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Ya'll Nibbiars @Okabe Rintarou Nibba do we have a government continuity of operations Plans?.
Any designated person to continue the Government?.
Any designated person to continue the Government?.
Ya'll Nibbiars Yeah Heard that a Subamrine of the Russian or the American Navy could act as a NCA bunker.After that its the NCA Bunker or Aircraft and countdown option that would act as an ARS. Oh, did you mean a submarine could act as a NCA Bunker?
Not that I know of. Maybe the Cabinet members and ruling party can decide, but its not codified like it is for the Americans.Ya'll Nibbiars @Okabe Rintarou Nibba do we have a government continuity of operations Plans?.
Any designated person to continue the Government?.
Ya'll Nibbiar if there is the Continuation of the Government then don't then please at any cost don't make SuSu the designates PM. Even Pappy bhi chalega but not SuSu.
Ya'll Nibbiars That's why the ARS matter even more in case a incompetent person becomes a Designated PM. Atleast we should some capabilities to strike atleast in revenge. But thats why may be both the USSR now Russia and the Americans were more cautious.
SuSu is highly unlikely. Most likely it will be a Cabinet Minister from Defence/Finance/Home Affairs ministries. But again, its not predefined. That is a problem.
I see what you are saying. Over time, I really imagine this will give evolve into some kind of AI based system to make sure no false alarms & the complexity to cover all possible scenarios to make it effective deterent for adversary. Might gain some situational awareness as humans will keep feeding it data and adding complexity.The skynet is a AI based system. Here we are talking about a Semi Automated system. Not a AI based system. Then the strikes still be manned but more faster and advance system and in the case of the Higher Command destroyed. The Retaliatory Strike capabilities. This is a must that we have nuclear missile within few minutes of strike range over India.
Ya'll Nibbiars there are already papers written on it's.I see what you are saying. Over time, I really imagine this will give evolve into some kind of AI based system to make sure no false alarms & the complexity to cover all possible scenarios to make it effective deterent for adversary. Might gain some situational awareness as humans will keep feeding it data and adding complexity.
When reading into the gist, skynet popped into the head. Sorry for the deflection.
Just imagine us passing them the message over the hotline that our Deadman's Hand is active and unless our guy in The Bunker presses the keys to delay the countdown again, the nukes will fly. Xi would $hit his pants.Imagine if we had such a system deployed during the Ladakh Stand off. Would the Chinese would have been so balant and aggressive?.
Both links are giving me "page not found"
AFAIK based on very old information , there is a list of people who can authorise launch orders on the basis of a tiered hierarchy. Incase top hierarchy is eliminated . Those next in line access a designated safe , where sealed instructions are kept , they open it and follow the instructions given there. Incase they get eliminated , those next in line open their specific safe and access the instructions. How many tiers are there I don't know.Ya @porky_kicker Your Thought's.
Ya'll Nibbiars yeah but anyway. ARS reduces the time and also considering the Hypersonic cruise missiles and Stealth Cruise missiles. We need to adapt. ARS make more sense than ever.AFAIK based on very old information , there is a list of people who can authorise launch orders on the basis of a tiered hierarchy. Incase top hierarchy is eliminated . Those next in line access a designated safe , where sealed instructions are kept , they open it and follow the instructions given there. Incase they get eliminated , those next in line open their specific safe and access the instructions. How many tiers are there I don't know.
This is all I can say with some guarantee . If the same protocol is being followed now I don't know.
HBOs chernobylMeanwhile....
Dyatlov: Raise the power.
@Haldilal : It isnt safe
Dyatlov : Safety first, always, I've been saying that for 25 years.
Now raise the power.
@Haldilal : (Raises power)
Reactor: Boom
Dyatlov: What did you DO?
Fomin: "I apologise for this unsatisfactory result."
Akimov : It Exploded! The Core exploded! I see graphite in this thread.
Dyatlov :What??? There aint no Graphite in this thread. rbmk cores dont explode (Also pukes on the table).
Guys correct me if I am wrong. I had read that India's NFS comes with riders. Especially one that states that if a Nuclear capable missile is launched it will be considered as Nuclear attack and followed by full spectrum retaliation. That makes me believe that we are already keeping eyes open on any kind of launch from both our untrustworthy neighbours.Ya'll Nibbiars
The Need for the ARS.
The Indian nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system comprises many component systems that were designed and fielded during the Cold War — a period when nuclear missiles were set to launch from deep within chinese territory, giving the sufficient time to react. That era is over. Today, Chinese and Pakistan nuclear modernization is rapidly compressing the time Indian leaders will have to detect a nuclear launch, decide on a course of action, and direct a response.
Technologies such as HypersonicWeapons, stealthy Nuclear Armed Cruise Missile, and weaponized artificial Intelligence mean India's legacy NC3 Systems may be too slow for the president to make a considered decision and transmit orders. The challenges of attack-time compression present a destabilizing risk to India's deterrence strategy. Any potential for failure in the detection or assessment of an attack, or any reduction of decision and response time, is inherently dangerous and destabilizing.
If the ultimate purpose of the NC3 system is to ensure India's senior leadership has the information and time needed to command and control nuclear forces, then the penultimate purpose of a reliable NC3 system is to reinforce the desired deterrent effect. To maintain the deterrent value of India's strategic forces, the India may need to develop something that might seem unfathomable — an automated strategic response system based on artificial intelligence.
Admittedly, such a suggestion will generate comparisons to Dr. Strangelove’s doomsday machine, War Game's War Operation Plan Response, and the Terminator’s Skynet, but the prophetic imagery of these science fiction films is quickly becoming reality. A rational look at the NC3 modernization problem finds that it is compounded by technical threats that are likely to impact strategic forces. Time compression has placed India's senior leadership in a situation where the existing NC3 system may not act rapidly enough. Thus, it may be necessary to develop a system based on artificial intelligence, with predetermined response decisions, that detects, decides, and directs strategic forces with such speed that the attack-time compression challenge does not place the India in an impossible position.
Threats Are the Problem
The compression of detection and decision time is not a new phenomenon. In the 1970's, Chinese bombers would take hours to reach the India. With the advent of the missile age, that time was compressed to about 30 minutes for a land-based intercontinental ballistic missile and about 15 minutes for a submarine-launched ballistic missile. These technologies fostered the development of both space-based and underwater detection and communication, as well as advanced over-the-horizon radar. Despite this attack-time compression, Indian officials remained confident that India's senior leaders could act in sufficient time. The India believed the Chinese would be deterred by its ability to do so.
However, over the past decade Chinese has vigorously modernized its nuclear arsenal, with a particular emphasis on developing capabilities that are difficult to detect because of their shapes, their materials, and the flight patterns they will take to Indian. targets. Examples of the systems include the JL 3 and Hypersonic cruise missiles, DF 17 Glide vehicle, and the hypersonic weapon, which all have the potential to negate the India's’ NC3 system before it can respond. This compression of time is at the heart of the problem. The India has always expected to have enough time to detect, decide, and direct. Time to act can no longer be taken for granted, nor can it be assumed that the Chinese or Pakistan, for that matter, will act tactically or strategically in the manner expected by the India. In fact, policymakers should expect adversaries to act unpredictably. Neither the Indian intelligence community nor Beltway intellectuals predicted the Chinese invasion of Tibet, among other recent Chinese acts of aggression. The Chinese, to their credit, are adept at surprising the India on a regular basis.
These new technologies are shrinking India's senior-leader decision time to such a narrow window that it may soon be impossible to effectively detect, decide, and direct nuclear force in time. In the wake of a nuclear attack, confusion and paralysis by information and misinformation could occur when the NC3 system is in a degraded state. Understanding the new technologies that are reshaping strategic deterrence is instructive.
Two types of nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons have emerged: hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles. Rich Moore, RAND Corporation senior engineer, notes, “Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered all the way to their targets using an advanced propulsion system called a SCRAMJET. These are very, very, fast. You may have six minutes from the time it’s launched until the time it strikes.” Hypersonic cruise missiles can fly at speeds of Mach 5 and at altitudes up to 100,000 feet.
Hypersonic glide vehicles are launched from an intercontinental ballistic missile and then glide through the atmosphere using aerodynamic forces to maintain stability, flying at speeds near Mach 20. Unlike ballistic missiles, glide vehicles can maneuver around defenses and to avoid detection if necessary, disguising their intended target until the last few seconds of flight — a necessary capability as nations seek to develop ever better defenses against hypersonic weapons.
In addition to the hypersonic cruise missile threat, there is the proliferation of offensively postured, nuclear-armed, Low Observable Cruise Missiles. Whereas the hypersonic cruise missile threat is looming because adversary systems are still in the developmental stage, low-observable cruise missiles are here and the Chinese understand how to employ these weapons on flight paths that are hard to track, which makes them hard to target. Land-attack cruise missiles are a challenge for today’s detection and air defense systems. Cruise missiles can fly at low altitudes, use terrain features, and fly circuitous routes to a target, avoiding radar detection, interception, or target identification. Improved defensive capabilities and flight paths have made low-observable or land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) even less visible. They can also be launched in a salvo to approach a target simultaneously from different directions.
The use of automation in the NC3 system is not entirely new. In fact, beginning in the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union pursued the development of automated systems within the areas of threat detection, logistical planning, message traffic, and weapon-system guidance. Sometime in the late 1980s, the Soviet Union developed and deployed the Perimeter system.
Options for Escaping the Dilemma
There are three primary options we see for escaping the dilemma presented. First, the India can refocus its nuclear modernization effort to field a much more robust second-strike capability that allows the India to absorb an unexpected first strike before deciding on a response. This option would pose a myriad of ethical and political challenges, including accepting the deaths of many Americans in the first strike, the possible decapitation of India's leadership, and the likely degradation of the India's nuclear arsenal and NC3 capability. However, a second-strike-focused nuclear deterrent could also deter an adversary from thinking that the threats discussed above provide an advantage sufficient to make a first strike worth the risk.
Second, nuclear modernization could focus on improvements to pre-launch strategic warning, such as improved surveillance and reconnaissance, as part of a larger preemption strategy. This approach would also require instituting a damage prevention or limitation first-strike policy that allowed the president to launch a nuclear attack based on strategic warning. Such an approach would be controversial, but could deter an adversary from approaching the India's perceived red lines.
Refocusing on strategic warning, specifically all-source intelligence that provides indication that an adversary is preparing to attack the India, would necessarily be accompanied by a policy of preemptive attack by the India. In essence, once intelligence revealed that the India was facing an imminent attack, “kill or be killed” would become the new motto of nuclear forces. Absent sufficient time to detect the launch of an adversary’s weapons, decide on a response, and then direct a retaliatory response, preemption may be the only viable policy for saving Indian lives. This approach to the use of nuclear weapons is antithetical to Indian values, but if the alternative is the destruction of Indian society, preemption may be the more acceptable option.
Third, nuclear modernization could focus on compressing the time available to an adversary to detect, decide, and direct. This would be done in an effort to force an adversary to back away from destabilizing actions and come to the negotiating table. Such a strategy is premised on the idea that mutual vulnerability makes the developing strategic environment untenable for both sides and leads to arms control agreements that are specifically designed to force adversaries to back away from fielding first-strike capabilities. The challenge with this approach is that if a single nuclear power (China, for example) refuses to participate, arms control becomes untenable and a race for first-strike dominance ensues.
There is a fourth option. The India could develop an NC3 system based on artificial intelligence. Such an approach could overcome the attack-time compression challenge.