Revived: plan to give access to bases to US

[sorcerer]

on one hand in this part four

it is interesting line

"(vi) Some argue that the ongoing Indo-US joint military exercises and the benefits of logistical cooperation are at present tilted in favour of the US. However, it is pertinent to point out here that the current global geo-strategic environment is marked by a contradiction. On the one hand, countries are forging 'promiscuous' politico- diplomatic partnerships. On the other, they are adopting hedging strategies as a result of uncertainties about the intentions of the emerging poles.
For India, joint military exercises with the United States serve both imperatives concurrently.62 Consequently, identifying convergence of interests between the two countries and absolute gains are more crucial for India than extracting a 'balance-of-dividends' and relative gains.

so in essence this lines advises india that it should not look at mutual benefit from US for allowing basses to US on indian soil
and that it should be grateful to maibaap US that they have choosen India to do its dirty work and that the Indians should be garteful that US is even asking India instead of Others

haha with this kind of attitude we are going nowhere

We can always expect US to get what they want. They will either get what they want through their tricky clauses or with sheer arrogance.

Hope the Indian camp puts favorable consequences in the final draft of INDIA USA Agreements after the negotiations.

 

[sorcerer]

Excerpts from Defence Security Corporation Procedure - USA


C3.7.3. Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR).

C3.7.3.1. C4ISR Definition. C4ISR encompasses systems, procedures, and techniques used to collect and disseminate information. It includes intelligence collection and dissemination networks, command and control networks, and systems that provide the common operational/ tactical picture. It also includes information assurance products and services, as well as communications standards that support the secure exchange of information by C4ISR systems. Under the C4ISR umbrella, systems exchange digital, voice, and video data to appropriate levels of command. The two key aspects of C4ISR systems are access to secure networks controlled by Information Security (INFOSEC) products and services, and the classified data resident in the C4ISR networks. See CJCSI 6510.06B (not for public release) for information on the release of U.S. INFOSEC products (Communications Security (COMSEC), cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic key material, security infrastructure) to foreign purchasers. Transfers of U.S. C4ISR capabilities to countries and international organizations must support a U.S. Combatant Commander's (CCDR) interoperability requirements or otherwise clearly benefit U.S. objectives. A purchaser's desire to be interoperable with the United States is insufficient justification for release. A purchaser must obtain approval from the supporting CCMD for access to classified U.S. C4ISR and INFOSEC prior to submitting a Letter of Request (LOR) for C4ISR. Pre-LOR coordination activities will take place between the requesting foreign purchaser (via SCO in country or Embassy in the United States) and DSCA (Programs Directorate). See Section C3.3.4. Prior to physically receiving any U.S. INFOSEC products or services associated with a secure C4ISR system, the purchaser must negotiate and sign a Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) or other INFOSEC agreement (e.g., COMSEC MOU, INFOSEC Equipment Agreement) with the CCMD.

Source:Security Assistance Management Manual

 

[ezsasa]

Excerpts from the draft Communication Interoperability & Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) that the US wants the Indian government to sign. Gives you a sense of why the Indian armed forces and government are so reluctant to proceed with it. The US Embassy here has been tasked with (in their words) "educating" the Indian government about how CISMOA is simply an enabler of more substantive cooperation.


====

Why am i not seeing a downside to this inoperability of comsec, How are both parties supposed to communicate when we do not have inoperability of communication sets between the two forces. I remember that video about redflag 08 in the U.S where among other blabbering the american colonel did say that our guys were not able to communicate with the tower because of communication sets inter-operability,in that case situation was resolved by making some of our guys were relaying the communications to the indian team sitting in the tower along with the american team.

one thing i know is that americans specify each and everything in their contracts, they do not go beyond or below what is written in a contract. we also know about contracts written by our guys where much is left to the imagination during execution and there by confusion. Ex: Russian sub deal and Vikramaditya deal.

 

[sorcerer]

one thing i know is that americans specify each and everything in their contracts, they do not go beyond or below what is written in a contract. we also know about contracts written by our guys where much is left to the imagination during execution and there by confusion. Ex: Russian sub deal and Vikramaditya deal.

This part is where I trust the Current GoI to do right.if they are seriously planning to proceed with either of the 3 contracts or all three.. Though all the three seems to to be inter related at operational scenario.
PMs office has given a political node to persue the agreements..which means there will be certain realistic effort to realise some or all factors on the agreements.

 

[ezsasa]

This part is where I trust the Current GoI to do right.if they are seriously planning to proceed with either of the 3 contracts or all three.. Though all the three seems to to be inter related at operational scenario.
PMs office has given a political node to persue the agreements..which means there will be certain realistic effort to realise some or all factors on the agreements.

My guess is : if our babu's are taking the lead in the document preparations and negotiations there are bound to be issues. if somebody from the forces are equally involved in these documents and negotiations chances of having a good output increases, if forces are not at the table and acting in advisory capacity loopholes are bound to come out later.

Then again we have parrikar who seems to be decent guy at the helm of things, maybe we need not worry after all.

 

[hit&run]

Excerpts from the draft Communication Interoperability & Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) that the US wants the Indian government to sign. Gives you a sense of why the Indian armed forces and government are so reluctant to proceed with it. The US Embassy here has been tasked with (in their words) "educating" the Indian government about how CISMOA is simply an enabler of more substantive cooperation.

====

Thanks @sorcerer; for providing all that information above, a year ago I tried to search the same but wasn't able to. This thread so far is going good.

Thanks @PaliwalWarrior; for highlighting few important points.

 

[sorcerer]

India - USA: Will they strike a balance of interests?

Narendra Modi has to find a balance between the interest of India to develop relations with the United States and attempts by Barack Obama to set it against Russia and China. This is how the Russian experts look at the main trend of the US-India summit.

The summit will be held from January 25 to 27. This will be the first meeting of the US President with the Prime Minister of India on Indian soil and the second attempt to restart the strategic partnership between the two countries.

Barack Obama is sure to bring with him interesting offers for the Indian partners. It is highly probable that a pragmatic Narendra Modi will take them, of course, if he considers them to be beneficial for the country. However, the honoured guest will always have to remember that the Indian authorities are clearly committed to the idea of national sovereignty and a multipolar world. That Narendra Modi's team wants to see in the United States an equal partner and hopes that Washington is also aware of it.

Narendra Modi has made it clear that he views the US as not the only, but one of the centres of power in a multipolar world. This is the opinion expressed by Tatyana Shaumyan, expert at the Institute of Oriental Studies:

"Modi has invited Obama to be the Chief Guest at the Republic Day celebrations not accidentally. Probably, this was done in order to balance the visits by Putin in December and by the Chinese leader Xi Jinping in September. India is interested in developing relations with the United States, especially because the Indian diaspora in the US exceeds two million. Washington understands it and tries to play on it. In particular, now Obama speaks with sharp anti-Russian statements. During the visit, he will not deny himself the pleasure of trying to distract India from its relations with both Russia and China. But he is not likely to succeed."

Sergei Lunev, an expert with MGIMO, believes that the Indian leadership, undoubtedly, will defend national interests and is unlikely to depart from this basic stand:

"United States, no doubt, would like to see India as its full-fledged ally, but very serious differences on global issues do not allow this. Obama will certainly try to persuade the Indian authorities to conduct openly pro-American policy. But this will hardly produce any results. On global issues, India is unlikely to depart from its previous line, and therefore quite serious potential for conflict with the United States will continue to exist. India will develop and strengthen comprehensive ties with Russia and China, participate in the organizations in which both Russia and China are involved. These organisations are BRICS as well as the SCO which India is likely to join this year".

It is quite probable that the US will try to play the Indian card to contain China, to scare India about the Chinese threat. This is the opinion of Nina Lebedeva, expert at the Institute of Oriental Studies, who also predicts India's response to such a move:

"India will, of course, keep in mind its national interests, but it will also take into account its interest in the relationship with the United States. India is of course interested in them - the US Navy supports the interests of India in the Indian Ocean. And at the same time it will not lose sight of the relationship with China. Because China is a very important trade partner, especially after the visit of President Xi Jinping. India will have to strike a balance in negotiations with Obama, as it has done repeatedly. No wonder Americans have recognized it as a balancing state, a pendulum that swings to one side and the other, but is very sensible and pragmatic in protecting its interests."

It is already well known that the parties will not sign any military agreement. The long-awaited agreement on the Indo-US nuclear deal could be signed. Meanwhile, the probability of approval of the deal by the US Congress is fifty-fifty. But one should not expect any special sensations from Barack Obama's visit. Just like the first visit by Narendra Modi to the United States on September 30 last year, which did not produce any sensations.

India - USA: Will they strike a balance of interests? - News - Politics - Russian Radio

 

[sorcerer]

Is the United States a 'Dangerous' Ally?

A former Australian prime minister is among those who argue that it is.

Some American strategists have of late expressed the concern that the United States' growing military ties with various nations in East and Southeast Asia give these nations a finger on the American trigger. That is, actions these nations may take on their own could involve the United States in a war with North Korea, Russia or China. This issue has been particularly raised with regard to Japan because the U.S. has declared that it views the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as if they were parts of Japan – which the United States is committed by treaty to defend.

Now, a former Australian prime minister, Malcolm Fraser, turns the tables on this concern in an important article in the most recent issue of The National Interest. Fraser fears not that Australia will drag the United States into war, but rather that the United States will involve Australia in a war not of Australia's making.


Fraser goes so far as to label the United States a "dangerous ally" because since the fall of the USSR Australia has "become progressively more enmeshed in American strategic and military affairs," such that it is effectively no longer capable of making its own military decisions. He is particularly concerned by the possibility that the United States could launch military attacks from bases located on Australian territory but Australia would be given no opportunity to oppose the United States' decisions. In short, Australia has "effectively ceded to America the ability to decide when Australia goes to war."

Moreover, the United States' sense of exceptionalism and its cultural insensitivity trouble Fraser. As he sees it, these qualities have caused the United States to antagonize China and Russia and have let the U.S. irresponsibly engage in armed conflicts in the Middle East. Fraser sees the conflict in Ukraine in part as a result of Washington's attempt to include Ukraine in NATO – demonstrating a "marked lack of historical understanding" about Russia.

To rectify the situation, Fraser suggests that the U.S. remove its military facilities from Darwin and Pine Gap as soon as logistically possible. He also recommends that Australia shore up its diplomatic activities throughout East and Southeast Asia and at the United Nations, as well as increasing Australia's defense spending to three percent of GDP.

All of this is important because the United States has in the last few years followed a "burden sharing" policy. It has called on allies to pick up part of the tab for the military buildup to "balance" China as well as Russia. (Indeed, some military planners favor a division of labor in which allies assume responsibility for one or more specific missions.) Such burden sharing is viewed as a way of responding to domestic pressures to keep its defense budget low. Moreover, including other nations in its various coalitions of the willing enhances the legitimacy of the United States' military operations. For example, to fight ISIS – a force estimated at most to include 32,000 fighters – the U.S. assembled a coalition of sixty countries, many of which were included not because of their military capabilities but rather because they added legitimacy to the operation. In addition, the United States views establishing military partnerships with other nations as a way to contain China – although officials avoid the term "contain" because it smacks of the Cold War era and its tensions.

Critics of this approach – Fraser is far from the only one – worry that the nations with which the United States has established ties will come to view the United States' statements as full-fledged commitments to come to their defense in the event of an attack. These nations should learn from Ukraine's experience: When Ukraine relinquished its nuclear weapons, the U.S. gave it "security assurances" in what is known as the Budapest Memorandum. As Steven Pifer at Brookings noted, in 1994 these security assurances were "a check for U.S. support – albeit one the United States hoped would never be cashed." However, when Russia used its armed forces to grab parts of Ukraine and to threaten others, these assurances turned out not to provide much of a deterrence. After all, as one lawyer explained privately, these were merely assurances, not guaranties.

All this suggests that although Fraser's assertion that the United States is a "dangerous ally" is unnecessarily provocative, the issues he raises surely deserve much attention. Military alliances seem attractive for various reasons already listed. One should, though, not ignore that they are also risky – for all involved.

Amitai Etzioni is a professor of international relations at The George Washington University. His latest book, The New Normal, was released in November by Transaction Publishers. Follow him on Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, or send an email to [email protected] to subscribe to his monthly newsletter.

Is the United States a 'Dangerous' Ally? | The Diplomat

=========

A very interesting article which says about "Burder Sharing Policy" of USA. This article supports the major concern of a few of us in the forum.

India should be very careful when dealing with the US in matters od policies pertaining to nationsl security.

 

[blueblood]

1) The critics of the agreement also point out that United States military forces are operating all over the world including the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The LSA with India would, therefore, benefit the US more than India because currently India's military forces are not operating near America.38 The critics argue that the dividends of logistical cooperation and on-going joint military exercises are skewed in favour of the US. The fact is that the US has signed logistics support agreements with South East, South Asian, and also with Middle East countries. If India will not sign the agreement it will not affect much the US military operational capability in these regions.

2) The US demands that unless India signs LSA along with two other technology safeguard agreements—the Communication Interoperability and Security Agreement (CISMOA), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA)39—the advance of bilateral defence cooperation will be hampered and India will keep itself away
from obtaining cutting-edge defence technologies which will affect operational capability of its armed forces. As the former US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, stated on a visit to
New Delhi in January 2010, that not getting the outstanding agreements signed 'is an obstacle to Indian access to the very highest level of technology.

3) The US also cut off weapons supplies to India after war broke out between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. India's defence establishment has had a residual distrust of the US since then, and this has not changed despite subsequent, positive developments in the bilateral relations.42 An enduring trust deficit is thus hindering in building consensus on key security areas for cooperation.

4) Buying an American-made fighter jet in its Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), argued that 'the United States requires all foreign buyers to sign up to end-use monitoring agreements (EUMAs).

------------------------------------------------------------

This pretty much sums up what I wanted to say.

 

[Ray]

Part 5

The Way Ahead
The logistics support agreements that the US has signed with many other countries are mutually beneficial agreements. India thus should move on the pending LSA to strengthen defence and strategic relationship with the US. So far, the Indian government has not clearly indicated any objections to the provisions of the agreement. If there is any objectionable
element in the proposed agreement, then it should be identified and the two sides should negotiate to arrive at an agreement that is consistent with their national interests and policies. As mentioned above, the agreement has several benefits from both the defence and strategic aspects. It helps in mitigating capability gaps and logistics shortfalls. The systems and methods of LSSS, when integrated and supplemented with the proposed agreement, would decrease wait time and increase sustainable capabilities.
Since it is a two-way agreement, the two countries would share both the responsibility and benefits of the agreement.

The increasing seriousness of non-traditional security challenges, coupled with the criticality of the South Asian region on the stability and security of both the world and India, also increases the importance of the agreement to have all the needed LSSS in a timely, efficient, and effective manner. Moreover, as India's role and foreign policy interests are growing
in the world, to match its growing role the need of logistics support is very clear. The agreement will help Indian armed forces to develop their capabilities, play better humanitarian assistance and relief operations, and to operate beyond the South Asian region in safeguarding its vital national interests. At present, however, it seems that political sensitivity,
deep-seated distrust, bureaucratic and procedural hurdles, and some short-sighted domestic policies in both countries are stalling this process.63 Yet, despite these difficulties, the India-US relationship has witnessed a remarkable transformation in the last decade. The US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta's visit to India in June 2012 further highlighted
the growing convergence of India-US strategic interests and rising India's significance to the United States' Asia-pivot strategy.64 Now both sides need to sustain the momentum on the issues where they have made progress, including cooperation on defence, technology transfer, trade, energy, the environment, and education. They need to move their
disagreements towards cooperation, without reverting to the acrimony that characterized past relations.65 The 'wider public in India accepts that establishing good relationship with the US is a desirable objective. Pragmatic thinking in India supports the inclination of the government to bring India and the US closer.'66 On the other hand, the US government
has also placed its strategic focus on improving its relations with India. The scope of the opportunity, diplomacy, and negotiations between the two countries are also underway to iron out the existing disagreements in a manner acceptable to both sides. These efforts would put a promising India-US strategic relationship back on track. They now need to turn
their common interests into complimentary policies.


Acknowledgements
The author would like to express his sincere thanks to Dr G. Balachandran, Dr S. Kalyanaraman, Col Vivek Chadha, Dr Anit Mukherjee, Cdr Sarabjit Singh Parmar, and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions which were of great help to the enrichment of the paper.


Source http://www.idsa.in/system/files/jds_7_1_SarojBishoyi.pdf

======

@Ray @roma @pmaitra @Casper @ladder @blueblood @sob @SajeevJino @EXPERT @LETHALFORCE @ezsasa @PaliwalWarrior @Razor @The Messiah @Otm Shank2 @Bangalorean @hit&run


and all others


=

That sums it up.

 

[Ray]

What is CISMOA?

17 Dec 2009 Jason Verdugo: The Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement or "CISMoA" is another facet of bureaucratic and sometimes political attributes of doing business and allying with the United States. The CISMoA should not be confused with the EULA which is a totally different agreement covering the use of systems purchased. The CISMoA provides guidance on how the systems will function with other systems. The CISMoA however, can be abused as an agreement and become an extension of /or a replacement for a EULA which can defeat the entire purpose of any cooperation and the purpose of the CISMoA.

The recent exercises between the Indian and U.S. militaries were a success and both sides are continuing to get acquainted with each others people, equipment, and doctrine. There were probably issues with interoperability that were uncovered for which, neither side is telling. They will however work to fix any technical and collaborative issues, so that when the next joint exercise occurs, at least those first problems will be fixed.

In the 21st century, communications equipment aren't just some solid state radios where each side only needs to know a particular frequency to communicate on. Communications equipment are highly complex pieces of computerized hardware running equally complex software and encryption products. Sometimes it's difficult to get the same equipment with the same country to work properly much less trying to conduct joint operations with different countries using different equipment.

The CISMoA attempts to facilitate agreements on how each nation's radios will communicate with each other effectively. For example, India troops may want to call in an air strike with U.S. air assets, this will require Indian ground radios to be compatible with U.S. strike aircraft radios to include encryption. Likewise, U.S. Special Ops may want to call in Indian long range artillery. The U.S. SpecOps on the ground will need their radios to communicate with Indian ground based artillery batteries.

Communications such as these are only a fraction of what CISMoA can cover. Going back to the air strike scenario, if laser guided bombs are employed, the Indian ground troops may require a laser designator. It's not just point and the aircraft shoots as the press and media will have you believe. That laser designator must be set to a specific agreed upon frequency of invisible laser light. The laser guided bombs loaded on the aircraft will also be set to accept that specific frequency. You can't have the enemy using a similar frequency of laser light to direct our bombs back on us (unlikely). If the frequencies do not match, the bombs won't register a signal.

Another real world example is with the Patriot missile system that the U.S. has sold to Japan. It turns out that the frequency the U.S. system uses to send a launch command to the missiles is the same frequency used by Japanese commercial cell phone carriers. OOPS! This required a tweaking of the Patriot systems in Japan to use a different frequency that likewise while good for military use in Japan, can not be used inside the U.S.

A current real world problem for which the U.S. and other allies in the war theater's (possibly even Indian units) are experiencing issues with unmanned air vehicles (UAV's) communications. The frequencies are becoming ever more difficult to manage and they are jamming each other, making command and control more and more difficult if not impossible. Actually, the U.S. lost another Reaper last week in Afghanistan for an "unknown" reason which has already been traced to a loss of comm link.

A further problem is the creation of device to defeat the improvised explosive device or IED. The U.S. Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization or JIEDDO based out of the Pentagon has poured billions of dollars in development & deployment of specialized electronic equipment. One such device is used to jam the cell phones and other devices used to remote detonate IED's. Unfortunately one of these devices uses the same frequency that the Blackhawk helicopter uses for firing IR countermeasure flares. OOPS!

Ultimately the term for this is called "Spectrum Management" and the U.S. and her allies try diligently to prevent problems like this from occurring. CISMoA helps, but in a fluid theater of operations with many different nations with many different types of communications platforms operating, this is showing to be impossible.

CISMoA may also cover electronic warfare or EW. (see the EW article link). EW, if properly employed can be a powerful weapon against your enemies. However, since it's an area weapon with broad reach, if the management of operations and spectrum are not perfect, then you may jam your own forces and/or your allies to your own detriment.

At least with India and the U.S. there will be fewer different systems and only two players. Theoretically spectrum management should be easier and more feasible.

CISMoA does not just cover hardware and software; it also covers doctrine and interaction. We can share a command center which could be transferring Indian commanders to U.S. ships or transferring U.S. Commanders to Indian ground command facilities. These commanders will be responsible for their respective forces. They will need to know how each other works. One Generals decision to bomb a target may be in conflict with the other Generals plan to take the target, hence, friendly fire incident. Or one General may want to continue negotiating while another General might want to bypass a village instead. CISMoA tries to create a framework for commanders to operate in so that they don't have to halt operations and call Washington or New Delhi for guidance. One regulating factor for a CISMoA can be the Rules of Engagement or ROE.

An example is the ongoing media blitz of the German commander in Afghanistan who called in an American aircraft to conduct an airstrike on a fuel tanker truck that had been compromised. Needless to say there was a lot of death and destruction. The communications and weapons performed exactly as designed and agreed upon, however the politics and media have twisted the event from a proper combat decision of a valued commander to a television treasure trove that the Taliban and or Al-Qaeda can take to the Pakistani mountains.

A CISMOA can be a powerful tool to help operations, but it can be horribly tainted and twisted into a hindrance or a scapegoat of policy because of politics.


============

I would say...NO Go.

IMO, CISMOA can KISSMOIASSMUAAH

Signing CISMOA means quiet a compormise

Right Sir? @Ray, @pmaitra, @Kunal Biswas

Having worked in the field I will say the issues raised is indeed true.

There was a time when our own Infantry could not communicate with our own Indian tanks since we had US type radios and the tanks had Russian radios, and we were to fight together.

I concede that there will be issues but a resolution can always be made where interoperability is feasible.

If you cannot communicate, then you are a dead duck and on your own guts and wits.

 

[sorcerer]

1) The critics of the agreement also point out that United States military forces are operating all over the world including the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The LSA with India would, therefore, benefit the US more than India because currently India's military forces are not operating near America.38 The critics argue that the dividends of logistical cooperation and on-going joint military exercises are skewed in favour of the US. The fact is that the US has signed logistics support agreements with South East, South Asian, and also with Middle East countries. If India will not sign the agreement it will not affect much the US military operational capability in these regions.

2) The US demands that unless India signs LSA along with two other technology safeguard agreements—the Communication Interoperability and Security Agreement (CISMOA), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA)39—the advance of bilateral defence cooperation will be hampered and India will keep itself away
from obtaining cutting-edge defence technologies which will affect operational capability of its armed forces. As the former US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, stated on a visit to
New Delhi in January 2010, that not getting the outstanding agreements signed 'is an obstacle to Indian access to the very highest level of technology.

3) The US also cut off weapons supplies to India after war broke out between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. India's defence establishment has had a residual distrust of the US since then, and this has not changed despite subsequent, positive developments in the bilateral relations.42 An enduring trust deficit is thus hindering in building consensus on key security areas for cooperation.

4) Buying an American-made fighter jet in its Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), argued that 'the United States requires all foreign buyers to sign up to end-use monitoring agreements (EUMAs).

------------------------------------------------------------

This pretty much sums up what I wanted to say.

2) The CISMOA and BECA agreements are problematic... when it comes about developing independent technology platforms. What are the odds that India will have to communicate the methodology or a certain technical detail to US in that eventuality?
IMO this can severly...very severly hamper out independet operability + the odds of screwing up mutual beneficial technology platforms on defence technologh is also very much possible.
India wants to be an arms exporter..these agreements can severly hamper it when US parts or tech find its way inside our defence products.


US plays both sides very well.. USA cannot be trusted Period.
BUT
India can find ways to circumvent it and protect our independnce on our technology frontiers.


3)Positive developments what ever happened has always to do with the US plans of making INdia a junior partner. Havent you read the news article about the Previous AUstralian PM?

Is the United States a 'Dangerous' Ally? Post #128 on the same page.

4) American fighter may be good.but how good are they when we are talking about network centric war scenarios. You will have to buy the fighter and then to get the most benefit out of the fighter you will end up buying the whole platforms and related technologies and equipments and a mighty other packages and other support sidekicks and thuggy arms.

This kinda makes us vector into their scenario of operations or play by their rules. Meaning our independent operations will be severly hampered when we use their products.

This is where I trust Russia with its alternate plans, which could be superior or equal but gives us technology insight for our techn team as well as innovative products that will go with our existing platform and network centric scenarios. We already have the know how of their technologies and capabilities. The team has "worked together" and that means a lot in such complex projects.

I dont know how good will the tech be if we try to link the best of US and the best of Russia together with the Indian bonding in operational senarios where its all wired together with a lots of voids.

 

[sorcerer]

Having worked in the field I will say the issues raised is indeed true.

There was a time when our own Infantry could not communicate with our own Indian tanks since we had US type radios and the tanks had Russian radios, and we were to fight together.

Sir, in that case, hypotheticallly is India trying to birdge the gap on own way by trying to set defence deals with both US and Russia?
Meaning getting the products from both but somehow fixing the void by having own methods and tech to link them both so as to get both these platforms working together?

If such works...that would be great news...

But
I dont know how much its possible because of rights on the products and servicess offered..I suppose BECA has certain clauses pertaining to it.

 

[Ray]

Sir, India is not as weak vis a vis China as portrayed by "Desi Dork Media". China was a military power even in 1962 or rather 1950s, India was about as powerful as Bangladesh is today. If we can and sooner than later we will have to negotiate some kind of agreement with China or else we might loose a lot of resources competing with them militarily.

@blueblood,

The problem in 1950 or 1962 was not the military strength. It was solely the fact that India was absolutely under a clueless Govt that has no strategic insight.

 

[Ray]

Sir, in that case, hypotheticallly is India trying to birdge the gap on own way by trying to set defence deals with both US and Russia?
Meaning getting the products from both but somehow fixing the void by having own methods and tech to link them both so as to get both these platforms working together?

If such works...that would be great news...

But
I dont know how much its possible because of rights on the products and servicess offered..I suppose BECA has certain clauses pertaining to it.

If you are talking about the Infantry and tank communication incompatibility, we did exactly that.

We installed a radio in the tank which was what the Infantry was using.

It also cramped the already cramped space for the tanker and Russian tanks are cubbyholes.

 

[sorcerer]

If you are talking about the Infantry and tank communication incompatibility, we did exactly that.

We installed a radio in the tank which was what the Infantry was using.

It also cramped the already cramped space for the tanker and Russian tanks are cubbyholes.

But sir, in the network centric war scenarios where a whole lot of different forces , equipments come into the same theatre of operation, this could become very cumbersome.

The idea of convergence sounds good though!

 

[Ray]

But sir, in the network centric war scenarios where a whole lot of different forces , equipments come into the same theatre of operation, this could become very cumbersome.

The idea of convergence sounds good though!

That is why there should be interoperability.

I am talking in a military sense.

It can also compromise many things, but that has to be thought out and addressed.

Prima facie, the intent is good.

 

[blueblood]

@blueblood,

The problem in 1950 or 1962 was not the military strength. It was solely the fact that India was absolutely under a clueless Govt that has no strategic insight.

I completely agree with you sir, but I also know that an entire army without a single automatic rifle was going to face tough time.

 

[Compersion]

Where is diego garcia ?

In the middle of Indian ocean.

More important for India is ability to exert influence on Malacca Straits (andamans, vietnam etc) and access to Central Asia.

(i know it is unlikely at this moment) reason would be subtraction.

 

[Otm Shank2]

Part 2

Logistics Support Agreement

As already mentioned, the LSA is similar to the ACSA that the US has with many of its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies. The ACSA statute, formerly known as 'NATO Mutual Support Act', was enacted in 1979 to simplify exchanges of logistics support, supplies, and services between the US and other NATO forces. Subsequently, it was amended in 1986, 1992, and 1994 to permit acquisition and cross- servicing agreements with non-NATO eligible countries or international organizations.8 At present, the US has signed such agreements with over 80 countries around the world, including NATO member countries. In South Asia, it signed this agreement with Afghanistan in February 2004 and with Sri Lanka in March 200710 for ten years to transfer and exchange logistics supplies, support, and re-fuelling of services during joint military exercises, peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian relief operations. 11 It is quite pertinent to mention here that the US Department of Defense (DoD) and the Pakistan's Ministry of Defence had also signed this agreement in February 2002 which lapsed in February 2012.12 In a recent report, Pakistan's Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) recommended that the agreement 'may only be renewed if required on new terms and conditions that should include respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan and ensures the national interests.'13

Besides India, the US is currently negotiating with other South Asian countries14 for signing this agreement which will enhance DoD's rapid deployment capacity and capability to conduct global operations by adding logistical options through the region.


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@thesorcerer Thanks

This is a Sad concession of Sovereignty.

India has done well to isolate South Asia from Western military intervention. All examples of this capability from latin america to southeast asia to the middle east has created only turmoil. part two of that analysis said it would allow a quick mobilization of forces is the backbone of this. Its like the railroads that quickly ferried british troops to quell dissent in occupied india.

Instead of the usa negotiating with 14 asian countries for logistical agreements india should be doing that. If India signs then theyll give up too and follow suit. After India realises what a huge mistake this is, the Us and west will be deeply ingrained in the IOR and you won't be able to get them out for decades if not centuries. At least now theyre stuck on the a tiny rock far away to the south in the ocean

If India was serious about being a power it would focus on protecting its region first. You can't build a house during an earthquake. You will never have stability without a sole power in the IOR/ South Asia and only India has the scale and prospects. The west in south Asia cage the golden bird again


Im extremely disappointed in Modi and The BJP.