Indo-US Relations

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coming to indian interviewer it 'll be sure mix of every thing like khichdi.

'Hard to separate terrorism and Pakistan's nukes'

Mumbai: Ambasaador Howard Schaffer and Ambassador Teresita Schaffer are old hands when it comes to South Asia.

Having spent a large period of their three-decade career in their various capacities in the region, the husband-wife duo perfectly understands the nuances of the Indian subcontinent embroiled in the Kashmir tangle, even as the two warring nations of India and Pakistan acquired nuclear status.

Teresita served as the deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia between 1989-92 and then between 1992-95 served as the US Ambassador to Sri Lanka. Teresita works as the director, South Asia Programme, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Howard Schaffer served as the US Ambassador to Bangladesh (1984-87), served as the deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia twice, and worked as a political consellor at American embassies in both India (1977-79) and Pakistan (1974-77).

The couple was in Mumbai recently to speak at a seminar and took time off their busy schedule to speak to Rediff.com on a wide range of issues. Excerpts:

What explains the title of your latest book 'The Limits of Influence: America's Role in Kashmir'?

HS: I did so for several reasons. First, there's never been such a book I thought it is worthwhile explaining what United States position had been in all the years since 1948 when the issue first became internationally important.

The US policy on Kashmir has been touched upon more generally in books on US relations with India and with Pakistan. It's also been touched on in conflict resolutions literature. But I thought, and particularly since I have always had a great interest in Kashmir since visiting there in the 1960s, that the time had come for such a book to be written.

Moreover, there seemed to be increased US interest in Kashmir as expressed by Barack Obama when he was running for the Presidency.

Why do you think he did so?

HS: I think the reason was he felt that it was a dangerous issue, in the sense that it could lead to a war between India and Pakistan and he also felt that an American role might be possible at this time; even though in the past years whenever the United States have tried to play an active rile it did not lead to a Kashmir settlement.

In your address yesterday you mentioned about the sense of mistrust that India has for the US. What explains India nursing this mistrust for America, when the latter is playing an active role in settling the Kashmir dispute?

HS: This (mistrust) is based on a couple of things. One is the past history in which India has seen the US taking positions, which India perceived as being pro-Pakistan. This was particularly true when United States had a close security relationship with Pakistan. More generally, however, India has opposed any outside intervention in Kashmir for a very good reason.

Because India is a stronger power it also has control over that part of Kashmir (the valley), which is important. And for an outside power like the United States or the United Nations to become involved would not serve India's interests. Pakistan, on the other hand, because it's weaker, wants to gain the Valley looks to outside powers and specially the United States, as what you might call, equalise.

You mentioned in your address about three contentious issues between India and US: financial makeover, non-proliferation treaty and climate change, of which you said the financial makeover is the easiest to deal with. But despite this, India and US have signed a civil nuclear treaty. What has led to US's change in attitude towards India over the years?

TS: What has led to America's change in attitude towards India has nothing to do with those three issues. It was basically three things. The end of the Cold War so that the US no longer organised is foreign policy around the principle that Russia was the big adversary and India no longer had a reason to look to Russia as their primary international support. So that was the first reason for this changed attitude.

The second thing was India's economic growth so that India looked to its future much more in economic terms and the big economic power was the United States, which could then be helpful to India because India had charted a new course in the world.

And the third thing is the increasing size and prominence of the Indian-American community, which gave us the kind of personal connection that the US also had with the European countries from which, for example, my ancestors came.

The three contentious issues -- there are actually two contentious issues ? the third I think is an asset, they represent the parts of Obama Administration's global agenda. I think the time is ripe for India and the United States to work together on a greater extent on global issues. Because India needs to be involved or they won't be solved.

But of the global issues that the Obama Administration is dealing with, one is quite harmonious between India and the US and the others are difficult. That, I think, really is a reflection of the fact that there are difficult problems in the world.

How long do you think will the US take to wind up its operations in Afghanistan and how will the equations in the Indian subcontinent shape once US decides to move out of Afghanistan?

TS: That is, I think, a very important question. Afghanistan came first, Iraq came second. Many people, including me, believe that Iraq distracted US attention from the very important, difficult and unfinished business in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, some people believed, will be easy but they were proven quite wrong.

When will that wind up? I don't know. President Obama referred to July 2011 as the point at which we would start to take a different course and what hope to begin able to thin out the US presence. But almost as soon as he had spoken those words were refined, and re-interpreted, and re-calibrated to make it clear that you were bnot going to see a rush for the exits (in Afghanistan) in July 2011 and what the US does will be driven by the situation on the ground.

And I think that also answers your other question about what would be the equations in the sub continent. It really depends on what kind of situation there is in Afghanistan. Do you have reasonable stability? I mean Afghanistan isn't going to turn into India, okay! But do you have reasonable stability help the (Afghan) government succeed in consolidating its ability to govern and to be a decent neighbour.

Pakistan has some particular issues, which could turn out to be stabilising or destabilising factors in Afghanistan and that's going to make a difference. Afghanistan has been a place where there were proxy wars in the past. Can those be wound down? And I think those are all very key questions.

Do you think India will allow a situation in its neighborhood wherein US leaves Afghanistan as a client state of Pakistan, despite Pakistan wanting it? Pakistan would want to avoid being in a pincer-like grip between India to its east and a pro-India Afghanistan to its West.

HS: I am not sure at all what India would do at that point. You surely would want to maintain influence as much as possible in Afghanistan, and as you correctly said, this is what Pakistan wants to avoid. There is one important element to consider, however, it may very well be that the Pakistanis succeed in helping bring to power in Kabul a regime that they perceive is favourable to them. But, it is by no means guaranteed that such a regime will maintain any kind of loyalty or subservience to, or even friendship, to Pakistan.

I think the history suggests that the Afghans are very independent minded people and are not really prepared to become clients of anybody. And Pakistan may find well to its dismay that the authorities it thought would be friendly once they came to power in Afghansitan became the same kind of Afghan nationalists suspicious of Pakistan.

You believe that India and Pakistan could settle the Kashmir issue only if the two countries were led by strong leaderships. But nothing happened at the Agra summit. Is an amicable solution to the Kashmir issue possible that will include the aspirations of the Kashmiri people?

HS: I think that's certainly possible. But I emphasise that you need two strong governments and I think that President Musharraf felt that he was only strong enough somewhat later in his term in office by which time there was not a strong enough government in India which could make the kind of concessions which would be required for whatever kind of settlement is eventually reached.

But certainly it is very possible in future. It's very difficult now to see that there is going to be a strong and stable government in Pakistan surely in the near term. But I would hope that eventually a settlement could be worked out. For a settlement to be worked out it's also important that relations, more generally, be far better than they are today. I can't imagine that even if there were strong governments in both Delhi and Islamabad at this point where there are such bad feelings and suspicions between the two countries that much progress could be made towards a resolution on the Kashmir issue.

Many foreign policy hawks in India believe America's interests in the Indian subcontinent are Pakistan's nuclear assets, and that containing terrorism directed towards India is secondary. What do you think?

TS: I think the worst contingency I can imagine will be a nuclear exchange between India and Paskistan. Let me emphasise, but I think this is unlikely, I don't think the leaderships in either countries is crazy and, I think they are increasingly, as they spend more time as nuclear powers, aware of what dangers would be. But if you want me to pick up the worst possible, that is the worst possible.

But it's really hard to disentangle the terrorism risk and the risks to Pakistan's nuclear assets. Pakistan's nuclear assets are under the control of the army. As long as the army is under leadership that is, if you will, traditionally nationalistic, then I think they will keep good control of their nuclear assets. If the character of that leadership changes or if the government's ability to exercise reasonable control in most of the country is eroded then you could have a different situation. And that's why the internal insurgency in Pakistan is such a big worry for people in Washington.

So to come around to the original question I think both of those are major concerns for Washington.

What are the odds that the terror factories operating out of Pakistan can lay their hands on a dirty bomb, given the dangerous liaison between some of the Pakistani generals and the jihadis?

TS: I think the chances of that right now are poor. Because I think the assets are well controlled now. The trouble is you may not have an awful lot of advance notice if the character of Army leadership changes. And that's why when people in the United States government talk about the security of Pakistan's nuclear assets they usually say things look okay to us because they don't want to spread panic. But if you ask them to talk about the longer term they recognize that there's a potential problem.

What are the factors responsible for this different American approach towards Pakistan and India on the civil nuclear agreement? Or is the A Q Khan effect?

TS: The US is trying to maintain its relations with India and Pakistan on independent tracks. There are different drivers that keep them going. In Pakistan the security relationship has usually been in the driver's seat Afghanistan is what is really in the driver's seat now.

With India it is a much broader range of things. We now have security relationship with India. There is the whole question of Indian Ocean maritime security where this close co-operation and where US and India's interests are very-well aligned. It is a question of how both the countries want Asia to develop in the future.

As far as the civil nuclear agreement the only reason the United States was willing to contemplate a civil nuclear agreement with India was that India's record in not transferring its nuclear know how and nuclear assets was very, very good. India had honoured its agreements with us, India had maintained export controls, India was willing to strengthen its export controls. If we had not had those factors we could not have obtained the Congress's agreement to the India-US nuclear deal.

Pakistan's track record is terrible. A Q Khan is the symbol of it but I believe he was part of a larger process and he was probably the brains of that larger process. So when you say ask if that was the sole factor that's an absolutely vital factor.

But India conducted nuclear tests twice?

TS: That's right. But from that point of view both India and Pakistan had by testing done something that the US had very much wanted to avoid and we all know that. But the US-India civil nuclear agreement was intended to reposition India as a state that the United States recognise was responsible.

And we really weren't ready to do that with Pakistan and we knew that even if the Administration had been ready, which it wasn't, the Congress was nowhere near ready.

There's a perception that the US wants to use India as a bulwark against growing Chinese influence in the region?

TS: Okay, let's talk about China. The idea of the US using India as a bulwark against China really misrepresents the whole set of power relationships in Asia. India doesn't want to play somebody else's game against China. However, India has security concerns about China as the Indian security hawks would be the first to tell you so. The United States has security concerns about China. Both India and US want to work with China. We both have increasingly important economic relationships with China. China is a rising power; India is also a rising power though India has not risen as far as fast. So there is a China connection to US-India relationship.

But I think that the correct way to describe that is that neither India nor the United States wants China to dominate Asia. We both want to work with China in a friendly context; we both want to see a network of strong powers in Asia that are able to work together. That's the correct way to look at the India-US-China triangle.

Does your book on Kashmir envisage a practical solution to solve the Kashmir tangle?

HS: I think there really are several elements, which make up a solution. The only common solution which I can see would be sufficiently acceptable to India and to Pakistan and to the Kashmiri people to be feasible. And there are several elements in this. One is, the present line of control would be converted into the International Boundary between the two countries. There may be some minor rectifications along the line but essentially the state would be divided along this lines it has been divided since 1948.

A second point could be that that line, that International Border would allow easy movement of people and goods in both directions. I would also see a considerable measure of autonomy or self-government if you will for Kashmiris on both sides of the line and finally I would expect that certain all-Kashmir institutions could be developed which could look at non-controversial issues such as tourism. Obviously, all of this would have to be accompanied by a considerable degree of demilitarisation on both sides.

What really drove off the Pakistani soldiers and intruders off Kargil heights? Was it the US diplomatic pressure or the Indian Army?

If there had been no US diplomatic pressure the Indian Army would have forced Pakistan out of the Kargil heights. The US diplomatic pressure only accelerated that process. And it obliged Nawaz Sharif only to acknowledge that they were Pakistani forces and he had to take responsibility for them.

 

[JAISWAL]

sir, ur post is very deep thinking of american policy and measure of double std. regarding india and pakistan

 

[JAISWAL]

Although the pic. is not rosy but i support the indo american good realationhttp://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2010/136973.htm http://www.usindiafriendship.net/

 

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THE ART OF DECEPTION - Nirupama Rao’s visit would serve notice on the Obama administration

Camouflage, sometimes bordering on deception, has been a part of diplomacy since the earliest record of diplomats among mankind in Mesopotamia in 3,000 BC. There was a time when the United States of America, with its infinite resources, mastered the art of deception as an instrument of its foreign policy.

A high point of such diplomacy was the secret trip made by Henry Kissinger to China through Pakistan to facilitate Richard Nixon’s historic opening to Beijing under Mao Zedong. Since then, smaller men have attempted poor copies of such deception, as in the case of Colin Powell who went to New Delhi in 2004 professing America’s friendship only to fly to Islamabad a day later and gift General Pervez Musharraf the status of Washington’s major non-Nato ally.

Whenever India attempted camouflage as an instrument of its external affairs, these efforts have ended, more often than not, in disastrous consequences. One such attempt was a ‘secret’ meeting in London in April 1994 between Indian and US officials for a non-proliferation initiative in South Asia. The meeting was exposed when a woman Indian foreign service officer, who now holds a very senior position in the government, carelessly walked into a party at the Indian high commission in London in very casual clothes. An alert reporter, who knew that the lady officer ought not to be in the United Kingdom unless something special was going on, immediately contacted his editor in New Delhi, who ferreted out details of the secret talks in London for the next day’s newspaper. The uproar that ensued made sure that it was the end of P.V. Narasimha Rao’s non-proliferation initiative.

More recently, when he was foreign secretary, Shiv Shankar Menon went on a ‘secret’ trip to Madrid to meet the Bush administration’s point man on the Indo-US nuclear deal, Nicholas Burns. That was when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pranab Mukherjee, the United Progressive Alliance’s nominee for negotiations with the left parties on retaining their support for Singh, were telling Prakash Karat and Sitaram Yechury of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) that India would not approach the International Atomic Energy Agency for a Safeguards Agreement, which would have taken the nuclear deal forward in Washington. Menon met Burns in secret to assure him otherwise.

But Menon did not take anyone in his ministry into confidence or hand over responsibilities during his travel to Spain. When some senior officials in South Block found out, they felt let down. They leaked what was happening. It was this camouflage, which alerted Karat that the UPA was double-dealing the CPI(M), and the countdown for withdrawing support to Singh began.

This week, the foreign secretary, Nirupama Rao, engaged in her brand of camouflage diplomacy in Washington, but she appears to have got away with it. Rao is in Washington ostensibly for a meeting of the Indo-US High Technology Cooperation Group, but her real reasons for visiting the US at this time are entirely different. The HTCG was important in Indo-US engagement when it was formed in 2002, when a range of sanctions against India were in force and the country was finding it next to impossible to obtain dual-use civilian-defence items from America — even a Cray computer for the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore.

Because the Group was already up and running, it helped India steer through a crucial phase of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership when it was launched in January 2004. The NSSP was the precursor of the nuclear deal, bilateral cooperation in space and high technology trade. But the HTCG meetings are no longer of any great policy interest to India. In fact, they now primarily benefit US commercial interests, but New Delhi goes along with its meetings simply because the mechanism exists. The foreign secretary said as much when she told the Group’s industry-to-industry session on Monday that the “US industry has brought up policy constraints in this forum that have, in their perception, hampered their high technology exports to India.”

The last time an HTCG meeting brought any policy benefit for India was at its fifth meeting in February 2007, when Menon secured a commitment from the US that its high-technology exports to India that still need licences will be in line with the requirements of America’s closest allies: Israel and the UK.

The real objective of Rao’s visit to Washington was to serve notice on the Obama administration that the way things are going in Indo-US relations, it can no longer be business as usual unlike during the UPA government’s first five-year term. This she did in her own understated style, without being offensive or moralistic as New Delhi’s visiting envoys to Washington — including some previous foreign secretaries — can be.

It was not lost on the Americans that Rao emplaned for Washington a day after the Russian prime minister, Vladimir Putin, left New Delhi for home. Putin’s was a brief working visit. Yet, despite the complete absence of trappings of a State dinner or a State visit — designations used by the Obama administration to pander India’s ego — Putin’s one-day stay in New Delhi produced results that far outstripped what the Obama administration has been able or willing to work out with India during its 14 months in office.

The Americans are aware after what Rao has been telling them this week that unless they change their ways of dealing with Singh’s government, Barack Obama’s forthcoming State visit to India will be a pale shadow of Putin’s working visit last week. It ought to make those from Obama’s administration at the HTCG meetings — who are engaged in a comprehensive reform of US export control systems through its “National Export Initiative” — sit up and note that while Indian companies are still on their “Entity List” for restricted dealings, Putin, for instance, agreed not only to let India use Russia’s famous “Glonass” global positioning system for military purposes but also signed a joint-venture deal to produce the navigation equipment.

Rao did not mince words when she told the HTCG that “it is anomalous that a body like the Indian Space Research Organisation, which is developing several collaborations with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, should continue to be on this list.” When Obama’s defence secretary met A.K. Antony in January, the defence minister told Robert Gates that while the US wants India to buy its defence equipment, three units of the Defence Research and Development Organisation and the defence ministry-owned Bharat Electronics Limited and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited are still under US sanctions. Putin, on the other hand, had no hesitation in tying up with India for jointly developing a fifth-generation fighter plane or for the supply of MiG-29s worth $1.5 billion.

Rao put on a brave front when she said in public that “we are in the process of operationalizing the (Indo-US nuclear) agreement through close coordination between our two governments”. But the fact is that at yet another recent round of talks on reprocessing arrangements under the deal, the inclination of US negotiators was to raise new problems that will need one or more rounds. Putin, on the other hand, agreed to the construction of at least 16 atomic power plants without making the heads of India’s nuclear sector jump through more hoops, US-style. The government’s decision on Monday not to go ahead with the civil liability for nuclear damage bill was the right signal to Washington even as the foreign secretary was discussing the issue with the Americans.

It was on Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran — which Rao recently visited — that she did the most plain-speaking with her US interlocutors. She may have convinced the White House and the state department that if the US looks at Afghanistan through unifocal Pakistani lenses at this critical juncture, other countries such as India, Iran, China and Russia, which have interests in Kabul, will fight that trend with some degree of coordination. But the problem is that the Obama administration is in a bind. The swagger among Pakistanis that they have had their way in Afghanistan is proof that the US has surrendered beyond redemption to Rawalpindi’s army general headquarters on Kabul.

Rao’s honest report back to New Delhi ought to be that while India is assiduously courted by the Obama administration, it is not respected unlike China, Russia, or even Saudi Arabia for that matter. That situation will change only if the UPA government resolves to stand up for itself a little more without worrying about what “they” will think in Washington. But it is a report that the Prime Minister’s Office may not want to hear.

 

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U.S. export control regulations “anachronistic,” says Nirupama Rao

Nirupama Rao, Indian Foreign Secretary, on Tuesday described the United States Bureau of Industry and Security's (BIS) Entities list “anachronistic” saying, “It is anomalous that a body like the Indian Space Research Organisation, which is developing several collaborations with National and Aeronautical and Space Administration, should continue to be on the list.”

Co-chairing the 7th meeting of the India-U.S. High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) along with Daniel Hill, Acting Under Secretary for Industry and Security, Ms Rao exhorted attending delegates from the U.S. Department of Commerce to reconsider control restrictions for U.S. exports to India. She also addressed the Entities List issue at another speaking engagement at the Woodrow Wilson Centre later in the day.

The BIS's Export Administration Regulations contain a list of names of foreign businesses, research institutions, government and private organisations and individuals that are subject to specific license requirements for the export, re-export and transfer of specified items.

At present the list includes ISRO, Bharat Dynamics Limited and Department of Atomic Energy entities such as the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Indira Gandhi Atomic Research Centre, Indian Rare Earths and most nuclear reactors (including power plants) not under IAEA safeguards.

Arguing that the earlier trend of restrictions being reduced had been halted, Ms. Rao said that among the early results of the HTCG were the removal of a number of Indian organisations from the Entity List by 2005, de-licensing of certain categories of dual-use items and institution of a presumption of approval policy in other categories. “This process of easing of controls seems to have slowed down; we need to address this issue,” she emphasised.

Indian record “exemplary”

There would appear to be significant support for this view from the private sector, notably Indian industrial lobbies with a presence in the U.S.. For example Ms Ranjana Khanna of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) said, “We appreciate that further liberalisation of export controls needs to be accompanied by the responsible use of high technology items and preventing its diversion to unintended uses… India's record has been exemplary in this area.”

Yet Ms Rao did admit she was reassured by the U.S. government's announcement of its intention to overhaul their Export Control policy and hoped to see the enhancement of trade in such goods and technologies between our two countries and removal of remaining Indian organisations from the Entity List. “We hope that your response and the outcome of your review would be such that it would reflect — and reaffirm the strategic nature of our partnership,” she said.

She may have some cause for relief — overall, total exports of advanced technology products exported from the U.S. to India have increased from $1.3 billion in 2003 to over $4 billion in 2009, despite the backdrop of the global economic slowdown.

Progress would also appear imminent with the civil nuclear agreement between India and the U.S.. Regarding the deal Ms Rao said, “Once the 123 Agreement is implemented, a structured bilateral interaction with the Industry on both sides could take forward the process.” Even in the interim period there has been a steady and direct interaction between U.S. nuclear industry and NPCIL, with two MoUs already signed with GE Hitachi and Westinghouse, she said.

View from the U.S.

Responding to some of the concerns regarding export controls voiced by the Indian side Deputy Secretary of State Dennis Hightower said (via a representative) that while it was critical that the U.S. increased trade, it would simultaneously maintain its strong commitment to national security.

While he pointed out that in 2009 the U.S. exported $16 billion of goods and services to India and only three percent of these exports required a license from the Department of Commerce, he however acknowledged that “As trade in high technology grows our export control system will have to change to keep pace.”

Deputy Assistant to the President Michael Froman also commented on the Indian questions about excessive controls highlighting the fact that ten years ago 24 per cent of U.S. exports to India required individual licenses from the Department of Commerce while today only 0.3 percent of U.S. exports to India require individual licenses.

Further, he added, the licensing process and time for India now is down to 28 days, a decrease from 31 days in 2008 and less than the worldwide average of 35 days. Mr. Froman also said in 2009 BIS reviewed 985 export and re-export licenses for India, valued at approximately $334m, for which the denial rate was about 2.1 per cent.

Arguing that “Many of the U.S. high-technology items are eligible for export to India under licenses that are not available to many other countries, including China,” he said that they had to however be mindful of the diverse threats from state actors, transnational groups and even individual actors.

Suggesting that the U.S. was seeking a balance between expanding trade and not compromising on national security Mr. Froman said, “To address these challenges the U.S. is conducting a fundamental review of its export controls system.” The U.S. needed a dynamic export control system that “focuses on a core set of technologies that are critical to our national security while further unleashing the innovative power of U.S. industry to compete for sales in less sensitive items around the globe,” he said.

Creating jobs through trade

Ms. Rao bolstered the case for U.S. trade with India by stressing, in her presentation, the possibility of creating more jobs in the U.S. by deepening high-tech trade between the two countries. She cited several examples of job-creating trade agreements including the signing of the End Use Monitoring Arrangement and Technology Safeguards Agreement for Space application last year. Additionally regarding Air India's order for 68 Boeing aircraft, she said, “I am given to understand that each US aircraft means 10,000 jobs across 50 states of the country.”

Ms. Rao also mentioned that there was potential for growth in the defence industry, as India diversified its sources for defence systems for its military as well as counter terrorism requirements – even through the route of permitting private sector participation in defence production.

She further sought to dispel concerns “lingering” over India's intellectual property protection regime, saying “The Indian IP regime is completely TRIPS-compliant… A major programme of modernisation of the infrastructure of Intellectual Property Offices of India costing about 40 million dollars was implemented during the 10th Five Year Plan.”

 

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Press Release on the Visit of the Foreign Secretary to Washington (15-16 March 2010)

Foreign Secretary, Smt. Nirupama Rao visited Washington DC from 15-16 March 2010 to co-chair the 7th meeting of the India-US High Technology Cooperation Group. This was the first meeting of the High Technology Cooperation Group, a component of the India US Strategic Dialogue, with the new US Administration.

It may be recalled that during the State visit of Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to Washington in November 2010, he and President Obama "agreed that strengthening high technology trade between their countries is in the spirit of their strategic dialogue and partnership. They reiterated their shared commitment to technology security and that it is in their mutual interest to invigorate this area of their partnership".

During the two days of deliberations – between the industry representatives of both countries followed by the Government level meetings to consider the recommendations of the industry - on promotion of high technology trade between India and the USA , the two sides were able to consolidate the progress made in the last five years and identified the next steps for further expanding high technology trade between India and the US - especially in the areas of Defense and Strategic Trade, Biotechnology and Nanotechnology. They also agreed to create new groups for focused attention on cooperation in Health IT and Civil Aviation.

The Indian side requested the US Department of Commerce to review US Export Controls applicable to India and update them to bring them in keeping with the changed political realities that contextualize India-US strategic partnership today.

During her visit to Washington for the HTCG meetings, Foreign Secretary had a series of bilateral meetings with US Administration officials.

On March 15, the Foreign Secretary also met Michelle Flournoy, Under Secretary for Policy in the Department of Defence.

On March 16, Foreign Secretary met her counterpart, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Mr. William Burns. Secretary of State, Ms. Hillary Clinton dropped in and joined the discussions. Smt. Rao also met the National Security Advisor, General James Jones, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Mr. Robert Hormats and Under Secretary of State for Democracy Global Affairs, Ms. Maria Otero.

The Foreign Secretary also met Congressman Gary Ackerman and Senator Joseph Lieberman.

It may be recalled that the two sides had instituted a Strategic Dialogue in July 2009 when Secretary Clinton visited India. The Indian External Affairs Minister is expected to visit Washington soon for the first round of Strategic Dialogue with Secretary Clinton.

The bilateral meetings of the Foreign Secretary with US interlocutors provided an opportunity to review the progress on various pillars of India-US Strategic Dialogue agenda including cooperation in defence, nuclear energy, counter-terrorism, agriculture, education, energy, space, cyber-security etc.

Discussions also focused on regional issues including India’s neighbourhood. Foreign Secretary briefed the US side about her talks with the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan last month. She exchanged views on recent developments related to Afghanistan and stressed that Afghanistan presented the foremost security related challenge in the region. She reiterated India’s long held position that it was important for the international community to stay the present course in Afghanistan for as long as it is necessary. The US interlocutors conveyed their appreciation of the important developmental work being done by India in Afghanistan.

At the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, the Indian Foreign Secretary delivered an address on the subject, “Two Democracies – Defining the essence of India-US Partnership”. She also had a separate breakfast meeting in the morning of March 16, 2010 to interact with experts from prominent Washington Think Tanks.

 

[ajtr]

USA want to see India as its ally like south Korea,Japan, Australia to take care of its interest in south Asia and IOR.But the thing is India is not interested in playing such a role.It want a role which is independent from US foreign policy which at many times is flawed.there is lot of divergence in Indo-US foreign policy then compared to convergence.So what India will look for is equal partnership based on convergence with various powers of the multi polar world rather than be a lapdog of USA bandwagon.

Putting India on the Atlantic

The United States sees India as a guarantor of the liberal international order – The 2010 QDR assumes that India will act in the general interests of the political and economic order that the Atlantic powers have established

On February 1st, 2010, the United States Department of Defense released the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The expiration of the Soviet Union had left the United States bereft of a grand strategy. In 1993, the US Congress mandated that the Department of Defense submit a report every four years on long term defence strategy and procurement. Although the four-year cycle does not directly correspond with the American presidential term, it does mean that every presidential administration is required to submit a QDR. Thus, the QDR gives a presidential administration the opportunity to both lay the tracks of future procurement, and to make a statement about its strategic orientation. The 2010 QDR, therefore, is one of the first major opportunities for the Obama administration to set forth its national security priorities, and to steer the national defence apparatus of the United States in its desired direction.

While the Bush administration’s 2006 QDR attempted to paint the struggle against al-Qaeda in grand, ideological terms, the 2010 QDR focuses on winning the nation’s wars and especially on maintaining the liberal international economic and political order that undergirds globalisation. For QDR 2010, stability is the watchword. The QDR treats India, China and Pakistan firmly within the context of the contribution or threat that each poses to the liberal international order, suggesting that India will act as guarantor of that order, that China may threaten the order, and that Pakistan requires assistance in maintaining order. However, the QDR fails to deal seriously with potential sources of friction in the US-India relationship, instead simply assuming that India will choose to support the US-designed international economic and political infrastructure.

The most positive assessment of the QDR’s appreciation for India’s role in the international security arena would note that the 2010 QDR devotes almost twice as much attention to India as its 2006 counterpart. A balanced observer would have to acknowledge that even this proportional increase amounts only to an expansion from seventy-eight words to one hundred and sixteen. Nevertheless, the heightened focus lies in the greater attention paid to Afghanistan-Pakistan, and to the Indian Ocean. The 2006 QDR treated the Afghanistan war as an accomplishment of the “Long War”, the ideological struggle between the United States and forces of terror personified in Osama bin Laden. Both because of events and because of a shift in ideology, the 2010 QDR treats the Af-Pak situation as a problem to be solved. It notes:

As the economic power, cultural reach, and political influence of India increase, it is assuming more influential role in global affairs. This growing influence, combined with democratic values it shares with the United States, an open political system, and a commitment to global stability,will present many opportunities for cooperation. India’s military capabilities are rapidly improving through increased defense acquisitions, and they now include long-range maritime surveillance, maritime interdiction and patrolling, air interdiction, and strategic airlift. India has already established its worldwide military influence through counterpiracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief efforts. As its military capabilities grow, India will contribute to Asia as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

While much of this paragraph involves diplomatic-speak, it nevertheless carries several important indicators of how the United States views India and Indian military power. Indian democracy is important, but the commitment to global stability is key. The emphasis on growing Indian military power, especially those elements of military power that contribute to international stability, indicate that the United States understands India to be a partner in the maintenance of the liberal international trade system, and it perceives India’s military power as a guarantor of that system.

The QDR does not discuss either China or Pakistan in the same terms. It holds open the hope that China may play a constructive role in the maintenance of the liberal international order:

China’s military has begun to develop new roles, missions, and capabilities in support of its growing regional and global interests, which could enable it to play a more substantial and constructive role in international affairs.

However, where the QDR treats Indian military capabilities as a boon to international cooperation, it also discusses Chinese capabilities as a threat to the United States, and as a potentially destabilising force in the East Asian economic order. China’s development of anti-ship ballistic missiles, advanced submarine technology and cyber-warfare capabilities are all cited as areas of concern. To be sure, the QDR remains agnostic about eventual Chinese intentions, and recognises the importance of the Sino-American economic relationship. Nevertheless, the contrast between the treatment of China and India is striking.

Similarly, the QDR expresses skepticism about Pakistan’s contribution to international order. Rather than discuss the ways in which Pakistan might reinforce international stability, the central concern of the QDR seems to the ability of Pakistan and its friends to maintain stability within Pakistan’s borders. Pakistan receives more attention in the QDR than either China or India, which is evidence of US defence secretary Robert Gates’ pragmatic focus on current wars. The emphasis is on Pakistan’s ability and will to continue to carry out a counter-insurgency campaign against Taliban and Al Qaeda forces within its own borders. To this end, it describes assistance programs designed to increase Pakistani state-building capabilities, as well as to re-orient the Pakistani military away from conventional combat and towards the counter-insurgency doctrine that has recently characterised US military operations.

For understandable reasons, the QDR avoids the argument that issues concerning India, China and Pakistan might be interrelated. Indian capabilities are not discussed in the context of containing China, nor of positively influencing Pakistan. China’s relationship with Pakistan and potential rivalry with India receive no attention.

In this context, the implications for direct co-operation between the US and the Indian armed forces are substantial. By emphasising the regional reach of the Indian armed forces, the importance of the Indian Ocean, and the need to stabilise the liberal international order, the QDR creates grounds for military co-operation in several different arenas. For example, the Indian Navy has taken on responsibility for anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, along with the United States and a host of other countries. Because of its geographic position and familiarity with the Indian Ocean region, the Indian Navy is uniquely capable of managing anti-piracy operations between the Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden and the Straits of Malacca. The QDR’s focus on maritime surveillance and interdiction capabilities suggests that the United States projects the Indian Navy as playing a major role in anti-piracy operations in the coming decades.

Concerns about terrorism are tied to concerns about piracy, both because of the presence of jihadi groups in Somalia and because of the maritime nature of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The Indian Ocean, touching on much of the Islamic world, remains a significant avenue of terrorist travel, as well as a potential area of operations. Terrorist funding, either from drug trafficking or potentially from piracy, depends on easy and secure access to the Indian Ocean. The QDR expects that Indian naval, air, and police capabilities, in collaboration with the US presence in the Indian Ocean, will help turn the ocean into a governed space.

Finally, the emphasis on strategic airlift creates an opportunity for co-operation in disaster relief. Both the 2004 tsunami and the more recent Haitian earthquake relief efforts demonstrated the importance of military air and sea lift capabilities in natural disasters. United States Navy amphibious capabilities played a key role in 2004, and again in 2010. The Indian Navy also conducted operations in support of tsunami relief in 2004, and the addition of both the INS Jalashwa (the former USS Trenton) and the INS Vikramaditya should further enhance Indian amphibious and disaster relief capability. The establishment of an amphibious warfare hub in Andaman and Nicobar will also facilitate long term disaster relief cooperation.

All of these operations, and even the implicit assumption that India will act as a guarantor of the liberal international order, are dependent on a deeper assumption about India’s intentions. The QDR blithely—and arguably, given the weight placed on that assumption, recklessly—assumes that India wants to act as a guarantor of the international order, and that it will continue to want to act as such a guarantor for the foreseeable future. In short, the QDR assumes that India wants to play in the US game. Moreover, it assumes that India will gear its foreign policy and military force structure around the role of regional policeman. While this assumption might not seem extraordinary in the context of the last ten years of US-Indian relations, it would have seemed seriously questionable in 1990. The United States and India have had many foreign policy disagreements over the years, ranging from relations with Pakistan to the proper attitude towards China to support for various states and sub-state groups. While the Indian armed forces have diversified supplies, New Delhi still procures a considerable amount of equipment from Russia, even as relations between Moscow and Washington deteriorate. Finally, although differences over nuclear proliferation have eased over the last ten years, India and the United States still stand on different sides of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty chasm.

Thus, while the QDR confidently projects about India’s role in supporting the US-defined international order, it conveniently ignores what might become serious differences in foreign policy outlook. At some point and to some degree, India’s desire to restructure the international order (at least at a regional level) may come into conflict with the US desire for stability. This does not imply fault on the part of either country, but rather the simple recognition that different states view the world differently and seek different (if often compatible) ends. The QDR’s treatment of India on this point stands in contrast to its treatment of China. According to the QDR, China must choose between supporting and trying to revise the international order. India’s contribution, however, isn’t treated as a choice, but rather as an assumption.

In an important sense, the 2010 QDR “Europeanises” India. It assumes that India will, minor friction aside, act in the general interests of the political and economic order that the Atlantic powers have established, just as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and NATO have acted for the past several decades. This framework is unquestionably productive. It sets Indian foreign and military policy apart from either Pakistan or China by treating the former as a solution and the latter two as problems (even if India isn’t described as a solution to the particular problems posed by either China or Pakistan). It opens space for thinking seriously about the role that the Indian military could play in maintaining regional stability, and hints at both avenues for cooperation and a desired Indian force structure.

However, the program set forth in the QDR hinges on the assumptions that Indian and US interests will not diverge substantially, and that India is interested in playing the role that the US wants it to play. These assumptions would be problematic if they were associated with France, Germany, or Japan—nations which have had strong, decades-long security relationships with the United States. Friction inevitably develops, even in close alliances. Particularly for a document intended to set forth long-term strategy and procurement policy, the expectations of comity between Indian and American interests seem optimistic. This is not to say that tension will develop, or that either side is unprepared for the tasks that lie ahead. Rather, at least some note of caution would be wise, and well taken.

 

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Shifting Indian, Russian and U.S. roles

There is still a vast body of people in India who believe that the United States has a lot to offer to democracies. But the narrow focus of the present U.S. government in talking only to the military in Pakistan, and the spectacle of seeing the U.S. president go cap in hand to negotiate with China, are discouraging even such people.

But there is still a way forward for the United States. The concert of democracies begun in 2008 should be pursued; in the maritime field the U.S. Navy is still by far the preeminent power. The finest U.S. export to the world is still its education system. Manufacturing could still come back to North America from China if only Wall Street would eschew financial engineering and the U.S. government would promote real engineering at home.

The rule of law is very weak in China – as Google is discovering. It would be better for U.S. companies to relocate to India, where the judiciary fiercely guards its independence. Many international companies are basing their research and development in India today, where the rules on foreign direct investment are very progressive for this type of industrial activity. Major U.S. commercial and manufacturing interests, which have been the country’s lifeblood, would do well to refocus from China to India.

The Russians are taking advantage of Indian laws and creating joint ventures with the Indian government and private enterprises, with government encouragement. In return, India has been given a contract with Russian company Elkon to mine uranium.

India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation is being accommodated in the Siberian oilfields; the Indian Space Research Organization is accessing Russian satellites and communications systems in civil and military applications; new contracts for civil and military aircraft are being drawn up between India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. and Russia’s Sukhoi Company; and Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear energy corporation, is building 16 civil nuclear plants in India with Nuclear Power Corporation. .

These contracts were on the table for at least two years, but the short-term focus of the Americans has cost them not only the loss of these billion-dollar contracts but thousands of jobs – perhaps more as spinoffs in sales, marketing and maintenance contracts.

A rough calculation indicates that of the US$150 billion India wants to spend in five years, the Russian prime minister has walked away with at least half the budget. This is the result of a lack of long-term geopolitical vision and business sense in the United States – rather surprising, as the Indian economy is geared to consumption at home which translates into exports for the supplying nation, and that to a billion plus people, on par with China.

Considering the demographic challenge facing China due to its one-child policy, by 2020 India’s population under 35 years of age will be leading global economic growth. With both leading political parties in India pursuing similar economic growth plans, the economic future of India is in safe hands for this century.

India’s democracy, its soft power, English language skills, information technology industry, strong judiciary and need for infrastructure in virtually every field of business is and will be a strong catalyst for growth in this century. The United States needs the vision to focus on making India its partner and not a client as it rebuilds.

 

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Friends of sorts

Because India won't advance American strategic goals unless it assists it, Indo-US relations will always be limited.

17 March 2010: Why do Indo-US relations never reach their full potential? To be sure, the Indo-US nuclear deal seems to contradict this premise, but not if you look deeper. The deal is nowhere near the promise the first Manmohan Singh government claimed it held, because the stars of its initiator, the former president, George W.Bush, faded in the course of getting it contentiously approved from the US and Indian legislatures. The more Bush lost popularity on the Iraq War and the stronger the feeling grew that he had hastened America's decline, the tougher it got on the nuclear deal, with the non-proliferation lobby gaining the upper hand. Today, barring the Manmohan Singh government, nobody gets excited about the deal, whose unintended consequence of rapidly gained Russian and French civilian nuclear technologies and fuel have gripped popular-strategic discourse. If the deal comes for examination, it is in the negative sense, of long-drawn-out and possibly stalled negotiations with the US on reprocessing rights, and in relation to a controversial piece of legislation called the nuclear liability bill. Worst of all, from prime minister Manmohan Singh's perspective, the US president, Barack Obama, is not the most ardent champion of the nuclear deal. He would prefer India to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons' state.
So while the nuclear deal was a short-time trend-setter of a new proximity in Indo-US relations, in the long-term, India's ties with America will languish. Why? Why have so-called "natural allies" like India and the US (on account of their common democratic governments) not come closer than they have, with mutual suspicions and distrust marking their ties? During the Cold War, there were ready answers for this, even though they did not satisfy. One of them was that India was perceived, despite its non-alignment policy, to be closer to the Soviet bloc, which made everyone in the West suspicious of New Delhi. There are obvious flaws with this pat analysis. India did not start out at Independence opposed to the US. Indeed, it read in the US's freedom struggle from Great Britain instructions for itself. Till Nehru was PM, he felt an openness towards America which he thought was not adequately reciprocated, especially after the 1962 Chinese aggression, and when latter American military aid was tied to progress on the Kashmir question with Pakistan. Indo-US distance grew under Indira Gandhi and Nixon-Kissinger made this worse with their rapprochement with China using Pakistan. Few in the US cared to note that Mrs Gandhi was disturbed by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and hinted this in public.
But with the end of the Cold War, there was a new potential to Indo-US relations that were not met. Part of the reason lies with the nature of India's democracy, which is solidly wedded to strategic autonomy. Although non-alignment may be dead, its organizing principles remain very relevant to India. Such being its democracy, India cannot become anybody's tool. It may be argued that democracy makes subservience to another democracy improbable. This is not entirely true if you consider US-NATO relations or America's ties with Australia-New Zealand, although the worm has turned in several of these places. And yet, if it is accepted on a broad principle, of democracy's generic non-subservience to another democracy, it would explain the relatively more "easy relations" between democratic US and dictatorial Pakistan (the present civilian government is a cover for a military state). "Easy relations" must be qualified for what they mean: master-slave ties. The US is the master and Pakistan the slave. Certainly, it is not so simple in the Af-Pak case, where Pakistan's idea of a good/ bad Taliban is the veritable tail that is wagging the American dog. But it is an idea that suits US interests and enables a tidy retreat from Afghanistan next year. And what's more important, Pakistan, more precisely, the military, is willing to do everything to make the US exit from Afghanistan smooth. It is another matter that Pakistan hopes to gain strategically against India by such assistance to the US. The point is that Pakistan is at the ready disposal of the US. A dictatorial regime can make itself so available to America, become its willing client state. India cannot, because it is both a democracy and permanently impressed with the principle of strategic autonomy, despite Manmohan Singh's attempted lurches out of this framework.
But all democracies don't have similar constraints working with the US to its advantage. The grossest example is the UK, which was closest in the Margaret Thatcher years to the Ronald Reagan administration when he was battling the evil empire. But the end of the Cold War made no significant change in US-UK relations. It is hardly a coincidence that the Tony Blair government "sexed up" intelligence on Saddam Hussein's WMDs to join George W.Bush's Iraq War, while the Bush administration heaped scorn on France and Germany for opposing it. There is a common element here between a fundamentally dictatorial regime like Pakistan's and a liberal democracy like the UK joining the US's foreign wars. It is military-to-military ties that bind them all (and their war presidents and premiers), the US, the UK and Pakistan. That is not so readily available with France or Germany or even Australia today, and it is not on the cards anytime soon with India. India won't join the US's foreign wars (assuming it has the continuing capacity to wage them) in a long time to come, and thus will always have a limited friendship with the US.
Check back even on the much-touted Indo-US nuclear deal and its stasis may be linked to modest American-Indian military ties (combined and joint operations and equipment sales only skim the surface of such relations). When Bush II's America intervened in Iraq, it tried and failed to get the A.B.Vajpayee government to deploy troops there. Vajpayee used the Left to create public and parliamentary opinion opposing Indian military involvement in Iraq. When the first Manmohan Singh government was elected, and the nuclear deal was offered, its signing was preceded by the defence framework agreement. Pranab Mukherjee, the then defence minister, was rushed to the US to sign the framework pact despite his acute discomfiture. The nuclear deal immediately followed the framework agreement. The agreement envisaged Iraq War-like scenarios where India would not hold out. Interoperability was specifically sought to tap on Indian military resources (soldierly and material) in any such future war. It is another thing that because of political opposition and India's commitment to strategic autonomy that prevents joining other countries' wars, the defence framework agreement with the US has not met American expectations. Which is why India's relations with the US are stagnating and going downhill. The compromises that the US seeks to extract from India's independent foreign policy and strategic autonomy cannot be accepted. This is as good as India's relations with the US will ever get without making them adversaries.

 

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Robert Blake on Listening Tour in Af-Pak and India: But Region is Holbrooke’s Domain

Washington, D.C. 19 March (Asiantribune.com):
When reporters at the State Department briefing Friday March 19 asked why Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robert Blake was visiting Pakistan and Afghanistan along with India when Af-Pak region was the domain of US special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke, the department spokesman Mr. Toner said they had different roles.

"Blake, I think, is just also trying to get a sense of what's going on the ground so he can be better informed in his role," he said.

Being the special envoy Holbrooke had visited the region eight, nine times as "that's proper and right that he would do so," Toner said. "But that said, Assistant Secretary Blake is obviously engaged in that issue as well."

This is Blake's first visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan after becoming assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia last year. These countries so far had remained in the personal domain of Special US Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan Mr Richard Holbrooke
Robert Blake, who was America’s deputy chief of mission in New Delhi a couple of years ago before he was ambassador to Sri Lanka 2007-09, left Washington Wednesday, March 17 on an official tour in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and later to meet with his counterparts in the European Union in Brussels.

The United States says it is engaged in a common struggle with Pakistan and India against terrorism, it's encouraging all round cooperation through strategic dialogues with the two South Asian neighbors. Robert Blake is said to be visiting the region to get a feeler of the situation.

"We have a very rich, strategic dialogue with India," State Department Spokesman Mark Toner told reporters on Friday when asked about what the visiting Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao discussed with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her counterpart Undersecretary of State Bill Burns Tuesday.

Robert Blake, U.S. Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, is travelling to India during March 17-30, the State Department announced on Wednesday. He will also visit Afghanistan and Pakistan for the first time in his role as Assistant Secretary.

Focussing on U.S.-India business relations, Mr. Blake is scheduled to deliver a keynote address at the Asia Society Corporate Conference in New Delhi on March 20 and hold consultations with Indian and American business representatives.

He will also use the visit to conduct discussions with his counterparts in the Ministry of External Affairs “to prepare for the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue in Washington in early summer,” according to the State Department statement.

Mr. Blake's visit to Afghanistan will revolve around meetings with embassy officials in Kabul and local officials in Kunduz and discussions with the Provincial Reconstruction Team.

The statement said: “Assistant Secretary Blake will deliver a keynote address at the Asia Society Corporate Conference in New Delhi on March 20. He also will have consultations with Indian and American business representatives, and have discussions with his counterparts in the Ministry of External Affairs to prepare for the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue in Washington in early summer.

“While in Afghanistan, the Assistant Secretary will meet with embassy officials in Kabul and then travel to Kunduz to meet with local officials and visit the Provincial Reconstruction Team.
In Pakistan, Assistant Secretary Blake will meet with federal and provincial officials, civil society representatives, religious leaders and business representatives in Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore.

“Assistant Secretary Blake will hold consultations with EU counterparts in Brussels as part of our ongoing dialogue on South and Central Asia. “

On February 18 addressing the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in Chicago, Illinois on U.S. relations with India and the region Robert Blake spelled out the U.S. policy toward the region in this manner:

(Begin Quote): Strategic Cooperation

“The nuclear issue brings us to the final pillar of the Dialogue, which addresses strategic cooperation, including global issues, defense cooperation, counterterrorism, and non-proliferation.

“On the defense side, our bilateral exercise program continues to grow and to strengthen. We have a robust exercise program that has enabled us to enhance an already great military-to-military relationship with exercises such as Cope India, Malabar, and Shatrujeet.

Defense sales are also of great interest to American companies. We’ve already seen some very important defense sales just in the last year or two of C-130Js and P-8 maritime patrol aircraft.

“The Indian government also recently submitted a Letter of Request for ten C-17 aircraft worth about $2.5 billion. And that’s not the end of it.

“There are large numbers of important potential deals, up to $18 billion worth of new opportunities that will become available in the next several years, most notably the multi-role combat aircraft purchase which by itself is a roughly $10 billion sale in which two American companies -- Boeing, headquartered here in Chicago, and Lockheed Martin -- are competing.

That the Indians are now considering U.S. manufacturers and U.S. technology to meet their military aircraft requirements—which would have been unimaginable just ten years ago—is just one measure of how far and how rapidly our relationship is evolving.

“A critical component of the strategic cooperation framework is, of course, counterterrorism. You’ve seen our two countries cooperate more and more, particularly since the horrific November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, which the Indians refer to as 26/11.

“Home Minister Chidambaram’s highly successful visit here last September, which gave him the opportunity to consult with senior officials in just about every U.S. agency involved in the all-important challenge of battling terrorism, underscored the breadth of our still-expanding cooperation on this crucial issue.

“When Prime Minister Singh visited Washington in November the two leaders stressed that our partnership in counterterrorism efforts is “indispensable for global peace and security,” and agreed on a Counterterrorism Initiative to strengthen our work together in this vital endeavor.

The last area in strategic cooperation is that of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Now this is an area where there’s a very different and more positive dynamic between our countries as a result of the civil nuclear deal.

“Prime Minister Singh also shares the President’s far-reaching vision for a nuclear weapons-free world.

“Our broader challenge is to strengthen the global non-proliferation system and I think this is an area where the United States and India can work more closely as partners.

“The Nuclear Security Summit President Obama will host in Washington in April, to which 43 nations have been invited and which we expect Prime Minister Singh will attend, provides an excellent opportunity to highlight this evolving partnership.

“In addition, the civil nuclear deal turned probably our most significant irritant in bilateral relations into an opportunity for cooperation. This has the potential to lead to billions of dollars worth of opportunities for American companies, and many thousands of jobs as a result of that. A few more steps are still required, and we expect them to be completed in the next few months.

Afghanistan and Pakistan

“Finally, because I know that you will ask me about it, let me add a few words regarding the regional dynamic between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

“India, Pakistan and the U.S. all face the common threat of terrorism. While we would like to see India and Pakistan reach a stable relationship, they will do so on their terms at the appropriate time.

“At the same time, India has become a valuable, in fact a top five, contributor to Afghanistan’s reconstruction.

“India has contributed valuable assistance to Afghanistan’s reconstruction, both in infrastructure, such as construction of the Parliament building and highways, and humanitarian, such as food aid to 2 million schoolchildren. It has pledged over $1.2 billion in assistance.

“Few relationships around the world matter more to our collective future, or hold greater promise for constructive action on the challenges that matter most to all of us, than the partnership between the United States and India.

“That doesn’t mean that we will always agree, because we won’t.

“But together we can build on the solid foundation that already exists, an even stronger partnership that serves not only the interests of our two countries, but of the rest of the international community.

“The United States and India share common ideals and complementary strengths reflected in our very close people-to-people contacts, our shared embrace of democratic principles and our willingness to work together on issues that matter not only to us, but to the global community.”

 

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US doing India a favor by ignoring it

US doing India a favor by ignoring it A lot of anxious discussion is taking place in India that Obama is not as interested in India as was Bush, and that the Pakistanis have managed to leverage this into excluding India from the Afghan settlement.
But far from signaling doomsday, as Editor's compatriots seem to think, America is doing India a favor by reducing the importance of the relationship.
Editor's argument is simplicity itself. The US is like a 100-ton dinosaur that is as quick on its feet as it is attention-deficit. When the US is on the move, it crushes everything to the center, left, and right. Very frequently it forgets what it is doing and takes a giant poopies without warning. This results in the burial of its friend and allies. After which, the US goes "Oopsies!" and smacks itself on the hand, saying "Bad Sam. Sam Bad." Then it goes looking for new situations and new allies to bury....
....India does not need America to help it offset China or to deal with Pakistan, or whatever the reason d'jour for sucking up to America may be. If you want America's respect, be self-sufficient in your national security, and keep America at arms length. The Americans will respect you because you respect yourself.
As for Afghanistan, the quickest way for India to defeat Pakistan on Afghanistan is to ignore Pakistan. We don't need a seat at any table for any settlement. When you sit at the table, you become responsible for the outcomes. No one in their right mind should have anything to do with an Afghan settlement, because it is going to be a 100% mess once the US leaves. India should simply continue its support of the anti-Taliban people, and it should tell the Pushtoons "If you need us, call us."
This is called minimalist diplomacy, and its the best thing for India. It's the best thing for the US too, but there is no chance whatsoever the US will see this.
Here's a good example of the US messing up India Iran is much surplus in natural gas, India and Pakistan are energy importers. Proposal: an Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline. After Iran assuages Indian fears re Pakistan, India agrees to join, though some issues regarding transit charges remained to be worked out.
Next thing you know, US is sitting on India's head, saying "you cant trade with Iran because they're our enemy."
Iran-Pakistan are proceeding with the deal; India is sitting twiddling its thumbs. But is US saying anything to Pakistan? Nope.
So India cant trade with a traditional friend, Iran, but it's OK for Pakistan?

 

[ajtr]

cross posting


HEADLEY: FROM OBAMA WITH LOVE

B.RAMAN

All Governments indulge in spin. One should not, therefore, blame the Government of Dr.Manmohan Singh for indulging in spin in the case of David Coleman Headley, of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), and for trying to mislead the hapless Indian public with the help of obliging journalists that the plea bargain entered into by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with Headley was not a setback, but a great triumph for Indian diplomacy.


2. We might not have succeeded in getting him extradited in the Mumbai 26/11 case, says bravely Home Secretary G.K.Pillai, but the option of getting him extradited in other cases is still open. What other cases?


3. We will keep trying, says Home Minister P.Chidambaram. And, in the meanwhile, more Indians will keep dying at the hands of the terrorists.


4. "Four Reasons Why India is Smiling" says "The Times of India" of diminishing credibility. Why India is smiling according to the whiz kids of the TOI? For the first time LET's links with Al Qaeda being underscored in a US Court. Oh really? The first time a clandestine cell of the LET was detected in the US was in 2003 when George Bush was the President. The FBI arrested a number of American nationals of Pakistani, Saudi and other origin and charged them with waging war against India from US territory.


5. What is the second reason for India's smile visible only to the TOI and not to many of us? "The threat of execution will hang over him." Oh really? Under the US law once the FBI renounces its right to demand death penalty in a case it cannot go back on its commitment whatever be the new evidence.


6. What is the third reason for the smile? India can interrogate Headley even if he is not extradited. Another gem from the TOI. Interrogation is done in your custody. Otherwise, it is meaningless. Yes, under the plea bargain Indian investigators can question him in FBI's custody. The FBI officer will decide the relevance of the questions.


7. The fourth reason for India's smile so visible to the TOI? India's case against the LET has become stronger.So what? Will India be able to get Pro.Hafeez Mohammad Sayeed, the Amir of the LET, arrested and prosecuted by Pakistan? Will India be able to see that Pakistan dismantles the LET infrastructure in Pakistani territory? Will India be able to prevent another 26/11? Then of what use India's case against the LET becoming stronger?


8. The "Hindu". the other daily of no credibility, has come out with its own gem. Says N.Ram, the precious son of the Tamil soil and our own unique contribution to the world of Indian journalism: " Barring death penalty enthusiasts, no one has any reason to bemoan the Plea Agreement".


9.Oh,oh.oh,oh Mr.Ram. It has got nothing to do with death penalty. It has got everything to do with Pakistan's continued use of the LET to kill hundreds of innocent Indians. Our investigation into 26/11 runs on two parallel tracks----- the responsibility of the LET, which the Pakistanis project as a non-State actor with which the State of Pakistan has nothing to do and the responsibility of the State of Pakistan. What the US has sought to achieve through the choreographed plea bargain is that while India will be able to highlight the responsibility of the LET, it will not be able to establish the responsibility of the State of Pakistan. The Obama Administration wants the world to perceive 26/11 as the crime of a non-state actor as claimed by Pakistan and not the crime of the State of Pakistan. That is the real issue here.


10.What did Headley know according to the FBI's own court affidavits?


He knew Ilyas Kashmiri of the 313 Brigade, who is close to Osama bin Laden and who recently threatened to attack the IPL cricket matches and the Commonwealth Games. Headley had met him in North Waziristan in the beginning of 2009.


He knew many office-bearers of the LET whose identities the FBI has not revealed.

He knew many serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Army.

11. What he must be knowing?


The identities of the many contacts he made in India during his repeated visits.

The identities of the sleeper cells of the LET, which have not yet come to the notice of the Indian investigators. If the FBI had allowed us to question Headley in time, we might have been able to prevent the Pune blast of February 13 if it had been planned by the LET or its Indian associates.

12. The FBI had seen to it that we will not be able to find out all this by independently interrogating Headley. It is a great tragedy and speaks eloquently of the decay of our sense of national self-respect that instead of having the spine to stand up to the US and protest loud and clear over the FBI's shutting out access to Headley, we are indulging in more spins to project what has happened as a triumph for Indo-US cooperation over which we should smile and not cry.


13. The Obama Administration has been repeatedly kicking us in the back.It did so in respect of Afghanistan. It has done so in respect of Headley. Instead of having the courage and intellectual honesty to admit to our people that we have been let down nastily by the US, we are indulging in more spins to project the kicks as, in fact, boquets from Obama with love.


14.Dear Dr.Manmohan Singh, Dear Shri Chidambaram, Dear Shri Pillai, Dear Shri Ram, Dear whiz-kids of ToI : Some weeks ago Mulla Baradar, supposedly No.2 in the Afghan Taliban, was arrested by the ISI in Karachi.He is in the ISI's custody. The US and Afghan intelligence wanted independent access to him for interrogation. The ISI refused and told them he could be questioned in the ISI's custody. The US insisted on independent access and warned Pakistan of the likely consequences if it did not agree to it. This week's reports say that Pakistan has been forced to allow independent access to the Americans.


15. That is the way a self-respecting nation protects its interests and nationals. For the US, independent interrogation of Baradar was necessary to hold those responsible for American deaths in the past accountable and to prevent more deaths in future. It insisted on it and had its way.


16. India is not the US. The clout which it has over Pakistan we do not have anywhere in the world. At least we could have had the courage to protest---- loudly and openly--- instead of projecting every stab in the back by Obama as a kiss in the back.


17. Annexed is an article titled "PM in the US: The Spin and the Fizzle" written by me on November 30,2009.


18. The spin continues. The more the spins, the more will be the fizzles.( 19-3-10)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: [email protected])

ANNEXURE

PM in US: The Spin & The Fizzle ( http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3525.html )

By B. Raman

The proof of the pudding is in the eating. The Washington pudding served by President Barack Obama to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during the latter's visit to the US from November 23 to 26, 2009, is yet to be tasted, but if one is objective in analysing the outcome of the visit, one will have to concede that the spins put out by one of the PM's advisers from the PM's plane through obliging journalists before he landed in Washington DC have remained what they were----spins and nothing more.

2. Two of the pre-summit spins put out from the plane related to India's right to reprocess used nuclear fuel from US-supplied power stations and co-operation in counter-terrorism. The Indian public was given the impression that the agreement on the re-processing modalities had almost been finalised and would be a flagship outcome of the visit.

3. Hardly had the PM landed in Washington DC when Nirupama Rao, the Foreign Secretary, had to unspin the spin put out from the aircraft. She told the journalists that while there was progress in the negotiations, an agreement was still away and may not be the outcome of the visit. We have now been told during a post-summit spin session on board the plane while the PM and his party were returning to New Delhi that barring one or two issues, the agreement has almost been clinched. It might not have been possible to initial it during the PM's stay in Washington DC, so what? It is a question of a wait of another seven to 10 days. So we are told now.

4. Another pre-summit spin from the PM's aircraft was that a memorandum of understanding on future counter-terrorism co-operation between the two countries would be another important outcome. It was made out that the lightning visit of Leon Panetta, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to New Delhi before the Prime Minister took off for Washington was an indicator of the importance attached by Obama to this subject.

5. What the spin-masters did not tell the Indian public was that the CIA chief had actually flown to Islamabad due to concerns over the growing isolation of President Asif Ali Zardari and had stopped over in India by the way.

6. Some New Delhi-based analysts, who always go lyrical on Indo-US relations, have extensively quoted from the Manmohan Singh-Obama joint statement to claim that the so-called joint counter-terrorism initiative mentioned in the statement was, in fact, the flagship outcome of the visit. In post-summit spin sessions on board the returning aircraft, one of the PM's advisers put out for all who might believe him that Obama himself was personally monitoring the FBI investigation into the activities of the Chicago cell ( David Coleman Headley--- Tahawuur Hussain Rana) of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and that on his instructions a high-level team of the FBI headed by its chief would be flying to India to share with us all the information collected by the FBI during the investigation.

7. What the Indian public was not told was that the programme for the New Delhi visit of the FBI chief was fixed long before the PM's visit to Washington DC and that in the US the President has no powers to monitor the FBI's investigation process which is independent. Indian Prime Ministers may as a matter of habit monitor the investigations of the CBI, but the US President can't monitor the FBI 's investigations.

8. Embarrassed by the statement of the US National Security Adviser, Gen. James Jones, when the PM was still abroad that the Indian investigators may not be able to join in the interrogation of Headley and Rana due to legal difficulties, the spin-masters told us that this was because the two suspects had not yet been indicted before a court. We were told that once they were indicted, our investigators would be able to interrogate them.

9. What we were not told was that once a suspect is indicted, he is transferred to judicial custody and no more interrogation is possible without a special court order. US courts are often hesitant to permit foreign investigators to interrogate suspects facing trial before them. That is what Gen. Jones meant when he talked of legal difficulties.

10. The so-called counter-terrorism initiative, which has been projected as path-breaking, is thin in substance and thinner in new ideas. Two ideas of considerable originality and significance were born out of Indo-US counter-terrorism co-operation initiatives under the Bill Clinton and George Bush Administrations. The idea of a Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism came out of the meeting between Jaswant Singh, the then Foreign Minister, and Strobe Talbot, the then US Deputy Secretary of State, at London in January 2000 in the wake of the Kandahar hijacking. Now this has become a model for a similar mechanism with many other countries.

11. The Indo-US Cyber Security Forum was born post-9/11 during counter-terrorism interactions between security officials of the Bush and Atal Behari Vajpayee Governments. Compared to those ideas, not a single new idea has come out of the much-hyped summit between Manmohan Singh and Obama.

12. And yet we are asked to hail the so-called counter-terrorism initiative. We should gladly do so if someone could explain to us what this initiative is about. Yes, there has been an improvement in what is called mutual legal assistance between India and the US after the 26/11 terrorist strike in Mumbai. For the first time since counter-terrorism co-operation between the two countries started in the 1980s the FBI allowed its officers not only to share their forensic findings with their Indian counterparts, but also to help the Mumbai Police in its prosecution by allowing FBI officers to testify before the trial court through video-conferencing. In the past while the FBI had shared its findings with us, it had refused to allow its officers to testify before an Indian court.

13. There has been a welcome change in that attitude because of the enormity of the offence and the death of six US nationals at the hands of the terrorists. There was an improvement in intelligence-sharing under the Bush Administration. In December, 2008, Indian media carried reports about two timely warnings regarding the 26/11 strikes received by the Indian agencies from their US counterparts in September,2008. The US agencies were also of considerable assistance in the collection of technical intelligence during the terrorist strike which forced the Government of Pakistan to arrest some of the conspirators based in Pakistan and initiate action, however unsatisfactory, against them. All this was done between November 26, 2008, and January 20, 2009, when Bush was still the President.

14. One understands that under the Bush Adminisatration, the US agencies were helpful in collecting intelligence about the Pakistani involvement in the explosion outside the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July, 2008, and sharing it with their Indian counterparts. They did it automatically on their own without the need for our PM having to take it up with Bush.

15. What has been our experience since Obama took over on January 20, 2009? One has not heard of any active US role in helping us in the investigation of the recent second explosion outside our Embassy in Kabul. Even though the FBI has reportedly already shared a lot of intelligence with our agencies in the Headley-Rana case, one has the impression that there has been some foot-dragging by the US authorities in respect of sharing with the Indian agencies information which could help them in identifying serving or retired Pakistani military and intelligence officials with whom Headley and Rana were in touch.

16. If we are given permission to interrogate them, our investigators will query them on the identities of the Pakistani officials. The officials of the Obama Administration are uncomfortable over the prospect of this.

17. There is an apparent strip-tease going on about Headley. There are wheels within wheels in the Headley case. Before he gravitated to the world of jihadi terrorism, he was in the world of narcotics smuggling. He was reportedly arrested once by US officials responsible for narcotics control.

18. Instead of being dealt with severely as one does normally with narcotics offenders, he seems to have been treated somewhat leniently. Did the narcotics control agency of the US recruit him as its agent in return for the lenient sentence? Was the FBI aware of this? We are all assuming that he was able to lead a high-profile life in India because of financial assistance from the LET and the Pakistani intelligence. Were payments from the US narcotics control agency also helping him lead a comfortable life in India and rub shoulders with film personalities and other high-flyers?

19. Will we get complete answers to these questions from the FBI ? The Obama Administration's counter-terrorism co-operation with India reminds one of the policy pursued by the Clinton Administration. Help India in preventing and investigating an act of terrorism originating from Pakistan, but avoid helping India in any matter which might prove detrimental to the State of Pakistan.

20. We ought to be more balanced in our assessment of US policies which have an impact on our core interests and more articulate in expressing our concerns and misgivings. Our relationship with the US is important, but that does not mean that we let ourselves be overawed into silence.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: [email protected])

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Obama will give Pakistan a nuclear deal like Bush gave India since he is determined to have the equal equal rivalry back , he has already given billions in aid and weapons this is still missing and I would not be suprised one bit when he does it. It is a much bigger benefit to India if he does it for the following reasons:
India would realize the Bush nuclear deal is not something special that as touted, this would make India's foreign policy more clear unlike now where India is trying to hard to please USA and getting nothing tangible (yet) and not make mistakes in buying to many reactors( or being pressured into choosing a USA plane in MRCA)
Pakistan's nuclear program would become more scrutinized and come under NSG,NPT,MCTR,FMCT,Hyde act type waivers that India received and it would also reveal a lot more about Pakistan's nuclear program and who is involved in it(China ETC...)
It would bring competition and better pricing power to India by having countries and companies to compete like the do in other areas like weapons.
It would free up India foreign policy from being 100% in USA camp and pushed into being a counter to China
It would also weaken the NPT and prevent any double standard used against Iran's program, and also give India a reason to not sign and it could be used as leverage in the future.
The main issue would be how USA is going to finance it but if they can give tens of billions of dollars during this economic depression to pakistan then this should not be a issue.

 

[venkat]

ISI and PAK army are going to have a strategic discussion in US sometime next week!!! what's this strategic discussion? I am pretty sure that Indian Govt is being made a fool ,by the threesome!!! Headly, the man who knows everything of 26/11 is not being sent to India!!! Headly is a double agent as per reports!!! so USA knows apriori about the impending 26/11 attack. 26/11 is not in the agenda of American govt. They are hell bent on safegaurding their own interests in Afghanistan and their war on terror with Taliban . Pakistan has arm twisted america in to giving in!! They know pretty sure that with out the help of pak ,they can not do anything in Afghanistan!!! pakistan is trading information of anti pak Taliban terrorists who are being killed by drone attacks. its a double game by pak. one shot two birds. In turn for its services pakistan is getting latest weapons, new F-16, AH-1 cobras,1000 LGB kits ,used frigates and clandestinly lots of freebies.
Indian govt should make it clear and unfold this drama by ISI.Pak army and US govt. The ultimate aim of the NATO forces fighting in afghanistan and the US army is to hand over afghanistan to pakistan controlled propak Taliban and make good their escape back to NATO barracks!!!Aid from US and Europe will flow in to Afghanistan in return!!! The situation in Afghanistan will return to the Taliban days with out Osama bin laden and the one eyed mullah!!!! so its a happy ending to their game and new beginning to our eternal headache!!!

 

[ajtr]

Obama will give Pakistan a nuclear deal like Bush gave India since he is determined to have the equal equal rivalry back , he has already given billions in aid and weapons this is still missing and I would not be suprised one bit when he does it. It is a much bigger benefit to India if he does it for the following reasons:
India would realize the Bush nuclear deal is not something special that as touted, this would make India's foreign policy more clear unlike now where India is trying to hard to please USA and getting nothing tangible (yet) and not make mistakes in buying to many reactors( or being pressured into choosing a USA plane in MRCA)
Pakistan's nuclear program would become more scrutinized and come under NSG,NPT,MCTR,FMCT,Hyde act type waivers that India received and it would also reveal a lot more about Pakistan's nuclear program and who is involved in it(China ETC...)
It would bring competition and better pricing power to India by having countries and companies to compete like the do in other areas like weapons.
It would free up India foreign policy from being 100% in USA camp and pushed into being a counter to China
It would also weaken the NPT and prevent any double standard used against Iran's program, and also give India a reason to not sign and it could be used as leverage in the future.
The main issue would be how USA is going to finance it but if they can give tens of billions of dollars during this economic depression to pakistan then this should not be a issue.

When usa cant even question Abdul qadeer how can usa scrutinize Pak nuke progam.FYI usa was in full knowledge of trough out 1980 and 1990s about pak nuke bomb but it turned blind eye towards it coz it was fighting in afghanistan.now also circumstances are same.USA perfidy wrt pak and china is truly visible.best thing india can do is supply nukes bomb to say cuba and Venezuela then see how usa crawl upto india.play the game usa way ie not by following rules but breaking them all.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

When usa cant even question Abdul qadeer how can usa scrutinize Pak nuke progam.FYI usa was in full knowledge of trough out 1980 and 1990s about pak nuke bomb but it turned blind eye towards it coz it was fighting in afghanistan.now also circumstances are same.USA perfidy wrt pak and china is truly visible.best thing india can do is supply nukes bomb to say cuba and Venezuela then see how usa crawl upto india.play the game usa way ie not by following rules but breaking them all.

simple if Pakistan has to separate their reactors like India had to between civilian and military side, it would reveal how many and where the military reactors are;start and give much more clues about how advanced their program is. India does not need to supply nukes to cuba or venezuela we can simply have relations back with Iran and help them in their program. But the biggest benefit would be Indian govt can stop playing this subservient role to USA who only want India as a counter to China(let USA fight their own battles)
It would also shift the burden of Pakistan's nuclear program into USA'S camp .USA has more or less forgiven all proliferation by Pak, we have to accept this and move on ,leave this mentality of looking for a reward for being a good boy and do what is best for our national interest.

 

[san]

What US is going to do with Afganistan remains speculative. In th past , wherever US has gone, they did not leave easily. The ultimate goal of US may to get acess the minreral & hydrocarbon rich central asia region. In that case, they ar not gonna to leave Afganistan. US is not in Afganistan just to defeat their own bad guys aka Taliban. Their is a long term planning before invading Afganistan sure.

 

[ajtr]

What does America have to hide?

Here is a hypothetical situation. Imagine that the Indian police arrest a man who had advance knowledge of the 9/11 plot. Not only did he work with the conspirators but he had also been sent to New York several times to conduct reconnaissance so that the terrorists would be able to successfully execute their assault.
Naturally, the US would want to extradite this person so that he could be tried in a US court for his involvement in one of the worst acts of terrorism in recent times. Assume now that India not only refused to discuss the extradition but also denied the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) any access to the suspect. “We will tell you what he is saying,” the Central Bureau of Investigation would insist. “There is no way you can interrogate him face to face.”
Take our scenario further. Imagine now that even as the US seethes at being denied access to this important link in the 9/11 case, India announces that it has done a deal with the man. He will plead guilty to all charges. So, there is no question of the death penalty under our law. Nor is there any prospect of his being prosecuted under American law. Part of the deal is that we have assured the suspect that we will never extradite him. As for the sentence, that is still to be worked out but it will be decided on the basis of the deal that we have made with the terrorist.
How do you suppose America will react?
The answers are obvious. There would be a diplomatic incident. The secretary of state would call our home minister (or perhaps our prime minister) to insist that the terrorist is handed over to the FBI. India would be accused of betraying the war on terror. How can we prosecute the man in our country, we would be asked, when the crime he was involved in occurred in America? There would be threats galore. We would be warned of a suspension of aid. Summits would be cancelled and so on.
I have spent some time outlining this scenario because it closely parallels something that has actually happened: except that in this case, the terrorist was involved in 26/11, not 9/11. And it is not India that is refusing to extradite him but America that has told us to go take a flying jump.
It is not difficult to see why the case of David Headley evokes such strong emotions among Indians. For us, 26/11 is as important as 9/11 is to Americans. The difference is that while the US knows pretty much everything it needs to about 9/11 — especially as al-Qaeda has openly taken credit for the attack — India is still trying to piece together the details of the conspiracy. It is the US that has told us that Headley made several reconnaissance trips for 26/11. Naturally, we believe that such a man not only deserves to be punished by an Indian court but that his information may hold the key to unravelling the 26/11 plot. What’s more, we suspect that Headley also suggested Poona as a potential terror target. How many other such targets did he pinpoint? Until we interrogate him, we will never know.
So, why is the US behaving in this manner? Say what you will about the Americans but the truth is that till now, they have genuinely tried to fight a global war against terror and have regularly involved the world’s intelligence agencies in this effort.Why abandon the cooperation now? Why alienate India so completely for the sake of a terrorist? Why allow more people to be killed — in such attacks as the Poona bombing — by refusing to let Indian investigators question David Headley?
I believe that only one explanation fits these facts and that there is only one answer to these questions.
David Headley was an American agent.
When I first suggested this hypothesis on these pages, it seemed slightly outlandish but now, I am sad to see, it has become received wisdom on the subject. And each day brings us new evidence to support this thesis.
We know that Headley (who called himself Daoud Gilani in that era) was convicted on drug charges and sent to jail in the US. We know also that he was subsequently released from jail early and handed over to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which said that it wanted to send him to Pakistan as an undercover agent. All this is a matter of public record.
What happened between the time the US sent Headley into Pakistan and his arrest at Chicago airport a few months ago? How did an American agent turn into a terrorist? The US will not say.
There are broadly only three possibilities. Possibility one is that he remained a DEA agent but also got involved with jihadi groups while remaining on the drug agency’s rolls. Possibility two is that he was never really a mere DEA agent. In the aftermath of 9/11, when it was discovered that America had few agents within the jihadi networks, all American agencies came together to pool assets so that the US could penetrate the terror groups. It is significant that Headley was sprung from jail after 9/11 though of course the court would have to be told that it was the DEA that wanted him (rather than the CIA) because he had been arrested on drug charges.
If you stick with possibility two, then Headley was a double agent. Sent to infiltrate jihadi groups, he became a convert to the terrorist cause and betrayed his American handlers.
Both possibilities would explain why the Americans are reluctant to let us speak to Headley. They do not want him discussing his role as an American agent (whether for the CIA or the DEA) with Indian intelligence.
But there is a third possibility. One theory — advanced by The Daily Beast website and the American media themselves — is that Headley remained a US agent till the end. He was the source who told the Americans about 26/11, causing them to send us a vague warning about the attack before it happened. (Because this warning was not specific enough, our sloppy intelligence apparatus ignored it.)
If you follow this theory through, then you would have to argue, as some Indian intelligence officials do, that the Americans pulled Headley out because they suspected that Indian agents were getting wise to his identity. Far better to place him in secure American custody and to deny everybody else access than to risk having him exposed by a foreign intelligence service.
We do not have enough information to conclude with any certainty which of these three possibilities comes closest to what really happened. But of one thing, there can no longer be any doubt.
America is behaving very strangely in the David Headley case. It has something to hide. And it is scared of what Headley could reveal.

 

[ajtr]

cross-posting

The burnt-out case of David Headley

The Headley case highlights that the Indian government proved incapable of assessing the geopolitical dimensions of the US-led war in Afghanistan, while Pakistan has shrewdly exploited the fallacies in India's [ Images ] foreign policy orientation to navigate itself to an unprecedented geopolitical positioning, writes M K Bhadrakumar.

It must be the mother of all political ironies that the week that the government almost tabled in the parliament an extraordinary legislation safeguarding the business interests of American nuclear industry, should end with the burnt-out case of David Headley.

A whole lot of themes of faith and unbelief on the political-diplomatic front sail into view -- what can only be called the spiritual aridity of India's foreign policy. The time has come to examine the possibility of redemption.

Cooperation in the fight against terrorism lies within the first circle of US-India strategic cooperation. The Mumbai [ Images ] attacks led to unprecedented counter-terrorism cooperation between India and the US -- "breaking down walls and bureaucratic obstacles between the two countries' intelligence and investigating agencies", as the prominent American security expert Lisa Curtis underscored in a plain-speaking US congressional testimony at Washington on March 11.

here is no doubt that David Headley's arrest last October has been a breakthrough in throwing light on the operations and activities of the Lashkar-e-Tayiba [ Images ] in India. To quote Curtis, "Most troubling about the Headley case is what it has revealed about the proximity of the Pakistani military to the LeT." Trouble began brewing from this point.

The stark reality is that the US government viewed LeT largely through the prism of India-Pakistan adversarial ties. This is despite all evidence of the LeT's significant role since 2006 as a facilitator of the Taliban's [ Images ] operations in Afghanistan by providing a constant stream of fighters -- recruiting, training and infiltrating insurgents across the border from the Pakistani tribal areas.

The US's policy prioritised the securing of Islamabad's [ Images ] cooperation on what directly affected American interests and it made distinction between the 'good' Taliban and the 'bad' Taliban. This political chicanery lies at the epicentre of the unfolding drama over Headley.

Without doubt, Headley has been a double agent of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Inter Services Intelligence and it is a moot point whether the US knew this or at what point the US officials began suspecting it. The crux of the matter today is that Headley may spill the beans if Indian interrogators get hold of him and the trail can lead in no time to LeT. Where will that leave the US?

Obviously, Washington is in no position to 'pressure' the Pakistani military. Its obsession is to end the fighting in Afghanistan, which would enable President Barack Obama [ Images ] to drawdown the combat troops and declare victory in the war in the nick of time before the US presidential election campaign in 2012 unfolded.

The extent to which the US is beholden to the Pakistani military today is apparent from the illogical statements being made lately by even self-styled agnostics like the AfPak special representative Richard Holbrooke [ Images ] about Rawalpindi's so-called change of heart regarding use of terrorism as an instrument of geopolitics. Holbrooke applauds even while ISI is reads the riot act to him that any of his secretive reconciliation talks with the Taliban will need to be conducted with its full participation.

No matter what the American lobby in our midst might say, the Indian foreign policy and security establishment should have no illusions that the Obama administration is stringing Delhi [ Images ] along on the Headley case. The US cannot afford to acknowledge the reality that the LeT enjoys the support of the Pakistani military. For, that would complicate its strategic cooperation with the Pakistani military and in turn call into question its reconciliation policy toward Taliban.

Therefore, the US will do its utmost to ensure India is not handed down a shred of hard evidence by Headley linking LeT with the Pakistani military. Where does that leave our government?

Clearly, the assumptions underlying India's foreign policy ever since the UPA government came to power in 2004 are unravelling. These included first-rate bloomers like the idea of a US-led quadripartite alliance against China, India being an Asian balancer against China, the Tibet [ Images ] card, etc. They included naive estimations that a strategic partnership with the US could substitute for an independent foreign policy, that the contacts with Pakistan were best conducted under US watch, that Delhi must synchronise its policies with the US's global strategies.

The plain truth is that India today is saddled with a nuclear deal that is becoming difficult to operationalise except on American terms; India's ties with Iran are in tatters; the high level of understanding forged with both Iran and China by the previous NDA government in 2003 stands dissipated.

Worst of all, Headley's case highlights that the government proved incapable of assessing the geopolitical dimensions of the US-led war in Afghanistan. The government failed to comprehend that the ground realities of the war were pushing geopolitical alignments inexorably toward the formation of a US-Pakistan strategic axis. Pakistan has shrewdly exploited the fallacies in India's foreign policy orientation to navigate itself to an unprecedented geopolitical positioning.

This isn't paranoia or pessimism. On Wednesday, the US-Pakistan strategic dialogue is scheduled to be held in Washington with the Pakistani military leadership making an undisguised pitch for a pivotal partnership between the two countries commensurate with what it regards as Pakistan's legitimate claim to be a regional power.

India, on the other hand, looks around confusedly, unsure of its ability to connect Headley's clemency plea with the big picture, and like the burnt-out case in the Graham Greene classic, badly in need of a self-cure.

M K Bhadrakumar is a former diplomat.

 

[ajtr]

This article is all about how UPA admin is bought off by USA.And how much influence obama excercises over PM.

Russia offers N-fuel fabrication, uranium JV, India reluctant

India and Russia may have discussed far-reaching nuclear and defence cooperation behind the closed doors of Hyderabad House during Vladimir Putin’s visit on March 12. But according to sources in both establishments, the Russian offer, still being kept under wraps in India, was almost not signed during Putin’s visit.Until the night before the summit meeting between the two prime ministers, the Indian establishment was extremely reluctant about committing itself to the Russian bear hug, whether in the nuclear energy, defence or space sectors.

The offer on nuclear cooperation, however, was wide-ranging and generous. As part of the inter-governmental agreement on cooperation in nuclear energy and the road map for the construction of nuclear power plants, signed in the presence of the two prime ministers, Russia promised to “go beyond” the Indo-US nuclear deal.

Speaking to the Russian media after Putin’s visit to Delhi, Sergei Kiriyenko, the head of Russia’s nuclear energy agency, Rosatom, said Russia offered to build 16 nuclear power plants at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu and Haripur in West Bengal, design and build a nuclear fuel fabrication facility in India under IAEA safeguards and set up a joint venture to explore and mine uranium in Russia that would be used in India and third countries.

The joint venture would likely operate at the Elkon uranium field in Yakutia, in Russia’s mineral-rich Siberian landmass, Interfax, the Russian news agency reported.

The Russian state-owned mining company ARMZ Uranium Holding Co, or AtomRedMetZoloto, holds the licence to the Elkon field which is estimated to hold 344,000 tonnes of uranium or 5.3 per cent of the world’s recoverable reserves.

Kiriyenko, in fact, told Russian reporters back in Moscow that Indo-Russian nuclear cooperation would go much beyond building nuclear reactors and fabricating fuel for use in the several units at Kudankulam and Haripur. Moscow had also offered to jointly manufacture nuclear power equipment, which factories could be located in India.

Strategic nuclear analyst G. Balachandran told Business Standard that the Russian offer, if it came to pass, would mean that the mined enriched uranium from Yakutia could be used to fabricate nuclear fuel for the Russian nuclear power plants in India. He pointed out that Moscow’s offer of reprocessing rights for the spent fuel, at least for the moment, went beyond the offer from any other country, including the US.

“It’s a good offer to help out India,” Balachandran said, adding, “once several nuclear power plants are in the process of being built, large amounts of fuel will be needed for them.”

Balachandran also pointed out that the Indo-US nuclear fuel reprocessing pact, said to be in the last stages of finalization, would have to be submitted to the US Congress for approval before it could come into force.

“There is no prior consent for reprocessing US-origin fuel without US Congressional approval. And when this pact goes to the Congress, the House or Senate members could add their own conditionalities to it,” Balachandran said.

It now transpires that Russian first deputy prime minister Sergei Sobyanin as well as Rosatom head Sergei Kiriyenko were closeted with National Security Adviser Shivshanker Menon almost until noon on March 12, only a couple of hours before the two PMs were to start their conversations in Hyderabad House, pleading with him that India sign the Road Map as well as the IGA.

Menon is believed to have told the Russian side that India did not want to commit itself to the Russian-inspired road map because the current Five-Year Plan was coming to an end in 2012 and India did not want to make any promises beyond that period.

But the Russians, mandated by Putin to deliver a “big agreement” with India, told Menon that they were willing to make a compromise: Let India sign the road map in the presence of the two prime ministers in Hyderabad House that afternoon, and it could later back out of any understandings envisaged in the document.

Sobyanin, who had to leave the Menon meeting to accompany his prime minister to a meeting with Congress President Sonia Gandhi, asked another Russian nuclear expert to replace him at the meeting with Menon. Kiriyenko stayed on and the deal was done.

According to Indian sources familiar with the subject, Delhi did not want to be seen to be getting into a cinch with the Russians, especially since the US had done most of the heavy lifting by pushing through the nuclear deal in 2008 and had so far not got any “benefit” out of it.

Moreover, the road map, which envisaged the building of another two nuclear power plants at Kudamkulam (two are coming on-stream this year and 2011, respectively, and construction for another two will begin soon), totalling six plants, also included the possibility of expanding the Kudamkulam site to accommodate another four to six plants.

Meanwhile, there was the Haripur site in West Bengal, where the Russians were offering to build an additional four to six nuclear plants.

With the Indo-US reprocessing pact in its last lap and the Prime Minister readying to travel to Washington DC to attend US President Barack Obama’s nuclear summit, Delhi perhaps felt the time was not ripe to publicise nuclear cooperation with the Russians.

In fact, at the Putin visit, agreements on the fifth-generation fighter aircraft, the multi-role transport aircraft also did not see the light of day. And when Russia offered that Glonass, the Russian global positioning system, be extended to military signals for Indian use, Delhi demurred. That deal was not signed either, although the Indian side promised to do so later.