aspect, a question emerges. Why the Giao Chi Sea (14th century) was mistakenly called by Western people as the South China Sea as today? We would like to introduce the follow-up article by researcher Nguyen Dinh Dau to answer this question.

From the utmost antiquity to the 14th century, ancient people thought that the globe had only three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa.

Perhaps the pioneer for this is Greek geographer Ptolemeo who drew the world map with three continents from the South Pole to the North Pole, from the East to the West. These continents accounted for most of the globe and the remaining area for oceans was not significant. Western geographers and cartographers based on this to gradually improve the world map.

Errors at the beginning

The map of the Indian peninsula off the Ganga River in the 17th century, printed in Amsterdam, Holland, with notes in French
In 1492, Christophe Columbus, a Spanish navigator, believed in maps of his time, believed that he could reach India after crossing the Atlantic Ocean. When he arrived in the New World continent (America), he believed that this was India and called the aboriginals as Indian (Indien). This wrong name still exists until now.

In 1497, a Portuguese navigator - Vasco de Gama (1469-1524) commanded a powerfully commercial crew to India by taking a roundabout route through Africa, going upward and turning right to the Indian Ocean. On May 20 1498, the crew arrived in Calicut, after ten months in the sea.

The name India was very attractive in the ancient and medieval ages. Christophe Columbus headed to the west to look for India but he discovered America, and Vasco de Gama headed to the east to look for India and discovered the civilized East Asia.

In the 16th century, Portuguese navigators sailed to the north through the coast of Vietnam to survey China and Japan. They occupied China's Macau and set up the largest commercial firm there in 1557. Everywhere they passed, they made economic surveys and mapped with longitude and latitude.

The map of Indochina peninsula was made again to the reality to correct the Southeast Asia which was mapped wrongly in maps that had been used popularly before. This peninsula was called Presqu'ile de l'Inde delà le Ganges (Indian peninsula off the Ganges River). Therefore, most of Western maps in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries noted this part as India Orientalis. There was no map that called it the China Sea (Mer de Chine).

Paracel and Spratly Islands of Vietnam

At that time, the sea between Vietnam's coast and the Paracel Archipelago (including both Hoang Sa or Paracel and Truong Sa or Spratly Islands) was noted as the Giao Chi Bay near China (Golfe de la Cochinchine) on Western maps.

Cochinchine was the names of Giao Chi (Cochin) and Qin country (Chine) in Chinese characters. Western people read them differently and noted by Latin characters: Giao Chi (or Vietnam) became Cauchy, Cochi or Cochin while Qin became T'sin, Cin, Chine or China.

The country of Cochin (Giao Chi) had the same name with India's Cochin town and Portuguese noted Cochin as Cochinchina (Giao Chi near Qin country-China) to distinguish it. Cochin is the subject, China is object. China became the name of Zhonghua.

In 1525, Portuguese navigator Diogo Ribeiro discovered the great Pracel Archipelago (including Paracel and Spratly) amid the East Sea. He defined that this archipelago belonged to Cochin (Giao Chi or Vietnam today) so he noted Giao Chi's coast (in Vietnam's central province of Quang Ngai today) as Pracel coast (Costa da Pracel) [3].

In the 19th century, people knew that the Paracel Archipelago include small islands located scattered from the north to the south. In the north, they are called the Paracel (Hoang Sa) Archipelago and the Spratly (Truong Sa) Archipelago in the south. The East Sea that surrounds these archipelagos was not called the Cochinchina Sea (Giao Chi Sea) anymore, but it was mistakenly noted as China Sea (using the object – china - and leaving out the subject – cochin). In the 20th century, the name of China Sea became popular.

Perhaps from that error, China confirms the Giao Chi Sea or East Sea as its sea, including islands in that sea. In 1947, the government of the Republic of China made claims over the sovereignty of 80 percent of the East Sea with the U-shape line, including 11 interrupted dots. In 1949, the government of the People's Republic of China continued this misunderstanding by making similar claims. In 2009, China submitted to the United Nations a map with its waters bordered by the groundless U-shape line, which has been strongly protested by many countries for its violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The mistakes in noting geographic names caused many problems, and problems will continue and become more complicated if that misunderstanding is not solved.

Hundred Viet's (Bai Yue): Why the East Sea became the South China Sea?

 

[Ray]

Re: A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratle

A suggested tactic for Vietnam in case of a sea battle with China

Those who monitoring recent development in the East Sea (South China Sea) can not avoid from worrying about approaching military conflicts . And if a military conflict breaks out it would be definitely triggered by the Chinese side, not by a much smaller country in the region. There are at least four reasons to say so:

1) After the "detection period" (from 2009 to late 2011) China now seems to have known that the extent of reaction by the international community is limited while and the ASEAN alone has been divided and neutralized to a necessary extent by Beijing's various tactics of using economic and diplomatic measures ;

2) Beijing can now assure that no third power, including the U.S.A., Russia, will directly involve in a war between China and one of the ASEAN states, even the case of the Philippines as an ally of the U.S., especially when it is just a small and quick battle (as analyzed by the Chinese themselves);

3) By this time, China has basically regrouped enough overwhelming forces comprising more than 1,000 ships of all types beside a huge military base in Hainan Island and a logistical base in the Paracel Islands, a giant oil rig just put in operation. According to various intelligent sources, the Chinese sea-air forces have completed rehearsals for conflict situations, particularly for invasion of offshore islands;

4) Through the "collision" at this time around the Scarborouph island Beijing seems to have chosen the "human wave" tactic alongside with the "hot war" one if necessary. A victory here will encourage the Chinese to apply for other locations and with other countries. In short, after a period of preparation, the Chinese are now ready and determined to go ahead with their scheme for the full control of the East Sea (you can refer to chinese deployed forces by this link Các căn cứ quân sự của Trung Quốc trên Biển Đông - Thế giới - Dân trí).

Looking at the context and relationships and power balance in the East Sea at the moment, we can figure out a new posture have been established, in which Chinese forces are totally overwhelming in this region. The only source of strength of Vietnam, the Philippines and ASEAN in general is located in the righteousness based on international law and justice,but this has been blatantly denied by China while international organizations, including the UN, seems "powerless"; the more expected role of the United States has now shown unpredictable; and the "ASEAN unity" is revealing rigging and disabled by wicked schemes of China during the past years. So, perhaps only in case such conflicts prolongs and escalates into big wars then the Chinese may find themselves bogged down and denounced the international opinion. In other word, the Chinese only find obstacles when wars prolong. This is the situation Vietnam or any other weaker sides of conflict should force the Chinese forces into, at least during the transition time when the theory force overwhelms the power of truth.

As for the case of Vietnam, from long past experience the Vietnamese must rely on their internal forces or "force of self-reliance", in which the positions of land, mountains, rivers and sea contribute important elements to defeat various invaders no matter where they come from . One key factor to make up the internal forces in case defending sovereignty and territory in the East Sea can be found with the S-shape running from north to south of the East Sea. This is a dominant strategic position that no other regional countries posses.

As widely known, given all efforts to be made Vietnam could only reach the balance of "one fighting 100" with the Chinese side if a war breaks out . However, if we can break the conspiracy of quick wars or "blitzkrieg" as wanted by the enemy and force them to fall into the quagmire, then we can certainly win supports from the world and finally win the enemy. To do this, we need to workout a specific strategy which rely mainly on the support of firepower from the mainland, particularly by sophisticated missile pads located along the seacoast and from the bombers taking off from land bases. By this way, the entire western part of the East Sea, including the Paracel and Spratly and the exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles are in the range of direct fire from the main land . Most of the enemy's forces including warships and submarines and stationed forces on off-shore islands are within the effective range of our missiles. This can provide necessary power attacks and also effective deterrent measures.

Above is just a suggestion idea aiming at defending strategy, not invading strategy. It is even more worthy for Vietnam that is always the defending side of wars.

Hundred Viet's (Bai Yue): A suggested tactic for Vietnam in case of a sea battle with China

 

[Ray]

Re: A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratle

Beware of Chinese Jingoism

By Harry Kazianis is assistant editor of The Diplomat.
The Diplomat ,15Myay 2012

Over the last several weeks, as Western media has followed the unfolding of events of Chen Guangcheng's dash to the U.S. embassy in Beijing, which came on the heels of the Bo Xilai scandal, Chinese media has shifted its gaze elsewhere. In the South China Sea or West Philippine Sea, depending on which party you ask, tensions are being stoked in the form of provocative editorials, reporting, and the actions of Chinese journalists. Such reporting – nothing more than old fashioned jingoism – sets a dangerous precedent in an area of the world that is already rife with tensions. And, while such coverage is useful for turning the page on China's internal political soap operas, fueling the fires of Chinese nationalism can only inject a dangerous element that, if left unchecked, could make it harder for either side to compromise.

To be fair, sensationalist Chinese reporting is nothing new, nor exclusively Chinese. Yet, as events in the recent spat between China and the Philippines have unfolded, Chinese reporting has becoming increasingly aggressive.

Nothing demonstrates the recent tilt towards jingoism more than the example of a journalist from Dragon TV who decided to plant his nation's flag on the Scarborough Shoal/Huangyan Island/Panatag Shoal. Such symbolism couldn't be any stronger, short of taking up defiant residence. There was, however, a strange oddity to the footage, namely that the rock both sides are squabbling over was barely large enough for the journalist to stand on. In fact, part of the shoal submerges during high tide. Yet with large deposits of natural resources, fisheries, and important trade routes close by, it's no wonder both parties are so interested. The issue is complicated by the fact that the South China Sea is claimed in some part by not just China and the Philippines, but Taiwan, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia and others as well.

To make matters worse is what can be described as one of the worst timed slips of the tongue in modern journalism. Chinese journalist He Jia of mainstream CCTV declared during a news broadcast that "We all know that the Philippines is China's inherent territory and the Philippines belongs to Chinese sovereignty; this is an indisputable fact." While the broadcast has disappeared from the CCTV website, to make the gaff not once but twice in the same sentence seems odd to say the least. While He did apologize on Weibo for the slip, the comments below her apology speak volumes to the nationalistic sentiment that has built up around the issue.

Social media is also ablaze with nationalistic and fire-spitting commentary. While Chinese censors are quick to repress any of the latest news or rumors concerning Bo or Chen, matters in the South China Sea seem like fair game. One microblogger named kongdehua declared, "the Philippines have basically been making irrational trouble, if they want to start a war then we will strike, no one fears them." He went on to say in a widely quoted remark that, "If every Chinese spat once, we could drown (the Philippines)."

To be fair, Chinese media is also capable of creating discourse that prefers compromise and diplomacy when conflict between nations is possible. The Global Times, for example, has published content with a less harsh tone. Jeffrey Bader, U.S. President Barack Obama's senior advisor on China and Asia at the National Security Council from 2009 to 2011, described in an article the U.S.-China relationship as being "in reasonably good shape. The Chinese are working well with us on North Korea and Iran. Taiwan has not been a source of tension, and does not promise to be for years. Since that is the one issue on which we theoretically could have a conflict, the positive state and trend of cross-Straits relations is very important, and gets undeservedly little attention."

The Chinese Communist Party has a great deal of influence over what is said in its mainstream media in print, over the radio, on TV and in social media. If Chinese authorities were so inclined, they could rein in jingoism. Yet there seems little inclination so far to do so. Chinese editors and leaders should be wary.

Hundred Viet's (Bai Yue): Beware of Chinese Jingoism

 

[Ray]

Re: A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratle

No takers or are we commenting merely off the cuff on the issue without knowing a sausage?

 

[Ray]

Re: A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratle

From this analysis, it appears that China does not seriously have any case and that is why China is reluctant to allow the issue to go for arbitration to the UN.

China basically wants to solve issues by sheer might and force.

Obviously that is not within the comfort zone of the neighbours.

One wonders what will be the Chinese plans to diffuse the issue and yet usurp all the island and sea around as hers!

China is not a country that will give up its claims, legitimate, illegitimate or even bogus, just because the international community or international law opinion is contrary to hers!

 

[Yusuf]

From this analysis, it appears that China does not seriously have any case and that is why China is reluctant to allow the issue to go for arbitration to the UN.

China basically wants to solve issues by sheer might and force.

Obviously that is not within the comfort zone of the neighbours.

One wonders what will be the Chinese plans to diffuse the issue and yet usurp all the island and sea around as hers!

China is not a country that will give up its claims, legitimate, illegitimate or even bogus, just because the international community or international law opinion is contrary to hers!

Sir it is exactly that. Sadly since china is part of UNSC, no resolution can be ever brought against it.

 

[Ray]

Re: A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratle

Sir it is exactly that. Sadly since china is part of UNSC, no resolution can be ever brought against it.

So UN is basically a handmaiden of the Big 5!

I wonder why out Vietnam and Chinese members are so silent over this!

 

[Yusuf]

The only solution based on the posts made by Ray is Vietnam gets majority and malaysia gets a bit (depending on the veracity of the high tide feature). China gets to suck an egg and Phillippines should also leave alone it's claim. The claim based on geographical proximity actually opens a can of worms. Indonesia can well claim parts of Andamans saying its closer to it than mainland India. This is but just one example. Brunei is asking or just one island. Let them have it. Peace all round.

But no China will not let it go. It knows there are resources out there and it wants it all.

 

[Yusuf]

So UN is basically a handmaiden of the Big 5!

As if that is anything new sir. The UN is the most undemocratic institution in the world.

 

[Ray]

Re: A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratle

Where have our Vietnamese and Chinese posters gone?

Gone to sow the paddy crop?

 

[SADAKHUSH]

Re: A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratle

Most of them are on PDF. Last year there was never ending debate on the same issue. Take it from me, Chinese keep spinning the story with all the facts about fishermen visited the reefs, corals and islands. They also insist like a pest that the letter given to Mao by N.Vietnam's leader in 1950 is good enough for them to lay a claim on all the disputed territory.

I thank Brigadier Ray for providing us with detailed historical facts on the above topic. It is going to take me few days to read all and make notes of them as well.

 

[satish007]

Re: A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratle

Chinese has discussed with Vietnam, Vietnam can keep big share.
Both are communism,
but PH, not even a mile

 

[fzaq]

Re: A legal analysis in support of Vietnam's position regarding the Paracel & Spratle

Chinese has discussed with Vietnam, Vietnam can keep big share.
Both are communism,
but PH, not even a mile

China says Vietnam claim to islands 'null and void'
Posted at 06/21/2012 6:05 PM | Updated as of 06/21/2012 6:05 PM

BEIJING - China on Thursday "vehemently opposed" a new Vietnamese law asserting sovereignty over islands in disputed waters, the latest escalation in tensions over the resource-rich South China Sea.

The row comes days after an easing in a months-long stand-off between China and the Philippines, but shows the persistent cycle of territorial frictions triggered by what some see as Beijing's growing assertiveness in the area.

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun summoned Ambassador Nguyen Van Tho and told him that Hanoi's new law claiming the contested Paracel and Spratly Islands was a "serious violation" and called for an "immediate correction".

"Vietnam's Maritime Law, declaring sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, is a serious violation of China's territorial sovereignty. China expresses its resolute and vehement opposition," Zhang said, according to a Foreign Ministry statement.

< Edited >

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/global-f...hina-says-vietnam-claim-islands-null-and-void
greedy china wants it all