a fine article, a bit old but must read.
Paper no. 2061/14.12.2006
INDIA’S FINEST HOUR – DECEMBER 16 1971: LESSONS FOR INDIA’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
By
Dr. Subhash Kapila
Introduction – Pakistan’s “Unconditional Surrender” at Dhaka
In India’s post-Independence political and military history, December 16, 1971 was India’s finest hour. In a swift fourteen day military offensive against East Pakistan, the Indian Armed forces forced an “unconditional surrender” of the 93,000 strong Pakistan Army garrison in East Pakistan.
This total military victory of the Indian Army over the Pakistan Army was made possible by a direct synergy between India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the Army Chief, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, Air Chief Marshal PC Lal and the Naval Chief.
The strategic aim and military requirements of the Indian Army were allowed to prevail by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi over political preferences. This enabled the Indian Armed Forces to execute operations with boldness and audacity. The result was a spectacular success.
The Indian Armed Forces drew many lessons from this military campaign and revised their strategic doctrines.
However, on the 25th Anniversary of this historic event, what is worrisome is that certain weaknesses in India’s political leadership have kept surfacing as a persistent trend since 1947. India’s political leadership, irrespective of their political hues has yet to ignite a strategic mindset in their approaches to national security management.
India’s security environment is as troubled, if not more as it was in 1971. As in 1971, the United States and China are not inclined to restrain Pakistan for their respective strategic ends. Likewise, despite all the rhetoric of the Pakistani President, an emboldened Pakistan persists in its proxy war against India.
Against such a backdrop, this paper has selected to highlight the following issues which India’s political leadership must pay heed to:
* National Security Challenges to India’s Security Need to be Met Squarely and Boldly.
* India’s War Preparedness as a Strategic Imperative is a Constant Irrespective of the Regional Political Climate.
* India’s Political Leaders Must Develop Strong Reflexes and Audacity in Handling National Security Challenges
* India Must Resist Major Powers Pressures on National Security Issues
* India’s Fruits of Hard Won Military Victories Must Not be Frittered Away by India’s Political Leadership on the Negotiating Table or for Political Reasons
* India’s Political Leadership Must Recognize that India Has to “Stand Alone” to Protect Her National Security Interests.
National Security Challenges to India’s Security Need to be Met Squarely and Boldly
In 1971, India tried its utmost to find political and diplomatic solutions to the challenges posed by Pakistan. Pakistan was militarily emboldened by the support it got from the United States and China.
After Prime Minister Indira Gandhi went around the world capitals and particularly USA, she realized that no support was forthcoming for India from any quarter. It was then she realized that India was left with no other option than the military option. The Indian Armed forces were given the freedom of military action by her without any caveats attached. The results are there for all to see. The Indian Armed Forces delivered on the political faith and implicit trust reposed in them.
Today India faces similar problems from Pakistan and the scenarios are similar. Yet India’s political leadership dithers in meeting Pakistan’s provocative proxy war headlong. Every Pakistan based terrorist bombing is met with the standard feeble response of Manmohan Singh Government that terrorist bombings will not be allowed to derail the peace process with Pakistan.
Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister never advanced such feeble responses. In response to repeated provocations by Pakistan she gave the Indian Armed Forces full freedom of military action including permitting the Indian Army to enlarge the strategic aim of capturing the whole of Bangladesh as opposed to her initial political aim of capturing only Khulna and Chittagong to facilitate establishment of a Bangladesh Government- in- exile on Bangla soil.
It must also be remembered that India’s military offensive to liberate Bangladesh was mounted in defiance of United States and China’s direct military and political pressures.
India’s War Preparedness as a Strategic Imperative is a Constant Irrespective of the Regional Political Climate
India paid a heavy price when a military debacle was imposed on the Indian Armed Forces in the 1962 Sino-Indian War due to neglect of national security and war preparedness for long years by Prime Minister Nehru. It was based on a gross misreading by Nehru of the regional political climate and China’s intentions.
In March 1971, if the Indian Army had given in to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s initial pressures for early military operations, the results would have been a fiasco as the war preparedness of the Indian Armed Forces had gone down in the preceding period due to paucity of defence allocations.
The Army insisted on a six months time span to build up their military inventories to sustain their planned military operations. The results were stupendous.
The Kargil War 1999 with Pakistan highlights the imperatives of constant war preparedness as in today’s security environment, wars can occur without much warning and with short or no preparation times.
When Kargil War broke out, the inventories of the Indian Army were once again very low as in the 1990s during Dr. Manmohan Singh’s tenures as Finance Minister, the annual Defence Budget allocations stood constantly limited. But for the magnificent help of Israel which airlifted India’s military requirements as the War broke out, India would have not achieved success. Further, if the war had enlarged to a modern conventional war across the International Border, India’s military operations would have stood curtailed.
It is imperative that India’s political leadership at the highest levels ensures that military inventories are always to the full strength and India’s strategic reserves in terms of ammunition, petrol, diesel and spare parts are not depleted.
In 2006, the picture of indifference to this vital aspect of India’s war preparedness persists. Today India is not short of financial resources for her war preparedness or in terms of defence acquisition options. Yet the Indian Air Force today is short of 146 combat fighter planes seriously affecting the operational effectiveness of India's air power. The Indian Air Force Chief has cautioned the Government on many occasions.
The laxity lies in the politicization of India’s major defence equipment acquisitions ignoring the imperatives of national security. In war preparedness time is not a luxury which can be afforded.
India’s Political Leaders Must Develop Strong Reflexes and Audacity in Handling National Security Challenges
The Bangladesh War in 1971 was a classic example where the political leadership of the day was not found wanting in matching the boldness and audacity of the Indian Armed Forces. Earlier in 1965, it was Prime Minister Shastri who displayed political boldness in acceding to the Army’s request to cross the International Border for military operations against Pakistan.
Today the biggest challenge to India’s national security is the unrestrained Pakistan’s war of terrorism and the subversion of the fringe elements of the Indian Muslim community for their cause.
India’s counter-terrorism responses are feeble, infirm and apologetic. This arises from India’s political leadership lacking strong reflexes and audacity to meet headlong this challenge. This in turn arises not only from a lack of strategic culture in the political class but also because the counter-terrorism war is being determined by minority vote bank considerations rather than national security considerations.
If India aspires to be a global power, it cannot do so until its political leadership is ready for pre-emptive strikes, military interventions in the region where its security interests are threatened and a “political will” to use the tremendous power of the Indian Armed Forces.
India Must Resist Major Powers Pressures on National Security Issues
Following December 16, 1971, the Indian Army moved its 2 Corps and other formations to the Western Sector against Pakistan, Militarily; it was an opportune moment for India to carry the 1971 War to its logical conclusion, namely the destruction of the Pakistani military machine in West Pakistan.
Alarmed by the above, the United States put up unbearable pressure on Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to desist from any Indian military offensive against West Pakistan. India gave in to the pressures.
In the Kargil War, India again gave in to United States pressure to order a three-day ceasefire to enable to Pakistan Army to withdraw to the LAC. In the process the Pakistan Army mined these routes which India had to traverse at grave personnel costs to reach her positions on the LAC.
During OP PRAKARM, similar United States pressures prevented India from carrying its coercive war to its logical conclusion.
Presently, India’s strong counter-terrorism responses against Pakistan are being limited by extreme US pressures on the Manmohan Singh Government not to endanger General Musharraf’s rule in Pakistan.
India in this regard must learn lesions from the Chinese leaders. China in 1950 when it still had to consolidate the Communist regime, militarily challenged the United States in the Korean Peninsula. It needs to be noted that the United States was the sole nuclear weapons power when China challenged it.
India’s Fruits of Hard-Won Military Victories Must Not be Frittered Away on the Negotiating Table or for Political Reasons
India’s political leadership ever since 1947 has persistently exhibited this disturbing trend as the record below would show:
In 1947 Kashmir War when the Indian Army was within striking distance of Muzaffarbad (now capital of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir) it was stopped in its winning momentum by Prime Minister Nehru for political reasons. Capture of Muzaffarbad would have ensured Indian control of the entire J & K State, prevented the strategic nexus between Pakistan and China and there would have been no Karakoram Highway.
In the 1965 War with Pakistan, the Indian Army captured the strategic Haji Pir – Poonch Bulge and the Kargil Heights. Prime Minister Shastri agreed to return these territories to Pakistan at the Tashkent Conference under Russian pressure.
In 1971 War after the historic “unconditional surrender” of 93,000 Pakistan Army troops, Indira Gandhi “unconditionally” agreed to return them to Pakistan. The 93,000 Pakistan Army prisoners held for over a year were a tremendous leverage that was available to India to extract a full settlement on Kashmir from Pakistan on India’s terms. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi frittered away the golden opportunity made possible by the Indian Army. This was in marked contrast to her boldness during the War. The difference seemingly being that at Simla in 1972 there was no strategic advice available to her as she was now surrounded by political advisers.
Today when Pakistan persists in her terrorism and proxy war against India, the Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh seems inclined to gift away to Pakistan, India’s hard-won victories in Siachen and the Saltoro Ridge especially which dominates Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and also Kashmir territory ceded by Pakistan illegally to China. This is despite strong strategic advice from the Indian Army and the Indian strategic community.
Once again the reasons for a possible sell out on Siachen are political and not strategic. The political reasons being pressure from USA to give some concessions to General Musharraf to shore up his regime and that the Indian Prime Minister is keen to carry some accord with him to make his visit to Pakistan a success.
Once again this highlights Indian political leaders’ proclivity to barter away hard-won military gains for political reasons.
India’s Political Leadership Must Recognize That India Has To “Stand Alone” To Protect Her National Security Interests
The 1971 India-Pakistan War leading to liberation of Bangladesh was conducted in the face of stiff opposition from the United States and China. Even Russian attitudes were lukewarm initially. They became permissive of India’s military offensive only when they got firm indication of a US-China quasi-strategic nexus emerging as a result of Henry Kissinger’s famous trip to China.
In the run up to this War, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi scurried around world capitals to enlist political support against Pakistan’s genocide and its resultant affects of millions of refugees streaming into India. No country came forward to restrain Pakistan.
The Indian Armed Forces snatched a spectacular military victory against such strong opposition from the United States and China, It was made possible by a strong, bold and audacious Indian military leadership conscious that the political leadership of the day had given them the autonomy and flexibility to execute their strategic end-objective without one hand tied politically.
As India today tries to establish strategic partnerships with the United States and China, one thing that needs to be factored into India’s strategic thinking, formulations and plans is that despite such strategic partnerships, when the chips are down in the future between India and Pakistan, both USA and China would side with Pakistan.
India’s trajectory towards a global power status would generate in its wake uncertainties in India’s strategic intentions and the consequent development of counter-pressure points against India by her partners. India has to develop a “GO ALONE” political and military strategy of a strong and self valiant military and strategic capability backed by a strong and resolute political leadership with a strategically ignited mind-set.
It is important that India while establishing strategic partnerships keeps the above in mind as part of its contingency planning.
Concluding Observations
India’s remarkable sustained economic growth can make her an economic superpower one day, like Japan and Germany. But economic strength alone cannot make India a global power whose strategic interests and sensitivity to them would be counted in world capitals.
To become a global power commensurate with her growing economic strength India’s political leaders would have to fortify themselves with resolute will, a strategic culture and a strategic mindset to play the global power games.
The global arena and its power games are filled with imponderables that are the stuff of history. If India’s political leadership wants to equip themselves adequately to be competent to lead India toward a global power status, they must patiently study Indian History and India’s Military History in post-Independence India and devote time to grasp the essentials of war, strategy, national power and national security.
The world respects power and India’s political leadership has yet to exhibit that they have grasped the essentials of power, as this paper’s contents would indicate.
(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:
[email protected])
INDIA’S FINEST HOUR – DECEMBER 16 1971: LESSONS FOR INDIA’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP