Top ISI handler, missing while sneaking into India illegaly
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Kshatriya87
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India is not owning up for the abduction. If they do, pakistan will get a bargaining chip to get him back. Officially pakistan can never ask habib back if we don't acknowledge his abduction.
bose
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My point is we bargain Habib for Kulbhusan's release ... we let Habib go through the same what Kulbhusan is undergoing now...
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sayareakd
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http://news.statetimes.in/disappearance-lt-col-muhammad-habib-zahir/
‘Disappearance’ of Lt Col Muhammad Habib Zahir
Nilesh Kunwar
At a time when people go missing all over, reports in Pakistani media of Lt Col Muhammad Habib Zahir, a retired Pakistan army officer going missing in Nepal where he had ostensibly gone for a job interview may not be much of news. But this seemingly routine incident has all the ingredients of a potboiler.
What has been reported goes like this:
Lt Col Zahir retired from service in October 2014 and started working at Rafhan Mills in Faisalabad. He post his CV on job portal LinkedIn as well as the UN website and month ago got a telephone call from a UK number as well as an email. The person contacting Zahir is someone calling himself Mark Thompson and the message is that he has been shortlisted for the job of a vice president/zonal director for which he would be required to appear in an interview on 6th April at Kathmandu.
Subsequently, Zahir received a business class ticket to Kathmandu for 5th April and during the stopover in Oman he is received by person called Javed Ansari who provides him a Nepali sim card. The retired army officer reaches Kathmandu on 6th April as scheduled and it is here the story takes an unexpected twist. For reasons not yet known, he leaves for the Buddhist pilgrimage site of Lumbini, a town barely five kilometers from the Indian border on the same day and after reaching texts his safe arrival to his wife at 1:00 PM. Yet, everything seems normal because men in the Indian subcontinent have the proclivity of arbitrarily changing travel plans.
Thereafter, Zahir suddenly vanishes and hasn’t been heard of since then. With both his Pakistani and Nepali mobile numbers being switched off, the plot becomes thicker but things don’t end here. Subsequent inquiries reveal that the UK telephone number used to inform him of the interview in Kathmandu was computer generated and the website used to send the interview call message was registered in India. This has raised suspicions that the retired Pakistani army officer may have been the victim of an abduction plot orchestrated by Indian spy agency RAW!
Pakistan’s paranoia about RAW will most certainly give the abduction theory more currency in the days to come. But if RAW indeed possesses the exceptional abilities of subterfuge and deceit that the Pakistani establishment attributes to it then there are many contradictions in the abduction theory. Firstly, to execute such an elaborate plan just to entrap a middle level army officer who retired two and a half years ago and is working for a commercial enterprise with no defence or intelligence connections makes little sense from the intelligence acquisition point of view. Secondly, only a novice would use a website domain based in India for such a diabolical purpose.
To check out antecedents of one’s prospective employer is something that every individual instinctively does out of curiosity just to see if the proposal is really worth consideration. Lt Col Zahir had served in the artillery and ‘gunners’ (as artillery men are referred to in army parlance) all over the world have one thing in common- they are very meticulous. This is because for ‘gunners’, even an error of one degree can make artillery shells land where they shouldn’t!
So ‘gunners’ grow up in an environment where every order and instruction is repeated by the receiver to rule out possibility of such errors through a system called ‘checking back’ and over the period of time this becomes their second nature. Moreover it is not very common for prospective employers to fly interview aspirants’ business class and so I’m sure that even if he was casual, Zahir would certainly have done his basic homework and done some ‘checking back’ on the bona-fides of his prospective employers!
Though businesses do provide local cellular facilities to prospective employees, which organisation in the world takes the trouble of nominating a person to deliver a sim card to a job aspirant enroute when it is of no use at that point of time? Wouldn’t it have been more convenient and practical for the concerned party that had called Zahir for the interview to have arranged his reception party to deliver the sim on his arrival in Kathmandu? It certainly would have had a greater impact.
But the most intriguing about this whole episode is why Zahir went to Lumbini. This town isn’t a commercial hub and doesn’t have any business houses that can afford lavishing business class tickets on people shortlisted for interviews. So the question of the interview being rescheduled in the border town of Lumbini doesn’t make sense. However, if Zahir did appear for the scheduled interview in Kathmandu and irrespective of the results, what made this retired Pakistani army officer to forego a once in a lifetime chance to explore Kathmandu and instead proceed to Lumbini on that very day? Besides being a Buddhist pilgrimage site, Lumbini has little else to offer and it is unlikely that this would have interested Zahir!
Lumbini is in close proximity of the Indo-Nepal border Pakistan’s spy agency ISI is known to be having an ‘operating base’ here. Though it may just be a coincidence, but for Zahir to make it here in such haste is something that doesn’t quite fit into the narrative emerging from Pakistan. Therefore, even if one discount’s the extraordinary concessions made to Zahir by his prospective employers, there is something that doesn’t fit in the scheme of events. One could be generous and attribute Zahir’s travelling to Kathmandu in business class for an interview and a sim card of Nepal being handed over to him at Oman as a gracious act of unprecedented magnanimity on the part of his perspective employers. But, what explains his presence in Lumbini on that very same day?
But if Zahir’s inexplicable visit to Lumbini raises suspicions, it’s the time plan which confirms that is something amiss. I am not aware of the time when Zahir reached Kathmandu on 6th April and it really doesn’t matter. However, what is of concern is the time when he reached Lumbini. As per media reports Zahir’s wife claims that he had texted her his safe arrival at Lumbini at 1:00 PM. Nepal time is 45 minutes ahead of Pakistan and so Zahir must have texted his wife at about 12:15 PM. On checking the Internet, I found that Buddha Airlines operates three flights from Kathmandu to Lumbini and their timings are:
o Departure Kathmandu 9:00 AM, arrival Lumbani 9:35 AM
o Departure Kathmandu 4:30 PM, arrival Lumbani 5:05 PM
o Departure Kathmandu 5:35 PM, arrival Lumbani 5:35 PM
Now if Zahir texted his wife informing her of his arrival in Lumbini at 1:00 PM, then it is obvious that he could have only taken the 9:00 AM flight from Kathmandu. Taking a flight so early would have only been possible in two eventualities. First, that he attended a pre-dawn interview or second, that the interview story was made up as a cover for him to proceeded to Lumbini!
Only when Zahir surfaces will the truth emerge but going by indications, the truth that comes out may not be savoury
‘Disappearance’ of Lt Col Muhammad Habib Zahir
Nilesh Kunwar
At a time when people go missing all over, reports in Pakistani media of Lt Col Muhammad Habib Zahir, a retired Pakistan army officer going missing in Nepal where he had ostensibly gone for a job interview may not be much of news. But this seemingly routine incident has all the ingredients of a potboiler.
What has been reported goes like this:
Lt Col Zahir retired from service in October 2014 and started working at Rafhan Mills in Faisalabad. He post his CV on job portal LinkedIn as well as the UN website and month ago got a telephone call from a UK number as well as an email. The person contacting Zahir is someone calling himself Mark Thompson and the message is that he has been shortlisted for the job of a vice president/zonal director for which he would be required to appear in an interview on 6th April at Kathmandu.
Subsequently, Zahir received a business class ticket to Kathmandu for 5th April and during the stopover in Oman he is received by person called Javed Ansari who provides him a Nepali sim card. The retired army officer reaches Kathmandu on 6th April as scheduled and it is here the story takes an unexpected twist. For reasons not yet known, he leaves for the Buddhist pilgrimage site of Lumbini, a town barely five kilometers from the Indian border on the same day and after reaching texts his safe arrival to his wife at 1:00 PM. Yet, everything seems normal because men in the Indian subcontinent have the proclivity of arbitrarily changing travel plans.
Thereafter, Zahir suddenly vanishes and hasn’t been heard of since then. With both his Pakistani and Nepali mobile numbers being switched off, the plot becomes thicker but things don’t end here. Subsequent inquiries reveal that the UK telephone number used to inform him of the interview in Kathmandu was computer generated and the website used to send the interview call message was registered in India. This has raised suspicions that the retired Pakistani army officer may have been the victim of an abduction plot orchestrated by Indian spy agency RAW!
Pakistan’s paranoia about RAW will most certainly give the abduction theory more currency in the days to come. But if RAW indeed possesses the exceptional abilities of subterfuge and deceit that the Pakistani establishment attributes to it then there are many contradictions in the abduction theory. Firstly, to execute such an elaborate plan just to entrap a middle level army officer who retired two and a half years ago and is working for a commercial enterprise with no defence or intelligence connections makes little sense from the intelligence acquisition point of view. Secondly, only a novice would use a website domain based in India for such a diabolical purpose.
To check out antecedents of one’s prospective employer is something that every individual instinctively does out of curiosity just to see if the proposal is really worth consideration. Lt Col Zahir had served in the artillery and ‘gunners’ (as artillery men are referred to in army parlance) all over the world have one thing in common- they are very meticulous. This is because for ‘gunners’, even an error of one degree can make artillery shells land where they shouldn’t!
So ‘gunners’ grow up in an environment where every order and instruction is repeated by the receiver to rule out possibility of such errors through a system called ‘checking back’ and over the period of time this becomes their second nature. Moreover it is not very common for prospective employers to fly interview aspirants’ business class and so I’m sure that even if he was casual, Zahir would certainly have done his basic homework and done some ‘checking back’ on the bona-fides of his prospective employers!
Though businesses do provide local cellular facilities to prospective employees, which organisation in the world takes the trouble of nominating a person to deliver a sim card to a job aspirant enroute when it is of no use at that point of time? Wouldn’t it have been more convenient and practical for the concerned party that had called Zahir for the interview to have arranged his reception party to deliver the sim on his arrival in Kathmandu? It certainly would have had a greater impact.
But the most intriguing about this whole episode is why Zahir went to Lumbini. This town isn’t a commercial hub and doesn’t have any business houses that can afford lavishing business class tickets on people shortlisted for interviews. So the question of the interview being rescheduled in the border town of Lumbini doesn’t make sense. However, if Zahir did appear for the scheduled interview in Kathmandu and irrespective of the results, what made this retired Pakistani army officer to forego a once in a lifetime chance to explore Kathmandu and instead proceed to Lumbini on that very day? Besides being a Buddhist pilgrimage site, Lumbini has little else to offer and it is unlikely that this would have interested Zahir!
Lumbini is in close proximity of the Indo-Nepal border Pakistan’s spy agency ISI is known to be having an ‘operating base’ here. Though it may just be a coincidence, but for Zahir to make it here in such haste is something that doesn’t quite fit into the narrative emerging from Pakistan. Therefore, even if one discount’s the extraordinary concessions made to Zahir by his prospective employers, there is something that doesn’t fit in the scheme of events. One could be generous and attribute Zahir’s travelling to Kathmandu in business class for an interview and a sim card of Nepal being handed over to him at Oman as a gracious act of unprecedented magnanimity on the part of his perspective employers. But, what explains his presence in Lumbini on that very same day?
But if Zahir’s inexplicable visit to Lumbini raises suspicions, it’s the time plan which confirms that is something amiss. I am not aware of the time when Zahir reached Kathmandu on 6th April and it really doesn’t matter. However, what is of concern is the time when he reached Lumbini. As per media reports Zahir’s wife claims that he had texted her his safe arrival at Lumbini at 1:00 PM. Nepal time is 45 minutes ahead of Pakistan and so Zahir must have texted his wife at about 12:15 PM. On checking the Internet, I found that Buddha Airlines operates three flights from Kathmandu to Lumbini and their timings are:
o Departure Kathmandu 9:00 AM, arrival Lumbani 9:35 AM
o Departure Kathmandu 4:30 PM, arrival Lumbani 5:05 PM
o Departure Kathmandu 5:35 PM, arrival Lumbani 5:35 PM
Now if Zahir texted his wife informing her of his arrival in Lumbini at 1:00 PM, then it is obvious that he could have only taken the 9:00 AM flight from Kathmandu. Taking a flight so early would have only been possible in two eventualities. First, that he attended a pre-dawn interview or second, that the interview story was made up as a cover for him to proceeded to Lumbini!
Only when Zahir surfaces will the truth emerge but going by indications, the truth that comes out may not be savoury
Kshatriya87
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Can't afford to lose habib if he is the mastermind/co-ordinator of mumbai attacks.
sayareakd
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RAWALPINDI: The police have decided to send a team to Nepal to investigate the disappearance of retired Lt Col Habib Zahir who mysteriously went missing in the country earlier this month.
Muhammad Saad Habib, son of the missing retired officer, has suspected involvement of anti-state elements in the kidnapping and lodged an FIR with Rawat police on April 8.
After the case was registered, a Rawalpindi police officer wrote a letter to acting Inspector General of Punjab, retired Capt Usman Khattak, seeking permission from the ministries concerned for sending a team to Nepal’s Lumbini town, near the Indian border, where the retired army officer had gone for a job interview.
Published in Dawn, April 15th, 2017
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Pakistani police team going to Nepal needs be careful, Bihari kidnapping gangs are active in this area, we dont want another team to come looking for them........
Btw why they want to go to pleasure trip on Pak state expenditure, when same can be done by local Pak Embessy.
Muhammad Saad Habib, son of the missing retired officer, has suspected involvement of anti-state elements in the kidnapping and lodged an FIR with Rawat police on April 8.
After the case was registered, a Rawalpindi police officer wrote a letter to acting Inspector General of Punjab, retired Capt Usman Khattak, seeking permission from the ministries concerned for sending a team to Nepal’s Lumbini town, near the Indian border, where the retired army officer had gone for a job interview.
Published in Dawn, April 15th, 2017
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Pakistani police team going to Nepal needs be careful, Bihari kidnapping gangs are active in this area, we dont want another team to come looking for them........
Btw why they want to go to pleasure trip on Pak state expenditure, when same can be done by local Pak Embessy.
vinuzap
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after habib's disappearance afghans have alleady arrested 200 ISI spies in afghanistan
sooner or later retaliation will be more severe :
January 17, 2017
East Champaran
The role of the ISI in the November 20, 2016 train disaster in Kanpur is being suspected after Bihar Police, arrested three people, Moti Paswan, Uma Shankar Patel and Mukesh Yadav, who, they claimed, were working for the Pakistani intelligence agency to target Indian railways. The ISI link was being suspected after the interrogation of the trio, Police said. During interrogation, the three arrested persons provided some "positive lead" about the Indore-Patna Express derailment in Kanpur, District SP Jitendra Rana said.
The trio was arrested from Adapur Police Station area and they allegedly confessed to having worked for a Nepalese contact suspected to be connected to the ISI to target the railways, Rana told. The three are "professional criminals" involved in more than a dozen cases. The three were paid INR 3 lakh by a Nepali man Brajesh Giri, who allegedly had connections with Shamsul Hoda of Dubai, who had links with the ISI, the SP said. The money was paid to them to plant a bomb on the railway tracks at Ghorasan in East Champaran District, bordering Nepal, on October 1, 2016 Rana said.
Unspecified
165 January 18, 2017
East Champaran
Pakistan's ISI operatives in Nepal had offered a flat and a luxury vehicle besides huge cash to each member of the group that was assigned to plant explosives to derail the Indore-Rajendranagar Express near Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh in November, 2016, Police sources said. The revelations came to the fore during interrogation of Moti Paswan, who was arrested from East Champaran District of Bihar, close to the India-Nepal border, on January 16. The arrest was in connection with the abortive attempt to blow up the railway tracks near Ghorasahan in East Champaran, 200km north of Patna, to derail the Raxaul-Sitamarhi passenger train on October 1, 2016.
Moti, one of the three accused arrested in the case, had, according to the Police, revealed to his interrogators that two pressure cooker bombs were planted on the railway tracks at the behest of an India operative of the ISI, who had introduced himself as Brajesh Giri. He was offered INR 3,00,000 for carrying out the blast on the tracks on October 1, 2016. He was accompanied by Arun Ram, also called Mohan, and Deepak Ram, known as Sohan, who were subsequently killed in Nepal for their failure to accomplish the task.
Moti was in constant touch with Brajesh alias Giri Baba, who was assigned to hire people from East Champaran to carry out subversive activities in India at the behest of ISI, the Pakistani spy agency.
Police said that during interrogation, Moti revealed that Giri had promised to provide sufficient funds to the group to make investments in Bhojpuri movies. Giri, who acquired citizenship of Nepal, was introduced to the ISI operatives in Nepal by one Shamshul Hoda, who settled in Dubai for business purposes. Paswan stated, "I left for Nepal after the derailment of the train near Kanpur on November 20 last year. I, along with other members of the group, was supposed to get a house in Delhi where two operatives - Mohammad Zubair and Ziaul - were already settled".
Statement
166 January 29, 2017
Delhi
ISI operative Mehmood Akhtar's statement to interrogators in Delhi that many people from Bhopal had handed over sensitive documents to him, has left intelligence officials in Madhya Pradesh worried. Now efforts are on to identify Akthar's 'agents' in Bhopal, said sources in the intelligence wing. There are inputs that Akhtar had visited Bhopal thrice in the last few years.
Unspecified
ISI and CIA are in gloves with opium business in afghanistan
How the Taliban Gets Its Cash:
Officially, it’s believed that the Taliban has a yearly budget of around 500 million dollars. In private, however, Western and Afghani intelligence agencies admit that the real Taliban budget is closer to between one billion and two billion dollars, with most opting for the higher number. Intelligence sources at the former International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), since replaced by the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), place the number even higher—at more than two billion. Moreover, it is widely believed that the Taliban has stockpiled cash amounting to several billion additional dollars in preparation of a major campaign to seize control of Afghanistan at some point in the future.
Where exactly does the Taliban get all this cash? The sources are many and varied. Narcotics are one of the principal sources of the Taliban’s financing. Over the last two decades, Afghanistan has emerged as the principal source of the world’s heroin, producing somewhere between 70% and 90% of the world’s supply. Afghanistan sits at the heart of a region called the “Golden Crescent,” a rugged mountainous region incorporating northeastern Iran, Afghanistan, and northwestern Pakistan, which is the center of the world’s heroin production. Afghanistan is a “vertically integrated” heroin producer in that the entire process, from the cultivation of the opium poppy to the production of morphine and its subsequent conversion into heroin, all takes place within the country.
It does not appear that the Taliban is actually involved in the physical production of heroin or its antecedents. The Taliban’s principal function in the drug trade is to organize the smuggling of heroin out of Afghanistan, smuggle in chemicals, principally acetic anhydride, that are necessary for the manufacture of heroin and insure that government officials, either through bribery or intimidation, don’t interfere with the heroin trade as well as provide protection to the heroin factories. Because of its use for the synthesis of heroin by the deacetylation of morphine, acetic anhydride is a key ingredient in the manufacture of heroin and it is listed as a U.S. DEA List II precursor, and restricted in many other countries including, at least officially, Afghanistan.
Afghan government sources estimate that the Afghan heroin trade generates approximately two billion dollars in turnover within Afghanistan, with roughly one-third of the proceeds going to the heroin producers, one-third going to the Taliban, and the balance going to expenses including paying poppy farmers, running the heroin factories, and bribes to government officials and security personnel.
Taliban hashish seized by the Drug Enforcement Agency during Operation Albatross
The production of hashish is also a significant source of funding for the Taliban. According to UN sources, Afghanistan is also the world’s largest producer of hashish, supplying approximately 4,000 tons. Utilizing the same smuggling networks as those for heroin, hashish adds another 100 million to 150 million dollars to the Taliban’s coffers. Currently there are approximately 50,000 acres devoted to the production of hashish in roughly 17 provinces. For farmers, the cultivation of hashish is actually more profitable than that of opium poppies, yielding a profit of around 4,000 dollars per acre.
Smuggling, in general, is also a major source of funding for the Taliban. The same networks that can be used to smuggle in arms and munitions, or smuggle out drugs, can be used to smuggle a broad range of goods. Cigarettes, after drugs, are the second most significant item smuggled. Afghanistan imports approximately two billion dollars of Western cigarettes a year, an amount that seems disproportionately high given that only about 20% of inhabitants smoke. In addition, local cigarettes sell for around 30 cents a pack, one-third of the price of Western cigarettes. Western cigarettes cost around a dollar a pack in Afghanistan.
Officially, the Afghan government levies an excise tax of 20% on imported cigarettes. In June 2015, that tax was increased to 100%. In addition, cigarettes sold in Afghanistan are required to bear a government stamp showing that the excise tax has been paid. It appears that the excise tax and its required documentation are largely ignored. Kabul street markets are full of vendors selling Western cigarettes all clearly marked “South Asia Duty Free Sales Only” and absent any government excise tax stamp.
Taliban cigarette smuggling
There are only a handful of Duty Free Stores in Afghanistan, about a half dozen at major airports and border crossings, and a few that cater to ISAF personnel and diplomatic staff. It’s hard to imagine that these stores, perhaps a dozen or two, are responsible for sales of two billion dollars of foreign cigarettes. Those same cigarettes in India will fetch four to five times the average Afghan street price. It’s unclear how much cigarette smuggling adds to the Taliban’s coffers. It could be in the range of 100 to 200 million dollars a year.
In addition, the Taliban operates a range of commercial businesses, including emerald mines in Pakistan’s Swat Valley, timber concessions, some of which are legal some illegal, and marble quarries. The Taliban also levies taxes on citizens and businesses in areas they control. The extent of the contribution from these operations is unclear.
Emeralds from the Taliban controlled Mingora Mine, Swat Valley, Pakistan
Kidnappings are another important source of revenue. Although the United States remains resolute in not paying ransoms for kidnapped Americans (The Bowe Bergdahl case notwithstanding), other European countries have been willing to ransom their citizens. France and Italy have both paid multi-million dollar ransoms to free their nationals. Even Great Britain, which ostensibly agrees with the United States in not paying ransoms, has, it is rumored, on at least one occasion, paid a ransom to free a kidnapped Briton.
In addition, extortion against nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the form of protection money or payments for “security services” is also common. Additionally, kidnappings or extortion of Afghan citizens in both Afghanistan and Pakistan also add to the Taliban’s funds. All told, kidnappings and extortion of westerners, NGOs, and others probably contributes around 50 million dollars yearly.
Two other major sources of Taliban funding are Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) and, ironically, indirectly, the United States itself. Pakistan has supplied the Taliban with a broad range of arms, supplies, and financial help. In addition, the ISI has also assisted the Taliban’s smuggling operations, indirectly adding to their financing.
A significant portion of the Taliban’s Pakistani financing in turn came, ironically, from American sources. Pakistan has been a major recipient of US military and financial aid over the course of the past 15 years. Direct US military and economic assistance to Pakistan has amounted to over 20 billion dollars since 2001. Moreover, a significant amount of additional US aid to Pakistan was channeled through third party contractors. Pakistan was also reimbursed by ISAF for various services that it provided to American and coalition troops.
ISAF soldier keeps watch during construction of Route Trident in Helmand Province, Afghanistan
Directly and indirectly, U.S. financial aid to the Pakistani government is probably upward of 40 billion dollars. A significant amount of that aid went to the ISI, and from there some portion went to finance the Taliban. There is no way to determine what is the actual amount of financial support that the ISI has given the Taliban or how much of this assistance was derived from U.S. aid programs, since much of this aid is in the form of various services and supplies. The Afghan government estimates that actual cash transfers to the Taliban from the ISI have been in the range of 200 to 400 million dollars yearly.
Ironically, another major source of funding for the Taliban has been the construction projects undertaken under the auspices of ISAF, and the bilateral aid programs of the US and other European countries. After three decades of warfare, much of Afghan’s infrastructure had been destroyed. Large portions of its major cities had been reduced to rubble. Power transmission grids, roads, and rail networks have all suffered extensive damage. All told approximately 30 billion to 50 billion dollars was spent on a broad range of construction projects. Many contractors will now readily admit that they routinely added 10% to as much as 40% to the cost of such projects to kick back to the Taliban as protection money.
On a recent trip to Afghanistan one contractor recounted to me a story of a bridge in Helmand province that was built and destroyed a total of six times. According to the story, the contractor agreed to add 20% to the budget for the project and to kick that amount back to the Taliban as protection money on condition that the Taliban would not blow up the bridge until he had been paid for the construction job.
Taliban fighters in Afghanistan
Once the funds had been received he promptly paid the Taliban their cut and they proceeded to blow up the bridge. According to the contractor, the bridge was built and destroyed a total of six times, each time the Taliban getting their 20% of the construction budget. In conversations with other contractors, I tried to confirm if the story was true. All I could get was a chuckle followed by an enigmatic smile. Everyone I spoke to did confirm, however, that it was standard practice to build in a kick back to the Taliban to insure that militants did not attack or disrupt a construction project and that there were numerous examples of projects that were rebuilt multiple times.
I do not know if the story of the Helmand Bridge is true. I doubt we will ever know, but it is nonetheless a fitting metaphor for what happened in Afghanistan during the construction boom that followed the American intervention. Afghan intelligence sources estimate that the Taliban was able to skim off between 10% and 20% of the funds that were earmarked for construction over a roughly ten year period. That would put the Taliban’s take at somewhere between five and ten billion dollars over this period, or roughly an average of $500 million to a billion dollars a year.
The one refrain I heard while I was in Afghanistan, from everyone, government sources, RSM personnel and the proverbial “Afghan man on the street”, was that “the Taliban has plenty of money” and that “for the Taliban money is no problem.” Considering that the Taliban leadership was largely uneducated and inexperienced in matters of finance, it is remarkable that they could administer a multi-stream financial empire that was spitting out yearly several billion dollars in income or that they could do this while in hiding in Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s remote mountain wilderness.
It stands to reason that managing sums of money of this magnitude, collecting them, moving them around and spending them, would require a fairly sophisticated financial network and experienced money managers. Here again, all signs point to the ISI. They already have a track record managing and moving around sums of this magnitude having done it once before for the CIA while funding the mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan during the 1980s. No doubt, the reputation of ISI personnel for having sticky fingers gives them a powerful incentive to manage the Taliban’s cash.
In fact, the Taliban’s most significant weapon is not its arms or its ability to mobilize jihadists, but the vast sums of money that it seems to have at its disposal. The Taliban has billions with which to buy influence, corrupt government officials, and suborn even the most resistant opponent. Money can buy guns and recruit soldiers, but its insidious effects in undermining opposition and corrupting government security forces is far more deadly and a far more formidable challenge. Considering that al-Qaeda’s attack on September 11 cost less than 300,000 dollars, a jihadist organization with the Taliban’s financial resources should be a matter of serious concern.
The most effective strategy for destroying the Taliban once and for all is to uncover the financial networks that it uses to move money around, to cutoff its funding sources, and shut down the smuggling networks and illicit activities that it uses to fund its operations. It may well be that in time the Taliban may drop any pretense of jihadism or a political agenda and simply revert to a criminal enterprise, a common enough evolution among political-terrorist organizations. For now the most effective strategy the US can use to shut down the Taliban is simply to “follow the money.”
sooner or later retaliation will be more severe :
January 17, 2017
East Champaran
The role of the ISI in the November 20, 2016 train disaster in Kanpur is being suspected after Bihar Police, arrested three people, Moti Paswan, Uma Shankar Patel and Mukesh Yadav, who, they claimed, were working for the Pakistani intelligence agency to target Indian railways. The ISI link was being suspected after the interrogation of the trio, Police said. During interrogation, the three arrested persons provided some "positive lead" about the Indore-Patna Express derailment in Kanpur, District SP Jitendra Rana said.
The trio was arrested from Adapur Police Station area and they allegedly confessed to having worked for a Nepalese contact suspected to be connected to the ISI to target the railways, Rana told. The three are "professional criminals" involved in more than a dozen cases. The three were paid INR 3 lakh by a Nepali man Brajesh Giri, who allegedly had connections with Shamsul Hoda of Dubai, who had links with the ISI, the SP said. The money was paid to them to plant a bomb on the railway tracks at Ghorasan in East Champaran District, bordering Nepal, on October 1, 2016 Rana said.
Unspecified
165 January 18, 2017
East Champaran
Pakistan's ISI operatives in Nepal had offered a flat and a luxury vehicle besides huge cash to each member of the group that was assigned to plant explosives to derail the Indore-Rajendranagar Express near Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh in November, 2016, Police sources said. The revelations came to the fore during interrogation of Moti Paswan, who was arrested from East Champaran District of Bihar, close to the India-Nepal border, on January 16. The arrest was in connection with the abortive attempt to blow up the railway tracks near Ghorasahan in East Champaran, 200km north of Patna, to derail the Raxaul-Sitamarhi passenger train on October 1, 2016.
Moti, one of the three accused arrested in the case, had, according to the Police, revealed to his interrogators that two pressure cooker bombs were planted on the railway tracks at the behest of an India operative of the ISI, who had introduced himself as Brajesh Giri. He was offered INR 3,00,000 for carrying out the blast on the tracks on October 1, 2016. He was accompanied by Arun Ram, also called Mohan, and Deepak Ram, known as Sohan, who were subsequently killed in Nepal for their failure to accomplish the task.
Moti was in constant touch with Brajesh alias Giri Baba, who was assigned to hire people from East Champaran to carry out subversive activities in India at the behest of ISI, the Pakistani spy agency.
Police said that during interrogation, Moti revealed that Giri had promised to provide sufficient funds to the group to make investments in Bhojpuri movies. Giri, who acquired citizenship of Nepal, was introduced to the ISI operatives in Nepal by one Shamshul Hoda, who settled in Dubai for business purposes. Paswan stated, "I left for Nepal after the derailment of the train near Kanpur on November 20 last year. I, along with other members of the group, was supposed to get a house in Delhi where two operatives - Mohammad Zubair and Ziaul - were already settled".
Statement
166 January 29, 2017
Delhi
ISI operative Mehmood Akhtar's statement to interrogators in Delhi that many people from Bhopal had handed over sensitive documents to him, has left intelligence officials in Madhya Pradesh worried. Now efforts are on to identify Akthar's 'agents' in Bhopal, said sources in the intelligence wing. There are inputs that Akhtar had visited Bhopal thrice in the last few years.
Unspecified
ISI and CIA are in gloves with opium business in afghanistan
How the Taliban Gets Its Cash:
Officially, it’s believed that the Taliban has a yearly budget of around 500 million dollars. In private, however, Western and Afghani intelligence agencies admit that the real Taliban budget is closer to between one billion and two billion dollars, with most opting for the higher number. Intelligence sources at the former International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), since replaced by the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), place the number even higher—at more than two billion. Moreover, it is widely believed that the Taliban has stockpiled cash amounting to several billion additional dollars in preparation of a major campaign to seize control of Afghanistan at some point in the future.
Where exactly does the Taliban get all this cash? The sources are many and varied. Narcotics are one of the principal sources of the Taliban’s financing. Over the last two decades, Afghanistan has emerged as the principal source of the world’s heroin, producing somewhere between 70% and 90% of the world’s supply. Afghanistan sits at the heart of a region called the “Golden Crescent,” a rugged mountainous region incorporating northeastern Iran, Afghanistan, and northwestern Pakistan, which is the center of the world’s heroin production. Afghanistan is a “vertically integrated” heroin producer in that the entire process, from the cultivation of the opium poppy to the production of morphine and its subsequent conversion into heroin, all takes place within the country.
It does not appear that the Taliban is actually involved in the physical production of heroin or its antecedents. The Taliban’s principal function in the drug trade is to organize the smuggling of heroin out of Afghanistan, smuggle in chemicals, principally acetic anhydride, that are necessary for the manufacture of heroin and insure that government officials, either through bribery or intimidation, don’t interfere with the heroin trade as well as provide protection to the heroin factories. Because of its use for the synthesis of heroin by the deacetylation of morphine, acetic anhydride is a key ingredient in the manufacture of heroin and it is listed as a U.S. DEA List II precursor, and restricted in many other countries including, at least officially, Afghanistan.
Afghan government sources estimate that the Afghan heroin trade generates approximately two billion dollars in turnover within Afghanistan, with roughly one-third of the proceeds going to the heroin producers, one-third going to the Taliban, and the balance going to expenses including paying poppy farmers, running the heroin factories, and bribes to government officials and security personnel.
Taliban hashish seized by the Drug Enforcement Agency during Operation Albatross
The production of hashish is also a significant source of funding for the Taliban. According to UN sources, Afghanistan is also the world’s largest producer of hashish, supplying approximately 4,000 tons. Utilizing the same smuggling networks as those for heroin, hashish adds another 100 million to 150 million dollars to the Taliban’s coffers. Currently there are approximately 50,000 acres devoted to the production of hashish in roughly 17 provinces. For farmers, the cultivation of hashish is actually more profitable than that of opium poppies, yielding a profit of around 4,000 dollars per acre.
Smuggling, in general, is also a major source of funding for the Taliban. The same networks that can be used to smuggle in arms and munitions, or smuggle out drugs, can be used to smuggle a broad range of goods. Cigarettes, after drugs, are the second most significant item smuggled. Afghanistan imports approximately two billion dollars of Western cigarettes a year, an amount that seems disproportionately high given that only about 20% of inhabitants smoke. In addition, local cigarettes sell for around 30 cents a pack, one-third of the price of Western cigarettes. Western cigarettes cost around a dollar a pack in Afghanistan.
Officially, the Afghan government levies an excise tax of 20% on imported cigarettes. In June 2015, that tax was increased to 100%. In addition, cigarettes sold in Afghanistan are required to bear a government stamp showing that the excise tax has been paid. It appears that the excise tax and its required documentation are largely ignored. Kabul street markets are full of vendors selling Western cigarettes all clearly marked “South Asia Duty Free Sales Only” and absent any government excise tax stamp.
Taliban cigarette smuggling
There are only a handful of Duty Free Stores in Afghanistan, about a half dozen at major airports and border crossings, and a few that cater to ISAF personnel and diplomatic staff. It’s hard to imagine that these stores, perhaps a dozen or two, are responsible for sales of two billion dollars of foreign cigarettes. Those same cigarettes in India will fetch four to five times the average Afghan street price. It’s unclear how much cigarette smuggling adds to the Taliban’s coffers. It could be in the range of 100 to 200 million dollars a year.
In addition, the Taliban operates a range of commercial businesses, including emerald mines in Pakistan’s Swat Valley, timber concessions, some of which are legal some illegal, and marble quarries. The Taliban also levies taxes on citizens and businesses in areas they control. The extent of the contribution from these operations is unclear.
Emeralds from the Taliban controlled Mingora Mine, Swat Valley, Pakistan
Kidnappings are another important source of revenue. Although the United States remains resolute in not paying ransoms for kidnapped Americans (The Bowe Bergdahl case notwithstanding), other European countries have been willing to ransom their citizens. France and Italy have both paid multi-million dollar ransoms to free their nationals. Even Great Britain, which ostensibly agrees with the United States in not paying ransoms, has, it is rumored, on at least one occasion, paid a ransom to free a kidnapped Briton.
In addition, extortion against nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the form of protection money or payments for “security services” is also common. Additionally, kidnappings or extortion of Afghan citizens in both Afghanistan and Pakistan also add to the Taliban’s funds. All told, kidnappings and extortion of westerners, NGOs, and others probably contributes around 50 million dollars yearly.
Two other major sources of Taliban funding are Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) and, ironically, indirectly, the United States itself. Pakistan has supplied the Taliban with a broad range of arms, supplies, and financial help. In addition, the ISI has also assisted the Taliban’s smuggling operations, indirectly adding to their financing.
A significant portion of the Taliban’s Pakistani financing in turn came, ironically, from American sources. Pakistan has been a major recipient of US military and financial aid over the course of the past 15 years. Direct US military and economic assistance to Pakistan has amounted to over 20 billion dollars since 2001. Moreover, a significant amount of additional US aid to Pakistan was channeled through third party contractors. Pakistan was also reimbursed by ISAF for various services that it provided to American and coalition troops.
ISAF soldier keeps watch during construction of Route Trident in Helmand Province, Afghanistan
Directly and indirectly, U.S. financial aid to the Pakistani government is probably upward of 40 billion dollars. A significant amount of that aid went to the ISI, and from there some portion went to finance the Taliban. There is no way to determine what is the actual amount of financial support that the ISI has given the Taliban or how much of this assistance was derived from U.S. aid programs, since much of this aid is in the form of various services and supplies. The Afghan government estimates that actual cash transfers to the Taliban from the ISI have been in the range of 200 to 400 million dollars yearly.
Ironically, another major source of funding for the Taliban has been the construction projects undertaken under the auspices of ISAF, and the bilateral aid programs of the US and other European countries. After three decades of warfare, much of Afghan’s infrastructure had been destroyed. Large portions of its major cities had been reduced to rubble. Power transmission grids, roads, and rail networks have all suffered extensive damage. All told approximately 30 billion to 50 billion dollars was spent on a broad range of construction projects. Many contractors will now readily admit that they routinely added 10% to as much as 40% to the cost of such projects to kick back to the Taliban as protection money.
On a recent trip to Afghanistan one contractor recounted to me a story of a bridge in Helmand province that was built and destroyed a total of six times. According to the story, the contractor agreed to add 20% to the budget for the project and to kick that amount back to the Taliban as protection money on condition that the Taliban would not blow up the bridge until he had been paid for the construction job.
Taliban fighters in Afghanistan
Once the funds had been received he promptly paid the Taliban their cut and they proceeded to blow up the bridge. According to the contractor, the bridge was built and destroyed a total of six times, each time the Taliban getting their 20% of the construction budget. In conversations with other contractors, I tried to confirm if the story was true. All I could get was a chuckle followed by an enigmatic smile. Everyone I spoke to did confirm, however, that it was standard practice to build in a kick back to the Taliban to insure that militants did not attack or disrupt a construction project and that there were numerous examples of projects that were rebuilt multiple times.
I do not know if the story of the Helmand Bridge is true. I doubt we will ever know, but it is nonetheless a fitting metaphor for what happened in Afghanistan during the construction boom that followed the American intervention. Afghan intelligence sources estimate that the Taliban was able to skim off between 10% and 20% of the funds that were earmarked for construction over a roughly ten year period. That would put the Taliban’s take at somewhere between five and ten billion dollars over this period, or roughly an average of $500 million to a billion dollars a year.
The one refrain I heard while I was in Afghanistan, from everyone, government sources, RSM personnel and the proverbial “Afghan man on the street”, was that “the Taliban has plenty of money” and that “for the Taliban money is no problem.” Considering that the Taliban leadership was largely uneducated and inexperienced in matters of finance, it is remarkable that they could administer a multi-stream financial empire that was spitting out yearly several billion dollars in income or that they could do this while in hiding in Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s remote mountain wilderness.
It stands to reason that managing sums of money of this magnitude, collecting them, moving them around and spending them, would require a fairly sophisticated financial network and experienced money managers. Here again, all signs point to the ISI. They already have a track record managing and moving around sums of this magnitude having done it once before for the CIA while funding the mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan during the 1980s. No doubt, the reputation of ISI personnel for having sticky fingers gives them a powerful incentive to manage the Taliban’s cash.
In fact, the Taliban’s most significant weapon is not its arms or its ability to mobilize jihadists, but the vast sums of money that it seems to have at its disposal. The Taliban has billions with which to buy influence, corrupt government officials, and suborn even the most resistant opponent. Money can buy guns and recruit soldiers, but its insidious effects in undermining opposition and corrupting government security forces is far more deadly and a far more formidable challenge. Considering that al-Qaeda’s attack on September 11 cost less than 300,000 dollars, a jihadist organization with the Taliban’s financial resources should be a matter of serious concern.
The most effective strategy for destroying the Taliban once and for all is to uncover the financial networks that it uses to move money around, to cutoff its funding sources, and shut down the smuggling networks and illicit activities that it uses to fund its operations. It may well be that in time the Taliban may drop any pretense of jihadism or a political agenda and simply revert to a criminal enterprise, a common enough evolution among political-terrorist organizations. For now the most effective strategy the US can use to shut down the Taliban is simply to “follow the money.”
sayareakd
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New lies from Pakistan, earlier they said some Muslim man has accompanied Habib, now they changed the story.
.
https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/1...ave-links-to-disappearance-of-ex-army-officer
Three more Indian nationals have links to disappearance of ex-army officer
ISLAMABAD: Names of three more Indian nationals have surfaced regarding the disappearance of Lt Col (retd) Muhammad Habib Zahir.
The former Pak Army officer had gone missing earlier this month from Nepal, where he had traveled in pursuit of employment.
Sources disclosed names of three more Indian nationals - Safal Chaudhry, Ms Sabu Rajora and Dolly Rachel – who received him at Lumbini airport and reserved air ticket and hotel for the retired army officer.
Giving further details, the sources said that one Safal Chaudhry had reserved air ticket for Zahir, Ms Sabu Rajora reserved hotel room while Dolly Rachel received him at the Lumbini airport, which is located five kilometers away from Indian border.
The Foreign Office had earlier said that the involvement of enemy country’s spy agencies could not be ruled out in the disappearance of Habib Zahir.
.
https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/1...ave-links-to-disappearance-of-ex-army-officer
Three more Indian nationals have links to disappearance of ex-army officer
ISLAMABAD: Names of three more Indian nationals have surfaced regarding the disappearance of Lt Col (retd) Muhammad Habib Zahir.
The former Pak Army officer had gone missing earlier this month from Nepal, where he had traveled in pursuit of employment.
Sources disclosed names of three more Indian nationals - Safal Chaudhry, Ms Sabu Rajora and Dolly Rachel – who received him at Lumbini airport and reserved air ticket and hotel for the retired army officer.
Giving further details, the sources said that one Safal Chaudhry had reserved air ticket for Zahir, Ms Sabu Rajora reserved hotel room while Dolly Rachel received him at the Lumbini airport, which is located five kilometers away from Indian border.
The Foreign Office had earlier said that the involvement of enemy country’s spy agencies could not be ruled out in the disappearance of Habib Zahir.
New lies from Pakistan, earlier they said some Muslim man has accompanied Habib,
.
https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/1...ave-links-to-disappearance-of-ex-army-officer
Three more Indian nationals have links to disappearance of ex-army officer
ISLAMABAD: Names of three more Indian nationals have surfaced regarding the disappearance of Lt Col (retd) Muhammad Habib Zahir.
The former Pak Army officer had gone missing earlier this month from Nepal, where he had traveled in pursuit of employment.
Sources disclosed names of three more Indian nationals - Safal Chaudhry, Ms Sabu Rajora and Dolly Rachel – who received him at Lumbini airport and reserved air ticket and hotel for the retired army officer.
Giving further details, the sources said that one Safal Chaudhry had reserved air ticket for Zahir, Ms Sabu Rajora reserved hotel room while Dolly Rachel received him at the Lumbini airport, which is located five kilometers away from Indian border.
The Foreign Office had earlier said that the involvement of enemy country’s spy agencies could not be ruled out in the disappearance of Habib Zahir.
Lol pathological liars
:biggrin2:
Kshatriya87
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So India is so inefficient that it needs 1 guy to book an airline ticket and another to book a hotel room?
Just check the airport footage, truth will out !!
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Why are you in the Impression that "Habib" is in Indian custody??
"Habibi" ko "Dharti nigal gai ya Aasman Kha gaya".
Why we Indians are concerned about a Pakistani guy went missing in Nepal. It is headech of porkistan and Nepal.
Kindly note that Mr.Jadhav's Case nad "Habib's" case is different. It was Pakistan which claimed arrest of Mr. Jadhav. But in case of "Habib" India has not claimed arrest, it was porkistan which come out crying that their man got missing, before India can claim any arrest of a porkistani agent/spy.
Hence forget about "Habibi" after extracting and exploiting him he will be dumped in Arabian Sea, as feast to the fishes.
Take chill pill.
LordOfTheUnderworlds
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A practical question . how many people would be needed to carry that fat guy in one piece? he must be heavy.
captscooby81
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one person in a bicycle with a carrier will do to carry him in a gunny bag ... 
lcafanboy
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Pak seeks info on its Lt Col who went missing in Nepal
MEA joint secretary Deepak Mittal (L) and Pakistan ambassador to the UAE Moazzam Ahmad Khan (Middle). (File photo)
NEW DELHI: In what might turn out to be another twist in the Kulbhushan Jadhav case, Pakistan has written to India seeking information about its former army officer, Lt Col Mohammed Habib Zahir, who went missing from Nepal on April 6.
Anonymous Pakistan security officials in the past have been quoted by Pakistan media as saying that India had abducted Habib to secure Jadhav's release but this is the first time Islamabad has officially raised the issue with the Indian mission.
While Indian officials said they had no knowledge about Habib, Pakistan government sources said Islamabad was convinced that he was in India's external intelligence agency RAW's custody.
Nepal embassy officials here told TOI that investigations into Habib's disappearance are still on. Pakistan had earlier approached Nepal foreign ministry seeking their help in locating Habib.
Habib, who had worked in the past with ISI, had just arrived at Lumbini from Kathmandu when he disappeared. According to his family members, he had been offered a job with a UN agency in Nepal and was promised a salary of $ 8,500 per month. Unconfirmed media reports have claimed that he was on a "secret" ISI mission to Nepal.
Pakistan's decision to raise Habib's disappearance officially with India comes at a time the two countries are locked in a legal battle at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over the death sentence awarded to Jadhav by a Pakistan military court.
Brushing aside Pakistan's contention that it lacked jurisdiction in the matter, the ICJ stayed Jadhav's death penalty until the time it gives its final verdict on India's petition seeking his release.
An agency report from Pakistan said that Pakistan's attorney-general Ashtar Ausaf Ali will lead a team to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague on June 8 for a meeting of "agents" from India and Pakistan with the court's president to discuss the future proceedings in the Jadhav case.
While the ICJ upheld India's demand for provisional measures, including a stay on the sentence, Pakistan may choose to invoke Article 76 of the Rules of ICJ which says that at the request of a party the court may, at any time before the final judgement in the case, revoke or modify any decision "concerning provisional measures if, in its opinion, some change in the situation justifies such revocation or modification''. However, for Pakistan to prove that the situation indeed has changed, it might have to give a unilateral assurance to court that it will not hang Jadhav until the court had given its judgement.
http://m.timesofindia.com/india/pak...ent-missing-in-nepal/articleshow/58935786.cms
NEW DELHI: In what might turn out to be another twist in the Kulbhushan Jadhav case, Pakistan has written to India seeking information about its former army officer, Lt Col Mohammed Habib Zahir, who went missing from Nepal on April 6.
Anonymous Pakistan security officials in the past have been quoted by Pakistan media as saying that India had abducted Habib to secure Jadhav's release but this is the first time Islamabad has officially raised the issue with the Indian mission.
While Indian officials said they had no knowledge about Habib, Pakistan government sources said Islamabad was convinced that he was in India's external intelligence agency RAW's custody.
Nepal embassy officials here told TOI that investigations into Habib's disappearance are still on. Pakistan had earlier approached Nepal foreign ministry seeking their help in locating Habib.
Habib, who had worked in the past with ISI, had just arrived at Lumbini from Kathmandu when he disappeared. According to his family members, he had been offered a job with a UN agency in Nepal and was promised a salary of $ 8,500 per month. Unconfirmed media reports have claimed that he was on a "secret" ISI mission to Nepal.
Pakistan's decision to raise Habib's disappearance officially with India comes at a time the two countries are locked in a legal battle at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over the death sentence awarded to Jadhav by a Pakistan military court.
Brushing aside Pakistan's contention that it lacked jurisdiction in the matter, the ICJ stayed Jadhav's death penalty until the time it gives its final verdict on India's petition seeking his release.
An agency report from Pakistan said that Pakistan's attorney-general Ashtar Ausaf Ali will lead a team to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague on June 8 for a meeting of "agents" from India and Pakistan with the court's president to discuss the future proceedings in the Jadhav case.
While the ICJ upheld India's demand for provisional measures, including a stay on the sentence, Pakistan may choose to invoke Article 76 of the Rules of ICJ which says that at the request of a party the court may, at any time before the final judgement in the case, revoke or modify any decision "concerning provisional measures if, in its opinion, some change in the situation justifies such revocation or modification''. However, for Pakistan to prove that the situation indeed has changed, it might have to give a unilateral assurance to court that it will not hang Jadhav until the court had given its judgement.
http://m.timesofindia.com/india/pak...ent-missing-in-nepal/articleshow/58935786.cms
Mikesingh
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That's highly illegal. You can't just abduct a foreign national from another country. You'll be in the dock. So if we did abduct this Porki, it's going to be kept secret (officially). Thus there will be no so called 'exchange'. This Porki is a gonner till the end of days. This was just a lesson to the Porki ISI - you abduct our citizens and we'll abduct yours. Period!
Kshatriya87
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Also, Indians have officially denied any knowledge of him so no question of an exchange. At least not a publically known exchange.
