MRCA Evaluation
Mig-35 Flurcum.
The way the Russians have been behaving over a multiplicity of ongoing defence contracts, it would seem as though they had no real interest in the MMRCA deal. The complexion in ties has changed so deeply since the 1980s, that there is a very palpable degree of acrimony in pretty much every dealing with the Russians these days. They'll release photos of smiling Indian MoD bureaucrafts with their bureau officials, but behind the scenes, things are almost always ugly. Yet, Russia has gargantuan leverage with India, based entirely of course on the huge number of deals yet to be completed. The MiG-35 comes across as not convincing enough, and Russia has still to prove that it is a reliable after-sales supplier. The one thing that the Russians have managed to pull off, is to convince the IAF that the MiG-35 isn't just any old Fulcrum. It's the Fulcrum.
STRENGTHS
One of the principal draws of the MiG-35 is commonality of inventory type. Alongside the Indian Navy's MiG-29Ks and the IAF's upgraded MiG-29s, a lot of senior MoD officials believe the MiG-35 would be a sensible choice that would translate into real savings in infrastructure and trainign costs. The IAF holds its MiG-29s in high esteem. In fact, the MiG-29M/M2 and subsequently the MiG-35, were developed based in part on informal but organised feedback from IAF pilots on what was required to make the MiG-29 a truly multipurpose airplane. The IAF says it is eagerly awaiting more information and a demonstration of the FGA-35 variant of the Phazotron Zhuk-AE AESA radar, yet untested. In demonstration flights, IAF pilots have also been given an expansive look at the MiG-35's highly unique optronic locator system (OLS), which one IAF pilot (who flew the MiG-35 at Aero India 2007) said surpassed similar gear on some of the other aircraft. The OLS consists of an infrared search and track sensor in on the nose of the aircraft, and a ground attack sensor fitted next to one of the intakes. The IAF has been given demonstrations of the RD-33MK turbofan, and is very pleased with what Klimov has managed to achieve with it, against some fairly difficult deadline and legacy odds, though the IAF and MoD were terribly irked and continue to be so with Russia's decision to sell jet engines to Pakistan for the JF programme -- something that could spell real trouble in the final decision (Remember, other countries sell to Pakistan as well, but India reserves great expectations from Russia, especially since Moscow has articulated these loyalties more than once). Rosoboronexport has managed to convince the IAF quite effectively that the MiG-35 is indeed a quantum technological leap from the legacy Fulcrum. Politically, India continues to have enormous strategic ties with Russia, notwithstanding a certain fraying in recent times. Russia has always supported India politically during operations, and has never dared to question India's use of its equipment. Finally, the Russians have the most well-entrenched and experienced lobby within the IAF and government. And extravagant acts of politico-strategic altruism are not unprecedented when it comes to Indo-Russian defence ties.
WEAKNESSES
The MiG-35 programme has a single prototype (the ubiquitous No. 154 -- I flew in this at MAKS 07) and that too one without a full complement of the avionics/sensor package listed in the offered configuration. As a result, the IAF is of the view that a lot of the MiG-35's capabilities, as articulated by its engineers and pilots, are still theoretical, even though they may be perfectly real once the full package is integrated and available. With field evaluations to begin anytime now, there's a sense of apprehension about just how MiG will demonstrate the aircraft without testbed platforms -- which obviously throws up the question, will the IAF consider technological parameters on testbeds rather than on a fully integrated fighter plane? The MiG-35 is rigged with the MIL-STD-1553 electrical data bus, which could prove a serious downer, considering that some rival contenders come with the MIL-STD-1773 optical fibre based data bus, which the IAF is seriously interested in. A factor that almost needs no mentioning is that Russia has carelessly squandered any time it was given to prove its reliability, but persisting with its putrid reputation for being fickle, even heartlessly apathetic, when it came to after-sales support. Even the IAF's existing MiG-29s suffer from serviceability issues as a result of Russia's refusal to cooperate quickly on spares and aggregates support. Something that could go majorly against the MiG-35 is also the fact that the Russian Air Force has no immediate plans to place orders for the aircraft, and is instead going the Super Flanker way with greater gusto. Politically, the government feels there is little that can be politically gained from Russia, considering that strategic ties are already mature, even at a saturation level. Secondly, Russia's position in international politics has plummetted relentlessly since the 1990s, and the country offers no strategic advantages anymore. Third, buying from Russia would be a full-frontal on the US, which -- like it or not -- is India's principal foreign policy holy grail.
JAS-39 Grippin IN
Saab's tagline for the Gripen India campaign ("The Independent Choice") tells you a great deal about the depth of recognition by the company that the competition will most definitely be decided on political lines. Politically, the Gripen is squarely the odds-on underdog in the competition. The fact that it is an "independent choice" hasn't impressed an establishment that refuses to budge from the perception that the purchase of 126 fighters is as much a definitive politico-strategic investment as it is the topping up of depleting squadron strength of the IAF. This is not unreasonable, and even IAF pilots believe that the MMRCA contract is a chance to change a lot of things. Some view the Gripen's marketing as defensive, almost yielding too much to the overwhelming perception that India will buy American. But the aircraft itself has a great deal going for it.
STRENGTHS
Apart from the fact that is undoubtedly an excellent airplane, ironically, the Gripen's biggest play is the fact that it is a relatively independent choice. Within the government, many believe the Gripen is a safe bet at a good price, and one that (like the F-16), fits in with what the IAF had originally asked for. There also exists a belief within the government that the people at Saab have pioneered and fast-tracked the Demo NG programme principally for the MMRCA programme, and taken this to mean a level of commitment. The IAF has also received and been impressed by independent testimonials from the air forces of Hungary and Czech Republic about turnaround and ownership costs of the Gripen C/D. The IAF is also quite impressed with the Gripen's permutation configuration of systems, sensors and avionics, not to mention a quantum leap in the computer/bus (including Link 16), GCAS, satellite comms, payload capacity and EWS between the Gripen C/D and the Gripen NG. The IAF also likes the very nifty Cobra helmet mounted display system. The Gripen's pitch that it can be turned around on the ground (engine, systems) the fastest among all contenders makes it perfect for the IAF. The Gripen team has also squarely pitched the airplane as the a perfect complement to the "big-hitter" Su-30MKIs, implying that India's growing Flanker fleet could be inadvertently rendered superfluous if the heavy contenders in the MMRCA -- the F/A-18, the Typhoon or the Rafale -- were chosen for induction.
WEAKNESSES
Unfortunately, the Gripen's weaknesses are many. The biggest, I've outlined in the intro. The fact that is provides no strategic fruits is a big downer. The fact that Sweden promises not to interfere, but rather provide full autonomy to the Gripen India programme is simply too little in the Indian context. In fact, there are senior officers in the IAF who believe that Saab flatters itself in the belief that Sweden is powerful enough to fiddle with the strategic/military autonomy of a country like India, especially since the MMRCA provides for a total transfer of technology that very nearly precludes the possibility of any meaningful interference post-contract. Another weakness is the aircraft's country of origin itself. Provided that the Saab proves to be the best aircraft in the field evaluation tests (FETs) -- which it well might -- will any Indian government, let alone the Congress -- have the guts to buy Swedish ever again? If anyone has any doubts about the Bofors ghost, cast a glance at the farcical joke being played in the Indian Army's efforts to purchase 400 towed 155-mm artillery guns. It's been on since 2003, with an unprecedented four trial rounds. The final results laid out that the SWS Bofors gun was on top throughout. At the last moment, then Army chief General JJ Singh gave in to a firm political warning and called for a re-tender of the entire competition. It probably speaks volumes that he's now the politically-appointed Governor of Arunachal Pradesh. A stunned Bofors still hasn't recovered from the shock. Saab, which close links with the Bofors company, knows just what a liability being from Sweden is forever more in India. Worse, there's no sidestepping it. Worse still, even the IAF recognises that. The tragedy is, of course, that the Gripen has absolutely nothing to do with Bofors.
F-16IN Block-70
The handful of IAF pilots who got a chance to fly one of the UAE Block 60 Desert Falcons at Yelahanka in February had fantastic things to say about the aircraft. They were sold on everything from the sidestick to the the phenomenally well-designed bubble canopy, and from the gorgeous low altitude handling characteristics to the add-on IR pod. And this is quite separate from their experience of the aircraft's cockpit avionics. That's something that can scarcely be overstated. Based on my personal discussions with pilots, Defence Ministry officials and others familiar with the aircraft, here's a run down of the F-16's strengths and weaknesses in the current MMRCA competition. Remember, this is an overview of the opinion in establishment circles on the aircraft, and not merely a reiteration of facts already in the public domain.
STRENGTHS
There is simply no denying the F-16's operational record, a statistic completely unmatched by any other fighter plane flying today. The figures speak for themselves: 13 million flight hours, out of which 400,000 hours have been spent in combat. The type has flown over 100,000 combat missions and has been proven to be a true multirole fighter. The type has scored 72 air-to-air kills in the combat missions it has been flown on. This is an aspect that enjoys very serious credence within decision-making circles. The fact that the fighter is owned and operated by 24 nations is another source of reassurance. The air force also views this as a de-risking aspect of any potential purchase. The aircraft comes equipped with an AESA radar (the Northrop Grumman AN/APG-80) that the IAF absolutely adores. The IAF also feels the MIL-STD-1773 data bus on the fighter will be an enormous and valuable legacy leap, and this has been a point of some discussion during internal presentations made on the MMRCA contenders. The aircraft's cockpit ergonomics has the IAF in raptures, including former chief S Krishnaswami, who flew an F-16I during a visit to Israel in 2004, and could barely stop talking about what an amazing cockpit it had. One of the F-16's principal strengths is also its unit price. At under $30-million a piece, the IAF views the F-16 as a highly capable fighter at a highly competitive purchase price. The fact that there have been 52 follow-on buys of the type are considered an indicator to the IAF that ownership/lifecycle costs are also competitive. The IAF doesn't miss the fact that the F-16 is one of only two aircraft in the sweepstakes that fits the original weight specs laid out in the original qualitiative requirement -- QRs which were substantially altered later to allow in heavy fighters. Finally, (and probably most importantly!), the F-16 has the backing of the United States government, the target of India's most ambitious current foreign policy initiatives. Needless to say, anyone who downplays that aspect, is doing so at their peril.
WEAKNESSES
Let's get straight to what the IAF and Defence Ministry don't like at all about the F-16. The fact that there is a steady phase-out/replacement programme underway in the US, despite Lockheed-Martin's repeated insistence that there are four large busy production lines. The fact that the US isn't buying anymore Falcons is enough to put serious doubts into India's mind. Picking up early on this, Lockheed has managed to convincingly drive home the point that the F-16 is the logical bridge to the F-35 Lightning II, though this is viewed by the IAF as too crafty. It's almost a fake pledge, considering the gargantual clearances and procedures that would be necessary for India to be considered a buyer of a fifth generation fighter plane. Lockheed's pitch about the F-35 has therefore backfired in parts. A senior IAF officer, recently retired, says "While we were initially only doubtful, the F-35 pitch proved beyond doubt that Lockheed is trying to squeeze the last few drops out of its F-16 production lines, and the Indian requirement is too mouth-watering for them to ignore." The fact that the aircraft is operated by a lot of other countries, ironically, has a minor backlash effect as well on the IAF -- some of the top brass feel that an ambitious new purchase like the MMRCA contract, should be for a unique and exclusive aircraft, not one that is owned and operated by a huge number of other countries (including Pakistan -- the radar signature debate holds credence, incidentally), even though they do reluctantly agree that under the bonnet, the F-16IN is hardly comparable to previous variants of the same type. Finally, relations with the Obama administration have cooled considerably compared to the phonecall-a-minute diplomacy with Bush Jr, and this itself has somewhat blunted the throbbing needle pointing to Washington, even though the President has made it clear that he plans to keep up the evolving strategic dialogue with India.
F-18IN
The F/A-18E/F/IN Super Hornet is a little gem of an aircraft, except it's hardly little. It's 30% heavier than the legacy Hornet, and its designation was only kept the same to ease the pushing through of the idea to US Congress. In a sense, the Hornet is better known than the F-16 during the Cold War era. It was aircraft carriers stacked to the hilt with Hornets that prowled international waters for decades (and continue to do so with both Hornet and Super Hornets). Many say the Super Hornet is a completely new aircraft, which should have been given a new designation number and a new name, considering just what a different aircraft it is. But the IAF recognises that, not least because Boeing's Super Hornet has also been among the most visible aircraft in the sweepstakes:
STRENGTHS
It was Boeing, remember, that changed the entire complexion of the MMRCA, by "elbowing" (a phrase used by the IAF, but not with acrimony) itself into what was to be a competition for a medium-weight, medium-range fighterplane. It was also Boeing which virtually pulled the rug from under the other contenders by being the first to express its intention to supply an active electronically-scalled array (AESA) radar with its contender -- the highly respected Raytheon APG-79 radar. It was only after the IAF began doggedly pursuing information on the Raytheon radar and export licensing information that the other five contenders jumped onto the bandwagon and began either offering AESA radars, or publicising them in a more emphatic manner. The IAF recognises that unwaveringly, but still gives Boeing credit for changing the game. Among the six competing radars, the IAF has also been most exposed to the capabilities of the APG-79 that comes with the Super Hornet, in simulators and live flights. One IAF pilot who took the front seat in a Super Hornet at Aero India 2007 said he found the airplane's digital flight control system (FCS) to be possibly the most mature and intelligent in the world on a fourth generation aircraft. Many in the IAF are of the opinion that alleviation of pilot workload is something that has been achieved in a dramatic way in the Super Hornet -- its cockpit, one pilot says, is the very definition of convenience, automation and ergonomics. The AN/ASQ-228 advanced targeting forward looking infrared (ATFLIR) targeting pod is considered on par, if not better, than Lockheed-Martin's equivalent on the F-16IN. A lot of folks thought the fact that the Super Hornet is a naval fighter would be a downer, but no -- it has actually translated into its acceptance as a far more rugged, quick reaction fighter, which the Super Hornet undoubtedly is. In demonstration flight debriefs, the IAF has been careful to note that the airplane's short take-off capability with near full combat load is undeniable, as are its handling characteristics at low altitude with the same load. The Super Hornet comes backed by a firm that the government of India has a lot of experience dealing with. The fact that ahead of the F-35C, the US Navy's air arm is being standardised across roles on the Super Hornet platform is a source of great reassurance, for its reputation as the Navy's next "swiss-army knife". Being fairly battle proven despite its freshness off the block is a good thing too.
WEAKNESSES
The Super Hornet is in approximately the same weight class as the Su-30, and is, in every way, a heavy hitter, with all the attendant cross-section and logistics issues. The IAF has expressed apprehensions about the Super Hornet's logistics footprint (and its overall impact on ownership costs), though these have been discussed only internally -- they will be taken up during the foreign leg of the field evaluation tests (FETs). The Super Hornet is a rugged, beast of an airplane no doubt, but there remains a substantial quarter in the IAF which is still hung on the apprehension that it is, ultimately, a maritime strike fighter. "Let's face it. The development of the Super Hornet was with the US Navy in mind. The exports to other country's air forces are simply bonuses. It is a maritime strike fighter, with a maritime role development history behind it. Fielding it as an air force jet is borne from commercial considerations. Both Boeing and Lockheed are trying to maximise profits from the F-18/F-16 production lines before they have to shut shop for the F-35," says one senior IAF pilot, who does not fly anymore. The Indian government has opened its Boeing IDS account with the P-8I Poseidon deal -- the government may be wary of laying it on too thick with one vendor.
