WikiLeaks Revelations

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Classified By: MICHAEL OWENS, ACTING DIR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).

¶1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new

National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on the United

Nations (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued

DOS reporting of biographic information relating to the

United Nations (paragraph 2).

¶A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the 2004 NHCD and

reflects the results of a recent Washington review of

reporting and collection needs focused on the United Nations.

The review produced a comprehensive list of strategic

priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs

(paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as

they allocate resources and update plans to collect

information on the United Nations. The priorities should

also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage

reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission

Strategic Plans (MSPs).

¶B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National

Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was

established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If

needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and

the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following

each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.

¶C. (S/NF) Important information often is available to

non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies

participated in the review of this National HUMINT Collection

Directive. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can

assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to

encourage relevant reporting through their own or State

Department channels.

¶2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting:

¶A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State

reporting officers for much of the biographical information

collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email

and other means is vital to the community's collection

efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for

dissemination to the IC.

¶B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the

following information as possible when they have information

relating to persons linked to : office and

STATE 00080163 002 OF 024

organizational titles; names, position titles and other

information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell

phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information,

such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic

format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and

intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site

identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent

flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant

biographical information.

¶3. (S/NF) Priority issues and issues outline:

¶A. Key Near-Term Issues

1) Darfur/Sudan (FPOL-1)

2) Afghanistan/Pakistan (FPOL-1)

3) Somalia (FPOL-1)

4) Iran (FPOL-1)

5) North Korea (FPOL-1)

¶B. Key Continuing Issues

1) UN Security Council Reform (FPOL-1)

2) Iraq (FPOL-1)

3) Middle East Peace Process (FPOL-1)

4) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC-3)

5) UN Humanitarian and Complex Emergency Response

(HREL-3)

6) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMDN-5H)

7) Terrorist Threat to UN Operations (TERR-5H)

8) Burma (FPOL-1)

¶C. UN Peace and Peacebuilding Operations

1) Africa (FPOL-1)

2) Outside Africa (FPOL-1)

3) Policy Issues (FPOL-1)

¶D. UN Security Council

1) Procedures and Dynamics (FPOL-1)

2) Sanctions (FPOL-1)

¶E. UN Management

1) UN Leadership Dynamics (FPOL-1)

2) Budget and Management Reform (FPOL-1)

¶F. UN General Assembly Tactics and Voting Blocs (FPOL-1)

¶G. Other Substantive Issues

1) Food Security (FOOD-3)

2) Climate Change, Energy, and Environment (ENVR-4)

3) Transnational Economic Issues (ECFS-4H)

4) Arms Control and Treaty Monitoring (ACTM-4)

5) Health Issues (HLTH-4)

6) Terrorism (TERR-5H)

7) Trafficking, Social, and Women's Issues (DEPS-5H)

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¶H. Intelligence and Security Topics

1) GRPO can provide text of this issue.

2) GRPO can provide text of this issue.

3) Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations (FPOL-1)

4) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information

Systems (INFR-5H)

¶15. Collection requirements and tasking

(Agriculture is the Department of Agriculture; Commerce is

the Department of Commerce; DHS is the Department of Homeland

Security; DIA/DH is Defense Intelligence Agency/Defense

HUMINT; Energy is the Department of Energy; DNI/OSC is the

Open Source Center of the Director of National Intelligence;

FBI is the Federal Bureau of Investigation; HHS is the

Department of Health and Human Services; Navy is the Navy

HUMINT element; NCS/CS is the CIA's Clandestine Service;

OSC/MSC is the Map Services Center of OSC; State is the

Department of State; TAREX (Target Exploitation) collects

information using HUMINT Methods in support of NSA's

requirements; Treasury is the Department of Treasury; USAID

is the U.S. Agency for International Development; USSS is the

U.S. Secret Service; USTR is the U.S. Trade Representative;

WINPAC is the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and

Arms Control Center.)

¶A. Key Near-Term Issues

1) Darfur/Sudan (FPOL-1).

-- Views of United Nations (UN) member states on contributing

troops and air transportation equipment, such as helicopters,

to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the African Union

(AU)-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

-- Details of deployments of troop contributor countries to

UNMIS/UNAMID.

-- Details on actions and views of UN personnel deployed in

UNMIS/UNAMID.

-- Views of UNSC members on the success or failure of

UNMIS/UNAMID.

-- Operational plans of UNMIS/UNAMID from both the UN

Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York, and

UNMIS/UNAMID in Sudan.

-- Details of diplomatic engagement between UNMIS/UNAMID

Special Envoys for the Darfur Peace Process in Sudan, and the

Sudanese government or Darfur rebel groups.

-- Views of member states on UN activities in Sudan

(including Darfur).

-- Divisions between UN member and UN Secretariat assessments

of the situation on the ground as it affects UN action.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya,

Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Rwanda, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda,

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Vietnam

International Organizations: AU, European Union (EU), UN

2) Afghanistan/Pakistan (FPOL-1).

-- Plans and intentions of key UN leaders and member states

regarding the ongoing operations of the UN Assistance Mission

in Afghanistan (UNAMA), including force protection in

Afghanistan.

-- Information on plans and intentions of UN leadership or

member states affecting elections in Afghanistan.

-- Reactions to and assessments of security threats directed

at the UN or aid personnel attempting to render humanitarian

assistance.

-- Plans and intentions of key member states and Secretariat

leadership concerning Afghan political and economic

reconstruction, including efforts to combat warlords and drug

trafficking.

-- Afghan, Pakistani and Iranian intentions or reluctance to

secure and safeguard UN and nongovernmental organization

(NGO) personnel (international as well as locally-hired

staff).

Countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa

Rica, Croatia, France, Iran, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Pakistan,

Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam

Terrorist Groups: Taliban

International Organizations: EU, UN, World Bank

3) Somalia (FPOL-1).

-- UN plans and potential to expand, reinforce, or replace

the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and African Union

(AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

-- Plans and intentions of UN leadership, the Department of

Peacekeeping Operations, and member states to deploy a UN-led

maritime force to monitor piracy off the coast of Somalia.

-- Willingness of member states to pledge troops or air

transport to a possible UN or multinational force in Somalia.

-- Views of Somali population on the deployment of a UN or

multinational peacekeeping force in Somalia.

-- Details of diplomatic engagement between UN envoys and

Somali government or Somali opposition officials.

-- Information on World Food Program activities in Somalia.

-- Details of UN Development Program (UNDP)-Somalia training

Transitional Federal Government police officers and Alliance

for the Reliberation of Somalia officials in the Joint

Security Force.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, China, Costa

Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico,

Russia, Somalia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: AU, EU, NATO, UN

4) Iran (FPOL-1).

-- Plans and intentions of the UN Secretary General (SYG),

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Secretariat staff, or member states to address efforts by

Iran to develop, test, or proliferate nuclear weapons.

-- Positions and responses of member states to future

International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) Director

General reports on Iran,s Implementation of Safeguards and

relevant provisions of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.

-- Specific plans and activities of the UK, France, Germany

(EU-3), and Russia with respect to IAEA policy toward Iran.

-- Plans and intentions of key UN leaders and member states,

especially Russia and China, regarding human rights in Iran,

sanctions on Iran, Iran,s arming of HAMAS and Hizballah, and

Iran,s candidacy for UN leadership positions.

-- Plans and intentions of Perm 5, other key member states,

coalition partners, and key Secretariat officials concerning

sanctions against Iran.

-- Member support/opposition/subversion of US positions

regarding Iranian sanctions.

-- Iranian diplomatic efforts with the IAEA and UN member

states to avoid passage of additional sanctions and effective

implementation of existing sanctions, as well as its efforts

to end UNSC involvement in Iran's nuclear program by

returning Iran's nuclear file to the IAEA.

-- Information on Iran,s activities as chair of the UNDP and

within the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

-- Development and democratization activities of the UNDP in

Iran; details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s

relationship with Iranian officials.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Libya,

Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam

Terrorist Groups: HAMAS, Hizballah (Lebanese)

International Organizations: EU, IAEA, UN

Non-State Entities: West Bank and Gaza Strip

5) North Korea (FPOL-1).

-- Plans and intentions of UNSC members, especially the P-5,

to consider additional resolutions against North Korea and/or

sanctions under existing resolutions.

-- Information on the plans and actions of UNSC members to

address efforts by North Korea to develop, test, or

proliferate nuclear weapons.

-- UN views on food aid to North Korea, designating it as a

nation in famine, and misuse of aid.

-- North Korean delegation views and activities;

instructions/plans of delegation officials on North Korean

WMD-related issues.

-- Development and democratization activities of the UNDP in

North Korea.

-- Details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s

relationship with North Korean officials.

-- Biographic and biometric information on ranking North

Korean diplomats.

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Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Russia,

Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: EU, IAEA, UN

¶B. Key Continuing Issues

1) UN Security Council Reform (FPOL-1).

-- Positions, attitudes, and divisions among member states on

UN Security Council (UNSC) reform.

-- Views, plans and intentions of Perm 5 and other member

states on the issue of UNSC enlargement, revision of UNSC

procedures or limitation of Perm 5 privileges.

-- International deliberations regarding UNSC expansion among

key groups of countries: self-appointed frontrunners for

permanent UNSC membership Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan

(the Group of Four or G-4); the Uniting for Consensus group

(especially Mexico, Italy, and Pakistan) that opposes

additional permanent UNSC seats; the African Group; and the

EU, as well as key UN officials within the Secretariat and

the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Presidency.

-- Willingness of member states to implement proposed reforms.

-- Reactions of UN senior leadership towards member

recommendations for UNSC reform.

Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Libya, Mexico,

Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: AU, EU, UN

2) Iraq (FPOL-1).

-- Plans and intentions of the Perm 5, other key member

states, coalition partners, and key Secretariat officials

concerning Iraqi political and economic reconstruction, the

UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), and internal Iraqi

boundaries.

-- Plans and intentions of the International Organization for

Migration to assist with the reintegration of internally

displaced persons and refugees.

-- Extent to which member states will support or subvert US

positions regarding Iraqi objectives, including

reconstruction efforts.

-- Information on plans and intentions of the SYG,

Secretariat staff, or member states affecting elections in

Iraq.

-- Iraqi actions to convert UNAMI to a Chapter 6 mission.

-- Iraqi attitudes toward the UN.

-- Reactions to and assessments of security threats directed

at the UN or aid personnel attempting to render humanitarian

assistance.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Iraq, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,

Uganda, Vietnam

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Terrorist Groups: Insurgents in Iraq, Iraqi Shia Militants

International Organizations: EU, UN, World Bank

3) Middle East Peace Process (FPOL-1).

-- Details on views, plans and intentions of key Secretariat

decision-makers, member states and influential blocs and

coalitions on UN engagement and role in the Middle East Peace

Process (MEPP), including implementation of the roadmap.

-- Indications that a UNGA special session on the Middle East

might be reconvened.

-- Developments within the UN system that would further the

Arab-Israeli peace process.

-- Details about Quartet (EU, UN, US, and Russia) MEPP plans

and efforts, including private objectives behind proposals

and envoy negotiating strategies.

-- Strategy and plans of SYG special envoy regarding US

positions, Quartet plans, and other (EU, Russia, UK) special

envoys.

-- Indications member states or donor countries might scale

back UN peacekeeping presence in or aid donations to the

Middle East.

-- Plans of the SYG or member states to pressure the US on

the MEPP.

-- Views, plans and tactics of the Palestinian Authority,

including its representative to the UN, to gain support in

the UNSC, UNGA, or UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) for its

strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli issues,

including from Russia and EU countries, especially France,

Germany, and UK.

-- Views of Secretary General,s Special Envoy and UNSC on

possible settlement of the Shab'a Farms dispute to include

Syria/Lebanon border demarcation.

-- Secretariat views regarding water management as part of

the Middle East Peace Process, including domestic and

regional competition for allocation.

-- Quartet views on Syria's policies and approach toward

Israel and Palestinians and on Syrian motives behind and

efforts to subvert or support Israeli-Palestinian

negotiations.

-- UN efforts to influence negotiating positions on

territorial boundaries, water resources and management, and

right of return.

-- Views, plans and tactics of HAMAS to gain support in the

UNSC or UNGA for its strategies and positions on

HAMAS-Israeli issues, and on HAMAS-Palestinian Authority

issues, including from Russia, China, Iran, and EU countries,

especially France, Germany, and the UK.

-- Information on UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)

activities in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the West

Bank, and its relations with HAMAS/Hizballah.

-- Plans and intentions of member states to support/oppose US

priority to reduce the number of Middle East resolutions.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

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Croatia, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,

Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Spain, Syria, Russia, Turkey,

Uganda, Vietnam

Terrorist Groups: HAMAS, Hizballah (Lebanese)

International Organizations: EU, UN

Non-State Entities: Palestinian Authority, West Bank and

Gaza Strip

4) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC-3).

-- Plans and policies of UN leaders, member states, and

foreign NGOs to promote human rights.

-- Plans and intentions of member states toward the

International Criminal Court (ICC), International Criminal

Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International

Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Tribunal for

Lebanon, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and other

UN-related courts and tribunals dealing with human rights

issues.

-- Plans and intentions of UNHRC members to support or oppose

US policies in the UNHRC.

-- Views of UNSC and other member states on Zimbabwe,s

government policies on human rights, humanitarian assistance,

democracy, and candidacy for any UN leadership positions.

-- Views and intentions of UNSC, UN human rights entities,

and members regarding Sri Lankan government policies on human

rights and humanitarian assistance; UN views about

appointing a Special Envoy for Sri Lanka.

-- Plans and perceptions of member states toward

establishment of new measures to prevent genocide, crimes

against humanity, war crimes, and other systematic human

rights abuses.

-- Plans and intentions of member states toward proposals and

resolutions supported by the US or like-minded states,

including those advancing democracy; women's rights,

particularly implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1325 and

1820; those pertaining to children in armed conflict; or

those condemning human rights abuses in individual countries.

-- Information on reactions of member states to resolutions

designed to promote democracy, human rights and reforms in

the Muslim world.

-- Perceived success or failure of abilities and priorities

of the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights

(OHCHR), and efforts by member states to undermine OHCHR

independence.

-- Views, intentions and tactics of UNHRC members regarding

reform and the role of the US.

-- Member state support for/opposition to objectives of human

rights, refugee, development, and emergency relief agencies.

-- Plans and intentions of member states or UN Special

Rapporteurs to press for resolutions or investigations into

US counterterrorism strategies and treatment of detainees in

Iraq, Afghanistan or Guantanamo.

-- Degree of coordination by and among human rights agencies,

especially between the UN Human Rights Council, the OHCHR,

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the UNGA Third Committee, the UN Economic and Social Council,

and the International Labor Organization.

-- Plans and agenda for upcoming UNGA Third Committee and

UNHRC sessions and world human rights conferences,

particularly plans by developing countries to stymie

criticism of their human rights records through procedural

motions or influencing votes.

-- Plans of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to

sponsor resolutions or conventions in the UN restricting

freedom of speech under the rubric of criminalizing

"defamation of religion."

-- Details of UNHRC and OHCHR budget shortfalls.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Chad, China, Costa

Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Georgia, Iraq, Japan, Lebanon,

Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,

Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe

International Organizations: AU, EU, Human Rights Entities

and War Crimes Courts, ICC, OIC, UN

5) UN Humanitarian and Complex Emergency Response

(HREL-3).

-- Information on the planning and execution of responses to

humanitarian emergencies by UN member states and Secretariat;

indications US assistance may be requested.

-- Efforts of UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),

World Food Program (WFP), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN

Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO),

and other UN entities to respond to and to coordinate

activities in humanitarian or refugee crises, including

environmental disasters.

-- Views of UN Secretariat, UNSC members, and key member

states on UNRWA.

-- Details on effectiveness of UNHCR and OCHA leadership.

-- Information on ability of UN to gain/not gain humanitarian

access to troubled areas, especially in light of security

concerns.

-- Location of humanitarian facilities, including GPS

coordinates, and number of personnel.

-- Details of friction between UNHCR, OCHA and UN Security

Coordinator Headquarters and field offices.

-- Level of cooperation and coordination or lack thereof

between UN aid agencies and non-UN aid programs.

-- Interoperability and willingness to work with US

coalitions in humanitarian assistance operations; willingness

to provide support despite security threats.

-- Indications of donor fatigue.

-- Status of and member support for/opposition to efforts by

UNHCR to refocus organization's work and to redistribute

programs to other agencies.

-- Details on UNHCR funding shortfalls.

-- Perceived ability of the UNDP to coordinate an effective

UN presence in each country and to promote democratic

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governance.

-- Plans and ability to care for and protect internally

displaced persons.

-- Communications and logistics problems.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,

Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: Economic-Societal Entities,

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN, World Health

Organization

6) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMDN-5H).

-- Plans and intentions of member states to address threats

to international security from the proliferation of weapons

of mass destruction.

-- Views of member states on tactical and substantive aspects

of resolutions pertaining to missile proliferation, missile

defense, nuclear disarmament, the IAEA, and Israel's nuclear

program.

-- Information from key Secretariat decision-makers, key IAEA

Secretariat staff, member states, or influential blocs or

groups, such as the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), the OIC, or

the Group of 77 (G-77), on the role of the UN on nuclear

proliferation or addressing the expansion of capabilities to

produce or use weapons of mass destruction.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,

Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: EU, IAEA, International Arms

Control Organizations, OIC, UN

7) Terrorist Threat to UN Operations (TERR-5H).

-- Plans and intentions of Secretariat and member states to

respond to individuals affiliated with terrorist groups or

state sponsors of terrorism threatening the safety or

security of domestic and overseas UN personnel, facilities,

protectees, or installations.

-- Evidence of relationship or funding between UN personnel

and/or missions and terrorist organizations.

-- Debate in Secretariat, UNSC counterterrorism bodies

(subcommittees), UN agencies and among member states about

measures for funding of security for UN domestic and overseas

facilities, operations, and personnel.

-- Host-country intentions to secure and safeguard UN and NGO

personnel.

-- Reactions to and assessments of terrorist acts directed at

the UN, UN personnel, UN protectees, or domestic and overseas

UN installations, including foreign UN missions in New York.

-- Details of UN efforts to acquire, collect, assess and

disseminate threat information within the US and overseas.

-- Plans of UN security offices to upgrade security at UN

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domestic and overseas UN facilities.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,

Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: UN

8) Burma (FPOL-1).

-- Views of UNSC and member states on Burma,s policies and

actions on human rights, humanitarian assistance, democracy,

and attempts to play a larger UN role.

-- Plans and intentions of the Special Adviser to the UN

Secretary General on Burma regarding future interaction with

Burma and engagement with UN member states.

-- Plans and intentions of the SYG on Burma; level of trust

in his Special Adviser.

-- Views of Burmese officials on the SYG, on his Special

Adviser on Burma, and on key countries in the UN.

-- Role of the UN in Burmese elections.

-- Development and democratization activities of UNDP in

Burma; details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s

relationship with Burmese officials.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia,

Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: EU, UN

¶C. UN Peace and Peacebuilding Operations.

1) Africa (FPOL-1).

-- Plans and intentions of UN leaders and member states

regarding peace operations, especially in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Chad/Central African

Republic, Burundi, Cote d,Ivoire, and Liberia.

-- UN peacekeeping plans and intentions regarding military

operations against rebels based in the eastern part of the

Democratic Republic of the Congo.

-- Early warning information available to the Secretariat on

potential threats to peace and security.

-- UN views on the role of AFRICOM in African conflict

resolution and post-conflict capacity building.

-- UN expectations of US military involvement in African

peacekeeping missions and how this may influence UN

willingness to establish, curb, or end missions.

-- Extent to which UN peace operations in Africa are

straining the resources of the UN and member states; impact

of current operations on future operations and readiness.

-- UN views on peacekeeping mission creep and pressures to

expand the UN role in African conflict zones, either in the

form of more comprehensive "peacemaking" mission mandates or

in areas where security threats demand more aggressive and

timely UN-led multilateral intervention.

-- Details on views of the UN Department of Peacekeeping

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Operations on operational plans, including the ability of the

UN and its member states to build capacity in Africa,

including by working with the AU or other regional

organizations and NGOs.

-- Efforts by China, France, Iran, and others to gain

influence in Africa via UN peace operations.

-- Information on extent of support and capabilities for

peace operations by the AU and the Economic Community of

Western African States (ECOWAS).

-- Official stance on deploying HIV positive troops and

actual practice.

-- Degree to which official peacekeeping reporting matches

unofficial communications of events; views on those

discrepancies.

-- Views of African states that host peacekeepers regarding

UN peacekeeping troops and troop contributing countries.

-- Attitudes and intentions of Ghana and Rwanda concerning UN

peace operations in Africa and perception of their relative

ability to contribute to such efforts.

-- Attitudes of other African States to Ghana/Rwanda

participation and leadership.

Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi,

Central African Republic, Chad, China, Congo, Cote d,Ivoire,

Democratic Republic, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia,

France, India, Japan, Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Nepal,

Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa,

Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zimbabwe

International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN

Non-State Entities: Lord,s Resistance Army

2) Outside Africa (FPOL-1).

-- Plans and intentions of UN leaders and member states

regarding ongoing peace operations outside Africa.

-- Willingness of UN leaders and member states to support UN

peacekeeping efforts and utilize preventive diplomacy in

areas of potential conflict.

-- Views of member states on and plans to respond to the

US-backed G-8 plan to expand global peace operations

capabilities.

-- Views and positions of key member states and Secretariat

toward proposed resolutions, mandates, peacekeeping issues,

and US-sponsored initiatives.

-- Information on whether member states will utilize

references to the ICC to condition support for peace

operations.

-- Information on deployment benchmarks, pre-deployment

screening, and supply and logistic shortfalls in peace

operations.

-- Ability to obtain pledges and deploy capable military

forces, including surge capabilities.

-- Views of UNSC members, the Secretariat, and key member

states on Haiti,s government policies and actions on human

rights, humanitarian assistance, and democracy.

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-- Views and positions of UNSC members, the Secretariat, and

key member states regarding the UN Interim Force in Lebanon

(UNIFIL) and peacekeeping in Lebanon.

Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Georgia, Haiti, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,

Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Uganda,

Uruguay, Vietnam

International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN

3) Policy Issues (FPOL-1).

-- UN member views, plans, and intentions concerning the

capability of the UN to organize, lead, and carry out new,

complex military operations and civilian police operations.

-- Information on Secretariat or member views on or

initiatives for peace operations reform.

-- Information on the appointment of SYG special

representatives for new peace or political operations.

-- Scope, objectives, command structures, rules of

engagement, and threat environment for proposed peacekeeping

activities, including transportation and communications

infrastructures and any available maps.

-- Types, number, and capabilities of troops, equipment, and

materiel that countries are willing to contribute.

-- Information on interoperability of equipment and material

available for logistic support.

-- Information on turf battles between the Department of

Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, and

Department of Political Affairs over control of peace

operations.

-- Information on turf battles between logistic and military

sides of peace operations.

-- UN member views on reform of the Department of

Peacekeeping Operations.

-- Information on troop contributing countries' tendency to

follow orders given by troop contributing country commanders

vice UN field commanders.

-- Influence of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human

Rights (OHCHR) and the Office of the High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNCHR) on including human rights and refugee

concerns within peace operations mandates.

-- Host government views and concerns about UN policies

toward that country.

-- Influence of UN security coordinator on operational

planning; field personnel reaction to UN security directives.

-- Capability/plans for Standby High-Readiness Brigade

(SHIRBRIG) deployments.

-- Details on peacekeeper abuse of women and children;

national and UN responses.

-- Changes in ability of member states, especially member

states of EU, AU and ECOWAS, to contribute troops to peace

operations, including for economic, social, and operational

reasons.

-- Details on contributions of member states (in kind,

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personnel, or financial).

Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, China, Costa

Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, India, Italy, Japan,

Jordan, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia,

Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda,

Uruguay, Vietnam

International Organizations: AU, EU, UN

¶D. UN Security Council

1) Procedures and Dynamics (FPOL-1).

-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC members and

Secretariat on issues that come before the UNSC, especially

voting intentions of UNSC members and priorities or frictions

among the Perm 5.

-- Plans and intentions of UNSC members to support or oppose

US policies in the UNSC.

-- Specific views and positions of key member states on

US-sponsored initiatives, initiatives with implications for

the US, and other proposed resolutions and mandates.

-- Plans, intentions, views, positions, lobbying, and tactics

of regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the

UNSC, especially those that do not include the US

(particularly the Africa Group, AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group,

Arab League, the OIC, and the Group of Latin America and

Caribbean Countries (GRULAC).

-- Differences in the positions of member states, differences

between UN missions and their capitals, internal procedures

for determining voting instructions, and voting instructions

to delegations.

-- Priorities, plans, and intentions of new member states

joining the UNSC, and influences on them by regional groups,

blocs, or coalitions on issues before the UNSC, especially

those that do not include the US (particularly AU, EU, NAM,

G-77, Rio Group, Arab League, and the OIC).

-- Plans and intentions of member states of regional groups

regarding UNSC candidacy.

-- Biographic and biometric information on UNSC Permanent

Representatives, information on their relationships with

their capitals.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,

Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: AU, EU, OIC, UN

2) Sanctions (FPOL-1).

-- UNSC member plans, intentions, and views toward sanctions

issues, especially during negotiations of sanctions

resolutions.

-- Willingness of and efforts by UN member states to violate

sanctions.

-- Perceived and actual impact of sanctions on target

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governments, individuals, entities, as well as on civil

population.

-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC sanctions committee

members.

-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC sanctions committee

expert groups and their ability to support sanctions

monitoring.

-- Pressure to limit scope and length of new sanctions,

especially from coalitions and regional groups.

-- Views and actions of the Secretariat or member states with

regard to sanctions, including to bolster UN ability to

support sanctions implementation and to address violations.

-- Views of target government on sanctions imposed on it.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Sierra Leone,

Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: EU, UN

¶E. UN Management

1) UN Leadership Dynamics (FPOL-1).

-- SYG's management and decision-making style, and his

influence on the Secretariat.

-- Plans, measures and efforts undertaken by the SYG and

subordinates on US political and bureaucratic objectives for

UN management.

-- Role and influence of Secretariat and other key officials

with SYG and other UN system agencies.

-- Views of and brokering by key officials on major issues.

-- Changes in and appointment and selection process for key

officials of Secretariat, specialized agency, committee,

commission, and program officials in New York, Geneva,

Vienna, and other UN system cities, to include special

assistants and chiefs of staff.

-- Personalities, biographic and biometric information,

roles, effectiveness, management styles, and influence of key

UN officials, to include under secretaries, heads of

specialized agencies and their chief advisers, top SYG aides,

heads of peace operations and political field missions,

including force commanders.

-- Relations between key UN officials and member states.

-- Views of member states on the next SYG race, to include

preferred candidates and candidates lacking UN member support.

-- Views of UNSC members and other member states on Cuban,

Iranian, or Syrian candidacy for any UN leadership positions.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, Cuba, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Syria,

Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: UN

2) Budget and Management Reform (FPOL-1).

-- Plans, measures and efforts undertaken by the SYG and

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subordinates on US political and bureaucratic objectives for

UN management.

-- Perceptions of member states of the effectiveness of the

Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the Joint

Inspection Unit (JIU) to combat waste, fraud, mismanagement,

and corruption.

-- Effectiveness of the OIOS, in light of the review of the

OIOS mandate.

-- Plans and moves to implement OIOS recommendations.

-- SYG's view of the role of the OIOS.

-- Secretariat attitudes toward and evidence of corruption in

UN agencies and programs, and willingness to implement

measures to reduce corruption.

-- Plans and intentions of UN member states or the

Secretariat to address corruption issues at the UN and UN

agencies.

-- Plans and intentions of UNDP Executive Board members to

push for or block management reform proposals.

-- Plans and intentions of UNDP Executive Board members or

senior UNDP managers to address potential or actual cases of

corruption or mismanagement by field missions, including

efforts to cover up waste, fraud, or abuse.

-- Internal complaints by UNDP staff about waste, fraud, or

abuse and efforts by UNDP management to respond to them.

-- Plans and intentions of Board members, such as Iran, to

push for increased UNDP funding for programs in their own

countries or those of their friends.

-- Degree of independence from UN headquarters of UNDP

Resident Coordinators in the field and perceptions of field

staff on UN aid consolidation reforms under the "One UN"

Program.

-- Efforts by the G-77 Board members to develop common group

platforms, especially on budget and management reform issues.

-- Developments in the implementation of the performance

based personnel system and contractor reform.

-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UN specialized agency

executive committees.

-- Impact and effectiveness of whistle-blowing provisions on

the UN reform process.

-- Attitudes of UN staff and member states towards extending

a common whistle-blower protection program to all UN funds

and programs.

-- Indications of pressure by member states or groups to

increase or control growth in the budget.

-- Secretariat and member attitudes towards changes in the

scale of assessments.

-- Options under consideration to resolve financial problems.

-- SYG views on and plans for responding to Government

Accountability Office reports calling on the UN to more

effectively implement results-based budgeting, and make

further progress on management reform.

-- Secretariat and member attitudes and plans to improve the

UN budget process.

-- Status and use of advanced information systems to

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streamline UN processes.

Countries: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China,

Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Japan, Libya,

Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: UN

¶F. UN General Assembly Tactics and Voting Blocs (FPOL-1).

-- Plans, intentions, views, positions, lobbying, and tactics

of regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the

General Assembly, especially those that do not include the

US, i.e., the Africa Group, AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group,

Arab League, the OIC, and the GRULAC.

-- Details of bargaining on votes or candidacies and attempts

to marginalize or undermine proposed or planned US positions

or policy initiatives.

-- Information on the EU agenda in the UNGA, especially as it

relates to US priorities in the First, Third, and Fifth

Committees.

-- Information on efforts by the EU or other member states to

secure additional voting rights in the UN and its specialized

agencies.

-- Lobbying by member states for committee membership

assignments or vice presidencies.

-- Information on current and likely future leadership of

regional groups, blocs, and coalitions.

-- Differences over positions between UN missions and their

respective capitals.

-- Voting instructions to delegations on key resolutions.

-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of key committee chairs;

member views of issues that come before these committees.

-- Efforts of Third World countries to moderate, via NAM and

G-77, Third World positions on development, defamation of

religion, or human rights issues.

-- Intentions of UN members to use non-UN bodies and working

groups to bypass perceived UN bureaucracy.

-- Perceptions of member states of the viability and

potential impact of the US-backed Democracy Caucus.

-- Biographical and biometric information on key NAM/G-77/OIC

Permanent Representatives, particularly China, Cuba, Egypt,

India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan,

Uganda, Senegal, and Syria; information on their

relationships with their capitals.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya,

Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Senegal, South Africa,

Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: AU, EU, OIC, UN

¶G. Other Substantive Issues

1) Food Security (FOOD-3).

-- Status and proposals related to the UN Comprehensive

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Framework for Action to address the global food crisis.

-- WFP activities and proposals related to reforming donor

food aid policies and establishing a new standing global fund

to address regularly occurring food crises.

-- WFP and FAO plans and proposals regarding the impact on

food prices and food security of the growing use of ethanol

and biofuels.

-- Internal UN responses to international calls for reform of

FAO and WFP.

Countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa

Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Haiti, Iraq, Japan, Libya,

Mexico, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, Sudan,

Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe

International Organizations: FAO, UN, World Animal Health

Organization

Non-State Entities: Palestinian Authority, West Bank and

Gaza Strip

2) Climate Change, Energy, and Environment (ENVR-4).

-- Country preparations for the December 2009 Copenhagen UN

Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Meeting.

-- Developments related to other UNFCCC meetings and

discussions on a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol.

-- Perceptions of key negotiators on US positions in

environmental negotiations.

-- Developments on the Montreal Protocol, including reactions

to US efforts to limit hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs).

-- Indications that member states working through the UN and

its specialized agencies are/are not fostering environmental

cooperation, partnerships and capacity building between and

among member states and regional and sub-regional

organizations.

-- Monitoring of and compliance with UN-sponsored

environmental treaties; evidence of treaty circumvention.

-- Information on adherence to member states' own national

environmental programs, including protection, monitoring, and

cleanup efforts.

-- Efforts by treaty secretariats to influence treaty

negotiations or compliance.

-- Information on the Convention on Biological Diversity,

particularly on access, benefit sharing and bio-safety.

-- Information on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,

including potential efforts to modify or amend its provisions.

-- Information on excessive maritime claims, including those

relating to ridges.

-- Information on efforts to develop a mechanism to add

chemicals to the list of persistent organic pollutants.

-- Information and perceptions on the strategic approach to

international chemicals management, especially efforts of the

EU's management program.

-- Information on participation in and compliance with the UN

Basel Convention.

-- Status of efforts to set standards to promote

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environmental protection, including protection of forests,

desertification, and invasive or endangered species.

-- Efforts within the UN to protect water resources, and to

promote development of alternative sources of energy.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,

Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: EU, UN

3) Transnational Economic Issues (ECFS-4H).

-- Information on efforts by UN member states or

organizations to promote or obstruct regulatory reform,

including banking and financial reforms, transparency,

international law, trade, development, and foreign direct

investment to reflect the Monterrey anti-poverty consensus

and the Millennium Development Goals.

-- Plans, intentions, and tactics of the UNGA President

regarding international financial problems; views of member

states regarding these plans.

-- Plans and intentions of member states to support US

priorities related to economic freedom and promotion of

democracy.

-- Secretariat or member plans to develop multilateral

economic, trade, or development agreements impinging on US

interests.

-- Efforts by member states and the Secretariat to reconcile

international differences over globalization, especially the

perceived impact of globalization on human rights, labor, and

environmental issues.

-- Member positions on UN decisions, plans, and activities

concerning environmentally sustainable economic growth

through market economies, free trade, private investment, and

efficient multilateral development assistance.

-- Efforts to expand the global compact involving

corporations committed to observing human rights,

environmental, and labor standards.

-- SYG's views and statements on trade issues and efforts to

influence future World Trade Organization rounds.

-- Plans and intentions of UN member states that may impact

freedom of navigation.

-- Information on international taxation initiatives.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,

Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: EU, FAO, International

Financial Institutions and Infrastructures, UN, World Bank,

World Trade Organization

4) Arms Control and Treaty Monitoring (ACTM-4).

-- Plans, tactics, timetables, and draft proposals for the

Eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and especially

STATE 00080163 020 OF 024

information related to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East

and a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone initiative, from

interested individual member states (especially China, Cuba,

Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, and South Africa) and

like-minded groups such as the NAM and the New Agenda

Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South

Africa, and Sweden).

-- Member state views of the major problems facing the NPT;

whether or under what conditions states would consider

withdrawing from the NPT.

-- Member views on and responses to US plans and policies on

missile defense and positions on a Fissile Material Cutoff

Treaty, particularly those of Russia, China, and Pakistan.

-- Information on IAEA plans for safeguards, international

fuel banks, or other nuclear fuel supply arrangements, and

meetings of the Board of Governors at the IAEA.

-- Member views on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

(CTBT); prospects for country ratifications and entry into

force.

-- Member plans for plenary meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers

Group; views of the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation

Initiative.

-- Readiness of member states to reform the agenda of the UN

General Assembly's First Committee; proposals prepared by

member states for the First Committee.

-- Views of key delegations on US proposals on land mines.

-- Tactical and substantive information regarding periodic

arms control meetings in New York, Geneva, Vienna and

elsewhere, including the Biological Weapons Convention, the

Chemical Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty (NPT) review process, UN experts group on missiles,

and meetings on conventional arms.

-- Plans and intentions of member states to introduce new

arms control or proliferation prevention measures or make

significant changes to existing agreements.

- Member or Secretariat plans to address WMD proliferation,

safeguards, arms control and disarmament, or other threat

reduction efforts.

-- Foreign attitudes on UN-sanctioned arms control

negotiations.

-- Biographic and biometric data on, and positions of key UN

arms control interlocutors, especially candidates for the

position of Director General of the IAEA, and the heads of

other international institutions.

Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland,

Japan, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, South

Africa, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: EU, IAEA, International Arms

Control Organizations, NATO, OSCE, UN

5) Health Issues (HLTH-4).

-- UN, WHO, and other international organizations,

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forecasts, expected impacts, plans, proposals, key studies,

and reactions to major health crises and other health-related

issues, including efforts on disease eradication, improving

health standards and access to care and medicine, and

programs to monitor and respond to emerging infectious

disease outbreaks and other disasters or emergencies.

-- Information on deliberations in the UN and other

international health organizations on health issues and the

policy positions and objectives of member states and key

figures, including compromises, insertions, and items omitted

in published declarations and studies.

-- Information on international health organizations,

relationships and interactions with countries and other

organizations, including relationships with regional offices

or subsidiaries.

-- Details on limits and restrictions placed on international

organizations to investigate reports of diseases that pose an

international threat, including restrictions placed on the

nationality of members of investigation teams.

-- Details on disease transparency, particularly indications

about inconsistent reporting of outbreaks to appropriate

international organizations and delivery of specimens to WHO-

and FAO-affiliated laboratories, and including discussions or

agreements impacting the publicly disclosed occurrence of

diseases.

-- Details of discussions related to the accessibility of

HIV/AIDS drugs (antiretroviral drugs or ARVs).

-- Details related to the availability, accessibility, and

regulation of health care, particularly medications,

vaccines, and counterfeits.

-- Member state attitudes toward maintenance of smallpox

stocks.

-- Information on global counterfeit medications to include

surveillance, countermeasures, and research and development

issues.

-- Details on efforts to implement health-related Millennium

Development Goals.

-- Details on corruption in international health

organizations or the corrupt use of goods and services

provided for health issues by bilateral and multilateral

donors and international health organizations, including WHO,

UNAIDS, FAO, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis,

and Malaria.

-- Details on irregularities in Global Fund fundraising,

spending, and treatment of whistle blowers.

-- Personalities, biographic and biometric information,

roles, effectiveness, management styles, and influence of key

health officials, to include the Director General of the WHO,

head of UNAIDS, the Pan American Health Organization, under

Secretaries, heads of specialized agencies and their chief

advisers, and top aides.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,

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Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: EU, FAO, UN, World Animal Health

Organization, WHO

6) Terrorism (TERR-5H).

-- Information on plans and intentions of UN bodies and

member states to respond to or address within UN fora the

worldwide terrorist threat.

-- Structure, plans and key figures of UN counterterrorism

strategy.

-- Information on plans and activities of UNSC,s four

counterterrorism sub-bodies.

-- Plans and intentions of member states to address terrorism

by implementing anti-terrorism legislation as called for

under resolutions, particularly as they relate to tracking

financial transactions.

-- Views of member states on US policy toward terrorism.

-- Efforts of member states to support or oppose activities

undertaken by UN specialized agencies such as the

International Maritime Organization and the International

Civil Aviation Organization to improve maritime and airline

security.

-- Information on UN support for technical assistance to

member states to combat terrorism, particularly in Africa.

-- Views of member states about inclusion or exclusion of

terrorism against Israel in counterterrorism efforts and

definition of terrorism.

-- (For further requirements, see the NHCD on Terrorism

Threats to US Interests at Home and Abroad, July 13, 2005.)

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,

Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: UN

7) Trafficking, Social, and Women's Issues (DEPS-5H).

-- Plans and intentions of member states to support or oppose

US priority to combat trafficking and exploitation of men,

women, and children.

-- Member state perceptions of ability of UN Economic and

Social Council (ECOSOC) to follow through on strategies to

support women and children through UN specialized bodies.

-- Information on member efforts to combat organized crime,

narcotics trafficking, and trafficking in persons.

-- Plans and intentions of member states to address

reproductive issues, including the aims of the EU vis-a-vis

the US, GRULAC, Arab, and OIC nations.

-- Member state perceptions or plans regarding efforts to

reconcile religious differences worldwide.

-- Information on reforms undertaken within the UN

Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

and future plans of the organization.

-- Member views on education initiatives.

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Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,

Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: EU, OIC, UN

¶H. Intelligence and Security Topics

1) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related

requirements.

2) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related

requirements.

3) Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations (FPOL-1).

-- Influence of key UN-affiliated foreign NGOs on UN

decision-making.

-- Efforts of foreign NGOs to undermine US policy initiatives.

-- Foreign NGO role in, views toward, and influence on UN

policies and activities on globalization, justice, human

rights, the environment, and

family/women/children/reproductive issues.

-- Ability and capacity of foreign NGOs to assist refugees,

displaced persons, and victims of disasters through the UNHCR

and WFP.

-- Ability and capacity of foreign NGOs to support the UN

Environmental Program or national efforts with environmental

protection, pollution monitoring, and cleanup efforts.

-- Contacts between foreign NGOs and Secretariat staff that

could involve sharing of confidential data.

-- Foreign efforts to strip US or foreign NGOs of UN

affiliation and to block US or foreign NGOs seeking UN

affiliation.

-- Efforts by member states-*particularly China, Cuba,

Israel, Russia, and Islamic countries*-to obtain NGO

affiliation for organizations supporting their policies.

-- Efforts by organizations affiliated with terrorist

organizations or foreign intelligence organizations to obtain

NGO affiliation with the UN.

-- Efforts by the EU through the Arhus convention to place

NGOs on UN bureaus; reactions of member states to those

efforts.

-- Role of NGOs at the Office of the High Commissioner for

Refugees (OHCR), OHCHR, and UNHRC in the Third Committee of

the UNGA.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, Cuba, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,

Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: EU, OIC, UN

4) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information

Systems (INFR-5H).

-- Current technical specifications, physical layout, and

planned upgrades to telecommunications infrastructure and

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information systems, networks, and technologies used by top

officials and their support staffs.

-- Details on commercial and private VIP networks used for

official communications, to include upgrades, security

measures, passwords, personal encryption keys, and types of V

P N versions used.

-- Telephone numbers and e-mail addresses of key officials,

as well as limited distribution telephone numbers/directories

and public switched networks (PSTN) telephone directories;

dialing numbers for voice, datalink, video teleconferencing,

wireless communications systems, cellular systems, personal

communications systems, and wireless facsimiles.

-- Information on hacking or other security incidents

involving UN networks.

-- Key personnel and functions of UN entity that maintains UN

communications and computer networks.

-- Indications of IO/IW operations directed against the UN.

-- Information about current and future use of communications

systems and technologies by officials or organizations,

including cellular phone networks, mobile satellite phones,

very small aperture terminals (VSAT), trunked and mobile

radios, pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls, encryption,

international connectivity, use of electronic data

interchange, Voice-over-Internet protocol (VoIP), Worldwide

interoperability for microwave access (Wi-Max), and cable and

fiber networks.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,

Uganda, Vietnam

International Organizations: UN
 

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Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Post hosted two CODELS during the week of

May 25: one from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee led

by Senator Casey, the other from the House Committee on

Foreign Affairs led by Congressman Ackerman. Both

delegations met with Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who

conveyed similar points on the Peace Process and Israel's

concerns about Iran. End summary.

Peace Process

-------------

¶2. (C) Barak began his meeting with the Casey delegation by

apologizing for being late due to what he described as an

"internal debate" at the Prime Minister's office regarding

the development of a response to President Obama's upcoming

speech in Cairo. He noted there are "perceived gaps" between

the USG and the GOI regarding the Peace Process, and

explained the GOI's internal debate is focused primarily on

how to ensure that the U.S. and Israel "trust each other."

Barak expressed confidence that PM Netanyahu is sincere in

wanting to "seize this opportunity and move forward" with the

Palestinians, but alluded to members of the coalition who do

not agree with this course of action.

¶3. (C) From his perspective, Barak told the Casey delegation

that the GOI was in no position to dictate policy to the

Palestinians or the USG regarding the Peace Process -- "it

takes two to tango, and three to negotiate," he said. Barak

noted that it is the GOI's responsibility to ensure that "no

stone is left unturned" regarding the Peace Process; if

efforts to achieve peace ultimately fail, then the GOI must

be able to state that every effort was pursued. He said he

personally had no objection to "two states for two nations,"

and panned Arab arguments for a bi-national state in Israel.

Barak said Israel envisions "two peoples living side by side

in peace and good neighborliness" as the final goal.

¶4. (C) With the Ackerman delegation, Barak focused on the

need for a regional approach to the peace process. He

supports a regional initiative for peace and cooperation for

the entire Middle East region to be launched by Israel. He

stressed as well the need to build trust and convince the

U.S. administration that the new Israeli government is

"serious in its efforts toward peace."

¶5. (C) Barak commented on political developments in the West

Bank and Gaza in both meetings. He said the GOI continues to

review its policy, and then added that the Palestinian

Authority has much to accomplish in terms of law enforcement,

a functioning judiciary, and regaining control of Gaza before

a "balanced" Palestinian state can be created. He has been

extremely impressed with the work of U.S. Security

Coordinator Gen. Dayton training PA security forces, and

commended Salam Fayyad's concrete, practical approach.

¶6. (C) Barak made clear in these meetings that he feels the

Palestinian Authority is weak and lacks self-confidence, and

that Gen. Dayton's training helps bolster confidence. He

explained that the GOI had consulted with Egypt and Fatah

prior to Operation Cast Lead, asking if they were willing to

assume control of Gaza once Israel defeated Hamas. Not

surprisingly, Barak said, the GOI received negative answers

from both. He stressed the importance of continued

consultations with both Egypt and Fatah -- as well as the NGO

community -- regarding Gaza reconstruction, and to avoid

publicly linking any resolution in Gaza to the release of

kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.

Iran/North Korea

----------------

¶7. (C) In his meeting with CODEL Casey, Barak said the GOI

believes its "keystone" relations with the USG remain strong.

He described the integral role the USG plays in preserving

Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), especially when

faced with threats posed by Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas. He

noted that the GOI's positions on Iran are well known, and

described North Korea's recent nuclear test as a "second

wake-up call" (the first being the AQ Khan network). Barak

asked rhetorically how a lack of firm response to North Korea

would be interpreted by Iran's leadership, speculating the

USG would be viewed as a "paper tiger."

¶8. (C) In both meetings, Barak said "no option should be

removed from the table" when confronting Iran and North

Korea; engagement will only work in conjunction with a

credible military option, he said. Barak said he was

TEL AVIV 00001177 002 OF 002

personally skeptical that engagement would lead to an

acceptable resolution, and argued in favor of a paradigm

shift to confront the triple threat posed by nuclear

proliferation, Islamic extremist terrorism, and rogue/failing

states. He said a strategic partnership with China, Russia,

India, and the EU is essential in facing these threats.

Barak argued that failure to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran

would result in a nuclear arms race in the region as Turkey,

Egypt, and Saudi Arabia look to acquire nuclear weapons.

¶9. (C) When asked if the USG and GOI have fundamental

differences of opinion when assessing Iran's nuclear program,

Barak said we share the same intelligence, but acknowledged

differences in analysis. He suggested that the USG view is

similar to presenting evidence in a criminal court case in

which a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty.

As such, USG standards are tougher -- especially following

the failure to find WMD in Iraq -- while end-products such as

the 2007 NIE unintentionally take on a softer tone as a

result. Barak said the fate of the region and the world

rests on our ability to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear

weapons -- as such, the standards for determining guilt

should be lower as the costs are higher.

¶10. (C) In both meetings, Barak described Iranians as "chess,

not backgammon players." As such, Iran will attempt to avoid

any hook to hang accusations on, and look to Pakistan and

North Korea as models to emulate in terms of acquiring

nuclear weapons while defying the international community.

He doubted Tehran would opt for an open, relatively

low-threshold test like the recent one in North Korea.

Rather, Iran will seek ways to bypass the NPT while ensuring

its program is redundant and well-protected to prevent an

irreparable military strike. Barak estimated a window

between 6 and 18 months from now in which stopping Iran from

acquiring nuclear weapons might still be viable. After that,

he said, any military solution would result in unacceptable

collateral damage. He also expressed concern that should

Iran develop nuclear capabilities, other rogue states and/or

terrorist groups would not be far behind.

Pakistan

--------

¶11. (C) Barak reinforced his message regarding Pakistan in

both meetings. He described Pakistan as his "private

nightmare," suggesting the world might wake up one morning

"with everything changed" following a potential Islamic

extremist takeover. When asked if the use of force on Iran

might backfire with moderate Muslims in Pakistan, thereby

exacerbating the situation, Barak acknowledged Iran and

Pakistan are interconnected, but disagreed with a causal

chain. To the contrary, he argued that if the United States

had directly confronted North Korea in recent years, others

would be less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons programs.

By avoiding confrontation with Iran, Barak argued, the U.S.

faces a perception of weakness in the region.
 

ifii

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Pakistan defends nuclear stance revealed by WikiLeaks

ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Pakistan on Monday defended its decision to deny the United States access to a nuclear research reactor after leaked diplomatic cables revealed a U.S. attempt to remove enriched uranium from the facility.


More...
 

Vikramaditya

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Iran-Pak gas pipeline unlikely to take off: Wikileaks

Despite Iran and Pakistan signing on an ambitious gas pipeline deal with its possible extension to India, the multi-billion project is unlikely to take off, according to the text of an American diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks. A source, whose name has been removed, in the cable confided to
the US diplomat in a private conversation on June 4, 2009 that he viewed near-term implementation of the Iranian-Pakistani gas link project as "very unlikely", the cable said.

"The downbeat comment by the was made despite the recent signing in Istanbul by President Ahmadinejad and President Zardari of an Iranian-Pakistani MoU committing to the gas project," it said. "According to this source, indicated that he had several reasons for this opinion, but the only one he elaborated was that "the Pakistanis don't have the money to pay for either the pipeline, or the gas," the cable said.

During a panel discussion at the Baku Oil and Gas Show from June 2-5, 2009, on the future prospects of Caspian gas, several commentators noted the difficulty of doing business in "unpredictable, overly bureaucratic" Iran, and the alleged historical "unreliability" of Iranian gas supply contracts previously reached with Turkey and Turkmenistan.

"For example, panelists recounted that, after long negotiations, Iran has four times failed to sign separate Liquid national Gas contracts at the last minute.

Two panelists claimed that Iran has repeatedly diverted gas supplies to meet domestic needs, thereby interrupting its contractual gas exports - and has not paid contractual penalties for these violations," it said.

"A source asserted bluntly that Iranian political leaders are totally focused on domestic needs and personal jockeying, and are simply not interested in hearing about the value of optimising foreign gas exports. The only exception, he claimed, is their interest in the notional prospect of annually exporting ten billion cubic meters (bcms) of gas to Europe," the cable said.

"He attributed this interest to a conviction that such a deal will significantly increase Iran's political leverage in Europe and substantially insulate it from future European pressure - a perception he characterised as revealing, and "typically" unrealistic," it said.

LINK
 

SHASH2K2

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India is not concerned over the recent secret documents released by the whistleblower website Wikileaks, the Indian foreign minister said on Monday.

While the entire international community strongly condemned the publication of the classified cables from U.S. embassies around the world, including in Moscow, India said it was interested in their further development.

"The Indian government is not really concerned, but we are definitely very interested in finding out what Wikileaks is all about. Because they said that they were going to put on the web 4 million documents. So we are watching with interest," Somanahalli Mallaiah Krishna said.

However, Islamabad slammed WikiLeaks diplomatic cables covering Pakistani nuclear program.

"We condemn this irresponsible leak of the secret documents," Dawn News TV channel cited the spokesman for the Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Basit as saying.

Wikileaks cited Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah as referring to Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, as the greatest obstacle to Islamabad's progress.

"When the head is rotten, it affects the whole body," he said.

The documents also say Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin plays the role of "Batman" to President Dmitry Medvedev's "Robin".

In other revelations sure to cause embarrassment in diplomatic circles, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was also described as a "physically and politically weak" leader whose "frequent late nights and penchant for partying hard mean he does not get sufficient rest," according to Elizabeth Dibble, US charge d'affaires in Rome.

Also, a U.S. embassy cable described Afghan leader Hamid Karzai "an extremely weak man" who takes seriously "bizarre stories or plots against him."
 

SHASH2K2

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Till now these leaks has more good than bad for us . Good in terms of exposing China and Pakistan double play and it strengthen our stand against these two countries. its good so far as no shocking revelations against us.
 

RAM

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WikiLeaks: Hillary called India self-appointed front-runner for UNSC seat


WASHINGTON: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described India as a "self-appointed front-runner" for a permanent UNSC seat and directed US envoys to seek minute details about Indian diplomats stationed at the United Nations headquarters, according to classified documents released by WikiLeaks today.

In a potentially damaging disclosure, the whistle-blower website released a "secret" cable issued by Clinton on July 31, 2009, as part of its massive leak of a quarter million classified documents of the American government.

The cable posted by The New York Times gave directions to US diplomats to collect information on key issues like reform of the UN Security Council and Indo-US civilian nuclear deal and pass it on to the intelligence agencies, including on foreign associates' credit card and frequent-flier numbers that could be used to track a person's movements.

It asked US diplomats to ascertain deliberations regarding the UNSC expansion among key groups of countries like "self-appointed front-runners" for permanent UNSC seats -- India, Brazil, Germany and Japan (Group of Four or G-4); Uniting for Consensus group -- especially Mexico, Italy and Pakistan -- that opposes additional permanent UNSC seats; African Group; and European Union, as well as key UN officials within the Secretariat and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Presidency.

It also sought biographical and biometric information on key NAM/G-77/OIC (Organisation of Islamic Countries) permanent representatives, particularly China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Senegal and Syria; and information on their relationships with their capitals.

The cable also wanted to know about members' plans for plenary meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group; views on the US-India civil nuclear cooperation initiative; besides members' views on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); prospects for country ratifications and entry into force.

The New York Times said the leaked cable gave a laundry list of instructions for how State Department employees can fulfil the demands of a "National Humint Collection Directive" in specific countries. Humint being the spy-world jargon for human intelligence collection.

One cable asks officers overseas to gather information about "office and organisational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cellphones, pagers and faxes," as well as "internet and intranet handles, internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent-flier account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information," it said.



Read more: WikiLeaks: Hillary called India self-appointed front-runner for UNSC seat - The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...SC-seat/articleshow/7010909.cms#ixzz16gEh7TzG
 

Parthy

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Wikileaks Cablegate: Iran saw Pakistan as a nuclear-weapons competitor says Lavrov

Some amazing facts are tumbling from Wiki leaks Cablegate. The 09MOSCOW1111 Classified Cable from US's Moscow Embassy on 29/4/2009 has a following revelation " Iran had long been concerned about Israel, and saw Pakistan as a nuclear-weapons
competitor."
Lavrov commended the new U.S. approach to Iran, welcoming President Obama's readiness for the U.S. to engage "fully" in talks with Iran. Willingness to discuss "all" the issues was a welcome step, and one which Russia had been advocating for several years, Lavrov said. Iran wielded a lot of influence in the region, including on Afghanistan, Iraq, Hizbollah, Hamas, Gaza, etc. Iran had long been
concerned about Israel, and saw Pakistan as a nuclear-weapons competitor. Putin had asked Ahmadinejad during a meeting in Tehran a few years before why he made such anti-Israeli statements, but Ahmadinejad had not responded, only saying that Iran was "not doing anything in the nuclear sphere different from Brazil." Putin had replied that Brazil was not in the Middle East. While Iran wanted to dominate the region and the Islamic world, which was of concern to Arab governments, the U.S. should realize that the "Arab Street"
considers Iranian leaders to be heroes.

Further the document mentions

Overall, he said, the Iranians had legitimate security concerns. They had been attacked more than once by their neighbors, and saw Pakistan's nuclear status as "competition for regional leadership."
http://frontierindia.net/wikileaks-...n-as-a-nuclear-weapons-competitor-says-lavrov
 

ganesh177

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What are the possibilites that pakistan secretly allowed US scientists to visit the nuclear sites and remove the enriched uranium, and kept the news away from media to avoid the mayhem ?
 

ganesh177

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If watched closely then so far it has also not harmed US and its foreign policy, infact its other way round makes me think if it is all organised and planned by US to further its foreign policy, by taking entire world for a ride with this master stroke.
 

pmaitra

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US diplomats called Putin 'alpha-dog', German Chancellor 'Teflon Merkel'

WikiLeaks cables reveal voyeuristic descriptions of world leaders

WASHINGTON: While many of the WikiLeaks cables deal with policy issues, there are some voyeuristic dispatches and colourful descriptions of world and regional leaders that are bound to cause red faces across the globe. Others who have dealt with Washington, including ministers and officials from India, might want to hold their breath if the brief preview of WikiLeaks Part I is any indication.

Among the more lively cables is one from the US embassy in Tripoli that says Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi "relies heavily on his long-time Ukrainian nurse, Galyna Kolotnytska," described as a voluptuous blonde who is possibly his lover.

"Some embassy contacts have claimed that Gadhafi and the 38 year-old Kolotnytska have a romantic relationship," the cable says, adding, "While he did not comment on such rumors, a Ukrainian political officer recently confirmed that the Ukrainian nurses 'travel everywhere with the leader'."

In other cables, US diplomats describe German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle as arrogant, vain and critical of America, while reporting that German Chancellor Angela Merkel, nicknamed "Teflon Merkel," avoids risk and is seldom creative. Westerwelle is described as having an "exuberant personality" that sometimes leads to conflict with Merkel, but little foreign policy experience and an ambivalent view toward the US.

Elsewhere, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has been referred to as "alpha-dog," Afghan President Hamid Karzai said to be "driven by paranoia", and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been compared with Adolf Hitler and described as "unbalanced, even crazy."

One detailed cable provides what is almost a psychograph of Ahmad Wali Karzai, Afghan President Hamid Karzai's brother. It says that, "unprompted, AWK raised allegations of his involvement in narcotics, telling the SCR (Senior Civilian Frank Ruggeiro) that he is willing to take a polygraph anytime, anywhere to prove his innocence and that he has hired an attorney in New York to clear his name. He suggested that the coalition pay mullahs to preach against heroin, which would reduce demand for poppy cultivation. AWK dismissed the narcotics allegations as part of a campaign to discredit him, particularly by the media, saying the allegations are 'like a spice added to a dish to make it more enticing to eat'."

The cable then goes on to assess Ahmed Wali Karzai as follows: Further emphasizing his links to the United States, AWK fondly recalled his days in Chicago as a restaurant owner close to Chicago's Wrigley Field. His restaurant was a hub for American in the Midwest who had worked or lived in Afghanistan prior to the Soviet invasion, he said. AWK was eager to engage and rarely stopped talking in the two-hour meeting. While he presented himself as a partner to the United States and is eager to be seen as helping the coalition, he also demonstrated that he will dissemble when it suits his needs. He appears not to understand the level of our knowledge of his activities, and that the coalition views many of his activities as malign, particularly relating to his influence over the police. We will need to monitor his activity closely, and deliver a recurring, transparent message to him of where are redlines are and what we expect of him in the months ahead.

Read more: WikiLeaks cables reveal voyeuristic descriptions of world leaders - The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...leaders/articleshow/7010745.cms#ixzz16gx45zdV
 
Last edited:

SHASH2K2

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Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described India as a "self-appointed front-runner" for a permanent UNSC seat and directed US envoys to seek minute details about Indian diplomats stationed at the United Nations headquarters, according to classified documents released by WikiLeaks on Monday.

In a potentially damaging disclosure, the whistle-blower website released a "secret" cable issued by Clinton on July 31, 2009, as part of its massive leak of a quarter million classified documents of the American government.

The cable posted by The New York Times gave directions to US diplomats to collect information on key issues like reform of the UN Security Council and Indo-US civilian nuclear deal and pass it on to the intelligence agencies, including on foreign associates' credit card and frequent-flier numbers that could be used to track a person's movements.

It asked US diplomats to ascertain deliberations regarding the UNSC expansion among key groups of countries like "self-appointed front-runners" for permanent UNSC seats -- India, Brazil, Germany and Japan (Group of Four or G-4); Uniting for Consensus group -- especially Mexico, Italy and Pakistan -- that opposes additional permanent UNSC seats; African Group; and European Union, as well as key UN officials within the Secretariat and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Presidency.

It also sought biographical and biometric information on key NAM/G-77/OIC (Organisation of Islamic Countries) permanent representatives, particularly China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Senegal and Syria; and information on their relationships with their capitals.

The cable also wanted to know about members' plans for plenary meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group; views on the US-India civil nuclear cooperation initiative; besides members' views on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); prospects for country ratifications and entry into force.

The New York Times said the leaked cable gave a laundry list of instructions for how State Department employees can fulfil the demands of a "National Humint Collection Directive" in specific countries. Humint being the spy-world jargon for human intelligence collection.

One cable asks officers overseas to gather information about "office and organisational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cellphones, pagers and faxes," as well as "internet and intranet handles, internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent-flier account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information," it said.
 

ganesh177

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Further, a us diplomat called mugabe a bully, and saudi king abdullah called zaradi a rotten head, karzai is called paranoid. I am surprised no one called mms a rubber stamp ?
 

SHASH2K2

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Further, a us diplomat called mugabe a bully, and saudi king abdullah called zaradi a rotten head, karzai is called paranoid. I am surprised no one called mms a rubber stamp ?
Pandora box is not fully open . It will be out in few days . There will be enough for us to be pissed off.
 

pmaitra

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Further, a us diplomat called mugabe a bully, and saudi king abdullah called zaradi a rotten head, karzai is called paranoid. I am surprised no one called mms a rubber stamp ?
You meant Zardari, right? However, what is 'mms'? Let me guess, that is Manmohan Singh, is that what you meant? If yes, then, we haven't heard any not-so-flattering terms about him from US diplomats. Let's see what more comes out in the future.
 

pmaitra

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Regarding 'Teflon Merkel', does anyone have any idea why this name was given?

This is my guess, but I could be wrong:
Merkel wants to have friendly relations with Russia along with her neighbours and the US. She wants no friction with her major trading partners and that includes both Russia and the West. Hence, teflon, known for its friction reducing qualities, does indeed suit her.

Edit:
Wikipedia states the following:
Teflon is a nickname given to persons, particularly in politics, to whom criticism does not seem to stick.
 

pmaitra

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Wikileaks cable release 'attack on world'

Wikileaks cable release 'attack on world'

29 November 2010, BBC News

The controversial whistle-blowing site Wikileaks has released a cache of 250,000 secret messages sent by US diplomatic staff.

So far, Wikileaks has published on its site 220 of 251,287 of what it describes as US "cables"; it has given the files in full to five media groups, including the New York Times and Guardian newspapers.

Below are some of the key issues the documents reveal.

Iran attack

Several Arab leaders and their representatives are quoted as urging the US to carry out an attack on Iran to bring an end to its suspected nuclear weapons programme.

In a cable from April 2008, the Saudi ambassador to Washington, Adel al-Jubeir, recalled King Abdullah's "frequent exhortations" to the US to attack Iran.

Mr al-Jubeir said the king wanted the US "to cut the head off the snake"; the cable also reported that the Saudi foreign minister was less extreme, calling for more severe sanctions on Tehran.

During a meeting between King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa of Bahrain and US General David Petraeus, the king told the US to stop Iran's nuclear programme "by whatever means necessary".

"The danger of letting it go on is greater than the danger of stopping it," he is quoted as saying in the cable from ambassador Adam Ereli, dated November 2009.

In a 2006 cable, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Mohammad bin Zayed, told the US he believed Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was "going to take us to war".

Meanwhile, Israel's Defence Minister Ehud Barak used a May 2009 visit by a Congressional delegation to Tel Aviv to warn that time was running out to stop Iran's nuclear programme.

"Barak estimated a window between six and 18 months from now in which stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons might still be viable," says a cable sent back to Washington by the US ambassador the following month.

"After that, he said any military solution would result in unacceptable collateral damage."

Spying on UN

A cable to US diplomats issued under US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's name tells them to collect "biographic and biometric" information - including iris scans, DNA samples and fingerprints - of key officials at the UN.

The diplomats are also ordered to find credit card details, e-mail addresses and passwords and encryption keys used for computer networks and in official communications.

The officials covered include "undersecretaries, heads of specialised agencies and their chief advisers, top SYG [secretary general] aides, heads of peace operations and political field missions, including force commanders".

At least nine similar directives covering various countries are included in the Wikileaks release, both under the name of Mrs Clinton and her predecessor, Condoleezza Rice.

Yemen drones

A January 2010 cable records a meeting between Yemeni President Abdullah Saleh and General David Petraeus, then US commander in the Middle East. The cable shows that the US has been operating clandestine bombing raids on suspected al-Qaeda targets in Yemen, with the approval of the Yemeni government in Sanaa.

Mr Saleh criticises the US use of cruise missiles against targets and says US troops cannot operate on the ground, but gives Gen Petraeus permission for fixed-wing bombers to circle outside Yemeni territory and "out of sight", waiting for target information.

The president is quoted as saying: "We'll continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours," while Deputy Prime Minister Rashad Alimi jokes that he had just "lied" to parliament, by telling them recent air raids in Arhab, Abyan, Shebwa had only been US-made but fired by Yemeni forces.

World leaders

Various world leaders are covered by the documents - showing the diplomats' less than flattering views of them.

Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is referred to as "feckless, vain, and ineffective as a modern European leader" by a US diplomat in Rome.

US diplomats were similarly unimpressed with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, describing her as "risk averse and rarely creative".

A 2009 cable from the US embassy in Tripoli claims that Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi "appears to have an intense dislike or fear of staying on upper floors".

The cable also says Colonel Gaddafi "relies heavily" on his Ukrainian nurse, who has been described as a "voluptuous blonde", and speculates that the two are involved in a romantic relationship.

Zimbabwe Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai is praised as a "brave, committed man" in a 2007 cable written by then ambassador to Harare, Christopher Dell.

But the flattery does not last, and Mr Dell goes on to say: "Tsvangirai is also a flawed figure, not readily open to advice, indecisive and with questionable judgement in selecting those around him."

In another cable, a South African minister takes a pot-shot at Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, describing him as "the crazy old man".

In 2008, the Moscow embassy described Russian President Dmitry Medvedev as playing Robin to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's Batman.

The cables also comment on the extremely close relationship between Mr Berlusconi and Mr Putin.

North Korea's Kim Jong-il is a "flabby old chap" suffering from trauma from a stroke, while Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is referred to as "Hitler".

Pakistan stand-off

Cables reported in the New York Times show US concern over radioactive material in nuclear power stations in Pakistan, with fears it could be used in terror attacks. They reveal the US has been attempting to remove highly enriched uranium from a research reactor in Pakistan since 2007.

In a May 2009 cable, US ambassador Anne W Patterson says Pakistan had refused a visit from US experts. She quotes a Pakistan officials as saying removing the fuel would be seen in Pakistan "as the United States taking Pakistan's nuclear weapons".

China warnings

In November 2007, the US urged Beijing to stop the shipment of ballistic missile components from North Korea to Iran, according to a cable released by the Guardian.

The goods were being moved through Beijing, and Washington demanded a "substantive response" to their request.

"We assess that the best way to prevent these shipments in the future is for Chinese authorities to take action... that will make the Beijing airport a less hospitable transfer point," the cable states.

China was also cited in another cable, reported in the New York Times, over concern at its alleged growing use of large-scale computer hacking.

The cable claims that a network of hackers and private security experts has been employed by China since 2002 and that it has hacked into US government and business computers, those of Western allies and the Dalai Lama.

The cable quotes a "Chinese contact" telling the US embassy in Beijing that the Chinese government had been behind the hacking of Google's computer systems in the country in January.

Guantanamo

The cables appear to reveal discussions between various countries on whether they would take prisoners released from the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.

Slovenia is offered the chance to meet President Barack Obama if it takes a prisoner, while Kiribati, in the South Pacific, is offered millions of dollars of incentives. Brussels is told taking prisoners could be "a low-cost way for Belgium to attain prominence in Europe".

Germany rendition row

In 2004, a German citizen was snatched in Macedonia and allegedly taken to a secret prison by the CIA. Agents had apparently mistaken him for an al-Qaeda suspect.

A 2007 cable from the US embassy in Berlin details the efforts the US made to persuade Germany not to issue international arrest warrants for the CIA agents accused of involvement.

In an account of a high-level meeting between US and German officials, the cables states that US diplomats "pointed out that our intention was not to threaten Germany, but rather to urge that the German government weigh carefully at every step of the way the implications for relations with the US".

Anti-terror in Qatar

The Gulf state of Qatar, which has hosted the American military for years, is described as the "worst in the region" for anti-terrorism, according to a state department cable from last December.

The cable, reported in the New York Times, said Qatar's security service was "hesitant to act against known terrorists out of concern for appearing to be aligned with the US and provoking reprisals".

Korea plans

US and South Korean officials have discussed plans for a united Korea, should North Korea collapse.

The US ambassador to Seoul said South Korea would consider offering commercial incentives to China to "help salve" Beijing's "concerns about living with a reunified Korea".

Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11858990
 

anoop_mig25

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I think wikileaks is more directed towards islamic world then others .america specially wants islamic people to know that its not america but also their masters want to stop iran from getting bomb so stop hating us and start asking questions to heir masters and for rest of words they donot want world to look as partial towards other nation so less important release of informations
 

tarunraju

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I'm surprised they didn't call Manmohan Singh "talking computer", "walkman with weak battery" (talks slooowly), or "porcelain doll".
 

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