i read that , still wondeing weather america forced india to sign such end user aggrement. america forgein policy is shaky ,
MMRCA News and Discussions - Part II
- Thread starter Sridhar
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LCA and MMRCA are completely different aircraft for different roles ( LCA would do point defence whereas MMRCA is for long range precision bombing as well as air combat )
IAF started MMRCA competition becqause LCA was not ready in time
i dont get it the mmrca competition, on one hand you have single engine fighter( SV GRIPEN) and onthe other hand you have heavy weight fighter( ,ig 35 , SH , EF) how can you compare the two types .i mean naturally the cost of ownership is less for single engine.
it is like comparing Mercades to SKODA
it is like comparing Mercades to SKODA
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India’s MMRCA Deal: Muddled Rationale, Costly Adventure?
Although nowhere near as high profile or politically dramatic as the 2008 Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, India’s proposed $10 billion procurement of 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) may have a much more profound impact on India’s strategic relations, particularly if a U.S. Platform – either Lockheed’s F-16 E/F or Boeing’s F/A-18 E/F – is selected as the winning bid. Indeed, given that the first eighteen aircraft bought in flyaway condition will likely not be operationalized into the Indian Air Force (IAF) until at least 2014-15, and the remaining 108 – aimed to be assembled indigenously – will not be operational until at least 2022, the strategic impact of the deal may far outweigh the tactical utility of this proposed stop-gap solution for a fourth generation fighter that might be dated by the time it is deployed. This raises the natural question, given other pressing needs for the IAF, of whether or not this is worth it.
Why did the IAF and Ministry of Defence (MoD) issue a request for proposal for 126 medium fourth generation MMRCA? The IAF currently operates between thirty and thirty-two combat aircraft squadrons, well below the mandated level of 39.5 squadrons; this combat strength is envisioned to fall further to roughly twenty-seven to twenty-nine squadrons in the next decade or so as older MiG-21 squadrons are retired without replacement. With such a depleted combat strength, the IAF cannot maintain the deployment patterns and operational readiness that are required for India’s self-defense. India's air superiority over Pakistan could also be threatened, particularly as Pakistan takes delivery of further F-16 orders in the coming years. As a result, faced with imminent depletion of force-strength, the IAF and MoD began considering options several years ago to replace its aging combat aircraft fleet.
One option was to replace the light combat MiG-21 squadrons with modern aircraft of similar, but augmented capabilities, such as the MiG-29 or French Mirages. The indigenous development of the Tejas light combat aircraft, however, which is roughly of the same class and capability as a modernized MiG-21, mitigated the need to acquire a foreign replacement for the MiG-21 squadrons. The Tejas, though, has run into engine problems, triggering a fresh search for a higher-thrust engine in August 2009; the IAF is thus not expecting to take delivery of its first operational Tejas aircraft for another several years. In addition, the IAF has been steadily incorporating the highly capable and versatile 4.5 generation Su-30 MKI, a Russian medium-to-heavy platform with interceptor, bomber, and ground attack capabilities into its force structure since 2002, and it is increasingly indigenously assembled by Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL); a total of 280 will be inducted into the IAF by 2015. The combination of the Tejas and the Su-30 MKI will largely replenish and supersede India’s retiring assets by the middle of the next decade, putting the IAF at full combat strength by 2022.
The other alternative was to leapfrog technologies entirely and acquire a fifth generation fighter capable of operating in a network-centric environment, with some stealth capability, such as the U.S.-made F-22 or F-35, or Russian-made Sukhoi PAK-FA. India and Russia have agreed, in principle, to jointly develop the Sukhoi PAK-FA which is roughly in the same weight-class as a medium combat aircraft. Recently-retired Air Chief Marshal Fali Major expects the fifth generation fighter to be operational around 2020. While the IAF will be below-strength in its targeted combat aircraft capability until 2015, once the full complement of Tejas and Su-30MKIs are incorporated by then – and with the targeted development and acquisition of the Sukhoi PAK-FA true fifth generation aircraft – the IAF will be well-placed with a mix of light and medium-to-heavy multirole combat aircraft capable of executing most envisioned fighter and attack missions.
So where does the MMRCA deal fit into the IAF’s force requirements? It was initially envisioned in 2001 as an interim solution to replace the retiring MiG-21 fleet with a more capable set of 126 4.5 generation fighters. The six candidates for the MMRCA deal are a mix of single and twin-engine aircraft all broadly classified as medium multirole combat aircraft: the F-16 E/F (with a vague future option of the F-35), the F/A-18 E/F, the Dassault Rafale, the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Saab Gripen NG, and Russia’s MiG-35. These six aircraft are currently undergoing IAF trials in a variety of combat environments: Bangalore, Jaisalmer, and Leh. These trials will continue for at least the next year as the IAF undergoes its evaluation both in India and in-country to evaluate weapons complements.
Once the IAF makes its recommendation to the MoD, the black-box of Indian bureaucracy will be responsible for awarding the contract. According to Rahul Bedi of Jane’s Defence Weekly, this process is expected to take until 2012-14, and the criteria by which the MoD will make its final selection are incredibly ambiguous. The first eighteen aircraft, to be bought off-the-shelf in flyaway condition, are not required to be delivered until three years after the awarding of the contract; any delays in the acquisition process may push the first delivery of MMRCA platforms into the latter half of next decade. The indigenization process for the remaining 108 aircraft will also be time-consuming, and will vary significantly by the platform selected, so it could be up to 15 years – if not more – before the bulk of the MRCA are inducted into the IAF.
This elongated timeline undermines the primary rationale for the MMRCA deal. Since the Tejas and the Su-30MKIs will be operational well before even the first eighteen MMRCAs are delivered, and the Sukhoi PAK-FA fifth generation fighter is likely to be developed around the same time as the indigenously produced MMRCAs, the $10 billion MMRCA complement could be dated by the time it is incorporated into the IAF’s force structure – and certainly by the end of its three-decade life cycle – particularly since an expanded order of Su-30MKIs might provide broadly similar capabilities. Though it presently lacks an “active electronically scanned array” (AESA) radar, this may be upgradeable.
Critics of this view will argue that the MMRCA deal nevertheless provides a necessary capability in between the takeoff weights of the slightly heavier Su-30MKI and the Tejas, allowing India to expand its “operational envelope.” For a largely status quo power, the natural question is, of course, where to expand for the IAF. In what specific missions and roles will there be a gap? There does not appear to be an articulated role for the MMRCA that cannot be filled by the IAF’s existing combat aircraft and the mix of the Tejas, Su-30MKI, and proposed fifth generation fighter; capabilities judged sufficient to meet most realistic regional attack and fighter contingencies. As such, there are other capabilities the IAF could invest in that would reap greater tactical utility. Big ticket items may be prestigious and sexy, but the IAF may benefit more from necessary role-specific capabilities, particularly close ground support aircraft for mountainous combined arms operations (e.g., A-10 Thunderbolts), transport, further high-altitude attack helicopters, and surveillance or attack drone capabilities for counterinsurgency operations.
Strategically for India, the MMRCA deal is an opportunity to expand its burgeoning arms relationship with the United States, from which it has recently purchased P-8 maritime reconnaissance aircraft as well as C-130 transport aircraft. It could also help reduce its dependence on Russia for mainline platforms, which has recently frustrated the Indian military and MoD with the Gorshkov delays and a persistent lack of supply of spare parts. The selection of a frontline U.S. combat aircraft would mark a watershed moment in India’s strategic outlook as it would be the first major shift away from Russian platforms, embedding India in a deeper commercial and military relationship with the United States for parts, weapons, maintenance, and operational training, generating an integrated client-side relationship.
But precisely because this shift would be such a break from India’s past suppliers – Russia and France – it would require the costly development of a separate production, maintenance, weapons procurement, and training line in an IAF that already supports at least twenty-six different aircraft platforms. And even though the MMRCA deal mandates a 50 percent indigenous offset, stringent licensing and monitoring agreements will likely mean that the U.S. will not allow certain sensitive technologies to be transferred to India for indigenous production. While a diversified strategic relationship with the United States is certainly in both nations’ interest, the MMRCA deal should not be viewed as a panacea toward that end, particularly since there are other commercial areas in which the two nations can cooperate that might be just as deep and easier to operationalize (e.g., nuclear energy). If India’s primary aim is to establish a deeper arms relationship with the U.S., it would make more sense to select an American fifth-generation aircraft – whose costs might be more justifiable – rather than a medium MMRCA.
The contours of the MMRCA deal as it is unfolding, raises a critical question: is it worth the tens of billions of dollars outlay for little stop-gap measure, which can ably be substituted by the Su-30MKI, and which will eventually be superseded by a fifth generation fighter that might come online roughly around the same time? The Typhoon and the Gripen would make little sense for India. As new platforms, they would be costly to integrate into the IAF, with little obvious additional strategic or tactical benefit. The MiG-35 and the Rafale would be easier to incorporate into the IAF but again will reap little marginal benefit. The F-16 and F-18 would have a significant strategic impact, but will also be the most costly to operationalize; if the primary goal is a deeper strategic relationship with the U.S. and diversification away from Russia, there may be more cost-effective measures to achieve that end. There must thus be a clearer articulation by both the MoD and IAF as to what the utility of the MMRCA acquisitions will be, and a sober evaluation of whether it is worth the financial and organizational costs given other gaping priorities. The view from the outside suggests that it is very difficult to justify.
Vipin Narang is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Government, Harvard University and a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University. In Fall 2010, he will be Assistant Professor of Political Science at MIT.
India?s MMRCA Deal: Muddled Rationale, Costly Adventure? | Center for the Advanced Study of India
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No Good Choices for the Indian Air Force
In the Medium-range Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) sweepstakes, the Indian Air Force (IAF) is confronted with many choices, all of them bad. Whatever the IAF’s reasons for wanting a new aircraft, the Indian government means to use the deal to make international political capital, gain leverage in bilateral relations, and cement a strategic partnership. The Air Staff Quality Requirements – insofar as these can be deduced – are opaque. Is the IAF in the market for an aircraft to carry a heavy weapon load over a long distance in extended regional operations, or for a warplane to augment its existing strength in localized air defense, strike, and similar short-legged, Pakistan-centric, missions? This fuzziness, deliberate or not, will help the government to make the final selection, based less on technological trends or performance parameters than on the basis of which purchase best serves the country’s larger strategic interests. Be that as it may, the candidate aircraft are currently undergoing flight tests in diverse Indian conditions – desert, high altitude, and high humidity – to determine their utility. If the aim is to get the maximum political bang for the buck for the $10.4 billion for a fleet of 126 MMRCA and the lucrative opportunity to sell other military hardware in the future and to enhance the supplier country’s political influence and its trade, technology, and military footprint in India, Delhi better secure a lot more than just some flying machines.
The irony is that India’s desire for a new fighter plane is in the context of even the cutting edge manned aircraft obsolescing so fast as to become expensive museum pieces before they serve out their 30 year life span with the IAF. Had the IAF been visionary in its approach, it would have foreseen the end of the “man in the loop.” Absent such an outlook, it might have taken the cue from, say, the U.S. Air Force, and opted to be ahead of the technology learning curve by investing in an armada of ballistic and cruise missiles and multi-purpose drones or remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), while retaining a small but powerful residual strategic manned combat aircraft capability. As a habitual laggard, however, the IAF seems satisfied with equipping itself fully for yesterday’s war.
Worse, unlike the Indian Navy with its warship directorate, the IAF has no in-house expertise in designing aircraft and never acquired a stake in indigenous manufacture. Indeed, it took perverse pride in stifling Indian aircraft projects just so it could continue to avail of more sophisticated imported warplanes. Thus, for example, the follow-on aircraft to the HF-24 Marut fighter that the famous wartime German Focke-Wulfe designer Kurt Tank originally developed for the IAF in the 1960s, was not allowed to get off the drawing boards. India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, had obtained the services of Tank a decade earlier in order to seed an aircraft industry in the country. India therefore made do with licensed production of the British Gnat and Jaguar and the Russian MiG-21, MiG-27, and MiG-29. However, because the supplier countries never provided source codes, etc., no real design-to-delivery capability evolved in the country. This is important because the MMRCA contract includes transfer of technology and local licensed manufacture which, other than hugely inflating the cost of the deal, will not benefit the country much. If the MMRCA has to be bought, it would be advisable to buy the whole lot of 126 aircraft off the shelf, resulting in heavily discounted unit cost and massive stockpile of spares. It will, moreover, prevent wasteful expenditure on establishing local production facilities which, in turn, will end up coupling the IAF to antique technology well into the future.
For the record, the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the Lockheed Martin F-16 IN (“Block 70”), Dassault’s Rafale, the European Consortium EADS’s Typhoon Eurofighter, Saab’s Gripen IN, and the Russian MiG-35, are in the running. Curiously, the most cost-effective solution – inducting more Sukhoi Su-30 MKI aircraft to meet the MMRCA demand – is not even on the table. Already in the Indian air order-of-battle, its development financed in the mid-90s by India, the Su-30, value for money-wise, is the best fighter-bomber in the business. Performance-wise, it can only be bettered by the F-22 Raptor. Dispassionate analyses suggest that it matches or surpasses either of the American aircraft in the race and, in its more advanced configuration, can outperform even the Joint Strike Fighter F-35, a plane Lockheed Martin have promised to replace the F-16 with on a “one for one” basis were India to buy the latter aircraft. Notwithstanding all these factors, the IAF believes the Su-30 MKI is “simply not good enough!”
Whatever the merits and demerits of the aircraft in the fray and the other allurements offered by the supplier states, the Gripen, Rafale, and Typhoon are unlikely to make it to the shortlist. Transacting with Sweden, France, and the Western European countries will not fetch India the same political and strategic returns as engaging with the United States or Russia. Moreover, because the Indian Armed Services have a record of choosing equipment from a supplier country the government prefers, the suspicion that the MMRCA decision will be driven by considerations of international politics, gains credence. The test data available from putting the various aircraft through their paces will, in the event, be the means of winnowing the field without alienating anybody too much.
If political and geostrategic factors are important, then the decision becomes a lot trickier for Delhi to make. The upside of buying American is obvious: it will give teeth to the military cooperation arrangement, emphasizing, among other things, inter-operability of military systems envisaged by the 2005 Defense Framework Agreement that both countries see as central to containing an ambitious and fast-growing China. The Russian military cooperation with India has also been predicated on the joint need to deal with the common Chinese threat. Buying the F-16 or F-18 will upset Moscow, which perceives the MMRCA decision as something of a litmus test of its continued good standing with India. By way of raising the costs to India of making the wrong choice, the tourniquet of spares and servicing support could be applied across the board, resulting in a rapid degrading of the readiness aspects of the Indian military. Indian armed forces still depend on Russia for about 70 percent of their equipment needs. The souring of the Russian attitude towards India, moreover, may have other consequences as well, such as a cutback in the Russian involvement in many high value military technology collaboration projects, raising of the acquisition costs of other items, and delays in the contracted delivery of, say, the nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine Akula on lease, and the aircraft carrier Gorshkov. Additionally, depending on how seriously Moscow takes this “affront,” there is the possibility of Russia making common cause with China in denying India a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, a seat India craves.
Delhi will have to make a judgment call on two things: on the United States as a reliable strategic partner and military supplier, and on the implications of such a supplier relationship for India’s independent posture. In this equation, Russia is the “known devil,” a longstanding purveyor of goods that the Indian military and bureaucracy have become familiar with over the last four decades. The U.S., on the other hand, is an unknown commodity, insisting that its partners adhere to its policy guidelines and with a worrying record of violating contractual, even treaty, obligations and treating its military customers in a high-handed and arbitrary manner. India has experienced American willfulness in the supply of the low enriched uranium fuel for its Tarapur nuclear power plant. Should Delhi opt for an American aircraft, it will have to be perennially mindful of U.S. concerns. Even so, there are no guarantees that the U.S. Congress won’t retroactively amend laws preventing spares support for the F-16s or F-18s, thereby virtually instantly grounding the Indian MMRCA fleet. In a crisis, this could be devastating. India is on the horns of a dilemma, confronted by choices that are neither good nor easy.
Bharat Karnad is a Research Professor in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. He is a CASI Fall 2009 Visiting Scholar.
No Good Choices for the Indian Air Force | Center for the Advanced Study of India
not true , manned combat aircraft are here to stay , the writer does not know how air combat takes place and what is the role of the pilot in the aircraft , the day is very far when machines will do alll out air combat ,as fo now manned fighter aircraft are here to stay ,it is not fault of IAF of accquring fighter aircraft very late ,rather the fault of the GOI ,for example the need for AJT,was projected in 1980 but the deal was signed in 2006 ( AJT HAWK) GOI love sto sleep ,and wakes up at the last minute
If the MMRCA has to be bought, it would be advisable to buy the whole lot of 126 aircraft off the shelf, resulting in heavily discounted unit cost and massive stockpile of spares. It will, moreover, prevent wasteful expenditure on establishing local production facilities which, in turn, will end up coupling the IAF to antique technology well into the future.
party true however the writes does not see that ,putting up production lines will produce more jobs here
party true however the writes does not see that ,putting up production lines will produce more jobs here
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1. Kill the message not the messenger'
This writer was responsible for drafting our nuclear doctrine.
"Bharat Karnad was a Member of the (First) National Security Advisory Board of the National Security Council, Government of India; specifically, he was a member of the Nuclear Doctrine Drafting Group, and of the external security and the technology security groups for the Strategic Review. Formerly, he was Adviser, Defence Expenditure, to the (Tenth) Finance Commission, India."
So this gentleman is obviously not a duffer
2. Why are manned crafts here to stay ? heard of AI ? Seen drones firing AAMs and Hellfires ? heard of Predator Drones ? Seen how accurate CMs are ? Seen ABMs ?
And this will solve all our labour problems ?
Are we buying MMRCA as a stop-gap measure or to provide employment ?
AI ,yes i have but you reallythink AI is as good as real pilot in the air ,if he has dfrafted our neuclear doctrine that does not mean he knows what air combat is and how air warfarre takes place, I have seen drones firing AAM and hellfires but how many hellfires can drones carry ,only two ,and what kind of targets are the drones targeting ,staionery targets ,hence hellfires are effective ,Cm are pretty accurate. full blown A2A combat with AI is still atleats 100 years away,as of now the role of drones are recon missions,very specific role for bombing missions etc ,not as what the write projects full blwon a2a combat
he says that america operates large number of drones ( yes they do but the number of drones make only 2 % of their combat fleet ,rest is still good old manned fighter aircraft ).
Quickgun Murugan
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Yep, that's the idea. Whats wrong with that?
Here we are with LCA wherein we cannot produce a successful fighter jet engine, and this guy talks about lack of vision for not producing drones and RPV's. How does he think that Indians will get the technological know-how of how to build a complicated RPV, when we cant even produce a 4th generation fighter on our own(Yesterday's war weapons in his words).
This guy is self contradictory. On one hand he says, no real design-to-delivery capability evolved in the country and on the other he is against getting the ToT for the machines we are going to buy. How can a student pass the 12th without going through the 10th grade? We first need to know how to build these fighters to set ourselves up to the future.
Clearly IAF are a bunch of non-visionary *****s who do not know why they need MMRCA when they already have the invincible MKI's. How did he write this article if he does'nt even know what MMRCA means? How can an elephant do a job of a horse?
What's new in that?
Litmus test?
If Russia really will put sanctions on India, then it will be called blackmail and not failed litmus test. Author tries to compare apples with oranges when he says MMRCA can influence acquisition costs of Gorshkov, as even before MMRCA RFP's were out, Gorshkov costs were getting increased.
MMRCA deal is pure business, and India is at its free will to do what ever it feels would be best for itself and its security. As a matter of fact, a MMRCA deal in Russian favor will give them even more leverage to raise acquisition costs never than before. A non-Russian MMRCA fighter alone will bring a strategic balance to IAF's predominantly Russian dependent inventory. In fact it is not India's litmus test, but Russia's litmus test of how it will treat India in case it fails to win MMRCA contract.
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a high resoulation eurofighter-typhoon cutaway
p2prada
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Must have been there since 2 years.Don't know if it's already posted. Spotted at a bus-stop in New Delhi.
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Lol. Some marketing skills those Swedes have :goodstuff:
Quickgun Murugan
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Super Hornet favourite in Indian and Brazilian tenders
Super Hornet favourite in Indian and Brazilian tenders
The Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is well placed to fulfil both the Indian and Brazilian fighter requirements, the company and its industry partners said on 28 October.
Boeing and its Team Super Hornet partners – Raytheon and General Electric (GE) – presented a broad-ranging review of the F/A-18E/F's position in both the Indian Air Force's (IAF's) Medium-Multirole Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) programme for 163 aircraft plus 63 options and the Brazilian Air Force's F-X2 tender for the first 36 of what is projected to be a total of 120 fighters.
Boeing stated that two major factors make the Super Hornet competitive in both markets: the first one being that the economies of scale that result from both the aircraft and its major subsystems are still hot (active) production lines and hence have steadily reduced the unit cost of the aircraft; the other is that the modular nature of the aircraft's sensors and propulsion system permit technology insertion that dramatically increases performance at minimal expense.
"The history of the F/A-18E/F's development has now seen a negative slope in terms of cost and a positive slope in terms of capability. For this reason we feel for the first time we are competing on even terms with the [Lockheed Martin] F-16 in terms of price," stated Boeing Military Aircraft IDS President Chris Chadwick.
Raytheon representatives, who also briefed during the New Delhi conference, emphasised that "Raytheon provided the first AESA [active electronically scanned array] radar sets to both the USAF [US Air Force] and USN [US Navy]", and that the company continues to leverage technological improvements across its product lines in improving the Super Hornet's AN/APG-79 radar.
Super Hornet favourite in Indian and Brazilian tenders
The Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is well placed to fulfil both the Indian and Brazilian fighter requirements, the company and its industry partners said on 28 October.
Boeing and its Team Super Hornet partners – Raytheon and General Electric (GE) – presented a broad-ranging review of the F/A-18E/F's position in both the Indian Air Force's (IAF's) Medium-Multirole Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) programme for 163 aircraft plus 63 options and the Brazilian Air Force's F-X2 tender for the first 36 of what is projected to be a total of 120 fighters.
Boeing stated that two major factors make the Super Hornet competitive in both markets: the first one being that the economies of scale that result from both the aircraft and its major subsystems are still hot (active) production lines and hence have steadily reduced the unit cost of the aircraft; the other is that the modular nature of the aircraft's sensors and propulsion system permit technology insertion that dramatically increases performance at minimal expense.
"The history of the F/A-18E/F's development has now seen a negative slope in terms of cost and a positive slope in terms of capability. For this reason we feel for the first time we are competing on even terms with the [Lockheed Martin] F-16 in terms of price," stated Boeing Military Aircraft IDS President Chris Chadwick.
Raytheon representatives, who also briefed during the New Delhi conference, emphasised that "Raytheon provided the first AESA [active electronically scanned array] radar sets to both the USAF [US Air Force] and USN [US Navy]", and that the company continues to leverage technological improvements across its product lines in improving the Super Hornet's AN/APG-79 radar.
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I heard it was put up in front of the procurement office or something.....
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South Block? :connie_searchingsky
Quickgun Murugan
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I can only laugh when Gripen calls itself "The independent choice".
Its neither independent, nor a choice.
Its neither independent, nor a choice.
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