WAR 1971

[LurkerBaba]

Does this mean our earliest ancestors were asexual single-celled organisms? After all the manner in which the earliest hunter-gatherer societies lived can be described as 'communist' in every sense: there was no private property besides personal belongings, no state, no social classes. Resources were very scarce, and so everyone played an equal role in ensuring the survival of the community. In fact this stage of human development was labeled by Marx and Engels, quite accurately, as 'primitive communism'.

There were tribes and classes. The physically strong would lord over the weak, take all the women and have a greater share in resources.

 

[Iamanidiot]

Civfanatic matsyanyaya was always present

 

[civfanatic]

We dont know what our earliest ancestors did.

We do know that among the earliest human societies there was no private property, state, or class, because all those things took form only after the Agricultural (Neolithic) Revolution.

However, if you and I were peers then and this hot chick came along, Id kill you to claim her for myself.

No you wouldn't, because that would be socially unacceptable. This is why social mores exist; they keep human behavior within reasonable limits to maintain a stable and functioning society. If everyone acted on their primal instincts there wouldn't be much of a society to speak of.

All I am saying is communism fails miserably in the face of testosterone. Our desire to consummate with the most desirable individuals of the opposite sex does not allow for the idealist utopia that Marx preaches. This is not a fact limited to us alone, it can be seen in every species be it mammals, birds, insects. The only species that displays absolute adherence to communist ideals are asexual single celled animals.

That has nothing to do with communism as a form of socioeconomic organisation. What would prevent you from having sex with as many people as you like in a communist society? If anything the lack of restrictive religious and pseudo-moral codes of behavior would encourage sexual liberalism. There have been plenty of free love advocates among anarchists, communists, and various leftist libertarians.

 

[civfanatic]

There were tribes and classless. The physically strong would lord over the weak, take all the women and have a greater share in resources.

Tribes are just large social groups, not states. Unlike states they do not have formal political sovereignty or a monopoly on force within a territory. They are a large association of people who have come together to satisfy certain basic interests.

At any rate I am talking about human society before even tribes.
Band society - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Civfanatic matsyanyaya was always present

???

 

[trackwhack]

We do know that among the earliest human societies there was no private property, state, or class, because all those things took form only after the Agricultural (Neolithic) Revolution.



No you wouldn't, because that would be socially unacceptable. This is why social mores exist; they keep human behavior within reasonable limits to maintain a stable and functioning society. If everyone acted on their primal instincts there wouldn't be much of a society to speak of.



That has nothing to do with communism as a form of socioeconomic organisation. What would prevent you from having sex with as many people as you like in a communist society? If anything the lack of restrictive religious and pseudo-moral codes of behavior would encourage sexual liberalism. There have been plenty of free love advocates among anarchists, communists, and various leftist libertarians.

The fact that as a male the only way to ensure my genes are passed on is to ensure that no one else screws my mate.

Civ, this argument is quite pointless in my view as you will never be able to convince me of Marx's credibility. I've been trying that myself for 15 years now. The issue here is that idealism and anatomy come into conflict. And at that stage anatomy wins. Its the same reason why a nomadic male lion has to fight an kill an existing pride leader to take his place. He then goes on to slaughter all the cubs in the pride to bring the lionesses back into heat, so that he can mate with them an in turn pass on his genes.

All life is mortal, and irrespective of whether all species are self aware like humans or not, no living organism can accept the eventuality of death. The closest one can come to attaining some semblance of immortality is to pass on ones genes. And to protect and ensure that it is my genes that has been passed on, I (and all males in general) will not ever accept a polyandric society.

Once this fact is acknowledged, you will see the conflict between idealism that communism professes and our anatomical shortcomings.

An ascetic who has overcome this desire of pseudo immortality of passing on genes is in my opinion the supreme for of mortal intelligence. But if everyone attains this level of enlightenment, the species dies.

For the ones who profess sexual liberalism, when a woman finally squats out a kid in the field, which of the many sexual liberals will step up and acknowledge paternal responsibilities? Or is communism professing that we bring up our offspring in nurseries without the kids ever knowing where they came from?

Rant stop.

 

[civfanatic]

The fact that as a male the only way to ensure my genes are passed on is to ensure that no one else screws my mate.

This is why the institution of marriage was created. My being monogamous we ensure that we have offspring that carry our genes. It may not be biologically optimal in the sense that we can't have as many offspring as if we were polygamous, but it is conducive to a stable society, which for humans (being social creatures) is of far more importance. Why is polygamy frowned upon in modern society, despite our biological inclinations?

Civ, this argument is quite pointless in my view as you will never be able to convince me of Marx's credibility.

It is irrelevant whether you agree with Marx or not. It is not my goal to convince anyone. My point, in the context of this discussion, is simply that communism in a primitive, small-scale form was an early form of human organisation. This is a fact rooted in anthropology and has nothing do with Marxism or any political ideology. Personally, I do not believe that wide-scale communism in the form envisioned by Marx is possible in the foreseeable future.

Its the same reason why a nomadic male lion has to fight an kill an existing pride leader to take his place. He then goes on to slaughter all the cubs in the pride to bring the lionesses back into heat, so that he can mate with them an in turn pass on his genes.

When a human gets a divorce, and re-marries, does he or she kill all the offspring from the previous marriage? Why don't we do that?

There is no point comparing humans to other animals in this context. They may share our basic biology and inclinations but not our forms of social organisation.

All life is mortal, and irrespective of whether all species are self aware like humans or not, no living organism can accept the eventuality of death. The closest one can come to attaining some semblance of immortality is to pass on ones genes. And to protect and ensure that it is my genes that has been passed on, I (and all males in general) will not ever accept a polyandric society.

There have been many polyandrous societies of the past and present, how have they managed to exist? In parts of India and Nepal, for example, men who cannot afford a dowry split the cost among themselves and thus they all become husbands of the woman. Why do they do that, if it goes against biology? Obviously, in this and many other cases, human behavior is influenced by far more factors than just biological inclinations.

Once this fact is acknowledged, you will see the conflict between idealism that communism professes and our anatomical shortcomings.

In any society, and not just a hypothetical communist one, you will see conflict between any social or political ideology and biology. If we go strictly by the laws of nature, there is no basis for the existence of democracy. Yet this does not prevent humans from creating modern democratic societies.

Or is communism professing that we bring up our offspring in nurseries without the kids ever knowing where they came from?

There have been societies of the past and present where children are raised collectively. I would assume that children in a communist society would be raised in a similar manner. This does not necessarily mean that the children won't know who there biological parents are, just that their attachment with them will not be as strong. Also, children raised in such a manner are likely to be more open towards others than children raised "normally", i.e. within the confines of a single family.

 

[trackwhack]

This is why the institution of marriage was created. My being monogamous we ensure that we have offspring that carry our genes. It may not be biologically optimal in the sense that we can't have as many offspring as if we were polygamous, but it is conducive to a stable society, which for humans (being social creatures) is of far more importance. Why is polygamy frowned upon in modern society, despite our biological inclinations?




It is irrelevant whether you agree with Marx or not. It is not my goal to convince anyone. My point, in the context of this discussion, is simply that communism in a primitive, small-scale form was an early form of human organisation. This is a fact rooted in anthropology and has nothing do with Marxism or any political ideology. Personally, I do not believe that wide-scale communism in the form envisioned by Marx is possible in the foreseeable future.




When a human gets a divorce, and re-marries, does he or she kill all the offspring from the previous marriage? Why don't we do that?

There is no point comparing humans to other animals in this context. They may share our basic biology and inclinations but not our forms of social organisation.




There have been many polyandrous societies of the past and present, how have they managed to exist? In parts of India and Nepal, for example, men who cannot afford a dowry split the cost among themselves and thus they all become husbands of the woman. Why do they do that, if it goes against biology? Obviously, in this and many other cases, human behavior is influenced by far more factors than just biological inclinations.




In any society, and not just a hypothetical communist one, you will see conflict between any social or political ideology and biology. If we go strictly by the laws of nature, there is no basis for the existence of democracy. Yet this does not prevent humans from creating modern democratic societies.




There have been societies of the past and present where children are raised collectively. I would assume that children in a communist society would be raised in a similar manner. This does not necessarily mean that the children won't know who there biological parents are, just that their attachment with them will not be as strong. Also, children raised in such a manner are likely to be more open towards others than children raised "normally", i.e. within the confines of a single family.

I have to respectfully disagree with your views Civ.

 

[Rage]

The blunders pointed out are being unfair to the establishment of the time:-
1. The territory gains in Kashmir were kept and not returned. Gain were made in Poonch and Kargil. These were very important gains. We exchanged Chamb for these mountain features. The decision was taken after a study by a team consisting of Lt. Gen PS Bhagat (VC), who recommended that we keep the mountain features and give Chamb if any bartering of captured land is done.

A campaign towards Gilgit-Skardu axis in the winter, is asking for trouble. The approaches are blocked with snow and would prevent our movement just as the snow prevented and PLA intervention during that winter. Secondly, the logistical requirements and fire support for the campaign would have have taken months to accumulate (the PLA took 5 months to gather supplies and equipment for the war).

2. We had to address the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. What does the author mean by saying we should not have recognised it?

3. Not bringing the PA war criminals to justice was a major blunder.

But my contention is, and the point still stands, what did Pakistan have to 'bargain' with? Why are we even talking about barter, when a barter envisages some kind of equilateral relationship? A severed nation, with its largest port city and financial capital on fire, with close to zero monetary and essential-commodity reserves, with huge political instability and domestic turmoil at the loss of the eastern half of its country and nearly a third of its service strength captured, with little or no immediate military assistance from the vicinity and from its closest, most potent allies drives a hard and nearly envious bargain that very few could achieve.


I can appreciate the fact that a complete offensive to occupy PoK was not viable- given that the western theatre was a bit of a Pakistani gamble and something that could not have been suredly anticipated before, and that Indian troops were required in the eastern half. But the decision should have been to exchange Pakistani troops and tracts occupied in the Punjab sector (a total of 13,000 km² ), alongwith an accord to 'prevent' escalation of the conflict by India: for a cessation of conflict, a removal of all int'l embargoes and a transfer of all lands captured by Pakistan in Jamu & Kashmir as well as geographically defensible (in the sense of sufficiently large and logistically feasible) tracts of contiguous areas, such as Gilgit- Baltistan, that would have severd Pakistan's land link with China for ever. Indeed the officer's corps of the three services, captured by the Indian army, would themselves have made a good bargaining chip given the preponderance of military's families in Pakistani politics and I would have segmented the negotiation of transfer of PoW's, making use of and exploiting the military's leverage over politics. Indeed, the negotiations would have become more protracted, as Pakistan worked on a political feasibility solution to transfer even more lands to India, but it is a bargain I would have driven and used the time to shore up int'l support, possibly opening up a backchannel dialogue with the United States in exchange for other political conncessions, and to mobilize forces in a limited capacity across the western theatre as a threatening act, to further expedite military pressure on the polity.


Indeed, it seems to me that the only viable 'reason' for India not driving a hard bargain, despite being in a militarily, logistically and geo-strategically clearly superior position, was international political opposition. It is the reason, we gave a new voice to the Kashmir dispute- almost as if it were an uncontested fact of the war just fought, when it never was; and agreed to a very amenable political transfer of prisoners, when in fact they were prosecutors of an 'unjust', ethnic war and what many in the western media have themselves described as 'genocide'. We were confused about our position at the bargaining table: were we , as aggressors or opportunistic usurpors, or saviours of an oppresed nation, even when we had, through Indira Gandhi, elaborated our position at the onset of war. It is this confusion, that prevented us from extracting the full gains of war. And it is this confusion, that has characterised bureaucratised Congress levity at every function, where it speaks of one thing at the international stage and fails to follow through everywhere else, where it matters. It is these lack of channels or clogged channels, between the polity and the bureaucracy, between the polity and the armed forces, or between the bureaucracy and the armed forces that has done India in, on several occasions. Whether it is with the Nehru Forward Policy, or the Nuclear deal, or neo-geostrategic postures in the 21st Century, or the modernisation of our border networks, definitional expolitation of capability has never followed elaboration of it.


I have now become convinced that a non-Congress government is a need at the next elections. For this, indeed, is a governance issue.

 

[pankaj nema]

This 1971 mistakes is pet PEEVE of retd military officers

While the govt has to take very holistic and long term view of the situation

Pakistan was INDEED weak and powerless BUT it had VERY POWERFUL friends watching KEENLY
from the side lines

The COLD war was at its height and NON aligned India had clearly aligned itself with the Soviets
through the treaty of Friendship and cooperation

Should we have TOTALLY cut off ourselves FROM US and the West and OIC countries
AND should we have made India another Israel which is such a hated country in the Islamic world

 

[pankaj nema]

A defeated country can be made to sign on ANYTHING but What prevents its powerful friends
like China USA and OIC block from intervening on its behalf at a LATER date

Why would Pakistan 's FRIENDS and allies allow its Humiliation and NOT turn against India

 

[pankaj nema]

Pakistan has ALWAYS basked in its friendship with China USA and Saudi

IF you guys remember about the Kargil war days then you must recall the reaction
of the international community

That alone shows that as recently as 1999 pakistan was very PROUD of its friendship with
China USA and Saudi arabia

Pakistan was clearly GUILTY and India was fighting such a difficult war so as to give an impression
that India is a responsible Nuclear power and does not want an ESCALATION

Yet ALL that these three Pakistani allies ie USA Saudi and China DID was to GIVE strong advice
to PAKISTAN to VACATE the territory and GO back

There was no condemnation as such of Pakistan's perfidy

 

[lemontree]

But my contention is, and the point still stands, what did Pakistan have to 'bargain' with? Why are we even talking about barter, when a barter envisages some kind of equilateral relationship? A severed nation, with its largest port city and financial capital on fire, with close to zero monetary and essential-commodity reserves, with huge political instability and domestic turmoil at the loss of the eastern half of its country and nearly a third of its service strength captured, with little or no immediate military assistance from the vicinity and from its closest, most potent allies drives a hard and nearly envious bargain that very few could achieve.

True. but they had the US backing them to the hilt. After the war the US sent them 90 Sabers, and F104s to beef up the PAF through Iran and Jordan. They had very powerful friends backing them.

India gains in the Western Sector:
3200 sq km in the Ladhak sector (this capture provids depth to the main road artery from Srinagar to Leh)
1200 sq km in Rajasthan sector (barren desert of no economic or military significance)
In both regions these gains lay in farflung, desolate, uninhabited and difficult areas of negligible economic, strategic and political value which could hurt the rulers of Pakistan only in their prestige.

Indian losses in the western sector:
- Chhamb, where the aftermath of the refugee problem still haunts the Jammu and Kashmir administration.
- Kasowala bulge, the Hussainiwala enclave and the Fazilka agricultural belt in Punjab could not be equated with marginal gains in the Sehjra bulge and the Mamdot enclave in economic, military or political terms. The Indian occupation of the major portion of the Shakargarh bulge was of some embarrassing to the Pakistanis in view of the refugee population, but this in no way impaired the Pakistani economy or upset its military tactical balance.

The Indian public was misled by articulate propaganda and impressive statistics.

I can appreciate the fact that a complete offensive to occupy PoK was not viable- given that the western theatre was a bit of a Pakistani gamble and something that could not have been suredly anticipated before, and that Indian troops were required in the eastern half. But the decision should have been to exchange Pakistani troops and tracts occupied in the Punjab sector (a total of 13,000 km² ), alongwith an accord to 'prevent' escalation of the conflict by India: for a cessation of conflict, a removal of all int'l embargoes and a transfer of all lands captured by Pakistan in Jamu & Kashmir as well as geographically defensible (in the sense of sufficiently large and logistically feasible) tracts of contiguous areas, such as Gilgit- Baltistan, that would have severd Pakistan's land link with China for ever. Indeed the officer's corps of the three services, captured by the Indian army, would themselves have made a good bargaining chip given the preponderance of military's families in Pakistani politics and I would have segmented the negotiation of transfer of PoW's, making use of and exploiting the military's leverage over politics. Indeed, the negotiations would have become more protracted, as Pakistan worked on a political feasibility solution to transfer even more lands to India, but it is a bargain I would have driven and used the time to shore up int'l support, possibly opening up a backchannel dialogue with the United States in exchange for other political conncessions, and to mobilize forces in a limited capacity across the western theatre as a threatening act, to further expedite military pressure on the polity.

We could not keep and feed 93,000 POWs forever, sooner of later, the US, UK, the western world and China would pressure India to release the POWs. We were receiving food and economic aid from the US and UK.

Indeed, it seems to me that the only viable 'reason' for India not driving a hard bargain, despite being in a militarily, logistically and geo-strategically clearly superior position, was international political opposition.

Very true.

It is the reason, we gave a new voice to the Kashmir dispute- almost as if it were an uncontested fact of the war just fought, when it never was; and agreed to a very amenable political transfer of prisoners, when in fact they were prosecutors of an 'unjust', ethnic war and what many in the western media have themselves described as 'genocide'. We were confused about our position at the bargaining table: were we , as aggressors or opportunistic usurpors, or saviours of an oppresed nation, even when we had, through Indira Gandhi, elaborated our position at the onset of war. It is this confusion, that prevented us from extracting the full gains of war. And it is this confusion, that has characterised bureaucratised Congress levity at every function, where it speaks of one thing at the international stage and fails to follow through everywhere else, where it matters. It is these lack of channels or clogged channels, between the polity and the bureaucracy, between the polity and the armed forces, or between the bureaucracy and the armed forces that has done India in, on several occasions. Whether it is with the Nehru Forward Policy, or the Nuclear deal, or neo-geostrategic postures in the 21st Century, or the modernisation of our border networks, definitional expolitation of capability has never followed elaboration of it.

It is possible that our political leaders were so drunk with the victory, that they did not think about extracting enough from the enemy. We spent too much effort in being magnanimous with the fallen foe.

I have now become convinced that a non-Congress government is a need at the next elections.

The incumbency factor will play its role, but the options to lead the nation are very few.

 

[Twinblade]

My aim and ambition is to enter the ARMY and to be a winner of PARAM VEER CHAKRA................

Ambitions like that are detrimental in the SSB. Pursuit of personal glory is viewed as a negative trait, as far as the inner strength necessary for making a sacrifice for the cause is concerned, they have many ways for finding that out

 

[Kunal Biswas]

this nation surely won't.

What is the fault of this nation, Its us who don't understand the importance of having a Nation, Its us who are making our own fate..

Only our forefather would know under the RAJ, What is felt like having a home of your own, which not to be called your own..

 

[Bhadra]

My aim and ambition is to enter the ARMY and to be a winner of PARAM VEER CHAKRA................

your ambition then is wrong and needs understanding. The aim of entering Army should be a noble and worthy profession. If one gets a chance one has to be self sacrificing and brave. Its recognition is dependant on higher ups and not you.
No one can claim a gallantry award. It is a recognition not a claim.

 

[Tomcat]

The Instrument of Surrender

The PAKISTAN Eastern Command agree to surrender all PAKISTAN Armed Forces in BANGLA DESH to Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA, General Officer Commanding in Chief of the Indian and BANGLA DESH forces in the Eastern Theatre. This surrender includes all PAKISTAN land, air and naval forces as also all para-military forces and civil armed forces. These forces will lay down their arms and surrender at the places where they are currently located to the nearest regular troops under the command of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA.

The PAKISTAN Eastern Command shall come under the orders of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA as soon as the instrument has been signed. Disobedience of orders will be regarded as a breach of the surrender terms and will be dealt with in accordance with the accepted laws and usages of war. The decision of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA will be final, should any doubt arise as to the meaning or interpretation of the surrender terms.

Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA gives a solemn assurance that personnel who surrender shall be treated with dignity and respect that soldiers are entitled to in accordance with provisions of the GENEVA Convention and guarantees the safety and well-being of all PAKISTAN military and para-military forces who surrender. Protection will be provided to foreign nationals, ethnic minorities and personnel of WEST PAKISTAN origin by the forces under the command of Lieutenant- General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA."

Signed by J.S. Aurora and A.A.K. Niazi on 16 December 1971.

Illustration showing military units and troop movements during operations in the Eastern sector of the war

thanks to wikipedia for the text of the Document of surrender and the Orbat depiction

 

[bhramos]

As a grand finale to the victorious role played in the liberation of Bangladesh and to make their final withdrawal, the Indian Army held a farewell parade at the Dacca Stadium on March 12, 1972 where the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, took the salute. Photo shows Sheikh Mujibur Rehman reviewing the parade. Photo: The Hindu Archives


Even as the role of the Indian military in giving birth to the new nation is celebrated, the role of its intelligence services remains largely unknown.(sevenoya)

Forty-five minutes before 12.00 pm on December 14, 1971, Indian Air Force pilots at Hashimpara and Gauhati received instructions to attack an unusual target: a sprawling colonial-era building in the middle of Dacca that had no apparent military value whatsoever.

There were nothing but tourist maps available to guide the pilots to their target — but the results were still lethal. The first wave of combat jets, four MiG21 jets armed with rockets, destroyed a conference hall; two more MiGs and two Hunter bombers levelled a third of the main building.

Inside the building — the Government House — East Pakistan's Cabinet had begun an emergency meeting to discuss the political measures to avoid the looming surrender of their army at Dacca 55 minutes before the bombs hit. It turned out to be the last-ever meeting of the Cabinet. A.M. Malik, head of the East Pakistan government, survived the bombing along with his Cabinet — but resigned on the spot, among the burning ruins; the nervous system, as it were, of decision-making had been destroyed.

For years now, military historians have wondered precisely how the Government House was targeted with such precision; rumours that a spy was present have proliferated. From the still-classified official history of the 1971 war, we now know the answer. Indian cryptanalysts, or code-breakers, had succeeded in breaking Pakistan's military cipher — giving the country's intelligence services real-time information on the enemy's strategic decision-making.

India's Army, Navy and Air Force were lauded, during the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of Bangladesh's independence, for their role in ending a genocide and giving birth to a new nation. The enormous strategic contribution of India's intelligence services, however, has gone largely unacknowledged.

Seven months before the December 3 Pakistan Air Force raid that marked the beginning of the war, India's Chief of Army Staff issued a secret order to the General Officer Commanding, Eastern Command, initiating the campaign that would end with the dismemberment of Pakistan.

Operation Instruction 52 formally committed the Indian forces to "assist the Provisional Government of Bangladesh to rally the people of East Bengal in support of the liberation movement," and "to raise, equip and train East Bengal cadres for guerrilla operations for employment in their own native land."

The Eastern Command was to ensure that the guerrilla forces were to work towards "tying down the Pak [Pakistan] Military forces in protective tasks in East Bengal," "sap and corrode the morale of the Pak forces in the Eastern theatre and simultaneously to impair their logistic capability for undertaking any offensive against Assam and West Bengal," and, finally, be used along with the regular Indian troops "in the event of Pakistan initiating hostilities against us."

Secret army

The task of realising these orders fell on Sujan Singh Uban. Brigadier — later Major-General — Uban was an artillery officer who had been handpicked to lead the Special Frontier Force, a secret army set up decades earlier with the assistance of the United States' Central Intelligence Agency to harry the Chinese forces in Tibet. The SFF, which until recently served as a kind of armed wing of India's external covert service, the Research and Analysis Wing, never did fight in China. In Bangladesh, the contributions of its men and officers would be invaluable.

Brigadier Uban — whose enthusiasm for irregular warfare was rivalled, contemporaries recall, only by his eccentric spiritualism — later said he had received a year's advance warning of the task that lay ahead from the Bengali mystic, Baba Onkarnath.

Less-than-holy war

The war he waged, though, was less-than-holy. In July 1971, India's war history records, the first Bangladesh irregulars were infiltrated across the border at Madaripur. This first group of 110 guerrillas destroyed tea gardens, riverboats and railway tracks — acts that tied down troops, undermined East Pakistan's economy and, the history says, destroyed "communications between Dhaka, Comilla and Chittagong."

Much of the guerrilla war, however, was waged by the volunteers of the Gano Bahini, a volunteer force. The Indian forces initially set up six camps for recruiting and training volunteers, which were soon swamped. At one camp, some 3,000 young men had to wait up to two months for induction, although the "hygienic condition was pitiable and food and water supply almost non-existent."

By September 1971, though, Indian training operations had expanded dramatically in scale, processing a staggering 20,000 guerrillas each month. Eight Indian soldiers were committed to every 100 trainees at 10 camps. On the eve of the war, at the end of November 1971, over 83,000 Gano Bahini fighters had been trained, 51,000 of whom were operating in East Pakistan — a guerrilla operation perhaps unrivalled in scale until that time. In the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Brigadier Uban sent in Indian soldiers or, to be more exact, CIA-trained, Indian-funded Tibetans using hastily-imported Bulgarian assault rifles and U.S.-manufactured carbines to obscure their links to India. Fighting under the direct command of RAW's legendary spymaster Rameshwar Kao, Brig. Uban's forces engaged in a series of low-grade border skirmishes.

Founded in 1962, the SFF had originally been called Establishment 22 — and still has a road named after it in New Delhi, next to the headquarters of the Defence Ministry. The organisation received extensive special operations training from the U.S., as part of a package of military assistance. In September 1967, the control of these assets was formally handed over to RAW — and used in Bangladesh to lethal effect.

From December 3, 1971, Brig. Uban's force began an extraordinary campaign of sabotage and harassment. At the cost of just 56 dead and 190 wounded, the SFF succeeded in destroying several key bridges, and in ensuring that Pakistan's 97 Independent Brigade and crack 2 Commando Battalion remained bogged down in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Some 580 members of Brig. Uban's covert force were awarded cash, medals and prizes by the Government of India.

November 1971 saw the Indian-backed low-intensity war in East Pakistan escalate to levels Pakistan found intolerable — pushing it to act. On December 3, Pakistan attempted to relieve the pressure on its eastern wing by carrying out strikes on major Indian airbases. India retaliated with an offensive of extraordinary speed that has been described as a "blitzkrieg without tanks."

Rejecting an offer for conditional surrender in the East, the Indian forces entered Dacca on December 15. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi promptly ordered a ceasefire on the western front as well: "if I don't do so today," she said of the decision to end the war, "I shall not be able to do so tomorrow."

How important was the covert war to this victory, and what cost did it come at?

India's new communications intelligence technologies were clearly critical; three decades on, the government would be advised to make fuller accounts public, and publicly honour the anonymous cryptanalysts who achieved so much.

The 1971 war history records that their efforts meant "several important communications and projections of the Pak[istani] high command were intercepted, decoded and suitable action [was] taken." Indian communications interception, the history states, even prevented a last-minute effort to evacuate the Pakistani troops from Dacca, using five disguised merchant ships.

The role of irregular forces, though, needs a more nuanced assessment. There is no doubt that they served to tie down Pakistani troops, and derail their logistical backbone. They were also, however, responsible for large-scale human rights abuses targeting Pakistani sympathisers and the ethnic Bihari population. There is no moral equivalence between these crimes and those of the Pakistani armed forces in 1971 — but the fact also is that the irregular forces bequeathed to Bangladesh a militarised political culture that would have deadly consequences of its own.

India's secret war in Bangladesh would have served little purpose without a conventional, disciplined military force to secure a decisive victory — a lesson of the utility and limitations of sub-conventional warfare that ought to be closely studied today by the several states that rely on these tactics.

The Hindu : Opinion / Lead : India's secret war in Bangladesh

 

[Bangalorean]

Great read! :thumb:

But then, that's how it is everywhere, in all wars and conflicts - intelligence agents and saboteurs are always the unsung heroes - people only remember the deeds of the armed forces.

 

[KS]

Gano Bahini ?

Is that another name for the Mukthis ? I'm hearing the name for the first time.

Also one important person missing is Maj,Gen Shabeg Singh whose role in the training of the guerillas was extensive. It was by a turn of fate that he himself was later involved in the training of the Sikh militants and was killed in the last stand @ Golden Temple.

 

[Ray]

Brig Uban was involved with the Chakmas.