China's integrated air defenses—based on cheap, sometimes stolen digital
technology—are now considered potentially more threatening to the U.S. than
Russia's. The wholesale use of commercial products has made Chinese
networks flexible, easy to upgrade and tough to exploit.
[....]
"The Chinese, like many countries without billions to spend on defense, are
figuring out how to leverage all that commercial technology into their military
capabilities," says Rance Walleston, BAE Systems' director of information
operations initiative and information warfare. "We've spent a lot of time looking at
Chinese technologies. They're not building many unique devices. Their
integrated air defense system [IADS] uses commercial standards," such as GSM
and voice over Internet protocols (VOIP).
The Syrian raid—which involved air-to-ground and network-to-network electronic
invasion of a Russian-built IADS—is convincing some that custom-built, highly
specialized and expensive air defenses with long development times are
decreasing in deterrent value. In fact, they have become victims of their own
uniqueness. Because they were hard to develop and field, they aren't often
modified. That gives electronic warriors the time to conduct analysis and build
countermeasures.
But last year's events haven't changed U.S. government views of the threat.
"A lot of the threat models used to evaluate whether new programs work are
outdated," says a participant in electronic warfare and network attack since the
1992-95 conflict in Bosnia. "They are Soviet-era models. Where are the people
who are thinking about what the Chinese IADS really look like? The Israelis are
already running up against different defenses now that they've highlighted some
of the weaknesses in Syria's air defenses."
But some senior U.S. Air Force officials disagree.
"The Chinese have been spending significant amounts for years on their IADS,
and while they do exploit commercial technologies, they also buy and co-develop
advanced missiles and radars with the Russians and others," says a former top
USAF acquisition official. "Network attack has been an integral part of taking
down an IADS for years and is integral to all of the major modeling activities."
U.S. intelligence analysts point out that in air defense, like other areas, China is
pursuing multiple paths that include embracing purchased systems as well as
developing their own high- and low-end solutions. The same is the case in air 62 of 76
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defense, they note, where the Chinese are buying Russian systems and also
developing their own versions based on what they learn from the acquired
systems.
That inability to change quickly also is reflected in U.S. defense acquisition
practices. For example, "the U.S. still insists on building a lot of unique radios
when they could use the commercial infrastructure and then build their own gear
to encrypt it for the last mile [of wireless communications in combat]," the EW
specialist says.
"Why spend billions on [joint tactical radios and future combat systems] that they
can't make as well the commercial companies? Why build high-power, aerial
standoff jammers when there are cheaper and more sophisticated ways to do
that mission with finesse [using lower-power data streams packed with
algorithms to disrupt, mislead or take over enemy systems]? If you believe the
trend in insurgent or terrorist command and control is toward low-power
communications, what is a B-52-based jammer going to do? If I stand off 100 mi.,
there's no way I'm going to have any impact on these threats."