Beyond the political correctness, there is no doubt that Russia is not too comfortable with the Chinese migrants. And the Russian President cannot avoid not having them because the Chinese are industrious and generally disciplined and so they are ideal for labour. I have seen them in Singapore and I must say that they are very hard working. Therefore, it appears that the Russian President has no choice but to have them.
The Chinese tend to congregate in their own group as it makes them comfortable in an alien country and so there is no dearth of Chinatowns all over the world. Hence, if the Chinese are gravitating to their own community and creating Chinatowns, it is nothing out of the ordinary.
Yet, given the geostrategic sensitivity of Russia, China is indeed a challenge to Russia's eminence in Asia, the eminence which Russia has lost ever since Gorbachev brought in his perestroika and put the erstwhile USSR out of circulation.
The continuous breakdown of Russia's sphere of influence by the various flower and colour Revolutions, assisted by the West, in erstwhile USSR federations, and the embracing of Comecon countries by the West, has been a body blow to the Russian prestige. They want to return to the glory that was there when Russia was the USSR and that is why strong men with jingoist desires, like Putin, are popular in Russia, no matter what the western media projects.
In such a scenario where Russia has been reduced to a 'has been', the replacing by China in the power equation has indeed been worrisome. China, justifiably, is a 'stronger' power given her economic surge and her introducing of sophisticated weaponry and revamping her defence forces.
Historically, China and Russia (USSR) have had serious differences. After the success of the First Five Year Plan, Mao practically abandoned the USSR. Since 1956, the countries had (secretly) been diverging ideologically, and, beginning in 1961, the Chinese Communists formally denounced "The Revisionist Traitor Group of Soviet Leadership.
Despite close relations at present, the potential of conflict between Russia and China is far from over. As the largest client of the Russian arms industry, Chinese military has been complaining about Moscow's reluctance to sell it the most advanced technology, while allowing China's regional rival, India, to purchase sophisticated weapons. Although Beijing has endorsed Moscow's idea of a "Russia-China-India" triangle, there are suspicions in China that Russia is trying to balance China's rising power by arming India. It is worth recalling that Beijing regarded Moscow's "neutral" position during the Indo-Chinese border war in 1962 as a betrayal, which became one of the major factors behind the Sino-Soviet split.
With high energy prices, Moscow is seeking to use the country's vast energy resources to enhance its economic and strategic position. China, on the other hand, is a major importer and is striving for energy self-reliance. China's rapid penetration into Central Asia to secure oil and gas poses a potential challenge to Russian energy corporations, which are seeking to monopolise the region's resources. Close ties with Moscow have not always guaranteed China priority in access to Russian energy over rivals such as Japan.
All territorial disputes between Russia and China has been resolved, the last being the Yinlong Island (known as Tarabarov in Russia) and half of the Heixiazi Island (Bolshoi Ussuriysky) at the confluence the of Amur and Ussuri rivers.
While territorial disputes have been formally settled, tensions continue to simmer. Nationalist voices have accused both governments of betrayal. In 2005, there were demonstrations of Cossack residents in neighbouring Khabarovsk against the handing over of the Russian-controlled islands to China. Sections of the media in Hong Kong and Taiwan have denounced Beijing for giving up China's claim not just to Heixiazi, which was lost to the Soviet Union in 1929, but all of outer Manchuria, captured by Tsarist Russia in the nineteenth century.
The Russian radio station Ekho Moskvy on July 21 broadcast comments expressing fears that the agreement opened the door for China to claim more land. Veteran Far East journalist Sergey Doreko declared: "China's claims go far beyond the Tarabarov Island or the Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island. China's claims concern the entire treaty which defined the Russian Far East in the second half of the nineteenth century. Therefore, by giving in now we are giving China an opportunity to put forward ever-expanding claims."
There is a long history of bitter territorial disputes between Russia and China. Amid China's defeat by Anglo-French forces in the Second Opium War, the Tsarist regime forced the Manchu dynasty to give up 1.2 million square kilometres of land in Manchuria in 1858-60. The Chinese regime has repeatedly emphasised in its patriotic education that these events were "national humiliations".
After the October Revolution in 1917, the new Bolshevik regime promised to abandon all colonial concessions in China. Leon Trotsky insisted, however, the territory should be returned to China only upon the victory of the working class or it would become a base for hostile imperialist powers to attack the USSR. Later, with the rise of the Stalinist bureaucracy and its betrayals of international socialism, Moscow's foreign policy was increasingly based on national interest.
The Heixiazi/Yinlong islands were seized by the Soviet army in 1929 during a skirmish with the Manchurian warlord, Zhang Xueliang. Through US arbitration, Zhang restored the Chinese Eastern Railway (a former Russian concession) to Soviet control in exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria. However, the Soviet army held onto the islands due to their strategic value.
Stalin did not return the islands to China even after the coming to power of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949. Instead, Stalin regarded a unified China under Mao Zedong as a potential rival. Stalin used the Sino-Soviet alliance to reassert former colonial concessions lost during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. At the same time, Mao's resentment toward Stalin's "Great Russian chauvinism" stemmed from the thoroughly nationalist ideology of the CCP. The conflicting national interests laid the basis for Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s.
Negotiations between the two countries over the status of Heixiazi took place in 1964. Beijing demanded acknowledgement of the "unjust" character of all the seizures of territories by Russia since the nineteenth century. Moscow refused to discuss the issue. The second round of talks in 1969 ended abruptly with the eruption of armed clashes over Zhengbao (Damansky) Island in the Ussuri River. Both sides massed millions of troops along their borders as tensions escalated.
Mao denounced "Soviet social imperialism" and followed this with a pragmatic turn toward US imperialism in 1971 and the formation of a de facto anti-Soviet alliance with Washington. Normalisation of Chinese relations with the US laid the basis for Deng Xiaoping's "market reform" in 1978. The third round of talks with Moscow over disputed territory took place only in 1986, after former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev called for a rapprochement with China, as part of his embrace of capitalist market relations.
Behind the cynical Sino-Soviet polemics over who represented "Marxism-Leninism" were the national interests of two competing bureaucratic cliques, both of which were based on the reactionary Stalinist conception of "socialism in one country". The Soviet Stalinists ultimately restored capitalism in the former USSR in 1991, while Mao's heirs transformed China into the sweatshop of the world after brutally crushing the working class in Tiananmen Square in 1989.
What is now bringing the two countries closer together is the common concern in ruling circles at the threat posed by US militarism. But if the strategic partnership no longer serves their national interests, the two capitalist powers could quickly become hostile to each other and the "settled" territorial disputes could again flare up.
Further, Mongolia is within the Russian sphere of influence, Mongolia has greater historical ties with China and that is also an area of concern for Russia.
In view of all this it is but natural that while Russia wants to benefit by having Chinese workers, they are chary about the Chinese congregating and creating their own pockets, which could be dangerous since proximity will assist the Chinese to bond, plan and propagate anti Russian activities (in case it is required) and which would be difficult for the Chinese if they were kept dispersed.