WAR 1971

Sakal Gharelu Ustad

Detests Jholawalas
Ambassador
Joined
Apr 28, 2012
Messages
7,114
Likes
7,762

kseeker

Retired
New Member
Joined
Jul 24, 2013
Messages
2,515
Likes
2,126
IAF Pilots of 1971 War Recount their days in Pow Camps in Pakistan [ Part -1 ] | idrw.org

Among the 12 IAF pilots lodged in a PoW camp near Rawalpindi in 1971, Group Captain Dilip Parulkar and Wing Commander M S Grewal tried to escape, and were caught just four miles from border. They tell The Indian Express Editor-in-Chief Shekhar Gupta, on NDTV 24X7's Walk the Talk, about the camaraderie they felt in Pak custody and how their plan came about.

Their story goes back more than four decades. Twelve Indian Air Force pilots, lodged in a Pakistani prisoner of war camp near Rawalpindi in 1971, hatched a great conspiracy. A conspiracy of escape. And three of them did escape, only to be caught four miles from the Afghanistan border. Now Canadian journalist Faith Johnston, an Air Force wife herself, has put together their story in a book called Four Miles to Freedom. Group Captain Dilip Parulkar and Wing Commander M S Grewal were the ringleaders and escapees of that group — the 'bad boys'. Dilip sir, you were shot in 1965 and also 1971.

Parulkar: That's right. But I make a differentiation — in '65, I was shot up, and in '71, I was shot down.

In '65, you were flying a Hunter, took a bullet in your shoulder, and decided not to eject.
Parulkar: I disobeyed orders, so to say, and landed the aeroplane back in Halwara.

Later it was found that the bullet had cut your parachute chord.
Parulkar: Had I ejected, I would have hit the ground at about 400 miles an hour.

So you've lived a charmed life. And then what happened in '71, you were flying a Sukhoi?
Parulkar: The aeroplane did not give me any chance. When I got the bullets in my plane, it went out of control. It is my great fortune that it pitched upwards, because we do all our fighting at about 100 metres or so. Had it pitched downwards, there would have been no time.

And it's a big plane.

Parulkar: Yes, and I had no choice but to eject. Our target was just east of Lahore. It was a radar station, we had to knock it out, which we did during this raid. But I was left behind by the formation.

And Gary Sir — every Grewal in the IAF is Gary — you were flying a Sukhoi as well.

Grewal: I was with 32 Squadron, operating out of Amritsar"¦ I was flying with Air Marshal (V K) Bhatia, and (Flight Lieutenant) V V Tambay"¦ And we were running towards an airfield at Shorkot Road — it's named after their pilot called Rafiqui.

The Pakistani fighter pilot Sarfaraz Ahmad Rafiqui, who was shot down in '65 at Halwara.

Grewal: Yes. This was my second mission of the day. I was in the process of pitching up to get into a dive when I lost control because my hydraulics got hit. The Sukhoi seat, K-30, is marvellous.

The ejection seat.

Grewal: It worked absolutely flawlessly and I landed on the ground, no injuries, but thereafter beaten up by villagers.

Dilip sir, that was your experience as well.

Grewal: Villagers don't spare you. They hit you, kick you, take away your items. They were looking for my revolver, my watch. But fortunately, I was very close to an airfield. The (Pakistani) air force people came, they rescued me from the villagers. They handcuffed me, blindfolded me, marched me to the airfield and there I was interrogated by, I think, the base commander. Within 10-15 minutes, I was put in a jeep and overnight driven to Rawalpindi, which was a long distance. It was a cold night, and we had this thin overall.

That's an insult, a fighter pilot being driven in a jeep!

Parulkar: I was put in a sedan.

Even worse.

Grewal: Talking about how good or bad they are"¦ My shoulders were paining, and one of the soldiers in the jeep who was my guard massaged my shoulders. And they held a cup of tea for me to drink. Early morning, I was dumped in a cell in Rawalpindi. This cell was absolutely unbelievable, it was so filthy. Had I been there another day, I probably would have given up. But next morning, I was taken to a press conference. Practically, all the leading newspapers were there.

You were almost the first PoW. On December 3 was the PAF (Pakistani Air Force) attack, and the IAF responded on 4th morning.

Grewal: On 3rd evening, in Amritsar, three Pakistani Mirages bombed our runway"¦ Air Marshal Bhatia and I were the only two pilots there. Next morning, our squadron flew in from Ambala, and thereafter we operated on the 4th. One mission on the 4th, and on 4th evening, I was shot down. After the press conference.. I said now they won't kill me, the world knows I'm alive.

Dilip sir, when you came down, who received you?

Parulkar: Almost the same thing (as Grewal). One minute you're bombing them, and the next minute they find you coming down in a parachute. So your welcome is assured (laughing)"¦ They started thrashing me, there were a lot of cries, 'kill him' and all that. Luckily, there was a policeman there who had some authority. He said 'No, no, this fellow is much more useful to us alive than dead'. 'He is going to be a fund of information for us'.

Were you that fund of information? I believe you drew the wrong map and were caught.

Parulkar: They wanted a sketch of the Adampur airfield.
The airfield near Jalandhar, one of our major forward air bases. Parulkar: The PAF was very keen to know the defences of Adampur so that they could bomb it, and I was not the person who was going to give it to them. So when they insisted on a sketch, I drew a sketch of the Santacruz airport.

Trust a Punekar to draw a sketch of Santacruz airport and set the bombers on Bombay!

Parulkar: They told me to draw all the gun positions and the ground-to-air missile positions. So I just drew blobs and crosses all over that airfield. This interrogator took that sketch and disappeared for about 10-15 minutes. When he came back, he was more livid"¦ 'You are fooling with us! We'll slaughter you. Isn't Adampur on the Hoshiarpur-Jalandhar main road?' he said. I said, 'Of course it is.' He said, 'Give me that map.' He punished me like a child, 'Go face the corner' and said 'No food for you tonight'. While leaving, he told the armed guard, 'If he moves, shoot him'. Thoughts like — something I had read somewhere — that you don't hear the bullet which hits you, were going through my head when I stood facing a corner. After a few minutes of standing like that, my legs got tired. So I tried to squat down. The armed guard loaded the rifle. So I sprang up again, and stood wondering what was going to happen. After a few more minutes, that same guard said, 'Sa'ab aapki taangein dard kar rahi hongi na (Sir, your legs must be hurting, no)?' I said yes. 'Aisa kijiye sa'ab, baith jaiye. Koi aayega to main khansoonga, uth jaana (Sit down then. When someone comes, I will cough. Stand up then)'.

Just as there is honour among thieves, there is honour and chivalry among soldiers.

Parulkar: There were many, many examples of it.

Grewal: This gentleman, he made me stand in a corner. It must have been past midnight, and the guard wanted a smoke. In the Army, with the cap on and in uniform, you don't smoke. So he wanted to smoke and he asked me, 'Sa'ab main beedi pi loon? Aap bhi baith jao ('Sir, may I smoke? You too sit down)'. So you sit down on your haunches, take a break, and he smokes his beedi.

After he finishes smoking, he says 'Aap khade ho jao (You get up now)'.

Parulkar: Because, to that jawan, we were still officers.

And you find that camaraderie.

Grewal: Same language, same people.

You talked about G-Force in ejecting, let me tell you a story. Remember Denzil Keelor, the fighter pilot who became an Air Marshal? I was at a dinner at the US Ambassador's house for an American air force general, General Merill McPeak. General McPeak was sort of boasting, 'Now we have new simulators that you can pull so much G' — 13-15, some phenomenal number like that, he gave. After he held forth, he asked Air Marshal Keelor, 'Do you also have such simulators?' Keelor said, 'I don't think so, but I am quite sure we don't need them"¦ All our boys have driven around quite a bit in Delhi's autorickshaws'. (All laugh). So, when you were taken to the PoW camp, did you think you would be tortured? Treated badly?

Grewal: The first impression of a camp is that you will be tortured there. That's expected. How much it is and how good or bad they are, comes with time.

It wasn't that bad.

Grewal: No. See, there was no physical beating, or making you bend down or physically abuse you or something. It was just questioning, standing in a corner. In the morning, the interrogator would come at, like, 8 o' clock and ask, 'Gary, would you like to have a cup of tea?'. 'Yes sir, I would love to have it.' That cup of tea would never come.

Psychological torture.

Grewal: And then keep questioning you again and again, same question, in the hope that you will trip, give a wrong answer.

Parulkar: The typical interrogation techniques"¦ The good cop used to try to get under your skin and say, 'That fellow is a terrible chap, be very careful. He doesn't take prisoners. You tell me whatever you like, I'll keep it to myself'.

But it was not unsavoury, or disrespectful?

Grewal: Not at all. They kept asking about the Adampur airfield"¦ They wanted to know (about) a safe corridor so that they could go in and bombard.

But this is the thing about the Indian and Pakistani armed forces. There is a certain degree of camaraderie and fellow feeling.

Parulkar: Well, two of my course mates trained in the US on Sabres. This was immediately after the '62 operations.

When the Americans offered Sabres to us"¦

Parulkar: That time, China was enemy No. 1"¦ They ran to our help and many of my friends and colleagues went to the States to train on Sabres. They had a common training academy. So Pakistanis, Yemenis, Algerians, our IAF pilots, all youngsters in their early 20s, and the base was not far from Las Vegas, the Edwards Air Force base.

They would go and gamble.

Parulkar: That's right. And they used to share cars, go together, party together. They were buddies, they were youngsters.

Flight Lieutenant Vikram Pethia, one of those captured by the Pakistanis, faced rough treatment.

Grewal: Pethia was a little weak physically also and got beaten up very badly. They put cigarette butts on him. Plus, when you end up with civilians, how much beating you take, who does what to you, for how long, there is no control.

Parulkar: It's my great fortune that in the force of (my ejection), a gun I had put in the lowest pocket of the overall, tore the pocket and fell out. It was not found by the people, otherwise"¦ Getting shot with your own revolver is injury on insult.

When did you think of escaping and why? You knew there was going to be an exchange"¦

Parulkar: If you're asking me personally, I had told my commanding officer in 1969 that if I become a prisoner of war — a fighter pilot has the highest chance of becoming a PoW because we are the only guys fighting deep into enemy territory — I told him, 'Sir, there's always a chance of us getting shot in Pakistan. I assure you if I become a prisoner of war, I am going to escape'.

And Gary sir, you?

Grewal: Part of our duty is to escape, so it was a part of my duty. It is Dilip who started this thing, about April, May, that 'Gary, let's try and get out'. I said, 'What's the hurry? Why take a chance?'. This went on two-three times. To add to that, our exuberance was because of us being bachelors. We had no one to cry over us"¦

Parulkar: All the three who escaped were not married (Harish Sinhji being the third). From the second day of my capture, this bug was in my mind, 'Escape, escape, escape'. So when we started meeting, it was almost like requesting Gary whether he'll come along with me.

Grewal: Harish Sinhji, he was one person who was of no help to us during the digging. But he was so persistent ke jaana hai (that he has to go). He was a little guy"¦

And much younger.

Grewal: Of course, he always boasted of his ancestry, being Jhala Rajput, and he said, 'You must take me'. So we had him in that group. But I told him we may have to wade or swim across a river. He didn't even know how to swim. He could not handle a man of his own size, if it came to that.

Grewal: So we finally ended up, three of us in one room, and of course (V S) Chati helped us out.

He was covering up for you?

Garewal: Yes.

Parulkar: And that was very effective. He held out till almost 11 o' clock.

Garewal: Had we gone across the border, probably they wouldn't have known till the evening that people are gone from the camp. It was a holiday, August 14, everybody was fast asleep.

None of your seniors, Commander B A Coelho, D S Jafa, tried to dissuade you? Nobody ordered you not to do it?

Garewal: No, nobody can order us not to do our duty.

But didn't they say that exchange was going to take place? The Simla Agreement would happen?

Parulkar: We had had enough false alarms like that"¦ everytime something diplomatic took place"¦ By that time, things had relaxed, we had a radio to listen to, we had newspapers coming to us. Every week there was something. This news used to come out in Pakistan because they wanted their 95,000 prisoners back"¦ After a few times, Gary lost heart and said, 'Yaar Dilip, enough. We have waited enough'.

Grewal: We had already started work on the wall. We had started removing the bricks.

Parulkar: (Indira Gandhi's special envoy) D P Dhar was to come, and we thought he would take us back in his aeroplane. Those were our hopes (laughs)"¦ And it's a shame that nobody thought of us at all. We were not even part of the negotiations.

Tell us about the Sukhois a little bit. It is a very large plane to be used for ground attack, carried a lot of ordnance.

Grewal: For that era it did.

We lost 18 Sukhois in that war. It formed the bulk of our losses.

Grewal: Maximum Sukhois yes, but don't forget that the maximum number of missions were also done by Sukhois.

So the criticism that the aircraft was bad or too vulnerable"¦

Grewal: No, not at all. But it could be a little too big for that role.

Although it could escape at supersonic speed.

Grewal: Yes"¦ Any other airplane with that kind of tail would have crashed or gone out of control. This thing kept flying. And with lot of other cases like that: bullets through the engine, through the fuselage"¦ There are a few shortcomings, but otherwise you can't blame it, it did its job.

That's why I think more Indian pilots were able to eject than Pakistan pilots.

Parulkar: Definitely, they had miserable ejection seats.

~~~~~~~~~~

Part-2 in next post.
 

kseeker

Retired
New Member
Joined
Jul 24, 2013
Messages
2,515
Likes
2,126
IAF Pilots of 1971 War Recount their days in Pow Camps in Pakistan [ Part -2 ] | idrw.org

In the second part of this Walk the Talk on NDTV 24X7, Wing Commander M S Grewal and Group Captain Dilip Parulkar tell The Indian Express Editor-in-Chief Shekhar Gupta how they executed their escape from the PoW camp near Rawalpindi in 1971, and how they were caught.

When you started planning the escape, what was the first thing you did? I believe Dilip sir here wanted to kidnap a Pakistani soldier.

Parulkar: That was the first thought that came to me. Whenever we went to the toilet at night (while in custody), one very sleepy corporal with a side holster and revolver would come with us. I remember his name, Corporal Mahfuz Khan. He was a Pathan from the NWFP (North-West Frontier Province), very dopey. I thought I could easily capture him. I was in my early 20s, I thought I could hold his revolver against his head, holding him hostage. This romantic idea came to me because of one aeroplane that had been commandeered by an Italian lover in the US. He had got the pilot to fly back all the way to Europe. But those are American values and Italian values.

Moreover, you were trading a poor corporal for a flight lieutenant!

Parulkar: In fact, when I thought over it calmly, I thought that in our country, they would shoot him before they shoot me for allowing this to happen (laughs). So I gave up that idea.

When did you start on the wall?

Grewal: See, we knew from our observations, from the bathroom where you could pull yourself up into a little ventilator, that there was an unprotected area behind our room. It was a biggish room and there was a little corridor used by the Pakistanis to move from a building to our area. That particular building was a recruiting and information centre for the Pakistan Air Force and it was completely unprotected at evening and night, with one chowkidar sleeping outside. We knew that if we could go through the wall, we would be in that building. It was Dilip's room to start with.

Were you able to scrape out the window?

Grewal: No, the window idea was before that. He (Dilip) was trying the window by himself. The window was also in the same room, looking on to the same corridor.

Parulkar: The window was located such a way that it could be seen only from a very specific, small, zone. Also, it was very old.

Grewal: It was half-gone, the frame was shaking.

Parulkar: So that is what gave me the idea. I did work on it up to the point where one push would have sent it out. And that required the cover of bad weather.

Grewal: Thereafter, we got down to the other plan, where we finally made it.

Parulkar: That was after Gary (Grewal) joined us.

Grewal: We had the wall worked out, we had the bed placed there, the bed covered with blankets, manoeuvred from here and there.

How did you dig the hole into the wall?

Grewal: It was an 18-inch-thick wall, you know, how they put bricks one after another, and mortar on the sides. We knew we had to scrape off the mortar inside. The mortar outside, we did not know about. But in between the bricks — what we call masala — it was not very strong.

What did you use to scrape it?

Grewal: We had a knife, a fork. And, in there, we were allowed to call a little boy to get us soft drinks like Coke or Pepsi. They would not remove the lid because it spilled. Have you seen an automobile engine valve? They had sharpened it and they would put the valve on top (of the bottle), bang it in and put a straw in. I took this valve from him.

Parulkar: We also had scissors, we had all grown a beard and we used it for trimming.

Grewal: With these three-four things, we could scrape the mortar in between the bricks. We would get down to work at night, Dilip and I. I would do it for half an hour, then I would get out, then he would spend an hour there, then I would get back. We went on till 12.30 or 1 at night, while (V S ) Chati and Hari Sinhji (the third person to escape with Grewal and Parulkar) kept watch.

Nobody heard anything suspicious?

Grewal: No, the guards were far away, and they were patrolling. And scraping was a slow process. The mortar that came out, we would put it in Red Cross boxes and stack them up right in front of them during the day. They could see them, but nobody opened to see what was inside the boxes. And we would clean the (cleared hole) and put the bricks back, and then again start. This process went on for more than a month.

What was the inspiration? I believe The Great Escape, Steve McQueen?

Grewal: Oh yes, we had seen all those movies, read all those books.

Papillon?

Parulkar: I had read Papillon just prior to"¦

Grewal: Have you heard about The One That Got Away, by (Franz) von Werra?

Yes. So what happened when you three got out? Chati stayed back.

Grewal: Once the hole was ready, the three of us were prepared. We told everybody we will be going. Before that, two of our attempts had failed.

Parulkar: Gary, because of his father's experience with criminals in Amritsar, had this idea that we can go through this all in one night. That is what burglars used to do in Amritsar. But we found this plaster to be a very huge obstacle. What we had to do is make a groove right along the periphery of that hole. We had made a size through which we could crawl easily. And we were making a groove right around the boundary of it. Gary was the last person to work on that. When he finally broke pieces of it, he said, 'Dilip, ye to biscuit ki tarah toot raha hai (this is breaking like a biscuit)' (laughs).

And then you smelled freedom.

Grewal: It had just started raining, drizzling.

Parulkar: The bad weather that we were hoping for all along happened at that very time. Providence was on our side.

I believe you walked out when a movie show had ended, there was a lot of crowd.

Grewal: Yes, we presumed a movie show had ended because there were rickshaws, tongas, shouting, the typical Indian scene. We were like anybody else on the road.

And then what happens?

Grewal: We come to a place where Peshawar University is on our right. At this university, there are a lot of people, and we don't know whether to proceed or stop. Dilip suggests, let's hide under a culvert. There's a railway line on the left.

Parulkar: Which we had studied on the map, that there is a railway line which goes on the left. That was part of the plan, to follow the railway line. And that would go past Landi Kotal up to Landi Khana. According to the map, Landi Khana was the last halt in that district. That was a gap in our intelligence, it was a major gap. It was there in the British days, but no more.

Grewal: You see, Landi Khana had vanished. So finally when we reached there, after one bus ride and then another bus ride"¦

You were searching for a place that didn't exist anymore.

Grewal: Right.

It was a train station in British times.

Grewal: We could have told a taxi fellow that we want to go to Torkham. But we thought if we tell him Torkham, he'll say, 'Oh, they want to cross the border'. So we said we want to go to see Landi Khana, and we're going back from there. But there was no Landi Khana.

Then you got caught. The tehsildar's clerk, or someone, got suspicious.

Grewal: Steno or clerk, someone. We are standing there, the three of us. There's a tea shop, and we're talking to the taxi guys, and we are negotiating just for the sake of negotiating, to bring down the price.

So it doesn't look like you are throwing money.

Parulkar: That's right.

Grewal: We are just being natural. But this guy is standing there, the road is not very wide. He comes across and says, 'Kaun ho, kahan jana hai (Who are you, where are you going)?' We said we've come from Lahore, we are going to Landi Khana. He said there is no Landi Khana. In the meantime, Dilip had gone and bought caps, we had put the caps on our heads and we had finished the tea. People started gathering.

Parulkar: We had decided money was no issue, let's go. Because we had money.

You were getting your PoW allowance, Rs 57 a month, a princely figure then, in addition to your salary in India.

Parulkar: Which I saved very carefully and, on the last two days of the month, the group used to get after me, 'Dilip, tu is mahine to nahin jaa raha yaar (you are not going this month, no), let's buy khubani, apricots'.

Grewal: We had apricots, we had chocolates, we had condensed milk tins.

Parulkar: And that was part of our escape kit.

So then you were caught.

Grewal: The tehsildar called some people, they took us to a so-called prison and locked us up. They searched us. We had PoW ID cards. They were in English. The people there, none of them could read English. So, one of them takes these three cards, he goes to the tehsildar. The tehsildar comes back with these cards, and he's probably figured out what they are. Now, we are locked inside this cell, and he's shouting at us, 'Tum Hindu ho, tum ye ho, tum wo ho'. In the meantime, he's told the political agent, Mr Burki. Mr Burki says, bring them over. So they handcuff us and walk us through the village. People are looking at us, following us, to Mr Burki's office. Poor chap, it was a holiday, he came from home to meet us. First thing he did was to have our handcuffs removed, made us sit down, made us comfortable, tea came, and then, of course"¦

I believe Dilip sir, you planned one more escape trick. How did that happen?

Parulkar: I was the prime mover in this whole process. I felt a sense of responsibility, because this was also something which I was accused of by the people who didn't want us to go.

That you were overdoing it.

Parulkar: Yes, so much so that at one point, they said, 'Look here, if anything happens to either of these two guys, you are responsible, Dilip. Be careful'. So, my take on that was, 'I am not responsible for that. Anybody who doesn't want to come is at liberty — it's a free country — to say no. But I am going. Anybody who wants to, can come with me'. Now, because of that, they were with me. Something I learned only at the National Defence Academy, it's there in golden letters in the library — first comes the safety, welfare and honour of your country, second comes the safety, honour and welfare of the men you command, and your own safety comes last. So, although I was not their commander, I was their leader. So it was up to me. They were in this soup because of me. So I had to get them out of it also.

Invent something.

Parulkar: We already knew that Usman Hamid had relinquished charge of the PoW camp and had gone as ADC to the chief.

That's very funny because one of your PoW colleagues, D S Jafa, had been ADC to our air chief, Air Marshal P C Lal.

Parulkar: So, Usman Hamid had gone from being our camp commander to Zafar Chaudhry's staff. We knew this because after taking over as his ADC, he brought Zafar Chaudhry to the camp, and he visited us. We met him. He was a gentleman, he never threw his weight around. He never made us look small, which was a big change when the new camp commander took over. So, anyway, with this knowledge, the tehsildar was questioning us as to who we were. He had not yet found those identity cards, which we had hidden in our waistband pockets. So I told the tehsildar we are airmen from the Pakistan Air Force station in Lahore, and that I wanted to talk to the ADC to the chief of air staff. We told him we are on 10 days' casual leave and we are going up to Landi Khana as tourists, just trekking, sightseeing. He said no, we are going to lock you up. And after 10 days, when they start looking for you, we'll release you, and then you can go back"¦ I knew in 10 days there would only be corpses going back. So I was not going to take that chance.

After haggling with him for a while, I even made a show and a sham of firing him. By that time, we had learnt enough of their language to talk to them. I said, 'Janaab, main aapko bata raha hoon main Air Force Station, Lahore, ka airman hoon, parachute section mein kaam karta hoon main, aur is watan ke liye main khoon bahata hoon. Aap mujhse aise, is tareeqe se, bartaav kar rahe hain! Main aap se kisi chhote-mote aadmi se baat karane ke liye nahin keh raha hoon. ADC to chief of staff se baat karna chah raha hoon. Aur aap nahin bol rahe hain. Aap ki khairiyat nahin hai (Mister, I'm telling you I'm an airman of Air Force Station, Lahore, I work in the parachute section, and I spill my blood for this country. And you are treating me like this! I'm not telling you to put me through to some lowly official. I want to talk to the ADC to the chief of staff. And you're saying no. You've had it).

So he put you through.

Parulkar: Yes, immediately. Peshawar is not very far from where we were.

The PAF Headquarters is in Peshawar.

Parulkar: And it was their independence day. He got through in minutes. And this conversation started, 'Sir, Philip Peters is here, with Ali Ameer (Grewal)'.

Those were your assumed names.

Parulkar: Philip Peters was chosen by me because it rhymes with Dilip.

Pretending to be an Anglo-Pakistani.

Grewal: Plus, we had to remember our assumed names. I had a course mate named Ali Ameer.

Parulkar: I had a classmate called Philp Peters.

So you spoke with Usman Hamid. What did you say?

Parulkar: I said, 'Sir, Philip Peters here. Do you know Dilip from the camp?'.

So, you first said Philip, then slipped in Dilip.

Parulkar: 'We had taken some leave from the camp, sir', I said. 'And besides me, Ali Ameer and John Doe are both here. We were on our way to Landi Khana, sir, as tourists, and they've suddenly stopped us for no reason'.

Grewal: 'And they are not letting us go' (laughs).

Parulkar: I told him, 'Sir, you know me, they cannot hold us'.

Grewal: He caught on.

How did he respond to you?

Parulkar: He was aghast. He said, 'Dilip, Dilip, what are you doing there in Landi Kotal?'. I said 'Sir, we just took a little casual leave, and that's how we are here, and look at this"¦'. He said, 'Give the phone to the tehsildar'. I gave him the phone. He very calmly told him, 'Ye hamare aadmi hain (These are our men)'.

Grewal: He immediately caught on. Till then, they had no information from their sources. This was the first time he was hearing this. But he was clever enough to know that something had happened.

Parulkar: There was no way the three of us should be in Landi Kotal.

So actually he saved your lives.

Parulkar: That was the plan. I put the jurisdiction at such a high level that the local fellow has no jurisdiction.

It also tells you that wars take place, but there are also decent people on both sides, and that decent people also go to war. That's the reason I feel blessed we've had this conversation, of friendship, and mutual soldier chivalry.
 

LurkerBaba

Super Mod
Joined
Jul 2, 2010
Messages
7,882
Likes
8,125
Country flag
Re: Should India have annexed East Bengal in 1971 instead of liberatin

Thread closed.
 

Ray

The Chairman
Professional
Joined
Apr 17, 2009
Messages
43,132
Likes
23,835
"Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War"


An interesting summary that is worth listening to.

Interesting comments on Pakistan's interest in Kashmir and Afghanistan and how the US cannot take these areas as necessary for its security requirement and instead it is an ideological issue that cannot be satiated.

Since Pakistan was founded in 1947, its army has dominated the state. The military establishment has locked the country in an enduring rivalry with India, with the primary aim of wresting Kashmir from it. To that end, Pakistan initiated three wars over Kashmir-in 1947, 1965, and 1999-and failed to win any of them. Today, the army continues to prosecute this dangerous policy by employing non-state actors under the security of its ever-expanding nuclear umbrella. It has sustained a proxy war in Kashmir since 1989 using Islamist militants, as well as supporting non-Islamist insurgencies throughout India and a country-wide Islamist terror campaign that have brought the two countries to the brink of war on several occasions. In addition to these territorial revisionist goals, the Pakistani army has committed itself to resisting India's slow but inevitable rise on the global stage.
Despite Pakistan's efforts to coerce India, it has achieved only modest successes at best. Even though India vivisected Pakistan in 1971, Pakistan continues to see itself as India's equal and demands the world do the same. The dangerous methods that the army uses to enforce this self-perception have brought international opprobrium upon Pakistan and its army. And in recent years, their erstwhile proxies have turned their guns on the Pakistani state itself.

Why does the army persist in pursuing these revisionist policies that have come to imperil the very viability of the state itself, from which the army feeds? In Fighting to the End, C. Christine Fair argues that the answer lies, at least partially, in the strategic culture of the army. Through an unprecedented analysis of decades' worth of the army's own defense publications, she concludes that from the army's distorted view of history, it is victorious as long as it can resist India's purported drive for regional hegemony as well as the territorial status quo. Simply put, acquiescence means defeat. Fighting to the End convincingly shows that because the army is unlikely to abandon these preferences, Pakistan will remain a destabilizing force in world politics for the foreseeable future.

Despite Pakistan's efforts to coerce India, it has achieved only modest successes at best. Even though India vivisected Pakistan in 1971, Pakistan continues to see itself as India's equal and demands the world do the same. The dangerous methods that the army uses to enforce this self-perception have brought international opprobrium upon Pakistan and its army. And in recent years, their erstwhile proxies have turned their guns on the Pakistani state itself.

Why does the army persist in pursuing these revisionist policies that have come to imperil the very viability of the state itself, from which the army feeds? In Fighting to the End, C. Christine Fair argues that the answer lies, at least partially, in the strategic culture of the army. Through an unprecedented analysis of decades' worth of the army's own defense publications, she concludes that from the army's distorted view of history, it is victorious as long as it can resist India's purported drive for regional hegemony as well as the territorial status quo. Simply put, acquiescence means defeat. Fighting to the End convincingly shows that because the army is unlikely to abandon these preferences, Pakistan will remain a destabilizing force in world politics for the foreseeable future.
http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/fighting-to-the-end-c-christine-fair/1117308839?ean=9780199892709
 
Last edited by a moderator:

Ray

The Chairman
Professional
Joined
Apr 17, 2009
Messages
43,132
Likes
23,835
I wonder where it has been discussed.

I saw the link in Small War Journal and have just about finished listen to it.

Most fascinating.

It has still not come to India. I am already ordering for a copy.

I will be sending the author my article that was published long ago and the Pak Military and Governance in a professional journal. It will add to her repertoire of the rational.

Personally I feel that all those who are in the military should read it and so should our politicians like Modi and Jaitley so as to get a different view that is not the stereotype.
 
Last edited:

Neo

Senior Member
Joined
Feb 17, 2009
Messages
4,514
Likes
964
I wonder where it has been discussed.

I saw the link in Small War Journal and have just about finished listen to it.

Most fascinating.

It has still not come to India. I am already ordering for a copy.

I will be sending the author my article that was published long ago and the Pak Military and Governance in a professional journal. It will add to her repertoire of the rational.

Personally I feel that all those who are in the military should read it and so should our politicians like Modi and Jaitley so as to get a different view that is not the stereotype.

I am curious about your article. Do you have a link?
Thanks!
 

Ray

The Chairman
Professional
Joined
Apr 17, 2009
Messages
43,132
Likes
23,835
I am curious about your article. Do you have a link?
Thanks!
No that magazine does not have a link, but long ago I reproduced some parts in the WAB when discussing the issue with IIRC one Aryan.

One of the issues was the jockeying (especially during the formative years) that was their between the Mohajir who were better educated and controlled all instruments of democracy (political, bureaucratic, legal and commerce) wherein they made the 'sons of the soil' who were feudal and illiterate second class (in a manner of speaking) and the military, who were the backbone of the son of the soil and how they clawed back their share in the sun, they being all from the 'son of the soil' stock and how Kashmir came to their rescue.

And so started the seesaw of Pak governance.
 
Last edited:
  • Like
Reactions: Neo

Neo

Senior Member
Joined
Feb 17, 2009
Messages
4,514
Likes
964
I wonder if its still there, I haven't posted in WAB for months and my 9000+ posts.are gone. :cry:

Are you referring to Aryan from the first PDf? He was a good guy, I wonder if he's still active.

Your fights with Aryan and Asim were a treat, I mis that.:sad:
 
Last edited:

Ray

The Chairman
Professional
Joined
Apr 17, 2009
Messages
43,132
Likes
23,835
I wonder if its still there, I haven't posted in WAB for months and my 9000+ posts.are gone. :cry:

Are ypu referring to Aryan from rrthe first PDf? He.was a good guy, I wonder if he's still active.

Your fights with Aryan and Asim were a treat, I mis that.:sad:
Asim became a friend.

It was however great to debate with him.
 

Ray

The Chairman
Professional
Joined
Apr 17, 2009
Messages
43,132
Likes
23,835
A QUESTION OF HONOUR

- The site for a national war memorial should not cause debate


Before the flicker of the last candle to commemorate those who laid down their lives for their motherland during the Kargil conflict dies out and memories of this 15th anniversary of Kargil Diwas begin to dim, it is perhaps time for the collective conscience of the nation to pause and reflect.

It is fair to say that this anniversary drew more public attention than have the previous ones. It is too early to judge whether this is a collective rekindling of the national conscience, the shadow of a new dispensation in South Block or some other factor, but if this shows a trend it is heartening. Because from the first time when the former prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, lit a candle in 2000, if anything, the celebrations have become pro forma rather than events deserving a few moments of national remembrance of and reflection on the supreme sacrifice made by those who 'gave their today for our tomorrow'. The reflections are about what makes these sons and daughters of India so unique that self-sacrifice comes as naturally as a daily chore to them and, indeed, what part we, as a nation and a people, have played, if any, in contributing to their making.

But first a reality check. Over the years, neither the supreme commander nor the prime minister has led the event and it is left to the defence minister and the service chiefs. The event in the capital city itself attracts little attention. The army, which lost 527 and had 1363 wounded (including gallant Indian air force officers and men), is left to commemorate the event at the Dras War Memorial, a memorial built on the foothills of Tololing Hill where some of the severest fighting took place, built not by the nation, but the Indian army.

There are also similar functions spread across the country, invariably at small memorials built not by the nation, but through initiatives of enlightened citizens and veterans. One such is at Chandigarh built by a people's initiative backed by a national daily where, on the given day, schools send children to draw inspiration and rub shoulders with veterans.

It is possible that the solemnity of the supreme sacrifice made by soldiers, sailors and airmen is being diluted by the multiple occasions when such commemorations are held: the others being Vijay Diwas, commemorating the victory in the 1971 war and the prime minister's homage to "Amar Jawan" on Republic Day. Or is it that by periodic unburdening of our conscience we feel that we are paying our due to these martyrs, making up in frequency what we lack in the sheer depth of our emotions and what we do for their widows. A recent media report even indicated that India has 25,000 war widows.

That is why it is perhaps an opportune moment for the nation to take a call on whether enough blood has been shed by our armed forces for us to observe a day of national remembrance when we dedicate a few moments to pause, reflect and draw inspiration from the martyrs. A day when every student from every institution from across the country is exposed to the spirit of selflessness and sacrifice that is embodied in the feats of martyrs; a day where our veterans and those serving visit these institutions of learning where the moral values and character of tomorrow's leaders are being moulded; a day when our young learn not to take our freedom for granted and a day when no less than the supreme commander leads the nation in paying homage accompanied by his entire council of ministers. That is also a day when the solidarity of the nation is on full display to friends and foes alike. Above all else, a day when each proud citizen of this country vows to ensure that the sacrifice of martyrs has not been in vain.

But to sow the seeds of such idealism there is need for a place of worship and for preachers. Nearly every self-respecting nation that has seen its soldiers in battle has found this temple to be a national war memorial with the names of martyrs inscribed in stone. And it is these names that act as silent preachers in the periphery of this hallowed monument.

It is ironical that the British erected India Gate on the Central Vista in memory of those soldiers from our soil who fought their wars. That memorial is visible from the Rashtrapati Bhawan, Parliament House and the North and South Blocks housing the highest executive of our democracy. And yet there is no yearning in the largest democracy in the world to ask where in this magnificent Central Vista is our own memorial to those who have died fighting independent India's wars. Sadly, it is left to the armed forces to plead for a national war memorial on this Vista, but their pleas have elicited the weakest of responses.

The ministry of defence has never shown much enthusiasm to smooth the inter-ministerial turf wars of which the national war memorial has become a victim. The last straw is the obduracy of the ministry of urban development and the Delhi Urban Arts Commission which have vetoed the proposal supposedly because the 'ambience of the India Gate complex would be disturbed'. Seeing the continuing decay of our urban landscape one would have thought that this ministry had greater priorities than obstructing a project that symbolizes not just national solidarity, but supreme sacrifice. As for the jholawallas of the Delhi Urban Arts Commission, one wonders if this is the only way some self-importance can be extracted.

It was in 2009 that, on instructions of the then prime minister, a group of ministers under the then finance minister, Pranab Mukherjee, with the defence and urban development ministers, considered the proposal for a national war memorial. It was then reported that they had recommended the memorial at the India Gate complex. To the objections of the upholders of ambience, the ministry of defence had indicated that, designed by the noted architect, Charles Correa, the memorial would only be a little higher than the ground and most portions of the marble slabs on which the 50,000 names would be etched would actually be below ground level. They would be in a circle around the canopy next to the India Gate. People could walk along the slabs, pay their respects and move to India Gate. Indeed, on Vijay Diwas in 2010, the then defence minister had assured the armed forces that this national war memorial would be a reality.

But there is no limit to busybodies in positions of authority who, in order to camouflage their own shortcomings, use their unfettered authority to play spoilsport. One such was the then chief minister of Delhi. A media report quoted the chief minister as saying, "It is a people's place. It is just like Marina beach and Chaupati. My point is that you can make a memorial anywhere else. Why spoil this beautiful place? Why become a hindrance to the people's enjoyment?" These are sacrilegious observations in the context of a national war memorial and as a veteran one can only hang one's head in shame.

The fact that in spite of the GoM's recommendations under Pranab Mukherjee (now president and supreme commander) the process was halted makes one sadly conclude that this hopelessly frivolous view prevailed and more ominously continues to this day. So in the collective wisdom of those that govern us in the name of the people, building a national war memorial at the India Gate complex will spoil the ambience of a beautiful place and hinder people's enjoyment. If this is the attitude of our elected representatives and those in governance, it does not surprise one that the armed forces are desperately short of officers. What is worse, this attitude will slowly eat into the vitals of the very fabric of our men and women in uniform who must wonder why they should be serving in the remotest corners of the country risking life and limb when the national priority is enjoyment of their people over homage and respect to their dead comrades. We will then be staring at a hollow security edifice.

At the conclusion of the wreath-laying ceremony at Amar Jawan Jyoti the other day, the defence minister assured the people of the country that a war memorial would be built and that necessary funds had been earmarked. What, however, will not be music to the ears of the armed forces, the veterans and some 25,000 war widows is his statement that it will be centred on the Princess Park complex. This is tantamount to giving in to the 'Marina Beach, Chaupati syndrome' and will be a betrayal of our martyred soldiers, sailors and airmen and the entire veteran and armed forces fraternity and will be received with deep disappointment.

This writer, for one, strongly believes that no matter how grand and big the new complex at Princess Park, it will be soulless. Soulless because our worthy leaders did not deem it fit to accord it a place on the Central Vista in the company of India Gate which commemorates those of our countrymen who laid down their lives fighting for the British and it will be soulless because the nation does not care.

Here is an appeal to the prime minister on behalf of those of our uniformed colleagues who gave their all and can speak no more.

"Honour us with a national war memorial on the Central Vista or leave us alone to be worshipped in our units and messes where at least we know our memories are treated with honour and dignity."

The author is a retired air marshal of the Indian Air Force
A question of honour
Comments, please.

What do you feel?
 

Kunal Biswas

Member of the Year 2011
Ambassador
Joined
May 26, 2010
Messages
31,122
Likes
41,042
After drifting for approximately thousand kilometers from Alwar, I have reached Longewala. This place romanticizes me allot. The battle of Longewala a legend in itself. It is located at 120 kms from city of Jaisalmer. Only way to reach this place is boulevard and if you are tourist then you have to hire a cab.



Longewala is prevalent because of the illustrious skirmish tussled between India and Pakistan in 1971. The clash of Longewala is all about how hundred odd men clogged and overwhelmed approximately 2000 Pakistani legionnaires. This battle was all about the audacity, impetus, chauvinism and drive to prizefight exhibited by those eighty Indian warriors. This scuffle is one of my favorite scuffles, and whenever I come to this place, my mind start envisaging how horde of men repudiated the destiny.



During the Indo-Pak war of 1971, A-Coy of 23 Punjab had taken up the defences at Longewala. The A-Coy company commander was Major Kuldeep Singh Chandpuri later on emeritus from Indian Army as a Brigadier.

On the nocturnal of 3rd Dec 1971, lieutenant Dharamveer was directed towards border pillar number 638 to carry out trans-border patrol, in order to bring enemy's info. Late in night-time on 4th Dec 1971, lieutenant Dharamveer passed back the info about the crusade of Pakistani tanks entering the Indian Territory. Appreciative the gravity of the status quo Major Kuldeep Singh Chandpuri requested battalion headquarter to send the reinforcement and in the riposte, he was told either to delay till morning or start retreating towards Ramgarh which was approximately fifty kilometers away from Longewala. The pronouncement was taken on basis of the métier of the enemy imminent towards Longewala. A-Coy had circa hundred odd men holding the ground matched to virtually two thousand Pakistani soldiers laterally with tanks hastening towards them.



Astoundingly, soldiers of A-Coy unequivocal to hold the ground, and either kill the enemy or die shielding their mother land. Pakistani forces pounce on at 0030 hrs, and keen-sighted this Indian soldiers placed mines onward of their defences. Indian soldiers did not uncluttered fire and hold their horses till enemy tanks did not reach thirty to forty meters away from the defences. Pakistani stopped at perimeter fences and erroneous it as minefield. Pakistanis squandered two hours in breaching the perimeter fence which they thought was a minefield. This allowed Indian warriors to buy more time and wait for reinforcement which was about to come with the first light in morning.



When Pakistanis were busy breaching the dummy minefield, Indians opened their RCL guns and wrecked twelve Pakistani tanks. Then Pakistanis exasperated to spasm on Indian defences from altered bearing but unfortunately their tanks and recovery vehicle got wedged in the sand. Indians kept firing on the soldiers who tried to gale towards them. By morning, Hunter bombers took off from Jaisalmer Air Force base. Pakistani tanks and soldiers were a sitting ducks for Hunters and by afternoon, Pakistani forces were completely smashed.
In this battle, losses were on both side. Pakistan lost 38 tanks and 179 soldiers were killed. India lost three of its courageous soldiers. Pakistani forces while attacking on India through Longewala, had taken out border pillar 638 from its original location and carried it till Longewala. They wanted to make Longewala as new international border between the two countries. The reason was that Longewala was a strong point to carry forward a war because of availability of necessary resources. Indians did not allow Pakistanis to succeed in their intentions.



On 9th Dec 1971, 13 Kumaon battalion of Indian army, carried out counter attack and crossed actual border pillar 638. Unlike Pakistanis, they carried out this attack in day light and surprised the Pakistani army. They captured 3 border observation post of Pakistan and forced Pakistani army to withdraw. In this counterattack 13 Kumaon lost one junior commissioned officer, and three other ranks. That border pillar 638 has been made as a battle trophy and kept at the center of Longewala.



This was not a story of any movie, this battle was real and it is always remembered for display of exemplary courage and wisdom. You must have seen the movie 300 which is considered as fictional. This real life battle was much more than the story of 300 where self-motivated soldiers defeated the destiny.

====================
====================

Source : ROD ON ROAD!!: The Battle of Longewala
 

shankyz

Regular Member
Joined
Oct 12, 2013
Messages
807
Likes
4,598
Country flag
Paki Army cowards ....

23 Punjab and 13 Kumaon - showing the Pakis textbook methods of both how to defend and how to attack...
 

ghost

Senior Member
Joined
Dec 16, 2013
Messages
1,234
Likes
2,455
War Hero Major General Ian Cardozo (retd)was wounded in the battle of Sylhet in Bangladesh in the 1971 war with Pakistan.

He lost his leg in a landmine blast, but conquered his disability and went became the first disabled officer in the Indian Army to command an infantry battalion and then a brigade.

Awarded a Sena Medal for gallantry, General Cardozo is presently Chairman of the Rehabilitation Council of India and has authored The Sinking of INS Khukri -- Survivors Stories and Param Vir -- Our Heroes In Battle.

In conversation with Claude Arpi, the general looks back at the war where more than 93,000 Pakistani prisoners were taken, a region was liberated and a new nation born.

A young major 40 years ago, he recounts the heroic battles fought by the Fifth Gorkha Rifles in the Eastern theatre, where he and a brave band of men played a pivotal role in the defeat of Pakistan.

We are celebrating 40 years of the most resounding victory of the Indian armed forces, tell us about your involvement in the 1971 Operations and the role of your battalion, the Fifth Gorkha Rifles.

I was in the Staff College doing a course. My battalion was already on the front. The second-in-command (known as '2IC') of the battalion had been killed; the army had to replace him.

They looked around and found this guy (then Major Cardozo) in the Staff College. My posting was cancelled and I was sent to the front.

I was permitted to drop my family back home (my wife and three sons). I returned to Delhi by train on December 3.

The war had already started, but we did not know, though we heard aircraft flying above us. In Delhi there was a blackout. Next morning, I went to Palam airport to catch the plane to Assam, but it was cancelled: it would have been a lovely target.

I jumped into a taxi, rushed to the railway station. The train was moving out of the platform, I managed to pull the chain and board it. The next night we reached a place called Dharmanagar. We have a wonderful system in the army of contractors. Over 150 years the same family of banias have served particular units in the army. One of them was there to meet me.

He said: 'Sahib, the hospital train is coming. Wounded officers from our unit are on that train, you should meet them.' I met four young badly wounded officers and then jumped into a jeep and drove night and day to reach my battalion.

I had to reach in time because the Fifth Gorkhas were part of a heliborne operation and the CO (Commanding Officer of colonel rank) was waiting for me. We had to go inside Bangladesh.

I reached the place at 3 am in the morning. Four helicopters were already waiting and four others were on their way back (from Bangladesh).

There were three persons standing there. As I reached, one of them said: 'Who is there? Who are you?' I replied: 'I am Major Cardozo, Sir.' He said: 'I am General (Krishna) Rao (later, the chief of the army staff].' The other two were my brigade commander and an officer from the Corps of Engineers. They said: 'Well done, you came on time.'

The helicopters were bringing the wounded back. It was the first time in the history of the Indian Army that we were going to launch a heliborne operation.

At the Staff College, when you plan an operation like this, it takes two or three days for the army and air force officers to sit together and discuss all the details (routes, arms and ammunitions available, etc.).

In this case at 9 am the battalion was told, 'You are leaving this afternoon at 2:30 pm; you should make your plans. There is a recee at 10 am.'

To go back in time, we had earlier launched an operation for the capture of a battalion at Atgram. Normally, a brigade (about 3,000 soldiers) captures a battalion (about 750 soldiers).

In this case, a battalion was given the task to capture a battalion and this without artillery fire. Normally with the artillery to pulverise the enemy, he is forced to keep his head down, then one can attack.

My CO questioned: 'How can I capture a battalion with my battalion without artillery?' He was told: 'You have no option, just do it. The Americans and the Chinese want to come in; we have to wrap up the operations.'

The CO requested: 'I want two nights for the recee.'
The first night we contacted the Mukti Bahini (the Bangladeshi freedom fighters), and went in with them shouting 'Jai Bangla. Jai Bangla.' The Pakistani forces opened fire.

We were able to locate where their LMG (Light Machine Guns) were. With the light of the firing we also saw their mortars. We repeated the same tactic the next night, and there was less fire with the enemy forces less alert.

The following night was chosen for the attack. The CO instructed us: 'We will go for a khukri (the Gorkha knife) attack. We will use only khukris and grenades. You go into the field, reach the bunkers, throw the grenades in and then use your khukris.'

Two young officers with a lot of josh (enthusiasm) did not follow the CO's instructions. They rushed directly into the bunkers and both were killed: A second lieutenant and a captain. But 32 enemy heads were chopped off.

The CO came and saw many bodies on the ground, but he did not realise that the Pakistani senior company commander was playing dead. When he came close to him, the Pakistani officer shot at the CO. They rolled on the floor grapping with each other. The Gorkhas did not know what to do for sometime, but they finally managed to kill the Pakistani officer.

This was the battle of Atgram in which we lost two officers, three JCO (Junior Commissioned Officers) and 3 ORs (Other Ranks). It is very little compared to the number who could have been killed without the cover of artillery fire.

Then (Lieutenant General] Sagat Singh (commanding 4 Corps) who was one of our most dynamic commanders ordered: 'Send the Fifth Gorkha to Ghazipur.' Why? Because an earlier battalion had been sent and it had failed, a second one went and failed.

Sagat Singh said: '5 Gorkha will do it.' We had already had so many casualties, our 2IC had been killed, many jawans were dead and the CO felt that we should be given a break; Sagat Singh said 'No.'

The Indian Army had not initially planned for the capture of Dhaka. But things changed as the operations went on. We had a very good strategy of bypassing the enemy's strong points and advancing along the weaker ones. The capture of Dhaka thus became a possibility.

Sagat Singh said: 'I want to be there first in Dhaka.' But Sylhet had to be captured before that.

How to get there? 'By helicopter', was the answer.

Who will go? The 4/5 Gorkha battalion.

My CO tried to plead: 'I have already lost so many officers (killed or wounded)'. Sagat Singh ordered: 'You will go. The Pakistani 202 Brigade was there, but they have now gone to Dhaka. There are only 200 or 300 'irregulars' (rakazars) there, what is the problem?' At that time, we had a strength 480 men only.
On December 7, a helicopter with the brigade commander went in for a recee, and they came back saying that there was no opposition, no firing. They thought that the corps commander was right, nobody was there.

The officers were told to 'get ready.' We had no time for plans, no time for strategy. The orders were just 'Capture the area, go on the ground and keep expanding.'

When the first sorties left for Sylhet, we discovered there was tremendous opposition. We did not know it till later, but 202 Brigade was still there; they had not gone to Dhaka.

Though we saw a lot of artillery fire, we thought it must be a battalion; we did not realise it was a brigade.

I went in the last sortie. My company 'johnnies' (soldiers) could not say my name 'Cardozo.' They called me 'Cartoos sahib' (in Hindi, 'cartridge').

When the helicopters landed, they went from helicopter to helicopter till they found me, and fired in the air with satisfaction.

The boys were not worried (about the enemy fire). They put me on their shoulders and shouted: 'Cartoos sahib has come, he is now with us, we can go.' I went to meet the CO who was also happy that I had reached.

We started fighting and after some time, we managed to get an area of 1000 metres by 1500 metres. The CO had told us there would be a link-up in 48 hours. For para-commandos, a link-up must be done within 48 hours or they are finished.

We had no food. We had only ammunition, grenades, one handful of shakarparas (sweet wheat balls), one bandage, one bottle of water and a barsatti to sleep on the ground.

No blanket, no clothes, no shoes, nothing else.

At that time, the war was covered by the BBC, Akashvani (All India Radio) and Pakistan Radio. Nobody believed Pakistani Radio. All India Radio was always giving news two days late, because they had to get the clearance from army headquarters. But the BBC gave news on the spot. They had very committed war correspondents and had got the permission to cover the operations.

We all listened to the BBC. That day we heard: 'A brigade of Gorkhas has landed at Sylhet.'

I told my CO: 'Sir, the Pakistanis are listening to the BBC, we are listening to the BBC, they have more than a battalion, so let us keep pretending that we are a brigade and let us deploy as a brigade.'


There was a risk: They could have taken us apart bit by bit. We took the risk and put LMG nests to fill up the gaps between the companies.

One day, we intercepted a Pakistani vehicle coming in; we picked up the officers and used the khukri. This put more pressure on us. The Pakistanis must have thought: 'We should get these guys.' The operations continued during the following days.

During the day time, we were supported by the air force (Hunters and MIGs) who were breaking the attacks. But at night we were on our own.

One day, a Pakistani patrol went between the companies. We came to the conclusion that they had realised that we were not a brigade. We had hardly any ammunition left. We decided to regroup as a battalion and fight till the bitter end.

The companies had to withdraw just after dusk, so that the enemy could not see us move.

One company came back intact, but the other company came a bit too early and was seen by the enemy while on the move. The CO and I were watching them come back as it became dark. We suddenly heard 'Allah ho Akbar, charge.'

But trust the Gurkhas, they took out their khukris, turned around and shouted 'Ayo Gurkhali.' They fought like in a theatre. After shouts and sounds of battle, silence fell. The company reached us, five, six boys were missing and we could hear the groans of the wounded.

There was an unspoken agreement between us and the Pakistanis: We brought our chaps back and they did the same with their boys.

The next day the fight continued, but (Then General, later Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw served Pakistan an ultimatum: 'You surrender or we wipe you out.'

On December 15 morning, 1,500 of them came out (we were 480) with white flags. The company commanders asked the CO: 'There is a huge number of them, what do we do?'

The CO told them, let their emissaries come. But if they come to know that we are only 480, they may change their minds.'

The CO told the emissaries: 'We have no orders to take your surrender. Come back tomorrow.' They said: 'We want to surrender.' 'No,' said the CO: 'Come back tomorrow.'

We spoke on the radio with the brigade commander (in Tamil) and told him: 'For God sake, come and take the surrender.'

The next morning, the Pakistanis came again. The brigade commander had meantime come by helicopter. The Pakistanis asked him: 'Where are you coming from?' He said: 'From such and such place'. The Pakistanis asked, 'But what is here, a brigade?' He told them that it was only a battalion.

A battalion only! They could not believe it. They had never realised that we were not a brigade. This was a big surprise for them.

Our surprise was that we thought that they were one brigade, but there were two brigades (the 202 and 313 Infantry Brigade)! We took the surrender of three brigadiers, a full colonel, 107 officers, 219 JCO, and 7,000 troops.

(Lieutenant General A A K] Niazi (commanding the Pakistani army in East Pakistan) had ordered Sylhet to be held for the defence of Dhaka. The second brigade had landed the same day as us. We were fighting two brigades at the same time.

Anyway, we were very cold, so I told this Pakistani JCO, 'Saab, aap ke pas kambal hain store mein?' ('Do you have blankets in your stores?')

'Haan Sahib('Yes, Sir').'

So I said, 'Main aap ko receipt de doonga (I will give you a receipt), can you give kambals to my men?'

'Kambal nahin laye, saab? ('Sir, you have not brought blankets?')'

'Hum sone ke liye nahin aaye, aap ko barbaad karne ke liye aaye. (We did not come to sleep, but to destroy you.)'

He digested that. Then I said, 'Agar kuch kambal rahe jaate hain, hamare affsar sahiba ko de sakte hain? ('If some blankets remain, can you give them to our officers?)'

'Kya baat karte hain saab, affsar sahiba bhi kambal nahin laye? ('What are you saying sir, even the officers do not have blankets?')'

So I said, 'Saab, agar jawano ke paas kambal nahin hain, to afsar sahiba ke liye kambal kaise ho sakta hai? ('When the jawans do not have blankets, then how can the officers have them?).'

He stood to attention, saluted me, and said, 'Janaab, agar hamari fauj mein Bharat jaise afsar hote, ye din humne dekhna tha ('Sir, if in our army we had officers like those in India, we would not have seen this day).'










1971, A War Hero Remembers - Rediff.com News


@jouni sir, gurkhas@Indian army
 
Last edited by a moderator:

Virendra

Ambassador
Joined
Oct 16, 2010
Messages
4,697
Likes
3,041
Country flag
Re: India Pakistan 1971 War - Stories of the Indo-Pak War 1971 by sam

 
Last edited by a moderator:

Ashutosh Lokhande

Senior Member
Joined
May 28, 2014
Messages
1,285
Likes
568
Re: India Pakistan 1971 War - Stories of the Indo-Pak War 1971 by sam

@genius, see your converted muslims bravery. couldnt save you guyz from afghan, moghul invader and then later also surrendering to fraction of an army of its size in dhaka. you converted muslims are so brave :lol:
 
Last edited by a moderator:

Latest Replies

New threads

Articles

Top