Take it with a pinch of salt nevertheless interesting.
China's vulnerability in Malacca Strait
By Hari Sud
Column: Abroad ViewPublished: March 20, 2009
Toronto, ON, Canada, — The Strait of Malacca is where the Pacific Ocean meets the Indian Ocean. It is the route that China-bound oil shipments take. All India must do to prevent a Chinese invasion of its northeast or Kashmir is to block this route. With its naval build-up of the last 10 years, and especially its recently announced purchases, India could do this.
India has U.S.-made submarine hunter-killer planes – Boeing P-8s equipped with Harpoon missiles – one Russian and one Indian-made aircraft carrier, French Scorpene attack submarines and an Indian-built nuclear submarine with missiles reaching hundreds of miles. It can arm its Russian and Indian-made destroyers and frigates with Brahmos sea-denial missiles, and has shore-based naval attack capability. The Chinese could not cope with this formidable force.
Add to this India’s growing network-centric capability and the Chinese are completely outmaneuvered.
If China put together a large force to neutralize India at the western end of the Strait of Malacca, it would weaken its home naval defenses in the South China Sea. Hence, China will continue to posture and send its navy on Indian Ocean cruises – but a formidable opposition is already building.
Moving into the Indian Ocean prematurely was a wrong move on China’s part. It alerted India and prompted a defensive build-up to counter China’s advances. China’s recent deployment of naval destroyers in the Gulf of Aden on anti-piracy missions revealed its newly acquired naval capability. An incident concocted by the Chinese press, in which an Indian Kilo-class submarine allegedly confronted a Chinese Aegis-class ship in the Gulf of Somalia, indicated China’s deep concerns about the growing prowess of the Indian Navy.
All China’s moves in the Indian Ocean – such as acquiring Coco Island from Myanmar and building up Gawadar Naval base in Pakistan – have been to intimidate India. India got the message and has begun building up its own naval forces. Its naval base in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, gives India a big advantage.
China’s offensive naval capability away from home has grown exponentially with the acquisition of nuclear submarines. It is refitting a Russian and a homemade aircraft carrier, which may be ready in seven years. Surveillance capability from Coco Island off the Myanmar coast has also enhanced its effectiveness.
Chins has four Sovremenny-class destroyers purchased from the Russians and delivered in 2000 and 2006. These are its most potent warships. Originally designed by the Soviets to attack U.S. naval flotillas on the high seas, the Moskit anti-ship missile is a very potent weapon. But its limited range of 10 to 120 kilometers is lower than the Indian Brahmos sea-denial missile, with a range of 300 kilometers. Sovremenny-class ships also carry long- and short-range ship-to-shore missiles – effective if the Chinese get too close to Indian coastal bases.
China has launched its own “total weapons system” in its Aegis-equipped destroyers, developed from stolen and copied Russian technology to counter U.S. Aegis-class ships on Taiwan patrol duty. Its capability to launch long-range anti-aircraft missiles and sea surveillance is noteworthy, but how closely the Chinese copy resembles the original is unknown.
Most noteworthy in China’s naval arsenal is its fleet of submarines. In the last 10 years China has taken delivery of 12 Russian Kilo-class submarines. These, together with two new nuclear-powered submarines – the Jin class to carry ballistic missiles and Shang class attack submarines – are more potent than their ships. Nuclear ballistic missiles on board the Jin-class submarine are meant to intimidate the United States and Japan.
A large mix of these ships and submarines could travel to the Indian Ocean from China’s newly built naval dock facilities on Hainan Island and confront India or the United States.
The private intelligence agency Stratfor has concluded that by 2015 China will have two aircraft carriers – one Chinese and one Russian, but refitted by China – and two to four nuclear submarines. But China faces immense challenges in building these. Without outside help, their reliability and effectiveness are in doubt.
India’s naval expansion is not far behind. It is adding six conventional submarines from France and 33 other ships in the next five years. In addition, one or two nuclear submarines plus an aircraft carrier of Indian design and a refitted Russian one should be ready in the next two and eight years respectively.
Overall, India currently operates 134 ships, 16 submarines and two, possibly three aircraft carriers. Indian submarines are relatively modern. The French Scorpene submarines are stealth and independent propulsion and can stay under water for long periods. The nuclear submarines will carry 700-kilometer-range missiles.
One Indian nuclear submarine with its indigenous missile system is in the final phase of construction. If the Chinese position a nuclear submarine off the coast of India, the Indians can send their own nuclear submarine into position off the southern coast of China. This tit-for-tat deployment will deny China the advantage.
India’s destroyers and frigates are equipped with longer-range supersonic Brahmos missiles and carry Barak-1 anti-missile defense systems. Its aircraft carrier is presently equipped with Sea Harrier jump jets, but these will be replaced with highly lethal naval version MIG-29Ks. The newer aircraft carriers will have more advanced weapons and aircraft.
It is the Indian P-8s, the newly ordered surveillance and submarine hunter-killer planes, that are a force to reckon with. They can pick out a submarine hundreds of miles from Indian shores and “kill” it with Harpoon missiles. Add to this the shore-based defense network and the enemy will have no place to hide or get away.
In addition, India’s network-centric battlefield interconnectivity has greatly enhanced the navy’s reach. It is a strategic force multiplier. Its availability to any navy enhances the entire spectrum of management including diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, strategic deterrence, trade and commerce and security.
India made its first inroads into network-centric warfare immediately after the Kargil War of 1999. The United States is the leader in this new concept but India, with its vast software development capability, is not far behind. At the moment the Indian navy is just about network enabled and is moving progressively toward the network-centric concept. A huge software and hardware development effort is underway.
Also India’s newly constructed Kadamba naval base matches China’s newly built facility on Hainan Island. When completed, it will be a naval base, air force station and naval armament depot with long-range missile silos. It is a US$8 billion facility, the third in a series of integrated navy bases on the country’s east and west coasts. Kadamba will berth 42 ships, including aircraft carriers and submarines. It will repair and refit all navy ships and naval planes. It is a giant base with easy access to the Indian Ocean.
Hence, by 2015 India will have a formidable naval defense. Most of the Indian hardware has been built with outside help and is highly sophisticated, outclassing China-built hardware.
Therefore, a smaller but deadlier force is what China will face in the Indian Ocean. There is one wild card however – Pakistan, which could take advantage of India’s preoccupation with the Malacca Strait to gain mileage for its own strategic aims.
In short, nobody can say that China’s navy 10 years hence will be a pussycat. But in the Indian Ocean, China will face a much bigger challenge than it anticipated.
