Indian Army wants futuristic vehicle for its Armoured corps

[Mad Indian]

Why was the US RFI not acted upon, Was US short of money?

You know this RFI was not acted upon in usa how?

 

[ersakthivel]

You know this RFI was not acted upon in usa how?

When was the RFI issued, what is the present status?

 

[Khagesh]

"I can not say I agree or disagree with Gen Shankar Roychaudhary but what the RFI suggests is otherwise by using the word " Medium" ."

he says that the low armor, unsafe ammo storage- turret cooking T series has failed in every enocunter with heavt armor , safe ammo storage western heavy MBTs each time.
There is no need for you to either agree or not. The truth is plain for all to see.

Where is the confusion about agreeing?

Doesn't Roy choudry count among the "uniforms" who are vehemently being defended by YOU?

It is obvious that Gen Shankar Roychaudhary is an untouchable because he has supported Arjun. Such lame supporters this Chandigarh Gang has gathered around itself.

leo is going to be modernized. Do you seriously think germans will redesign it below 50 tons with cumbersome auto loader arrangement?

So if IA standardizes on Sarvantra bridge laying equippment which can easily load 70 tons the so called logistic problem is over. Railways have no difficulty in transporting arjun, Infact the photos here show even russian t series tanks having their tracks protruding from trains. So all this over wieght -unable to deploy fast is meanignleess.

Why would they. Germans have some of the best bridging and rivercrossing equipment. They have always been a visionary in land warfare. Even the Americans use their designed equipment Leguan bridging equipment on their latest and best Wolverine Bridging equipment.

Regarding the rest of the crap on ex servicemen not standing up for armed forces, was @Ray good enough for you? He had the same opinion about DRDO as me. What about @lemontree ? He quit the forum before you even entered here. He had the same opinion on DRDO. What about @Bhadra he is ex military too?

Wow reference to authority. Beta I was here when this thing came into town. Apparently IDF has kept the data well preserved.

And Ray had about 22000 posts. Stop trying to pretend that you got the import of every one of those.

And damn the protection. You first bring in facts. DRDO came out of IA labs/depots. Why could not IA have developed new labs/depots of the kind Indian Navy has. Is it because a General equivalent officer in IN cannot and does not run a bloody darbar culture an orderly culture. Had these Generals been serious about treating their own people fairly then they would have themselves stopped talking through 'reliable sources' and spoken of their requirements upfront.

Why do these people end up at DRDO doors for missiles. Because their forefathers in foreign lands treat them as step-sons.

Why cannot these Generals speak the truth about their own histories. What happened around those Thapars and Kauls. What happened when the same Arjun that was claimed to have failed 4 times in 1000 km went without failures later on. Was it merely because the DRDO had installed a Blackbox onto the Arjuns. And damn it Arjuns sport a western engine. How come this Chandigarh Gang has the faith in western technology in some cases but not so in other cases. Is DRDO untouchable for them?

 

[Mad Indian]

Why was the US RFI not acted upon, Was US short of money?

http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/threads/combat-aircraft-technology-and-evolution.47398/page-12

From post number 233 onwards you have the exact copy of conversation between me and Decklander in another forum minus the foul words!!!

Also my replies to p2p2 are there for all to see in tejas threads.

Jugde where I am wrong and inform me

this is the third or fourth time I am posting this link to you.

But every time you r bemoan the departure of p2p2 and decklander , i post this links ,you escape without offering any comments about these interactions!!!

Will you stop this? I never said anything about you did I? I was talking about p2p and decklander. Why do you take it as my attack on you? BTW, decklander was an arjun supporter in case you forgot. He was the one who first actually showed Arjun was indeed a superior tank to T90

 

[Mad Indian]

When was the RFI issued, what is the present status?

Yeah like they share the details of their strategic programs under work with anyone. Anyway, unless you guys are going to give links to DRDO having problems with this RFI, your arguments have no weight

 

[Sakal Gharelu Ustad]

Yeah like they share the details of their strategic programs under work with anyone. Anyway, unless you guys are going to give links to DRDO having problems with this RFI, your arguments have no weight

What makes you think that DRDO guys don't get kickbacks by not opposing ludicrous IA demands?

 

[Mad Indian]

Wow reference to authority. Beta I was here when this thing came into town. Apparently IDF has kept the data well preserved.

Reference to authority.lol. Do you even know what you speak? Reference to authority is a fallacy to invoke the authority of someone "unrelated" to the field as a source of information. For example, I am a doctor and an expert (authority) in medicine , more so than others. But if I invoke this as an authority to talk about defence matters, claiming that I am an expert in medicine, then it is reference to authority fallacy. But if I make claims about medicine saying that I am an expert in that field , then it is NOT reference to authority fallacy.

And I was replying to your claim that exarmy members don't stick up for the army - by giving you examples of army members why did in fact stick up for the army against DRDO. Did you forget that you made that point in your original reply :biggrin2:?

 

[Mad Indian]

What makes you think that DRDO guys don't get kickbacks by not opposing ludicrous IA demands?

Edit: OK now I understand. Yeah that might also be possible- bribe DRDO to delay the projects so that IA buys from foreign vendors. But seriously I think pathetic work culture if DRDO is probably the most important the reason for delays. Every person I have known in internet who has seen it work has the same view on it so is my friend of a friend who actually works there.

And shortage of funds is the biggest lie anyone can throw around. I have not come across a single complaint from DRDO that there is shortage of funds- because there is none.

 

[Khagesh]

Theset of staements above is your personal opinion. new developments in armor will always increase protection. But to avail we need heavier tanks which can support enough space and weight for longer LOS thickness for crew protection.

40 ton tanks are noway fit to accomodate these future upgraded armor tech in any useful LOS armor length combo.

Hence in my view, mobility of mechanised forces must be the prime consideration.

It is not for nothing that Al Khalid is of only 46 tons which is going to be MBT of Pakistan ?"

"Pak has got 46 ton Al Khalid, because they have nothing in their bank account and forced to import these-chinese-soviet prehistoric junk"

Do you want the DGMF to float a global tender to design another space age era junk exactly like Al khalid?

The Chinese tanks are balooning in weight too (Type 99A2 is 54 tonnes). Soon Pakis would be impoverished out of the tank markets also (like aircarfts in last 20 years).

The chinese have recently unveiled their own 60 cal tank gun. Russians have forever been talking about mating a 155 gun to their tanks. Rhinemetal has its own 140 mm tank gun. Accuracy of American Fire Controls is increasing at much greater ranges. ATGMs are gaining in. The triple charges are being developed. All these systems will force the overall weight upwards, in any case. These larger guns may not be deployable today but they clearly demonstrate how the opponent is going to come prepared.

And our DGMF like in the earlier times (during migration from 105 mm to 120 mm) would again be a laggard. And why because they had agreed to finance the research in some other country keeping Indian R&D in the dump.

 

[Bhadra]

@Bhadra, your problem is that you identify yourself with the DGMF office.

TRAHI MAM .. TRAHI MAM

अयं निजः परः वा इति गणना लघुचेतसाम् ।
उदारचरितानां तु वसुधा एव कुटुंबकम् ॥

ayaM nijaH paraH vA iti gaNanA laghuchetasAm |
udAracharitAnAM tu vasudhA eva kuTuMbakam ||

This one is of my group, the other is an outsider: such is the thought of people with petty mind. For people who are magnanimous and broadminded, the whole world is a family.

------------------------------------------------------

Your problem is that you do not read posts properly.. before reading or while reading your mind starts working on answers which the quick mind may not give logically.. rather than trying to understand the thread / post.. contemplation is far from you. you must learn it even in old age..

I have twice made an open declaration - That I have never ever worked in the office of DGMF..

And most importantly, I am not a tank man - tank soldier or Mud Corps man ..

But nevertheless , I understand Tanks well as good as any soldier should understand ( not a scientist probably) and am sanguinely interested in in their military employment / value.

I am the one who always opposed the value of tank itself in many forums here and the senior members of the DFI may recall that.

But today I am forced to defend DGMF for his RFI due to my sheer convictions and logic of it.. and the illogical ways some fan boys are jumping over it left and right, up and down using absolutely foul language and making me wonder if at all they are educated leave aside they being scientists.

Namste..

 

[Bhadra]

what do you care about sir.
I am just DRDO employee posting from the office

Sir/ Madame,
All DODOs post from office only because, I think, they have no work.. When I visited DRDO labs at so many places, I found their scientist on internet only in the name of scientific research.. chatting with non scientist like me..

Secondly free ka maal.... you do not have to foot the bill.

That is why you remain absent on Saturday and Sundays on DFI forum... but even then at home you must be having govt paid internet / phone... but their your wife / husband or children must not be allowing you to harass me..

Keep entertaining all of us .. for me, I enjoy your one liners..

Do not reply unless it becomes a chatting thread ..
No time for smilies .. so I press Post Reply... Ha Ha Ha ha Ha ah ah aha...

Oh yah ! you said get married ... you mean to say to you !

I am so scared of those one liners.. you must be adapt in Indian "Sutra Vangamaya" .... like Pantanjali yoga Sutra where in every sutra can be a book. So I do not want to live with sutras ( Formulas to be very crude) !!

 

[Bhadra]

The very fact that DRDO has not leaked it's displeasure of the RFI in the media, speaks volumes in itself.

Have not heard from journalists, supposedly close to DRDO speak about the RFI.

Sir, it has been done sufficiently...
Rahul Bhonsale and Ajay Shukla are not mouthpieces then who... and many others ?? Some of them quoted by me..

Let me tell you sir, I having been reading them and have nothing against them.. per say..

But a healthy debate is what is required.. if they can put across their point of view so do others like me. I amy not be privy to information as much as they do but I a have a right to reply.

 

[Bhadra]

It is obvious that Gen Shankar Roychaudhary is an untouchable because he has supported Arjun. Such lame supporters this Chandigarh Gang has gathered around itself.



Why would they. Germans have some of the best bridging and rivercrossing equipment. They have always been a visionary in land warfare. Even the Americans use their designed equipment Leguan bridging equipment on their latest and best Wolverine Bridging equipment.





Wow reference to authority. Beta I was here when this thing came into town. Apparently IDF has kept the data well preserved.

And Ray had about 22000 posts. Stop trying to pretend that you got the import of every one of those.

And damn the protection. You first bring in facts. DRDO came out of IA labs/depots. Why could not IA have developed new labs/depots of the kind Indian Navy has. Is it because a General equivalent officer in IN cannot and does not run a bloody darbar culture an orderly culture. Had these Generals been serious about treating their own people fairly then they would have themselves stopped talking through 'reliable sources' and spoken of their requirements upfront.

Why do these people end up at DRDO doors for missiles. Because their forefathers in foreign lands treat them as step-sons.

Why cannot these Generals speak the truth about their own histories. What happened around those Thapars and Kauls. What happened when the same Arjun that was claimed to have failed 4 times in 1000 km went without failures later on. Was it merely because the DRDO had installed a Blackbox onto the Arjuns. And damn it Arjuns sport a western engine. How come this Chandigarh Gang has the faith in western technology in some cases but not so in other cases. Is DRDO untouchable for them?

MOD Edit: Sir, please write in English so that all members can understand and no personal attacks.

 

[sob]

@Khagesh and @Bhadra let us steer clear of Hindi words and keep it civil.

Please no sweeping comments on the Armed Forces will be allowed. There are rotten apples in every sphere of society, but wild allegations will not be allowed against the Armed Forces.

 

[Bhadra]

@Khagesh and @Bhadra let us steer clear of Hindi words and keep it civil.

Please no sweeping comments on the Armed Forces will be allowed. There are rotten apples in every sphere of society, but wild allegations will not be allowed against the Armed Forces.

But I wrote to him in Sanskrit !!

 

[Khagesh]

Ok guys,

I think I will lay off the attacks.

Apparently Canary Trap the web site of Retd. Col. RSN Singh is a dead link now. This implies that Retd. Col. RSN Singh or whoever he works for do not want that data and allegations to remain there. This can have only two black and white implications and one grey zone implication:
1) Sab mile hue hai (allow me this much Hindi). But this is too Kejriwal for my constitution.
2) The relevant people have things under their control. I have no self-doubt issues, so this is what I pick.
3) The grey zone possibility is that the Jedi Council and Dark Forces are fighting and the Jedi fighters do not need support. That too is good enough for me so long as both these sides keep in mind that this is my country.

So guys, it is time to wind up the show, for me at least.

@Bhadra @Mad Indian
dif tor heh smusma

 

[ersakthivel]

What makes you think that DRDO guys don't get kickbacks by not opposing ludicrous IA demands?

Just read what extend our pride of the nation defence forces can go to scuttle indigenous efforts.

This is from CAG report, no fiction.

ABSENCE OF LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
_______________________________


The most significant setback to production of MBT Arjun was the change in requirements put forth by the Army in February 2007. The tanks produced by HVF, Avadi were to be issued to the Army after inspection at the factory site in the Joint Receipt Inspection by the representatives of HVF, DRDO and Army.

The issued tanks were put through two trials - the Field Trial and the Accelerated usage-cum-reliability trials (AUCRT), by the Army. Joint Receipt Inspection was conducted (March 2005) for first five MBT Arjun manufactured (2003-04) in the pilot phase, one year after production.

The inspection of the second lot of nine pilot MBT Arjun, took place in February 2007, two years after production. By 2007, 53 MBT had already been produced by HVF, Avadi.

It was during this inspection in February 2007 that Army reported water ingress in the fighting compartment of tank while crossing shallow parts of a river and raised two additional requirements in the design of the MBT Arjun viz. zero level ingress of water in the fighting compartment and lead time for fording (time from tank’s entry into water to exit from water) to be minimised to 30 minutes.

We noticed that the corresponding benchmark fixed by the Army for T-90 tank was more relaxed, allowing 2.5 litres of water ingress. The requirement of zero level water ingress for medium fording was not stipulated in the Army’s requirements (GSQR of 1985) or in subsequent stages of development which had seen many changes in design.

In fact, the Joint Action Plan (of Army and DRDO), in August 1999, had cleared the medium fording capability of MBT Arjun. This issue was also not raised in the Joint Receipt Inspection of the first batch of pilot MBT Arjun. The new requirements necessitated the DRDO to modify the design of the second lot of nine pilot MBT Arjun.

The same got modified and were issued to Army by September 2007. The first lot of five pilot tanks was brought back from Army, got modified and issued to Army till October 2007. Balance 39 tanks of the bulk production were dismantled, reworked and issued to the Army in 2008-10. The whole task of dismantling and reassembly of 53 MBTs entailed an additional cost of Rs 84 lakh.

The Ministry stated (May 2014) that modifications were considered essential to improve overall performance from user’s perspective. The reply undermines the impact of the modifications in derailing the production and issue of MBT Arjun, which was a significant factor that led to an import of T-90 tanks that cost Rs 4,913 crore in November 2007 as discussed in Paragraph 8.3.4. The reply also does not address why the benchmarks on MBT Arjun regarding water ingress and fording, were more stringent than the corresponding requirements on T-90 tank.

Medium fording was one of the eight instances we noticed, where Army placed benchmark of parameters on MBT Arjun which were more stringent in comparison to those placed on T-90 tanks. These are detailed in Annexure XIX. We could not assess the impact of these benchmarks on the performance of the two tanks from our scrutiny of the Report on comparative trials of MBT Arjun and T-90 tank (February/ March 2010- referred to in Paragraph 8.3.2.8 ).

While we appreciate the Army’s quest for improving the quality of MBT Arjun, the imposition of more stringent parameters precluded a level playing field and more importantly, the inability to freeze the designs led to several changes in design, consequent delays in acceptance of MBT Arjun by the Army and in the overall, the production and issue of MBT Arjun.

___________________________

IMPACT OF 'EVOLVING' GSQRs
___________________________


Changes in design

Mention was made in Report No. 3 of 2006 of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India about the frequent changes in design leading to delay in development of MBT Arjun. The development of MBT prototype was to be completed by April 1982 but after going through several modifications in design, the prototype was cleared by the Army in 1998.

Given this concern on several changes in design, the Scientific Advisor to the Raksha Mantri had confirmed (2004) in a note to the Ministry that the design for MBT stood frozen.

This was, however, not the case. We found that 316 amendments to design of various assemblies were carried out even after freezing of the design and up to August 2010.

The changes were mostly justified by the Ministry in its reply (May 2014) as necessitated for product improvement and modifications based on user’s feedback on quality problems.

The reply does not take cognizance of the fact that even after clearing the production after acceptance of the prototype (1998), the designs continued to be re-worked for 12 years thereafter and frozen only in 2010.

_________________________________

ARJUN - T-90 COMPARATIVE TRIALS
_________________________________


Comparative field trials of MBT Arjun with T-90 tanks took place in February/ March 2010. Till such time, the Army had been consistently reporting quality problems in MBT Arjun; this was also reported to the Standing Committee on Defence (2007-08). The comparative trials were on four parameters viz. fire power, survivability, reliability and miscellaneous issues of the tank with weightage of 40, 35, 15 and 10 respectively.

As per the trial report, MBT Arjun performed marginally better than the T-90 tank in accuracy and consistency of firepower. However, T-90 tank performed better in lethality and missile firing capability. The Army concluded (April 2010) that “Arjun had performed creditably and it could be employed both for offensive and defensive tasks with same efficacy of T-90 tank.” The Army also recommended upgrades to make the Arjun tank a superior weapon platform. We were informed (February 2014) that the Mark-II version of MBT Arjun was under trials by the Army and that it would include the upgrades recommended by the Army.

We found that the MBT Arjun and T-90 tank were not exactly comparable in missile firing ability; the higher score of T-90 tank was mainly due to missile firing ability which was not in the design of MBT Arjun. Barring missile firing ability, the scores of MBT Arjun and T-90 tank would be 25.77 and 24.50 respectively in firepower. In the overall comparative score, T-90 tank scored 75.01, marginally higher than MBT Arjun which scored 72.46, mainly because of higher score on missile firing ability of T-90 tank.

__________________

T-90 PRODUCTION
__________________


The Russian Firm, M/s Rosoboronexport (ROE) was expected to transfer the design details in the Transfer-of-Technology (ToT) documents by March 2003. The documents were in Russian; the Army/Ordnance Factories’ efforts to get translated documents from ROE, failed. The documents were received between September 2001 and January 2003 following which HVF, Avadi concluded four contracts between September 2003 and September 2006 for translation of the documents. The translation was completed by July 2007 after the expiry of scheduled delivery period of first batch of 50 indigenous tanks by 2006-07. In all, the translation of ToT documents took almost six years.

The Ministry stated (May 2014) that translation of critical documents for indigenous manufacturing was carried out with available resource of Russian translators at HVF and there was no delay in production due to pending translation. The reply is not acceptable because delay in translation of ToT documents had certainly impacted on the indigenous production of T-90 tanks as production could not commence without the availability of translated documents.

Non-receipt of design documents for critical assemblies

We found that ToT documents in respect of some critical assemblies were not transferred by the Russian manufacturer, ROE, even after lapse of 12 years as of July 2013. An important component was the gun system (including barrel) for which the design had not been received as of May 2014. In fact, the Ministry cited this issue as the main reason for slippage in indigenous production of T-90 tank.

________________________________

QUALITY PROBLEMS WITH THE T-90
________________________________

During March 2010 to November 2013, HVF received 45 defect reports (DRs) from the Army relating to minor and major defects in the indigenous T-90 tanks. The defects mainly pertained to failure of gear box and defects in auto/electrical portion of the tanks. A Working Group was proposed (March 2012) to address these deficiencies which was not formed. The HVF, Avadi constituted (November 2004) a Failure Review Board (FRB) at factory level to investigate the reasons for defects at the users end. The FRB discussed (September 2013) the major failures and recommended remedial measures.

Accordingly, HVF implemented:

• a process audit to eliminate non-conformances in assembling process;
• introduction of 100 per cent pre-fitment and component level inspection and additional quality assurance checks at local supplier’s premises;
• extensive trials of samples supplied by the local firms after introducing improvements and before their induction into regular production; and
• deputing of HVF’s teams to field locations to ensure technical and maintenance support to the users.

Ministry told us that the FRB was a quality tool which facilitated timely action on defects. The delay in discussion of the FRB (September 2013), even when
the Army was raising quality concerns since March 2010, was not however, commented upon by the Ministry.

___________________

PRODUCTION RATE
___________________

Arjun:

The Public Accounts Committee had urged (December 2003) the Ministry to utilize the infrastructural facilities optimally so that the desired volume of production of MBT Arjun would enable increase of the indigenous content to 55 per cent. The Ministry assured the Committee that a production level, initially of 300 MBT Arjun to be raised to 500 tank later, would reduce the import content to under 30 per cent.

However, barring the initial indent of 124 tanks, the Board did not receive any further indents for MBT Arjun. Production has come to standstill since 2009-10 and to that extent, capacity created at a cost of Rs 87 crore for annual production of 30 MBT Arjun awaits utilization against Ministry’s decision for fresh orders. Meanwhile, HVF, Avadi holds idle inventory of Rs 128 crore reflected as “Work-in-progress”, which remains unutilised in the absence of fresh orders. The cost per MBT Arjun was Rs 21 crore (2009-10), against which the import content was Rs 13 crore. This brings the level of indigenisation in MBT Arjun to 38 per cent only. The initial development project on MBT Arjun had envisaged that barring the engine, all components/assemblies would be indigenously produced. Problems in sourcing major assemblies other than engines have been discussed in Paragraph 8.3.2.6.

T-90:

The production of T-90 tank at HVF, Avadi was short of the indent of November 2004 for 300 tanks, by 75 tanks as of March 2013. Even as the production was underway against the first indent, the Army placed a second indent for 236 T-90 tanks in December 2013. Meanwhile, the Ministry sanctioned (September 2011) Rs 971 crore for capacity augmentation of T-90 tank production by March 2014. This was expected to raise the capacity of Ordnance Factories from 100 per cent to 140 per cent of T-90 tanks.

It is noteworthy that Rs 96 crore was sanctioned (February 2004) for creating production capacity for 100 T-90 tanks, whereas augmentation of capacity from 100 to 140 tanks is slated for Rs 971 crore, a ten times increase in estimation over a period of seven years. Reasons for the extraordinary increase were not provided by the Ministry, in its response of May 2014. As of March 2014, only an amount of Rs 17 crore had been spent on the augmentation project and in the revised schedule, the project is expected to be completed in December 2016. The Board appears to have put the augmentation plan on a slow track as of now.

You can expect the same treatment for any DRDO entry into FRCV.

 

[ersakthivel]

Sir, it has been done sufficiently...
Rahul Bhonsale and Ajay Shukla are not mouthpieces then who... and many others ?? Some of them quoted by me..

Let me tell you sir, I having been reading them and have nothing against them.. per say..

But a healthy debate is what is required.. if they can put across their point of view so do others like me. I amy not be privy to information as much as they do but I a have a right to reply.

Since you are a great fan of CAG report, yo can read the CAG report on how army's never ending GSQR revisions and step motherly comparitive trials of T-90 and Arjun hampered the induction of Arjun and facilitated the fully faulty T-90 imports worth billions of dollars in my post no-637 just above this post.

And IA will exactly repeat the same with RFI for FRCV, there are no doubts about that.When they foul up simple comparitive trials of Arjun and T-90 how would they fairly compared FRCV contestants?

 

[Mad Indian]

Just read what extend our pride of the nation defence forces can go to scuttle indigenous efforts.

This is from CAG report, no fiction.

ABSENCE OF LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
_______________________________


The most significant setback to production of MBT Arjun was the change in requirements put forth by the Army in February 2007. The tanks produced by HVF, Avadi were to be issued to the Army after inspection at the factory site in the Joint Receipt Inspection by the representatives of HVF, DRDO and Army.

The issued tanks were put through two trials - the Field Trial and the Accelerated usage-cum-reliability trials (AUCRT), by the Army. Joint Receipt Inspection was conducted (March 2005) for first five MBT Arjun manufactured (2003-04) in the pilot phase, one year after production.

The inspection of the second lot of nine pilot MBT Arjun, took place in February 2007, two years after production. By 2007, 53 MBT had already been produced by HVF, Avadi.

It was during this inspection in February 2007 that Army reported water ingress in the fighting compartment of tank while crossing shallow parts of a river and raised two additional requirements in the design of the MBT Arjun viz. zero level ingress of water in the fighting compartment and lead time for fording (time from tank’s entry into water to exit from water) to be minimised to 30 minutes.

We noticed that the corresponding benchmark fixed by the Army for T-90 tank was more relaxed, allowing 2.5 litres of water ingress. The requirement of zero level water ingress for medium fording was not stipulated in the Army’s requirements (GSQR of 1985) or in subsequent stages of development which had seen many changes in design.

In fact, the Joint Action Plan (of Army and DRDO), in August 1999, had cleared the medium fording capability of MBT Arjun. This issue was also not raised in the Joint Receipt Inspection of the first batch of pilot MBT Arjun. The new requirements necessitated the DRDO to modify the design of the second lot of nine pilot MBT Arjun.

The same got modified and were issued to Army by September 2007. The first lot of five pilot tanks was brought back from Army, got modified and issued to Army till October 2007. Balance 39 tanks of the bulk production were dismantled, reworked and issued to the Army in 2008-10. The whole task of dismantling and reassembly of 53 MBTs entailed an additional cost of Rs 84 lakh.

The Ministry stated (May 2014) that modifications were considered essential to improve overall performance from user’s perspective. The reply undermines the impact of the modifications in derailing the production and issue of MBT Arjun, which was a significant factor that led to an import of T-90 tanks that cost Rs 4,913 crore in November 2007 as discussed in Paragraph 8.3.4. The reply also does not address why the benchmarks on MBT Arjun regarding water ingress and fording, were more stringent than the corresponding requirements on T-90 tank.

Medium fording was one of the eight instances we noticed, where Army placed benchmark of parameters on MBT Arjun which were more stringent in comparison to those placed on T-90 tanks. These are detailed in Annexure XIX. We could not assess the impact of these benchmarks on the performance of the two tanks from our scrutiny of the Report on comparative trials of MBT Arjun and T-90 tank (February/ March 2010- referred to in Paragraph 8.3.2.8 ).

While we appreciate the Army’s quest for improving the quality of MBT Arjun, the imposition of more stringent parameters precluded a level playing field and more importantly, the inability to freeze the designs led to several changes in design, consequent delays in acceptance of MBT Arjun by the Army and in the overall, the production and issue of MBT Arjun.

___________________________

IMPACT OF 'EVOLVING' GSQRs
___________________________


Changes in design

Mention was made in Report No. 3 of 2006 of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India about the frequent changes in design leading to delay in development of MBT Arjun. The development of MBT prototype was to be completed by April 1982 but after going through several modifications in design, the prototype was cleared by the Army in 1998.

Given this concern on several changes in design, the Scientific Advisor to the Raksha Mantri had confirmed (2004) in a note to the Ministry that the design for MBT stood frozen.

This was, however, not the case. We found that 316 amendments to design of various assemblies were carried out even after freezing of the design and up to August 2010.

The changes were mostly justified by the Ministry in its reply (May 2014) as necessitated for product improvement and modifications based on user’s feedback on quality problems.

The reply does not take cognizance of the fact that even after clearing the production after acceptance of the prototype (1998), the designs continued to be re-worked for 12 years thereafter and frozen only in 2010.

_________________________________

ARJUN - T-90 COMPARATIVE TRIALS
_________________________________


Comparative field trials of MBT Arjun with T-90 tanks took place in February/ March 2010. Till such time, the Army had been consistently reporting quality problems in MBT Arjun; this was also reported to the Standing Committee on Defence (2007-08). The comparative trials were on four parameters viz. fire power, survivability, reliability and miscellaneous issues of the tank with weightage of 40, 35, 15 and 10 respectively.

As per the trial report, MBT Arjun performed marginally better than the T-90 tank in accuracy and consistency of firepower. However, T-90 tank performed better in lethality and missile firing capability. The Army concluded (April 2010) that “Arjun had performed creditably and it could be employed both for offensive and defensive tasks with same efficacy of T-90 tank.” The Army also recommended upgrades to make the Arjun tank a superior weapon platform. We were informed (February 2014) that the Mark-II version of MBT Arjun was under trials by the Army and that it would include the upgrades recommended by the Army.

We found that the MBT Arjun and T-90 tank were not exactly comparable in missile firing ability; the higher score of T-90 tank was mainly due to missile firing ability which was not in the design of MBT Arjun. Barring missile firing ability, the scores of MBT Arjun and T-90 tank would be 25.77 and 24.50 respectively in firepower. In the overall comparative score, T-90 tank scored 75.01, marginally higher than MBT Arjun which scored 72.46, mainly because of higher score on missile firing ability of T-90 tank.

__________________

T-90 PRODUCTION
__________________


The Russian Firm, M/s Rosoboronexport (ROE) was expected to transfer the design details in the Transfer-of-Technology (ToT) documents by March 2003. The documents were in Russian; the Army/Ordnance Factories’ efforts to get translated documents from ROE, failed. The documents were received between September 2001 and January 2003 following which HVF, Avadi concluded four contracts between September 2003 and September 2006 for translation of the documents. The translation was completed by July 2007 after the expiry of scheduled delivery period of first batch of 50 indigenous tanks by 2006-07. In all, the translation of ToT documents took almost six years.

The Ministry stated (May 2014) that translation of critical documents for indigenous manufacturing was carried out with available resource of Russian translators at HVF and there was no delay in production due to pending translation. The reply is not acceptable because delay in translation of ToT documents had certainly impacted on the indigenous production of T-90 tanks as production could not commence without the availability of translated documents.

Non-receipt of design documents for critical assemblies

We found that ToT documents in respect of some critical assemblies were not transferred by the Russian manufacturer, ROE, even after lapse of 12 years as of July 2013. An important component was the gun system (including barrel) for which the design had not been received as of May 2014. In fact, the Ministry cited this issue as the main reason for slippage in indigenous production of T-90 tank.

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QUALITY PROBLEMS WITH THE T-90
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During March 2010 to November 2013, HVF received 45 defect reports (DRs) from the Army relating to minor and major defects in the indigenous T-90 tanks. The defects mainly pertained to failure of gear box and defects in auto/electrical portion of the tanks. A Working Group was proposed (March 2012) to address these deficiencies which was not formed. The HVF, Avadi constituted (November 2004) a Failure Review Board (FRB) at factory level to investigate the reasons for defects at the users end. The FRB discussed (September 2013) the major failures and recommended remedial measures.

Accordingly, HVF implemented:

• a process audit to eliminate non-conformances in assembling process;
• introduction of 100 per cent pre-fitment and component level inspection and additional quality assurance checks at local supplier’s premises;
• extensive trials of samples supplied by the local firms after introducing improvements and before their induction into regular production; and
• deputing of HVF’s teams to field locations to ensure technical and maintenance support to the users.

Ministry told us that the FRB was a quality tool which facilitated timely action on defects. The delay in discussion of the FRB (September 2013), even when
the Army was raising quality concerns since March 2010, was not however, commented upon by the Ministry.

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PRODUCTION RATE
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Arjun:

The Public Accounts Committee had urged (December 2003) the Ministry to utilize the infrastructural facilities optimally so that the desired volume of production of MBT Arjun would enable increase of the indigenous content to 55 per cent. The Ministry assured the Committee that a production level, initially of 300 MBT Arjun to be raised to 500 tank later, would reduce the import content to under 30 per cent.

However, barring the initial indent of 124 tanks, the Board did not receive any further indents for MBT Arjun. Production has come to standstill since 2009-10 and to that extent, capacity created at a cost of Rs 87 crore for annual production of 30 MBT Arjun awaits utilization against Ministry’s decision for fresh orders. Meanwhile, HVF, Avadi holds idle inventory of Rs 128 crore reflected as “Work-in-progress”, which remains unutilised in the absence of fresh orders. The cost per MBT Arjun was Rs 21 crore (2009-10), against which the import content was Rs 13 crore. This brings the level of indigenisation in MBT Arjun to 38 per cent only. The initial development project on MBT Arjun had envisaged that barring the engine, all components/assemblies would be indigenously produced. Problems in sourcing major assemblies other than engines have been discussed in Paragraph 8.3.2.6.

T-90:

The production of T-90 tank at HVF, Avadi was short of the indent of November 2004 for 300 tanks, by 75 tanks as of March 2013. Even as the production was underway against the first indent, the Army placed a second indent for 236 T-90 tanks in December 2013. Meanwhile, the Ministry sanctioned (September 2011) Rs 971 crore for capacity augmentation of T-90 tank production by March 2014. This was expected to raise the capacity of Ordnance Factories from 100 per cent to 140 per cent of T-90 tanks.

It is noteworthy that Rs 96 crore was sanctioned (February 2004) for creating production capacity for 100 T-90 tanks, whereas augmentation of capacity from 100 to 140 tanks is slated for Rs 971 crore, a ten times increase in estimation over a period of seven years. Reasons for the extraordinary increase were not provided by the Ministry, in its response of May 2014. As of March 2014, only an amount of Rs 17 crore had been spent on the augmentation project and in the revised schedule, the project is expected to be completed in December 2016. The Board appears to have put the augmentation plan on a slow track as of now.

You can expect the same treatment for any DRDO entry into FRCV.

What action has the modi govt initiated so far ? People responsible for killing Arjun unfairly (if that indeed is the case) should be tried for treason and should be put to death.

And that said, again this does not mean this RFI is shit. Punishing members for improper treatment of Arjun will prevent the repeat of the problems caused during Arjun induction.

 

[Bhadra]

@ersakthivel

Do you expected GSQR given in 1973 to reamin vali in 2000 or 2007 or 2015...

If your logic is than stopping peddling propaganda

About Competitive trails. These trails were carried out only on three selected parameters with varying degrees of score on each parameter.

Tanks have thousands of Parameters. Do not make fools us on that CAG page which you have quoted 100 of times. That is why I call this propaganda.

And lastly, I will not say that the authorities who conducted trails were paid by DODOs as I have no authentication for it and I can not resort to DODO tactics.